Factional Politics in an Indian State

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN UTTAR PRADESH



PAUL R. BRASS

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN AN INDIAN STATE

For Frank,
with warm
good wishes,
Paul Brass

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN AN INDIAN STATE

The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh

PAUL R. BRASS

AN AUTHORS GUILD BACKINPRINT.COM EDITION

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Published by iUniverse, Inc.

For information address:
iUniverse, Inc.
2021 Pine Lake Road, Suite 100
Lincoln, NE 68512
www.iuniverse.com

Originally published by The University of California Press

Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any Web addresses
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ISBN: 978-0-595-48245-8

Printed in the United States of America

For Linda

Preface

The field research for this study was carried out over a period of nearly seventeen months, between September, 1961, and January, 1963, in Uttar Pradesh. Throughout this time, I maintained a residence in Lucknow. From Lucknow, I made frequent field trips to the districts for two- and three-week periods. In addition, I made several trips to Delhi to interview members of Parliament (MPs) and to use the newspaper files of the All India Congress Committee Press Information Department. Before beginning the field work, I spent two months in London working on newspapers in the India Office Library.

Most of the material in this book is based upon personal interviews with more than 250 political leaders and other politically informed people in Uttar Pradesh. The majority of my interviews were with past and present officers of the District Congress Committees and with other prominent local Congressmen, with local opposition party leaders, with officers of local government and cooperative institutions, and with administrators, teachers, and journalists in the districts. I also visited several Block Development Office headquarters and spoke to the administrative officials at this level. I interviewed the panchayat presidents in some villages in Aligarh, Gonda, and Deoria districts. In Lucknow, I interviewed most of the senior ministers and ex-ministers in the state government, prominent state party leaders of the Congress and opposition parties, and many members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) from a number of districts in the state.

In addition to personal interviews, I benefited from first-hand observations of the 1962 General Election in Uttar Pradesh. I witnessed election meetings in Aligarh villages and in the mohallas of Kanpur City. I also worked in the election offices in five districts, copying out polling station statistics for the 1957 and 1962 elections. The election officers in all the districts were invariably helpful.

The third major source of information was newspaper reports. At the India Office Library in London, I used the back files of the *Leader* and the *Pioneer*. In Delhi, I used the excellent Press Information Department files of the All India Congress Committee on the Uttar Pradesh Congress. These files contained clippings from the major English and Hindi papers in India since 1946. I want to thank Mr. C. L. Sharma, who heads the Press Information Department, and his staff for permitting me to use the files for several weeks. During my stay in Uttar Pradesh, I kept my own clippings from the *Statesman* (Delhi), from the *National Herald*, and from *Aj*. In Kanpur, Mr. S. P. Mehra gave me access to the files of his newspaper, the *Citizen*. I also used the Kanpur supplement of the *Hindustan Times*; I owe thanks to Mr. T. V. Venkataraman for making the files available to me.

Other sources of information are mentioned in the study where appropriate.

In describing events in district politics, I have used two kinds of statements—those concerning the subjective perceptions of the politicians about political affairs and those which actually describe political events in the districts. I have tried to indicate in the footnotes whenever my descriptions of both subjective perceptions and of objective events are based upon interviews. In trying to construct a description of actual events in district politics, I was often faced with the problem of conflicting versions of reality. I have treated as "facts" those descriptions of events in district politics which I have been able to confirm from different kinds of sources (e.g., both newspaper reports and interviews), or those which opponents agree upon, or those which I have received from informed neutral observers. Unfortunately, it is not possible in many cases to give the identities of my informants.

My preparation for field work in India was begun in 1959 under the guidance of the members of the Committee on South Asian Studies at the University of Chicago. I was first attracted to Indian politics as a research field in course work with Dr. Myron Weiner. Dr. Weiner guided my research both at Chicago and in India. It was my good fortune to be in India while Dr. Weiner was there and so to be able to talk over my problems with him. I owe a special debt also to Miss Maureen Patterson, who was my first instructor in Hindi, my guide to library resources, and a personal friend.

Field research for the study was made possible by a Foreign Area Training Fellowship granted by the Ford Foundation. I am grateful to the Ford Foundation for their generous grant and to the staff of the Foundation for the sympathetic attention which they always gave to my requests.

Many people in Uttar Pradesh willingly gave me their time and their help. Dr. Trilokinath Srivastava, of the K. N. Government College, Gyan-

pur, introduced me to the intricacies of Uttar Pradesh politics in conversations in London. In Uttar Pradesh, I very often visited people uninvited and unexpected. I was always received with friendliness and hospitality. For reasons of propriety, it is not possible to thank those in politics and in government service who were helpful to me. However, I must thank those who aided my work by providing me both help and hospitality: Mr. Arthur Grice and S. P. Mehra in Kanpur; Anand Singh and the late Raghvendra Pratap Singh in Gonda; Nazir Hyder, of the Aligarh Muslim University; and Dr. Mohendra in Padrauna. I owe a great debt for help in many ways to Hayat Ahmad and to Zarina Bhatty.

I am grateful to those who read all or parts of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions and criticisms: Dr. Grant McConnell, Dr. Duncan MacRae, Jr., Maureen Patterson, Dr. Myron Weiner, Professor Fred G. Bailey, and Dr. Bernard S. Cohn. I benefited also from discussions in Professor Bailey's seminar at the University of Chicago. However, I am solely responsible for any errors and for the conclusions and interpretations presented.

The editors of the *Economic Weekly*, *Asian Survey*, and Dr. Myron Weiner, the editor of the book *Indian Voting Behaviour*, have kindly granted me permission to reproduce material verbatim or in revised form. The maps were drawn by Richard D. DePuma.

My greatest debt is to my wife, who read the manuscript piece by piece at all hours of the day and night, whenever I needed her support.

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

Fig. 1. The districts of Uttar Pradesh.

I.

Introduction

In the adaptation of modern institutions of representative government to traditional societies, political parties play the decisive role. In every modern polity, and in every polity which aspires to modernity, political parties are an indispensable link between the society and the institutions of government. In traditional societies undergoing modernization and political development, political parties have the double task of providing stable government and of bringing new groups of people into the political process while orienting them toward the political and economic goals of the modern state. The ability of former colonial countries to make a successful transition from foreign bureaucratic rule to democratic self-government depends very much upon the capacity of the political parties to perform these tasks.

The capacity of the ruling party in a new state to perform these tasks in turn depends upon how successful it is in the years after independence in transforming itself from a nationalist movement to an effective political party.[1] In the period of transformation, there is an inevitable process of disintegration. Ideological and communal differences which were submerged in the movement for independence develop into internal conflicts, leading to defections and splits. New conflicts develop over the distribution of positions of power and status in the new government. The ruling party is faced both with opposition from outside and conflict within the organization.

In some of the new states, the political parties have failed to check the

[1] This conception of the problems of transition from movement to party is based upon Myron Weiner's analysis of the stages of development of national movements in South Asia in *Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 12-16, and *Political Change in South Asia* (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963), pp. 36 ff.

processes of disintegration, have proved incapable of providing stable government, and have been replaced by military governments. Another common pattern of political development in the new states has been the emergence of one-party systems. In these cases, the leadership of the ruling parties have successfully checked the process of disintegration by prohibiting external competition and suppressing internal conflict. Few political parties in the new states have been able or willing to imitate the pattern established by the Indian National Congress. The Congress party in India has attempted to prevent the disintegration of its organization by competing with opposition parties for popular support and by managing internal conflict, rather than suppressing it.

This book is an analysis of the transition of the Congress organization in one Indian state, Uttar Pradesh, from a mass movement to an effective political party. It is a study of the processes of disintegration and integration in a modern political organization operating in a traditional society. It is an examination of the problem of the adjustment and adaptation of a modern political party to the traditional order.

Political parties which failed to make a successful transition from movement to party failed largely because they did not establish firm roots in the traditional societies. The ruling parties in the one-party states have been unwilling to compromise with traditional attitudes and loyalties in their eagerness to transform their societies. The Indian National Congress has adopted many measures which strike at the traditional order, including land reform and social reform measures, but the party organization has not taken upon itself the task of attempting to bring about a total and rapid transformation of values and attitudes in the traditional society. The Congress has chosen to make adjustments and accommodations, to interact with rather than transform the traditional order. In India, modernization is not a one-way process; political institutions modernize the society while the society traditionalizes institutions.

An important aspect of the transition of the Congress from movement to party has been the devolution of power from the center to the states. In the post-Independence period, the Congress increasingly has become a coalition of semi-autonomous state parties. Central control continues to be exercised, particularly in the arbitration of internal conflict, but conflict and controversy in state politics center around state issues and state personalities.

Within the states, there is an interaction between state politics and politics in the districts. As the Indian National Congress is a coalition of state parties, the state parties are themselves coalitions of semi-independent district party organizations. It is in the districts that the Congress organizations

interact with the traditional societies. In the districts, the forces of disintegration are most directly felt.

The working of the Congress organization in Uttar Pradesh will be studied at the state and district levels because the two levels of organization are integrated in important ways. However, the main concern of the study is with the effectiveness of the local, district Congress organizations in organizing popular support and in maintaining internal unity. Five districts have been selected for case studies. Each district has been selected because it represents in a very distinct way a particular kind of problem with which the Congress must deal and a particular kind of environment in which the Congress must operate. Each district is untypical of the state as a whole because no single district can be typical in a state so large and so diverse, but each district is typical of a regional kind of environment or a problem which is statewide in scope.[2]

The general argument of the book can be stated briefly. The problem of maintaining internal unity has been a much more serious concern for the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh than the organization of popular support. Like most political parties in India, the Congress party organizations in Uttar Pradesh are riven by factional conflicts. In fact, the faction is the basic unit of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh. Yet the Congress has not split apart or become so disorganized as to be unable to provide stable government in the state. The ability of the Congress organization to maintain itself despite incessant factional struggle has much to do with the character of the factions themselves. The factional structure of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh reflects the adaptation of the organization to the traditional society, for the faction belongs to the traditional order. The Congress, the agent of modernization in rural Uttar Pradesh, has become traditionalized. The traditionalization of the Congress organization does not mean that it does not perform a modernizing function in the society. Rather, there is a two-way interaction; the Congress performs its modernizing role through traditional social organization, the faction, which in turn adapts itself to modern party organization. In this two-way interaction, both the modern party organization and the traditional society are undergoing change.

The role of factions in the Congress party organization is thus not disruptive only. Factions perform both integrative and disintegrative functions for the Congress party organization in Uttar Pradesh. The dual role of factions and factional conflict will be demonstrated in the case studies.

Although the maintenance of internal unity is the primary concern of the Congress organization in Uttar Pradesh, the party must also organize

[2] The districts selected are described at the end of chap. iii. For the location of the districts, see fig. 4.

popular support. The ability of the Congress to organize popular support and to compete successfully with opposition parties will be analyzed in each district. In each of the districts selected for detailed study, opposition to the Congress takes different forms. In Gonda, opposition comes from Swatantra and the Jan Sangh; in Deoria, from the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the Socialists; in Kanpur, from the Communists; in Aligarh, from the Republicans; and, in Meerut, from independents. The variety of opposition parties which the Congress must face in these five districts is a measure of the diversity of the social and political environment in Uttar Pradesh. The fact that all the major opposition parties in Uttar Pradesh are represented in these districts makes it possible to examine the capacity of the Congress organization to compete with political parties which have different ideologies and social bases.

II.

Uttar Pradesh: History, Economy, People, and Politics

THE ENVIRONMENT

Area and Population

The area of Uttar Pradesh is 113,654 square miles,[1] almost exactly that of the state of Arizona. The population, according to the 1961 census, was close to 74,000,000 [2]—a figure surpassed only by the largest and most populous countries of the world. In parts of the state, the land has passed beyond the point of population saturation—rural densities exceeding 1,000 persons per square mile in many districts—and yet the growth rate continues to increase. The decade from 1911 to 1921 saw the last population decline in this state. Since 1921, the population has increased decennially by 6.7, 13.6, 11.8, and, in the last decade, by 16.7 percent.[3]

The population of the state is overwhelmingly rural. Only 12.9 percent of the population of Uttar Pradesh live in urban areas.[4]

However, the urban population is unimpressive only relative to the total population of the state. The 1961 census lists no less than 244 cities and towns with a combined population of approximately 9.5 million people. Even excluding most of the small towns, which lack real urban characteristics, there are 17 cities with a population over 100,000, 7 containing more than a quarter of a million people, and 3 exceeding half a million.[5]

Administratively, Uttar Pradesh is divided into 54 districts, ranging in

[1] *Census of India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1962: Final Population Totals*, p. 348.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 349 and *Census of India, 1951*, Vol. II: *Uttar Pradesh*, by Rajeshwari Prasad, Pt. 1-A (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1953), p. 25.
[4] *Census of India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1962, op. cit.*, p. 349.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 236-244.

area from under 1,000 to over 4,000 square miles and in population from 100,000 to 2,700,000. Rural population densities range from 41 in the hill district of Uttar Kashi to 1138 persons per square mile in Deoria district. All districts, even those with large urban centers, are predominantly rural; only Lucknow district is nearly evenly balanced between urban and rural areas. Literacy varies from under 10 percent in Budaun district to close to 40 percent in Dehra Dun.[6]

Geographic and historical regions

In broad terms, there are three major geographical areas in Uttar Pradesh: the northern mountains, the central plain, and the southern hills. Most of the area and population of the state are concentrated in the plains—close to 70 percent of the area and 90 percent of the population.

The northern mountain area, Kumaon, forms the central part of the central Himalayan range, with Himachal Pradesh on the west, Tibet on the north, and Nepal on the east. Peaks vary from 5,000 to 8,000 feet in the foothills to over 25,000 feet in the northern mountain range. The physical geography of Kumaon sharply separates it from the plains below, but the sacred geography unites the area with the plains. The area has been for long an important place of pilgrimage for Hindus of the plains, for it contains the headwaters of the Ganges. In modern times, the hill stations of the region have become resort areas for the people of the plains during the months of May and June. The region contains nomadic tribes who trade across the borders with Nepal and Tibet. However, Kumaon is overwhelmingly Hindu; the entire region is dominated numerically, economically, and politically by Brahmans and Rajputs, many of them originally immigrants from the plains. The region has been the area in Uttar Pradesh least affected by Islam; only in Dehra Dun and in the *tarai*[7] portion of Naini Tal district are there many Muslims.

The northern mountains are an area for religious pilgrimage and a haven from the heat of the summer. The southern hill and plateau districts, in contrast, contain no important places of pilgrimage and have the most unattractive climate in the state. In the pockets among the low hills, temperatures rise to extremes of 115° to 120° in the hot months. The region is a rocky area where agriculture is difficult and population is sparse. There are five hill districts—Mirzapur on the southeastern tip of the state and Jhansi, Jalaun, Hamirpur, and Banda on the southwest. The four southwest districts belong to the region of Bundelkhand, the greater part of which lies in Madhya Pradesh. The whole area lies on the fringe of the Vindhyan mountain range which separates north India from the Deccan. With only

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 348-351.

[7] The tract of marshy and jungly land between the Himalayas and the plains.

rare exceptions in India's imperial ages, Bundelkhand has been largely a battleground among petty local chiefs or between northern and southern empire-builders. The region takes its name from the Bundelas, a Rajput clan which rose to prominence here between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries.

All of the central plains area of Uttar Pradesh forms part of the Gangetic basin, but there are some important geographic differences within the area. Spate divides the area into two portions—the Upper Ganges Plain, comprising all of the western and central plains districts, and the Middle Ganges Plain, which is made up of the eastern districts of the state and is more like the plain of Bihar.[8] However, another division is possible, which considers both geographic and historical differences. Following Crooke, the plains can be divided into a southern and northern portion—the Ganges-Jumna Doab on the south and the area between the Ganges and the Nepal *tarai* on the north.[9]

Spate has pointed out the great significance of the Doab and particularly of the Delhi-Agra axis in Indian history, the latter an area of warfare where empires have been founded and destroyed.[10] Three of the state's five great cities are located in the Doab, each representing a different civilization. Agra, in the northern part of the Doab, was the capital of the Mughal Empire during its greatest period; Kanpur, further down, a modern industrial city, was created by British entrepreneurs in the late nineteenth century; finally, Allahabad, at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna, is the oldest city of the three and one of the most sacred of Hindu cities. In terms of physical geography, the area has a light rainfall, is irrigated by the canal systems of the Ganges and Jumna rivers, and is primarily a wheat-growing area, with sugar an important cash crop in the northern districts.

The northern plains area must be further subdivided into four parts: Rohilkhand, Oudh, Gorakhpur, and Benares. Rohilkhand includes seven districts in the west—Bijnor, Moradabad, Rampur, Budaun, Bareilly, Pilibhit, and Shahjahanpur. The region takes its name from the Rohilla Afghans who rose to dominance here in the eighteenth century. Rohilkhand has the heaviest concentration of Muslims in the state; in three of the districts, the proportion of Muslims is over a third of the total population. Rampur district remained an autonomous Muslim princely state until 1949. The region contains no important cities, but Bareilly has a population of over a quarter of a million and three other towns—Moradabad, Rampur, and Shahjahanpur—have populations over 100,000.

[8] O. H. K. Spate, *India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography* (2d ed., London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1957), pp. 495-521.

[9] W. Crooke, *The North-Western Provinces of India: Their History, Ethnology, and Administration* (London: Methuen and Co., 1897), pp. 27 ff.

[10] Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

Oudh, the central portion of the northern plains tract, contains twelve districts—all, except Gonda and Bahraich, on the southern side of the great Ghagra river. Oudh is the area in Uttar Pradesh with the longest historical identity. The borders of Oudh have fluctuated throughout its history, the twelve districts being the last to be annexed by the British in 1856. Oudh was an important province under both the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire. The annexation of Oudh in 1856 and the land settlement which antagonized the *talukdars* were among the most important causes of the spread of the Mutiny of 1857. Lucknow, the last capital of Oudh, is now the capital of Uttar Pradesh. Agriculturally, the twelve districts are transitional from the western wheat-growing area to the eastern rice-growing region.

Finally, on the eastern borders of the state are the predominantly rice-growing regions of Gorakpur and Banaras, part of the Middle Ganges Plain which merges into Bihar. The Gorakhpur region was sometimes part of Oudh, sometimes part of the old province of Bihar under the Mughal Empire. The Benares region has more historical individuality. Jaunpur, in this area, was the seat of an independent Muslim kingdom which challenged the authority of the Delhi Sultanate in the fourteenth century. Later, the area became part of Oudh; but, by the time of the British arrival, the Raja of Banaras had become effectively independent of Oudh. The city of Banaras is the most important center of Hindu pilgrimage for all of India.

Uttar Pradesh is largely a collection of geographic and historical regions. Yet, for the most part, the differences between regions are shadings rather than sharp breaks. Moreover, the borders of the state are in hardly any respects natural. On all sides, Uttar Pradesh merges into the physical and cultural environment of its neighboring states and countries. Kumaon merges into the central mountain belt, Bundelkhand into Madhya Pradesh, the eastern districts into the plain of Bihar. Even the northern boundary of the state is artificial, for there is *tarai* on both sides of the Nepal border. The Jumna forms a natural boundary between Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab in the northern districts of the Upper Doab, but the same river cuts the districts of Mathura and Agra in half. The desert of Rajasthan encroaches on the tip of Agra district.

Historical: The formation of Uttar Pradesh

The boundaries of present-day Uttar Pradesh (with the exception of the states of Tehri Garhwal and Rampur) were formed by the British gradually, by conquest and annexation, over a period of 76 years (fig. 2). British influence was firmly established in the area as early as 1764, when the forces of the Nawab of Oudh were defeated at Baksar. However, the British did not begin to acquire formal sovereignty over any of the territory of the

Nawab until 1775, when they forced the cession of the province of Banaras. For a time, the British remained content to consolidate their power in north India, using Oudh as a buffer state against the Marathas, Sikhs, Jats, and Afghans, whose forces were active to the west and northwest.

The period of greatest territorial acquisition by the British in the area

Fig. 2. The formation of Uttar Pradesh.

of Uttar Pradesh occurred in the first years of the nineteenth century, during the governor-generalship of Wellesley. Wellesley ended the policy of using Oudh as a buffer state and forced the cession from the Nawab of the Gorakhpur region in the east and the lower Doab and Rohilkhand on the south and northwest. Oudh was thus reduced to an enclave surrounded

and "protected" by the British on all sides except the north, where the Himalayas separated Oudh from Nepal. The acquisition of the lower Doab and Rohilkhand brought the British in direct confrontation with the Maratha chiefs, Sindhia and the Peshwa. The Anglo-Maratha War of 1803 brought the Upper Doab into British possession; in the same year, the British acquired most of Bundelkhand from the Peshwa by treaty.

Kumaon, except for Tehri Garhwal, was added to the British domain after the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1815. The three enclaves of Jalaun, Lalitpur, and Jhansi in Bundelkhand were acquired by the doctrine of "lapse," in the case of Jalaun and Jhansi, and by treaty with Sindhia in the case of Lalitpur. Finally, in 1856, the remainder of the old province of Oudh was annexed.

Until 1834, the territories acquired by the British in North India were administered from Calcutta. For a brief period, from 1834 to 1836, the new territories, with the exception of the Banaras region, were raised to the status of a separate presidency, with headquarters at Allahabad. However, in 1836, partly for reasons of economy and partly as a result of a struggle for control over the patronage of the new province, the administration of the area was reorganized. The new provinces were reunited with the Bengal Presidency, were renamed the North-Western Provinces, and were put under the administration of a lieutenant-governor.[11] In other words, the status of the North-Western Provinces remained inferior to that of the established presidencies of Bombay, Madras, and Bengal. In 1856, Oudh was added to the North-Western Provinces, but was administered separately by a chief commissioner. In 1877, the separate chief commissionership was given up and the region came under the direct administration of the lieutenant-governor. In 1902, the integration of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh was formalized and the two provinces were renamed the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The state was given its present name, Uttar Pradesh (which means "northern province"), after independence was achieved. In 1949, the two princely states of Tehri Garhwal and Rampur were integrated with the provincial government.

The Land

Zamindars and Talukdars.—The gradual process of acquisition by the British of the United Provinces, and the continual changes in administrative structure which were introduced, made for considerable diversity in administration. This diversity was particularly marked in the area of land

[11] The struggle for control of the patronage of the new territories among the officers of the East India Company and the reasons for the changes in the administrative structure in this period have been analyzed in Dharma Bhanu, *History and Administration of the North-Western Provinces (Subsequently Called the Agra Province), 1803-1858* (Agra: Shiva Lal Agarwala and Co. Private Ltd., 1957), chaps. iv and v.

settlement and revenue administration. It is often difficult to tell to what extent differences in administration from region to region grew out of differences in the local patterns of land rights or out of differences in the approach of British administrators to various proprietary classes. Moreover, it was some time before the British fully understood the complexity and variety of Indian land tenure systems.[12]

It would be out of place to discuss all the variations in land rights and in the land settlements which were made in the United Provinces. One distinction is, however, of considerable political importance, that is, between the *mahalvari* settlement in the North-Western Provinces and the *talukdari* settlement in Oudh.

Under the *mahalvari* system, the local village authorities or *zamindars* (of one or more or parts of one or more villages) were recognized as the landlords of their *mahals* or estates and paid the land revenue directly to the state. Under the *talukdari* system, the local village authorities were generally ignored and the *talukdar*, who was responsible for the collection of revenue usually from a number of villages, was recognized as the landlord of an entire *taluk* (revenue collection area). Both the *zamindar* and the *talukdar* were intermediaries between the cultivator and the state, although the smaller *zamindars* might cultivate some land of their own. In the North-Western Provinces, the *talukdars* were generally eliminated from the revenue administration. In Oudh, the *talukdars* were recognized as the sole proprietors and the *zamindars* were reduced to the status of tenants generally. In the North-Western Provinces, the settlement was overwhelmingly with the *zamindars*; in Oudh, the settlement was predominantly with the *talukdars*. That is, in the North-Western Provinces, no important *talukdars* retained effective control over their *talukas*; in Oudh, however, some *zamindars* became landlords. In the North-Western Provinces, the *zamindars* might be single owners of estates or coparcenary holders of estates. Some of the *zamindars* owned estates as large as those of the *talukdars* of Oudh.[13] In each district, there were several thousand *zamindars*. In the whole of Oudh immediately after the *talukdari* settlement, there were only 256 *talukdars*.[14]

These two patterns of land settlement represented two different forms of political as well as economic control. In the North-Western Provinces, the system of joint *zamindari* proprietorship tended to preserve or reinforce the

[12] Walter C. Neale, *Economic Change in Rural India: Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar Pradesh, 1800-1955* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 56.

[13] A full description of the land settlements in Uttar Pradesh can be found *ibid.* Some of the definitions in this section have been taken from Neale's useful glossary.

[14] Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, *The Taluqdari Settlement in Oudh* (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1882), p. 146.

economic and political dominance of lineage groups of proprietors.[15] The result is that, in most villages in the joint *zamindari* areas of Uttar Pradesh, a "dominant caste" controlled the land and dominated political life. Where a single *zamindar* collected the revenue or in the *talukdari* areas in Oudh, an entirely different kind of local structure of political dominance developed. The big *zamindar* or *talukdar* retained some of the attributes of a petty local chief. He acted not merely as a tax collector, but as a judge and a policeman, a dispenser of loans and a giver of gifts. In all these roles, except that of tax collecting, the large landed proprietor acted independently of the local official administration, although not necessarily or usually in conflict with it. Village political life was controlled by the large landed proprietor through his under-proprietors or revenue agents, some of whom had under-proprietary rights, while others were economically dependent upon the proprietor.

Zamindari abolition.—The entire system of intermediaries was abolished by the Congress government of Uttar Pradesh in July, 1952, under the terms of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Under the Act, the state collects the revenue directly from the tenants. The tenants acquired the right to purchase from the state full rights of ownership to their land by paying a fee ten times the amount of their annual land revenue. A uniform pattern of land tenure was established throughout the state (except in the hill districts). There were now only two main classes of landholders—*bhumidhars* and *sirdars*. *Bhumidhars* were those who acquired full rights of ownership to their land (and a 50 percent reduction in their land revenue) by paying 10 times their land revenue to the state. *Sirdars* were those who did not make this payment; *sirdars* acquired all rights of ownership except the right to transfer their property.

Several observers have noted that *zamindari* abolition changed very little either in the agrarian structure or the pattern of political dominance in Uttar Pradesh. Since the *zamindars* were entitled to retain both grovelands and lands, known as *sir* and *khudkhasht*, which they cultivated themselves or which they traditionally managed directly, few of the *zamindars* were actually dispossessed. Only 6 percent of the over 2,000,000 proprietors in Uttar Pradesh held no *sir* or *khudkhasht* land;[16] these were mainly absentee landlords. Most of the *zamindars* were small-holders, but it was not uncommon for the bigger *zamindars* and *talukdars* to retain a thousand or two thousand acres of land by this provision. Moreover, those who became *bhumidhars* after *zamindari* abolition were mostly ex-*zamindars*.[17]

[15] McKim Marriott, "Little Communities in an Indigenous Civilization" in McKim Marriott, ed., *Village India: Studies in the Little Community* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 185.

[16] Neale, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

In general, the absentee landlords and the big *zamindars* and *talukdars* were hurt most by the provisions of the Act, but because some were hurt does not mean that others gained. In effect, *zamindari* abolition merely confirmed all actual cultivators—whether *zamindars* or tenants—in the possession of their lands on a new legal basis.[18] The benefits to the holders of new legal titles were mainly psychological.[19]

Peter Reeves has shown how little was changed politically and socially by the Act. In villages where absentee landlords owned the land, "those who traditionally held sway, the high-caste tenant groups, continue to do so, while in the villages . . . where the zamindari body has remained in residence it has retained power or has conceded it only to the next-highest landholding group." [20] The bigger *zamindars* and *talukdars* retained their personal landholdings and their traditional influence over the political and social life of the villages formerly under their control.

Land ceilings.—In 1960, the Uttar Pradesh government passed another measure of "land reform." The Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act imposed a forty-acre limit on land holdings in the state. The Act was designed both "to provide land for landless agricultural labourers" and to bring about "a more equitable distribution of land." [21] Neither of these aims is likely to be achieved in any significant measure. A forty-acre ceiling, even if rigidly applied to all kinds of land, provides little surplus land in Uttar Pradesh; only 1.3 percent of the cultivated area would become surplus.[22] In fact, even less than this amount of land will become available under the Act, since grovelands and cooperative farms are excluded from the limit. Large landholders with foresight have for some time been preparing for this Act by converting their lands into mango, guava, and jack-fruit groves and by forming "cooperative farms" managed by their dependents. Finally, the ceiling applies to individuals, not to families, so that ex-*zamindars* with large families may still retain a substantial portion of their lands under foodgrains.

The Economy

In terms of per capita output, Uttar Pradesh is a region of agricultural stagnation and industrial decline.[23] In other words, although there has been

[18] P. D. Reeves, "Zamindari Abolition in Uttar Pradesh: An Investigation Into its Social Effects" (n.d.). (Mimeographed.)

[19] Neale, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

[20] Reeves, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[21] The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.

[22] Baljit Singh, *Next Step in Village India: A Study of Land Reforms and Group Dynamics* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 85.

[23] Government of Uttar Pradesh, Planning Department, *Third Five Year Plan*, Vol. I: *Report* (Lucknow, 1961), p. 6.

some increase in both agricultural and industrial output in this state in recent years, "the rate of development has not been faster than the rate of growth of population." [24] Per capita income in Uttar Pradesh for urban and rural areas combined increased slightly from Rs. 260 in 1950-1951 to Rs. 269 in 1960-1961.[25] However, rural income per capita declined from Rs. 198 in 1949-1950 to Rs. 193 in 1958-1959.[26] The Five Year Plans in Uttar Pradesh have not been able to alter this condition of economic stagnation, largely because of inadequate investment.[27] The Third Five Year Plan offers no hope of improvement, unless there is a radical change in the rate of investment, public and private; the Plan itself provides for a very low per capita investment.[28]

Agriculture.—Aside from the basic and underlying problem of lack of capital, agriculture in Uttar Pradesh suffers from two other difficulties—backward agricultural technology and uneconomic holdings.[29] Technologically, agriculture in Uttar Pradesh (as elsewhere in India), suffers from problems of soil erosion, lack of fertilizers, lack of adequate irrigation facilities, poor quality seeds, inefficient agricultural implements, and so on. To help in the solution of these problems, a vast program of national extension and community development has been in operation for the last decade and a half. Most of the villages in Uttar Pradesh are now included in community development blocks.

The problem of uneconomic holdings has been worse in Uttar Pradesh than elsewhere in India. Close to 56 percent of the holdings in Uttar Pradesh, according to a 1949 report, were under 2 acres; 81 percent of the holdings were under 5 acres and 94 percent were under 10 acres.[30] Only 6 percent of the population had holdings above the minimum which the Zamindari Abolition Committee considered to be an economic holding.[31] Recent surveys indicate that the holdings problem is as acute as ever.[32] Under such conditions, it is not surprising that the ex-*zamindars* who have been able to retain even 40 or 50 acres of land are able to maintain their economic and political dominance in village life.

The eastern districts.—Uttar Pradesh's agricultural problems are most

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[26] Baljit Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 38, citing Government of Uttar Pradesh, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (January, 1960), p. 128.
[27] Government of Uttar Pradesh, *Third Five Year Plan*, I, 6-9.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
[29] Neale, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-154.
[30] *Report of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee* (2nd ed.; New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1951), p. 14.
[31] *Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1948), I, 24.
[32] Baljit Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

pronounced in the eastern districts of the state. Here, population densities are over 1,000 persons per square mile, land holdings are extremely small,[33] and the resource base is very narrow. There are fewer industries here than in the west and much less urbanization; only three of the seventeen cities of Uttar Pradesh with a population over 100,000 are in this region—Allahabad, Banaras, and Gorakhpur. Unemployment is acute; villagers from the eastern districts go as far as Calcutta and Bombay for work. Heavy floods are an annual occurrence in much of the area and famine conditions are common.

Industry.—Large-scale industrialization offers little prospect for the foreseeable future in Uttar Pradesh of relieving the pressure on the land. Few new large industries have been established in Uttar Pradesh under the plans and those that have been established employ an insignificant number of people. In recent years, the Uttar Pradesh government has turned increasingly to industrial estates of medium- and small-scale industries to provide employment for those displaced from the land. Seventeen new urban industrial estates and twenty-three rural industrial estates have been planned for completion in the Third Five Year Plan;[34] the largest of these estates will provide employment for eight to ten thousand people.[35]

Two industries of long standing provide the major portion of this state's industrial base: the Kanpur textile industry and the statewide sugar refining industry. Neither industry is capable of much further expansion in Uttar Pradesh. Employment in the Kanpur textile industry long ago reached its peak; in 1953, it stood at 51,084.[36] In the last decade, employers engaged in retrenchment and rationalization so that employment is probably slightly less now. The sugar refining industry, with 70 factories spread over the state, employed 55,121 people in 1961.[37] Total factory employment in Uttar Pradesh in 1960 for all industries was only 314,454.[38]

The political implication of these economic conditions is that Uttar Pradesh is *not* a society which is experiencing the disruptive impact of rapid economic change. There is no doubt that economic change is taking place, but it is not the kind of change which is leading, in the short run at least, to new economic bases for political conflict.

[33] For example, in Basti district, the Zamindari Abolition Committee reported that 51 percent of the cultivating population of the district held less than one acre of land, in *Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee, op. cit.*, I, 25.

[34] Government of Uttar Pradesh, *Third Five Year Plan*, I, 34.

[35] *Development of Industries in Uttar Pradesh (Progress Review), 1961-62* (Kanpur: Directorate of Industries, n.d.), p. 36.

[36] D. N. Majumdar, *Social Contours of an Industrial City: Social Survey of Kanpur, 1954-56* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 51.

[37] *Development of Industries in Uttar Pradesh, op. cit.*, p. 186.

[38] Government of Uttar Pradesh, Department of Labour, *Annual Review of Activities 1961* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1962), p. 93 n.

Caste and community

The population of Uttar Pradesh is divided into two large religious communities, Hindus and Muslims, each of which is in turn divided into many castes and thousands of "subdivisions" of castes. The 1891 census, the most comprehensive caste census for Uttar Pradesh, lists some 54,710 so-called "subcastes" of Hindus and Muslims in Uttar Pradesh.[39] The subcaste is often the effective local caste unit, which may be confined to a few villages or to a tahsil[40] or a district. Above these local units are the broader groups of castes, such as Brahmans or Rajputs. The broad caste group is the conventional "caste," but the local units do not necessarily identify with or are even necessarily aware of the existence of most of the other local units who form a caste group. This kind of identification with a larger caste group is, however, one which has been developing over the last hundred years with improved communications, with the formation of caste associations, and with the introduction of democratic politics. Politically, the subcastes tend to decrease in importance and the caste groups to increase in importance at higher levels in the political system.

The 1891 census lists 240 caste groups, of which 155 are Hindu and 85 are Muslim.[41] These figures still include many very small castes confined to small areas of the state. The 1931 census listed 14 large caste groups, which accounted for 62 percent of the population of both Hindus and Muslims.[42] For purposes of this study, only a few of the larger or more important castes need to be mentioned. It is convenient to divide the Hindu caste population into three overlapping categories—the agricultural castes, the professional castes, and the urban trading castes. This classification omits the vast numbers of artisan and specialist castes, who have little political importance at present. Muslims will be treated separately.

The agricultural castes must be further subdivided into the traditional landowning castes, the cultivating castes, and the castes which provide field laborers. Among the traditional landowning castes, the Thakurs and Rajputs are by far the most important. Before *zamindari* abolition, Rajputs and Thakurs owned the largest share of the land in most of the districts in Uttar Pradesh; in Oudh, Rajputs were the most prominent *talukdars* and owned more than 50 percent of the land in most districts. Rajputs and Thakurs

[39] *Census of India, 1891*, Vol. XVIII: *The North-Western Provinces and Oudh*, by D. C. Baillie, Pt. III (Allahabad: North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Press, 1894), p. iii.

[40] A tahsil is a subdivision of a district.

[41] *Census of India, 1891, loc. cit.*

[42] *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. XVIII: *United Provinces of Agra and Oudh*, by A. C. Turner, Pt. I (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1933), p. 535.

are associated with the traditional Kshatriya class, the ruling class in the classic Hindu social order. Many of the Rajput clans trace their origins to Rajputana, from where they migrated partly in search of territory and partly as a result of the Muslim invasions from the seventh century onward.

After the Thakurs, the Brahman castes have been the leading proprietary castes in Uttar Pradesh. In many districts before *zamindari* abolition, Brahman castes took second place behind the Thakurs as landowners, although Brahmans were only rarely the leading proprietors in a district. Conventionally, Brahmans are the priestly castes and the learned castes, but most Brahman castes have direct ties with the land.

Thakurs and Brahmans were important landowners in most areas of Uttar Pradesh. Three other important landowning castes have a regional distribution only—the Jats and Tyagis in the western districts of the state and the Bhuinhars in the eastern districts. The Jats and Bhuinhars are examples of the way in which Uttar Pradesh tends to merge into its neighboring states, for the Jats are the characteristic peasant-owner caste of the Punjab, whereas the Bhuinhars belong more to Bihar. The Tyagis are a localized caste, important in a few districts in northwestern Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab.

All of the landowning castes mentioned above have also been traditionally cultivating castes, in the sense that most of their members actually work on the land or have personal farms cultivated by laborers under their supervision. Thakurs and Brahmans have the reputation of being poor cultivators, but they held as tenants before *zamindari* abolition the major portion of the land in Uttar Pradesh. The dominance of Thakurs and Brahmans in the countryside thus had a double support; they were both proprietors and cultivators of the land. Bhuinhars, Tyagis, and Jats also cultivated land; only the Jats, however, have the reputation of being industrious and efficient cultivators.

The major cultivating castes, that is, those who cultivated the land as tenants but were not prominent landowners, are castes such as the Kurmis, Ahirs and Ahars, Lodhas, Gujars, and Gadariyas. Three of these castes, the Ahirs and Ahars, Gujars, and Gadariyas, are traditionally graziers, but most of the members of these castes are cultivators. Ahirs and Kurmis are both fairly widespread castes in Uttar Pradesh, but the main concentrations of these two castes are in Oudh, in the eastern districts, and in Bihar. The Lodhas and Gadariyas are smaller castes, but also have a broad distribution; the Gujars are confined largely to the western districts of Uttar Pradesh.

The laboring castes include castes like the Chamars, Pasis, and Koris. Of these, the most important are the Chamars, who are also associated traditionally with leather-working. Chamars form the largest single caste

group in Uttar Pradesh, accounting for close to 13 percent of the total population of the state,[42] distributed in all districts except in the Kumaon hills.

There is an approximate correlation in the countryside between the status of a particular caste and its relation to the land. Here, the local caste unit again becomes decisive, for caste hierarchies change from place to place. However, broadly speaking, Brahman and Rajput castes tend to be elite castes. The status of the other landowning castes—Bhuinhars, Tyagis, and Jats—is also high in the local environment. The cultivating castes generally are of middle rank, corresponding to their economic position. Near the bottom in social status are the Chamars. However, the Chamar castes generally are in a process of upward mobility:[44] many have adopted a new name, Jatavs, and would be insulted if they were called by their old name, which is now considered demeaning.

The professional and trading castes are largely urban castes, with the exception of the Brahman priestly class which exists both in the countryside and in the cities. Another professional, predominantly urban caste is the Kayastha caste. Kayasthas were traditionally scribes and officials under the Mughals, but now, along with the Brahmans, they comprise the bulk of the lawyers, doctors, and teachers in the cities and towns. The trading castes include primarily the Vaishya or Bania castes, Agarwalas and Guptas, and the Khatris.

Numerically, the largest caste groups are the Chamars (12.7 percent), followed by the Brahmans (9.2 percent), Ahirs (7.8 percent), Rajputs (7.6 percent), and Kurmis (3.5 percent).[45] All the other castes mentioned above form only 2 or 3 percent or less of the total population of the state.

Muslims.—A similar division into castes could be made for Muslims, but it is not necessary to go into the details of Muslim caste for purposes of this study. The two important features of the Muslim population of Uttar Pradesh which should be pointed out, however, are the dispersion of Muslims throughout the state, on the one hand, and the relative concentration of Muslims in the cities and towns, on the other.

Muslims form approximately 15 percent of the total population of the state. In no district in Uttar Pradesh do Muslims form a majority of the population. The heaviest concentration of Muslims is in a broad northern band of districts, including the Upper Doab, Rohilkhand, and northern Oudh. In these northern districts, the proportion of Muslims is above their proportion in the population of the state as a whole, that is, from 15 percent

[42] *Ibid.*

[44] See Bernard S. Cohn, "The Changing Status of a Depressed Caste," in Marriott, ed., *Village India*, pp. 53-77.

[45] *Census of India, 1931, loc. cit.*

to nearly 50 percent in Rampur district. Altogether there are 20 districts in this northern belt and there is one other district, Agra, which is not in the belt but falls in the same Muslim population range. In the southern portion of the state, the proportion of Muslims ranges from 5 to 15 percent; ten districts have a Muslim population above 10 percent and 14 districts have a Muslim population between 5 and 10 percent. Only in Kumaon is the Muslim population negligible.

Like Hindus, most Muslims in Uttar Pradesh live in rural areas. However, the proportion of Muslims who live in the cities and towns is much higher than the proportion of Hindus—over 30 percent for Muslims and only 9 percent for Hindus. According to the 1941 census, close to 40 percent of the urban population of Uttar Pradesh was Muslim.[48] In Rohilkhand and western Oudh, almost all the principal cities have Muslim majorities; these include four of the 100,000-population cities of Uttar Pradesh—Moradabad, Saharanpur, Rampur, and Shahjahanpur. All other major cities and towns in the plains districts have large Muslim minorities, generally from 20 percent to 50 percent of the population. This concentration of Muslims in the cities and towns has been of great political importance in Uttar Pradesh. It has been in the cities and towns where the Hindu-Muslim communal riots have generally taken place. The towns are the centers of politics for Muslims even more than for Hindus. In the rural areas, the Muslim population is dispersed and politically ineffective. In the towns, many constituencies are completely dominated by Muslims.

In general, the demography of Uttar Pradesh reveals a tremendous diversity of peoples. This diversity is in addition to the geographical, historical, and economic diversities which exist in this state. That is, the various elements in the physical and social environment of Uttar Pradesh do not always reinforce each other. Geography and history divide the state in one way, the agricultural economy divides it in another way, and patterns of population settlement divide it in still other ways. The political significance of this kind of diversity is that there are no regional identifications within the state. Diversity is spread evenly throughout Uttar Pradesh: this is the most important environmental factor in Uttar Pradesh politics.

MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY

From the Mutiny to Non-Cooperation

The period between the Mutiny of 1857 and the first Congress Non-Cooperation movement of 1921 is of extraordinary importance in modern Indian history. It was during this period that English education began to

[48] *Census of India, 1941*, Vol. V: *United Provinces*, by B. Sahay (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1942), p. 56.

flourish in Indian universities, that movements of social reform and religious revival developed, that new political institutions were introduced into India, and that the Indian National Congress was formed. The cultural, intellectual, and political life of north India in this period has been neglected by historians of modern India, partly because north India occupied a secondary role in the intellectual and political life of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, compared to Bengal and Bombay. Yet the roots of many developments in twentieth-century Indian politics lie not in nineteenth-century Calcutta and Bombay, but in nineteenth-century Banaras, Allahabad, and Aligarh.

Nineteenth-century Banaras, Allahabad, and Aligarh represented the three different cultures which existed in modern India. Banaras, the traditional home of Hindu orthodoxy, became the center of Hindu religious revival under the leadership of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. Malaviya's revivalism led almost inevitably to communal conflict, for in nineteenth-century Uttar Pradesh, there remained many vestiges of Muslim dominance in the life of the province. Thus, to support the Hindi language, Malaviya had to attack Urdu; Malaviya led the movement in Uttar Pradesh, which began in 1883, to change the court character from Persian to Devanagari, essentially a change from Urdu to Hindi.[47] Malaviya is best known as the father of the Banaras Hindu University. He was also a prominent leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, which gave organizational form to the politics of Hindu communalism, and presided over the 1923 session of the Mahasabha in Banaras.

In this same period, Muslim communal politics began to take form after the founding of the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875, under the leadership of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Although Sir Syed joined in pre-Congress nationalist politics,[48] by the time of the formation of the Indian National Congress, his attitude toward nationalist politics had undergone a change. In a statement in 1888, Sir Syed gave his objection to the Indian National Congress and "to every Congress in any shape or form whatever which regards India as one nation."[49] The Anglo-Oriental College later became the Aligarh Muslim University and the training ground of Muslim League leaders.

If Hindu communalism in Uttar Pradesh was born in Banaras and Muslim communalism at Aligarh, the secular tradition in Uttar Pradesh politics has its origins in Allahabad. Allahabad was, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the capital of the United Provinces and the locus of

[47] Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947)* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p. 41.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[49] Cited *ibid.*, p. 67.

the High Court; also in Allahabad was Muir Central College, a government institution where the first generation of Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh received their education. Allahabad was the home of Tej Bahadur Sapru, the famous Liberal leader, the "Hindu incarnation of John Stuart Mill." [50] More important, Allahabad was the home of the Nehrus. The secular tradition which Motilal Nehru (and later Jawaharlal) represented probably grew out of two environments—the Muir College and High Court environment and the synthetic cultural environment of the Kashmiri Brahman community. Motilal Nehru and men like him were quite at home in the new institutions of government that were being established in India. Temperamentally, Motilal Nehru belonged to the constitutional wing of the Congress and he later led the Swaraj party in the legislatures, along with Chitaranjan Das from Bengal. However, Motilal, along with many others of different opinions, was swept into the movement of Non-Cooperation begun by Gandhi in 1920-1921.

From Non-Cooperation to Independence

The Non-Cooperation movement of 1921 brought to Indian politics a brief moment of unity which was never again recaptured. The movement meant different things to different people. It appealed to "the growing Hindu reaction against the dominance of Western civilization" and to Muslim religious resentment against the British because of the war against Turkey.[51] For liberal constitutionalists like Motilal Nehru, the movement was a protest against the atrocities of Jallianwala Bagh and the denial of civil liberties afterwards.[52] In Uttar Pradesh, the movement also had an economic content. In 1918, Purushottamdas Tandon had begun to organize the peasants in Oudh to fight for their rights against the *talukdars*. The peasant movement merged with the Congress movement in Uttar Pradesh, where there were "serious agrarian riots in the Oudh districts of Rae Bareli and Fyzabad." [53]

The most serious break in the political unity of the nationalist movement began with the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim riots. The rioting began with the notorious Moplah rising of 1921 in Malabar and was followed by an increase in communal tensions throughout the year 1922 in cities and towns

[50] Evan Cotton, "Some Outstanding Political Leaders," chap. x in John Cumming, ed., *Political India, 1832-1932: A Co-Operative Survey of a Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 192.

[51] L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *India in 1923-24* (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1924), p. 243.

[52] Jawaharlal Nehru, "My Father," in S. P. and Preet Chablani, eds. *Motilal Nehru: Essays and Reflections on His Life and Times* (Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1961), p. 18.

[53] Peter Reeves, "The Politics of Order: 'Safety Leagues' Against the Congress in the United Provinces, 1921-22" (1962), p. 3. (Mimeographed.)

throughout the country. In 1923, full-scale rioting broke out in north India; in Uttar Pradesh, there were riots in Moradabad, Meerut, Allahabad, Gonda, Agra, Rae Bareli, and the most serious of all in Saharanpur.[54] The riots of 1921-1923 led to the resurgence of both Hindu and Muslim communal politics. The Hindu Mahasabha became active again in 1923 and the Muslim League, which had been dormant during the Non-Cooperation movement, re-emerged as a political force in 1924.[55] The Congress Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-1931 was followed by another series of communal riots, culminating in the terrible Kanpur riot of 1931.

Despite this background of communal bitterness, Congress and League leaders in Uttar Pradesh formed an electoral agreement for the provincial elections of 1936.[56] Although the Congress contested only 9 of the 66 Muslim seats in Uttar Pradesh, the Muslim League won only 27 seats, the rest going to independent Muslim candidates.[57] Nevertheless, on the basis of the pre-election agreement, negotiations between the League and the Congress for a coalition Cabinet were begun. The negotiations failed and the Congress formed a government with the League in opposition. The failure of the Cabinet negotiations marked the final turning point in Congress-League relations in Uttar Pradesh. From 1937 on, the Congress and the League went separate ways. In the next provincial election in Uttar Pradesh in 1946, the League won 54 of the 66 Muslim seats,[58] exactly double the number of seats won in 1936, for the first time vindicating the League's claim to be the political spokesman for Muslims in Uttar Pradesh.

Hindu communal politics was less successful in Uttar Pradesh, largely because the Congress had become the political organization of Hindus in the state as the estrangement between Hindus and Muslims developed.[59] The Mahasabha devoted itself to unifying the Hindu community through social reform propaganda and to proselytizing among Muslims.[60] Yet the Mahasabha kept alive the tradition of militant Hinduism, which was taken up more effectively by the Jan Sangh after Independence.

The influence of Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru remained the dominant one in the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh in this period. In the 1920s, Motilal Nehru formed the Swaraj party within the Congress to fight the provincial and national elections. In this period, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and Pandit Pant rose to prominence in Uttar Pradesh politics. Kidwai and Pant

[54] *India in 1923-24*, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
[55] Ram Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 243.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 304.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 132.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

and their associates, representing the constitutional tradition in the Uttar Pradesh Congress, dominated the first Congress government in 1937.

A new development in this period was the growth of ideological politics within the Congress. The Congress Socialist Party (CSP) was formed in 1934 as a party within the Indian National Congress. In Uttar Pradesh, the CSP was led by Acharya Narendra Dev. The Socialists generally worked with the peasant leaders in the Congress and provided the intellectual justification of the agrarian movement. The peasant movement under Tandon, however, retained a separate identity from the Socialists within the Congress organization.

The Congress before Independence was a movement, rather than a political party. It contained within it a wide diversity of political beliefs, excluding only the militant communalists.

The development of political parties after Independence

From a movement, the Congress after Independence became a political party. The importance of this change for the internal functioning of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, the development of opposition political parties both out of differences within the Congress and out of dissatisfaction of non-Congressmen with the Congress will be summarized.

It should, of course, be kept in mind that the most important development in the pattern of party politics immediately after Independence was not the formation of new political parties in opposition to the Congress, but the disappearance from Uttar Pradesh politics of the main opposition to the Congress, the Muslim League. After the partition, the Muslim League leaders in Uttar Pradesh left for Pakistan. With the departure of their political leadership and the end of separate electorates, Muslim political organization in Uttar Pradesh came to an abrupt end.

Communal politics in Uttar Pradesh did not, however, end with the departure of the League. Hindu-Muslim riots attended the news of partition in Uttar Pradesh, as elsewhere in India. The partition gave a new impetus to Hindu communal politics, for militant Hindus blamed the Congress equally with the League. The Hindu Mahasabha continued its activities, but more important for the future of Hindu communal politics in Uttar Pradesh was the entrance of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) into politics and the formation of the Jan Sangh. The RSS, originally a non-political youth organization,[81] became active politically in the period between 1947 and 1951 when its workers provided assistance to Hindu refu-

[81] Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) p. 178.

gees from Pakistan and "defended" Hindus in the communal riots of this period. The Jan Sangh was formed by RSS leaders in 1951 to fight the general elections.

The Jan Sangh was formed by people who had either no past association with the Congress or who had only slight associations with the Congress. The other main opposition parties in Uttar Pradesh, the Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party, developed out of splits from the Congress. The first split came in 1948, when the Socialists left the Congress in Uttar Pradesh under the leadership of Acharya Narendra Dev. The second split occurred in 1950-1951 when some defeated faction leaders in the Uttar Pradesh Congress left the Congress and joined Acharya Kripalani's Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP). These two organizations merged after the 1952 general elections into the PSP. The Socialist Party arose in 1955 as a result of a split within the PSP.

The Jan Sangh and the Socialist parties provide the main opposition to the Congress in Uttar Pradesh. There are other parties which have strength in a few districts in the state. Swatantra has some influence among the ex-rajas and *zamindars* in a few districts; the Communists have some strength in some of the eastern districts and in the industrial city of Kanpur; the Republicans, descendants of the old Scheduled Caste Federation, have some strength in three districts in the western part of the state.

The party system in Uttar Pradesh may be described as a multiparty system with one party, the Congress, dominant. Table 1 summarizes the results of the Assembly elections by party in Uttar Pradesh for the last three general elections. The significant changes since 1952 have been the decline in the voting strength of the Congress and the increase in the strength of the Jan Sangh. It will be demonstrated in the rest of this study that the decline in Congress strength has much to do with internal factional conflict and does not necessarily show a trend that will lead to the disintegration of the Congress organization in the state. In fact, the decline of the Congress is partly due to a complacent tolerance of internal conflict based upon the justified belief among Congressmen that opposition parties do not represent a serious threat to their control over the state government.

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN UTTAR PRADESH: MEMBERSHIP AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT

Membership

It is difficult to draw a definite conclusion about the strength of the Congress from membership figures. Membership figures for the Congress in Uttar Pradesh are an index more of the intensity of internal factional strife than of external support. When internal conflict is great and when import-

ant organizational contests are expected, faction leaders in the Congress work to enroll primary members[62] in their localities. Charges are invariably raised by rivals that primary members enrolled by their opponents are "bogus." The implication of such a charge is that one's rivals have merely taken names from the voter lists at random and paid the membership fees out of their own pockets. The advantage in enrolling additional members is that the number of members on the Mandal Congress Committee,[63] the

TABLE 1
UTTAR PRADESH ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS

Party	1952 Pct. of Vote	1952 No. of seats	1957 Pct. of Vote	1957 No. of seats	1962 Pct. of Vote	1962 No. of seats
Congress	47.9	390	42.4	286	34.9	249
Jan Sangh	6.4	2	9.8	17	15.3	49
PSP[a]	17.8	20	14.5	44	11.9	38
Socialists[b]	...	...	...	...	8.5	24
Communist	0.9	0	3.8	9	5.4	14
Swatantra	...	...	...	...	4.8	15
Republican	...	...	...	...	3.8	8
Others	27.0	18	29.4	74	15.3	33
Total	100.0	430	99.9	430	99.9	430

Source: *Indian Affairs Record*, VII (April, 1962), 117.

[a] The 1952 PSP vote is the combined vote of the old Socialist Party and the KMPP.
[b] In 1957, the Socialists ran as Independents and won 25 seats.

lowest unit of the Congress organization, increases in proportion to the number of primary members in the Mandal.

In 1959, the last year for which figures are available, the primary membership of the Uttar Pradesh Congress was approximately 2.4 million (see table 2). This figure was the highest since Independence, with the exception of 1950, when membership was free and 4.8 million members were enrolled. In general, the primary membership figures show a direct correspondence between the intensity of factional strife and the number of Congressmen enrolled. Although the high membership in 1950 is partly explainable in terms of the absence of a membership fee, it also reflects the great internal struggle in the Congress at the time. The contest between Acharya Kripalani and Purushottamdas Tandon for the presidency of the Indian National Congress, a contest which grew out of the internal conflict in the Uttar Pradesh Congress, took place in 1950.[64] In the years between 1950 and 1957,

[62] The categories of Congress members are described in the Appendix.
[63] See the Appendix for a description of the Mandal Congress Committee.
[64] This point is discussed in the following chapter.

quiet realignments were taking place within the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh. No important organizational contests occurred in this period and, consequently, enrollment declined. The rise in primary membership figures since 1957 reflects the growth of a new phase of factional conflict. By 1959, when membership reached its peak since 1950, the Congress party organization in Uttar Pradesh was in the midst of an internal conflict which ultimately led to a change in government leadership in 1960.[88]

Accurate active membership figures for recent years for the state as a

TABLE 2
CONGRESS MEMBERSHIP IN UTTAR PRADESH, 1950-1959

Year	No. of Members	
	Primary	Active
1950[a]	4,800,000	n.a.
1953[b]	1,800,000	50,000
1954[b]	1,100,000	9,361
1957[c]	643,274	9,156
1958[d]	1,250,000	n.a.
1959[e]	2,400,000	n.a.

[a] *National Herald*, June 23, 1950.
[b] *National Herald*, May 11, 1954.
[c] Indian National Congress, *Report of the General Secretaries: January, 1958 to December, 1958* (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1959), p. 51.
[d] *National Herald*, January 24, 1959.
[e] *Hindustan Times*, January 29, 1959. The *Report of the General Secretaries: January, 1960 to December, 1960* (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1961) of the Indian National Congress gives, on p. 33, the figures 161,501 and 4,208 for primary and active members respectively in 1959. However, these figures are based on an incomplete return from the Province as a result of an AICC inquiry into charges of fraudulent enrollments.

whole are not available to the author. An active membership of 50,000 in Uttar Pradesh (reached in 1953) would mean one active Congressman for approximately every 1500 people, about the number of people in a large village. However, Congressmen in the districts do not claim to have an active Congress worker in every village.

Even active membership figures exaggerate to some extent the number of people who are party "militants." Influential local party leaders often enroll and try to elect to party units all the adult members of their families and their trusted employees. Moreover, Congress membership is not spread evenly in the districts. The large towns may be over-represented in comparison with the villages. For example, Hathras tahsil in Aligarh district had

[88] The history of factional conflict in the Uttar Pradesh Congress is given in the following chapter.

a total population in 1951 of 206,201, of which 57,162 or 28 percent lived in the town of Hathras. In contrast, of the 113 active members of the Congress in this tahsil in 1959, 48 members or 42 percent of the total came from Hathras town. Also, some villages have more than one active Congress member, while many have none. Sixty-five active members of the Congress in Hathras tahsil came from villages or small towns, but there are 363 villages and three small towns in the tahsil.[66]

In general, two aspects of Congress membership should be stressed. First, fluctuations in both primary and active membership figures reflect changes in the intensity of internal factional conflict rather than changes in external support. The membership figures for the Congress in Uttar Pradesh are not an accurate measure of the strength of the organization. Second, the Congress does not have an active member in all villages in the state. In Hathras tahsil, the great majority of the villages have no active Congress members.[67]

Electoral support

Table 1 shows a sharp over-all decline of support for the Congress in Uttar Pradesh in the last two general elections. It was stated that the decline does not necessarily indicate that the Congress organization in the state is disintegrating. An analysis of the election results in the Assembly constituencies in each district gives results which indicate that many of the district Congress organizations are able to arrest electoral decline and increase their votes from election to election. Most districts, 44 of the 51,[68] do show a decline in the Congress vote from 1952 to 1962. Moreover, 25 of the 44 districts show a continuous decline from 1952 to 1957 and from 1957 to 1962. In only 7 districts has the Congress proportion of the total vote increased over the decade. However, in 15 districts, the Congress organizations increased their proportions of the total vote from 1957 to 1962.

Another way of looking at the election results in each district is by ranking them in terms of the proportion of total votes won by the Congress in

[66] The population figures come from the *Census of India, 1951, Uttar Pradesh District Population Statistics 6: Aligarh District* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1953); the membership figures come from the 1959 register of active members of the Aligarh district Congress, provided by the Congress office in the district.

[67] The figures for Hathras tahsil are given as an example only. Hathras tahsil is neither a "backward" nor a highly politicized area and is, therefore, a useful example. Data for a systematic study of Congress membership in other rural districts in Uttar Pradesh were not available to the author.

[68] Although there are 54 administrative districts, there are only 51 electoral districts. The three new defense districts of Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, and Pithoragarh are combined by the state election office with the districts of Tehri Garhwal, Garhwal, and Almora respectively, from which they were separated for defense purposes.

each district in each election. In 1952, the range was from 65.9 percent in Saharanpur district to 31.3 percent in Ghazipur district. In 1957, the Congress won without contest all the seats in Tehri Garhwal district and lost all the seats in Shahjahanpur district with a total vote of only 22 percent. In 1962, the range was from 64.1 percent in Tehri Garhwal to 21.2 percent in Etah district. The median district percentage has declined continuously over the three elections from 47 percent in 1952 to 43.5 percent in 1957 to 37.3 percent in 1962.

A comparison of the relative rank of each district from election to election shows that there is great variation in the consistency of the ranking of many districts in support for the Congress. Some districts have declined precipitously in rank. For example, in Aligarh district in 1952, the Congress polled 56.3 percent of the vote, the seventh highest vote in the state. In 1962, the Congress polled only 24.9 percent in Aligarh district, the third lowest vote in the state. Some districts have shown an equally sharp increase in support for the Congress. Thus, Tehri Garhwal district, which has been the strongest Congress district in the last two general elections, was the fifth lowest-support Congress district in 1952. The important point about such extreme fluctuations is that they indicate that factors are at work in such districts which cause a deviation from the statewide pattern of slow decline in support for the Congress.

Three factors are of particular importance in explaining extreme changes in the electoral position of the Congress in a district: internal party factionalism, sudden changes in the allegiance of a class of voters, and the acquisition or defection of powerful leaders (such as ex-rajas) who control large blocks of votes. Thus, the extreme decline of the Congress in Aligarh district resulted from a combination of a sudden change in the allegiances of a low caste group and of Muslims with intense internal factionalism.[69] The influence of these factors on the election outcome in Aligarh operated in a unique way in the district and did not reflect a statewide pattern. In Tehri Garhwal, an ex-princely state, the rise in Congress strength in the last two elections occurred because of the recruitment into the Congress of the former Raja, whose influence remains paramount in the district.

Not all of the 51 electoral districts show such sharp changes in support for the Congress. The results of the ranking of districts for the three general elections revealed that some districts were persistently above the median in support for the Congress and some were persistently below. Twenty-three districts were isolated which showed considerable stability both in their absolute percentages of support for the Congress and in their relative ranking. Twelve districts were consistently above the median in three

[69] See chap. v.

general elections and 11 were consistently below the median. Figure 3 shows the location of both the high- and low-support districts.

Attempts to correlate support for the Congress with various environmental factors yield few clear patterns. Figure 3 shows both regional differences and similarities between high- and low-support districts. Kumaon,

Fig. 3. Districts consistently above or below the median in support for the Congress in the 1952, 1957, and 1962 General Elections.

the northern Doab, western Rohilkhand, and the southern hill districts are the areas where the Congress has been persistently strongest. The central Doab and eastern Rohilkhand are the areas where the Congress has been persistently weakest. In Oudh and in the eastern districts, some districts

have been persistently pro-Congress, others persistently anti-Congress.

Over the three general elections, there has been a marked shift in areas of Congress support. In the first General Election, the Congress was very strong in all of the northwestern districts, in most of Kumaon, and in parts of the central plains area. The Congress was weakest in the eastern districts and in the southern hills. By 1962, the areas of (relative) Congress strength had shifted away from the northwestern districts and the central plains to the southern hills and the eastern districts.

The regional distribution of Congress strength and the shift in areas of support over the decade both indicate that there is no apparent connection between poverty, economic decline, and opposition to the Congress. If anything, the distribution indicates exactly the opposite, that is, that the Congress is strongest and has been becoming (relatively) stronger in the most backward and poverty-stricken areas of the state. Kumaon, Bundelkhand, and the eastern districts are three areas which have been selected by the state government as the most backward areas of Uttar Pradesh and which are to receive special help in the Third Plan.[70] Although Kumaon has the lowest population density in the state and the eastern districts the highest, the problems of both areas relate to pressure on the cultivable land —a result of overpopulation in the eastern districts and a relative lack of cultivable land in Kumaon. In Bundelkhand, where population densities are also very low, agricultural productivity suffers from a severe shortage of irrigation facilities.

Because of the sharp contrasts in densities between the eastern districts, on the one hand, and Kumaon and the southern hill districts, on the other hand, there is no correlation between rural density and support for the Congress in the high-support Congress districts. Four of the 12 high-support districts were among the 12 highest density districts in Uttar Pradesh. An equal number were among the 12 districts with the lowest densities. The 11 low-support districts also show no correlation between rural density and Congress strength. Two of the 11 districts were among the 11 districts with highest densities; one was among the 11 with lowest densities. The evidence from the regional distribution of Congress strength and from the attempt to correlate rural density with Congress support is thus ambiguous. The regional distribution indicates a positive correlation between poverty and support for the Congress, but the district by district comparison indicates no correlation.

Variations from district to district in literacy rates also give ambiguous results when compared with the strong and weak Congress districts. The 12 high-support districts show no correlation; three districts are among

[70] Government of Uttar Pradesh, *Third Five Year Plan*, pp. 47-61.

the 12 highest in literacy and two are among the 12 lowest. However, the lowest support districts show a slight correlation; only one of the low-support districts is among the 11 districts with the highest literacy rates, but four are among the 11 districts with the lowest literacy rates. A scatter diagram shows only a very slight correlation.

Data from urban and rural constituencies indicate that Congress has greater strength in the few predominantly urban constituencies of Uttar Pradesh than it has in the rural areas. There are 21 wholly urban Assembly constituencies and 5 more which are predominantly urban.[71] In 1952, the Congress won in all urban constituencies, compared to 90 percent successes in rural constituencies. In 1957, the Congress won 21 of 26 urban constituencies or 81 percent, compared to 66 percent in the countryside. The figures for 1962 are 17 of 26 urban constituencies or 66 percent for the Congress, compared to 58 percent of rural seats. The Congress has thus done better in urban and predominantly urban constituencies in all three elections. However, support for the Congress has declined in the cities and towns, as it has in the countryside. Finally, the difference in support for the Congress in urban and rural areas narrowed considerably in the 1962 election.

No strong correlations exist between support for the Congress and the proportion of major caste and religious groups by district. The high-support and low-support districts are each approximately equally divided among districts with large and small Muslim populations. There is a slight correlation between support for the Congress and the number of Brahmans in each district, indicating the possibility of a tendency for Brahmans to be pro-Congress. The data on Rajputs and Ahirs indicate a slight correlation in the opposite direction, indicating the possibility of a tendency for these caste groups to vote against the Congress. However, for all three castes, the correlations both in district by district comparisons and in scatter diagrams are very slight.

For low caste groups, it is possible to compare the results in the constituencies reserved for these groups with the results from general constituencies. The results support the widely-held belief that the Scheduled Castes are strongly pro-Congress. In 1952, the election reports did not reveal the Scheduled Caste candidates. However, the Congress won 162 out of 166 seats in the double member constituencies[72] or 97.5 percent of the seats compared to 86.4 percent of the single member constituencies. In 1957,

[71] I have classified as "predominantly urban" only those constituencies which include towns with a population over 100,000. The average population in an Assembly constituency is between 150,000 and 200,000.

[72] In the double member constituencies, one seat was reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate, one seat was unreserved.

the Congress won 68 of the 89 constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes or 78 percent of the seats, compared to 64 percent of the general seats. In 1962, the Congress won 55 of the 89 reserved constituencies or 62 percent of the seats, compared to 57 percent of the general seats. The data suggest three statements about the vote for the Congress in Scheduled Caste constituencies. First, Congress successes have been persistently greater in the reserved constituencies than in the general constituencies; second, the percentage of seats won by the Congress has declined in both the reserved and general constituencies; and third, the difference in the proportion of Congress successes in reserved and general constituencies narrowed considerably between 1957 and 1962. The last point suggests that Congress strength among the low castes may be weakening.

In general, the detailed data by district and constituency show a general decline in support for the Congress by nearly every measure. However, the decline is not clearly related to any statewide environmental factors. The decline does not appear to derive from discontent in the poorest areas of the state, nor from the cities, nor from among the low castes. In fact, the data indicate the contrary, that the deprived and disadvantaged tend to support the Congress.

The absence of very sharp divisions in state politics is consistent with the description of the environment which has been given above. Differences in Uttar Pradesh politics, as in the social and economic environments, tend to be shadings rather than sharp divisions. The merging and mixing of regions and peoples in Uttar Pradesh combines with a lack of communication throughout the state among members of ethnic and other groups to produce a relatively complex politics without clear patterns. The factional character of internal Congress politics in the state also tends to produce a patternless politics. Districts which have been consistently strongly pro-Congress may suddenly become very weak Congress districts when the local organizations become divided by intense factional strife. Similarly, internal cohesion in a local Congress organization is often sufficient to stop a deterioration in Congress strength and to enable the Congress to increase its vote. These propositions will be developed in the case studies.

III.

The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh: The Growth of Factional Conflict

This chapter will be concerned with identifying elements of continuity and change in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics. It will be argued that conflicts which developed in the pre-Independence period—particularly since 1937, when the Congress first came to power in Uttar Pradesh and other states[1]—culminated in major internal crises in the post-Independence period, crises which led to a change in the content of political debate and in the character of political leadership within the Uttar Pradesh Congress. The content of political debate changed from an internal discussion of the place of language, culture, and region in the modern state and of the social and economic goals of Indian democracy to a more mundane controversy over the respective roles of party and government in the political system. Simultaneously, political leadership in Uttar Pradesh passed from the hands of the prominent leaders of the nationalist movement from this state into the hands of the second rank of party workers. The charismatic leaders, the prophets of independence, whose positions in the movement depended upon the esteem and awe in which they were held by the rank and file of Congressmen, were replaced by "political" leaders—men whose positions depend less upon their personal esteem than upon the political patronage they distribute.

Personal politics and factional politics existed in the Uttar Pradesh Congress before Independence, alongside a politics of issues. Since Independence, personal and factional politics have come to dominate the internal politics of the state Congress. This chapter will also describe the new sys-

[1] Congress Governments were elected in 1937, under the Government of India Act of 1935, in Madras, Bihar, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh), Bombay, and Orissa and were in power from 1937 until 1939.

tem of factional politics—the nature of factional alignments, the effect of factional politics on the stability of the state Government, and the interrelations between state and district party factions.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE PATTERNS OF POLITICS AND CONFLICT IN THE CONGRESS PARTY

Looking back at the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh and at the men who ruled it in the pre-Independence period for indications of developments to come is at first appearance a fruitless task. The issues that existed then seem irrelevant to contemporary Uttar Pradesh Congress politics. Even more frustrating are the apparently complete and wholly inconsistent changes of political allegiance which later took place among the men who emerged from this early period to positions of importance in post-Independence state politics. Divisions between "modernists" and "traditionalists," "secularists" and "revivalists," which seemed important then, hardly occur within the Congress party today. Men who were, during this period, ardent believers in Marxism and scientific socialism saw no inconsistency later in giving allegiance to Purushottamdas Tandon, at one time the leading spokesman in both the state and the country of Hindu revivalism.

Two aspects of traditional Indian society can help to explain how such inconsistencies are tolerated or ignored by politicians in contemporary state politics. For one thing, a high value has always been placed in Indian society upon compromise and persuasion and upon men who are adept at the art of reconciling opposites. Nothing so confounds a Westerner as the facility with which Indians find correspondences where the former sees only incongruities and inconsistencies. The second (and the more easily comprehensible) feature of traditional Indian society which helps to explain the changing patterns of alliance and conflict in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics is the essentially personal character of political loyalties. For many (perhaps most) politicians in Uttar Pradesh, there is no internal conflict involved in following leaders whose viewpoints on important issues are different from their own or in switching allegiances from one leader to another, leaders whose personal ideologies are sharply at variance. A politician may join a "socialist" faction, not because he has any ideas about socialism, but because he admires certain characteristics of the leader of the faction—characteristics which have nothing to do with ideology.

For pre-Independence Uttar Pradesh politics, it is possible to construct a typology of political leaders. Two kinds of latent conflicts which existed in Uttar Pradesh before Independence and which culminated in open conflicts in the post-Independence period were between "modernists" and "traditionalists" on the one hand and between ideologists and virtuoso poli-

ticians on the other hand. A fifth kind of politician of considerable importance in the pre-Independence period and for some time afterwards was the arbiter. The arbiter did not participate in conflicts either of principle or of men. His role consisted in reconciling conflicting principles and in making enemies work together in a common cause.

It is useful to make this typology of political leaders not because it has any relevance to present-day Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh, but because it makes it possible to show how certain kinds of politicians have declined in importance and others have come to prevail. In brief, the "modernists," the "traditionalists," and the men of ideology were the first to disappear from state Congress politics, some into non-political activities, others into opposition. The next to go were the arbiters, those who were adepts in the art of compromise and reconciliation. In the end, the state Congress was left almost completely in the hands of the modern virtuoso politicians, men who understand both the traditional society in which contemporary Uttar Pradesh politics must operate and the modern machinery of party organization and government patronage.

The Modernist and the Traditionalist: Jawarharlal Nehru and Purushottamdas Tandon

No evidence has yet come to light that there was ever any personal antagonism between the Nehru family and Purushottamdas Tandon. Whenever Pandit Nehru spoke of Tandon or Tandon of Nehru, it was always in terms of the highest regard. Yet, in 1950, Purushottamdas Tandon forged an alliance with Sardar Patel in a struggle for control of the national Congress organization, a struggle which represented the only serious challenge which Pandit Nehru had to face against his power and his policies after Independence.

Except for Sardar Patel, who died before this conflict was finally resolved, every one of the principal actors in the contest for control of the national party organization came from or spent his political life in Uttar Pradesh. Although the 1950 presidential election of the Indian National Congress between Tandon and Acharaya Kripalani was primarily a struggle for political power in both Uttar Pradesh and national politics, it was widely interpreted and rightly so as a conflict over principles and ideologies as well. The events leading up to the presidential contest of 1950 at the national level, the victory of Tandon, his later resignation, and the assumption of the presidency by Pandit Nehru have been dealt with extensively elsewhere.[2] This analysis is concerned only with the interrelationship between this struggle and Uttar Pradesh politics.

[2] Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), chap. iv.

Both Pandit Nehru and Tandon came from Allahabad. Both received an "English" education, Nehru in England and Tandon in Allahabad. Both became lawyers for a time early in their careers. And both belonged to the radical wing of the Indian National Congress in the sense that they early favored mass, peasant-based agitational movements to achieve the goal of independence. The similarities between the early careers of these two men are manifold, yet they represented two extremes of political attitudes in Indian life.

The major differences between Nehru and Tandon were not over ideology, although their attitudes toward socialism differed. Nehru never made a secret of his socialist principles and he often acted as the informal leader of the socialist movement within the Congress. However, he refused formally to lead or even to join the Congress Socialist Party (CSP).[3] Tandon was the leader of the peasant movements in Uttar Pradesh in the early 1930s. Although he was a radical revolutionary, he never espoused socialist ideology and he too refused to join the Congress Socialist Party. One of the anomalies of Uttar Pradesh politics that will be mentioned again later is that the most devoted followers of Nehru in Uttar Pradesh politics imitated his decision to remain aloof from the Congress Socialist Party, whereas most of Tandon's associates in the peasant movement joined the CSP.

The most important distinction between Nehru and Tandon was in their attitudes toward secularism and traditional Hindu values. The differences between the two men were never total. Nehru never rejected everything in traditional Hindu society, nor did Tandon ever openly oppose the idea of a secular state. Still, Nehru represented for many educated Indians the desire to be modern and "scientific" in one's outlook toward political and social problems, to be wholly secular in thought and action, and to consciously work against the triple evils which Nehru constantly castigated in his speeches—the evils of "casteism, communalism, and provincialism."

Tandon, on the other hand, represented Hindu "revivalism" and devotion to "Hindi, Hindus, and Hindustan." Although Tandon was considered a communalist by Muslim "revivalists" and has always been admired by Hindu communalists, it would be wrong to accept this view of Tandon. Tandon rather was the symbol in the Hindi-speaking areas of the kind of regional linguistic and cultural identification which became politically important after Independence. In the south, these cultural movements eventually developed into the often violent agitation for the linguistic reorganization

[3] The Congress Socialist Party was formed in Patna in 1934 as a party within the Indian National Congress. The reasons for the formation of the Congress Socialist Party and its later history are given *ibid.*, especially chap. ii and in Hari Kishore Singh, *A History of the Praja Socialist Party* (Lucknow: Narendra Prakashan, 1959), especially chaps. i-iv.

of states. In the north, where territorial unity is not a problem, the movement expresses itself politically in an identification of the Hindi-speaking areas as the "real" India and, sometimes, in the desire to impose this view of the "real" India upon the rest of the country.

By the time the contest for President of the Indian National Congress took place in 1950, Tandon and men who respected him as a symbol of Hindi and Hindu culture had become dominant in the Uttar Pradesh Congress. The Uttar Pradesh delegation gave a majority to Tandon. The success of Tandon, as Weiner points out, "was widely interpreted as a defeat not only for Kripalani but for Nehru as well." [4] Many who voted for Tandon no doubt felt that they were voting for Hinduism against secularism and for a more militant policy against Pakistan. Yet, only a few Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh look back upon this contest as a challenge to Nehru. Most Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh accepted both Nehru and Tandon as their leaders and saw no incompatibility between them. Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh intellectually recognized and accepted most of Nehru's political ideas as necessary for the development of the country, but it was Tandon who appealed to the emotional identification of Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh with their language, their culture, and their region.

The Ideologist and the Virtuoso Politician: Acharya Narendra Dev and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai

In the politics of Uttar Pradesh before Independence, there were many viewpoints and many different kinds of men to express them. All of the leading Congressmen of this period from Uttar Pradesh rose to national importance in one way or another. Acharya Narendra Dev was one of the early leaders of the Congress Socialist Party and an important Indian socialist thinker. He continued to hold positions of national importance in the socialist movement after Independence until his death in 1956. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai was a very different sort of person. He was devoted not to an ideology, but to a man and to politics itself. Throughout his life, he was Pandit Nehru's political right-hand man. Although far from being anybody's shadow or lackey, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai remained devoted to the Nehru family from the early 1920s, when he became private secretary to Motilal Nehru, until his death in 1954. These two men, Narendra Dev and Kidwai, represented two entirely different kinds of political styles; only one kind survived for long in the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh after Independence. It is another one of the curious anomalies of Uttar Pradesh politics that, although Acharya Narendra Dev helped to defeat Kidwai and to remove him from Uttar Pradesh politics, the style of politics of which Kidwai was the

[4] Weiner, *Party Politics*, pp. 71-72.

master became dominant in the Uttar Pradesh Congress very soon after Independence.

Acharya Narendra Dev intellectually was the leading exponent in the socialist movement in India of Marxism, as opposed to democratic socialism or Gandhian "socialism."[5] In practice, on specific policy issues, he tended to be moderate. Whatever his personal opinions, however, he always submitted to decisions taken by the party leadership even though often it took great political courage for him to do so. In a word, he placed loyalty to party and to the socialist movement above personal interest. Unlike Socialist leaders in other states, where the Congress Socialist Party had little importance in the Congress party organizations, Acharya Narendra Dev was always recognized as a leading member of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh and the Congress Socialist Party was the largest political group in the state Congress. In 1937, when the Congress formed governments in seven states and when the Congress Socialist Party officially opposed Cabinet-entry by its members, Narendra Dev personally favored participation in the Congress government, but declined an invitation to join the Uttar Pradesh Cabinet in deference to the official decision of the CSP.[6] Again, in 1948, when the Congress Socialist Party decided to withdraw from the Congress, Narendra Dev was reluctant.[7] When he took the decision to withdraw, however, it was again an act of political courage. At the time, the Congress Socialists were in control of the party machinery and had a group of forty or fifty members in the Congress state legislature party. Narendra Dev had a difficult choice to make. He and his followers could simply resign from the Congress and cross the floor of the House or they could resign from the legislature altogether and contest for their seats again in bye-elections against the Congress. Narendra Dev chose the latter course, with the result that only twelve legislators went with him, all of whom, including Narendra Dev himself, were defeated in the bye-elections by Congress candidates.

Acharya Narendra Dev was a man who was loyal to principle and to party, whatever the cost might be to his personal political career. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai was equally steadfast in his particular political style. If Narendra Dev was loyal to principle and to party, Kidwai was loyal to men—both to his leaders, Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, and to his followers, the motley band of district leaders who loved him and worked with him throughout his career.

More than any other political leader from Uttar Pradesh and as much as

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[6] On this point, see Sampurnanand, *Memories and Reflections* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 83.

[7] Raghukul Tilak, "Acharya Narendra Deva as I Knew Him" (Publication details not known). (Mimeographed.)

any leader in all of India, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai has become a legend. Wherever one travels in the districts of Uttar Pradesh, one has only to mention the name of Kidwai to hear a new story of Kidwai's loyalty to his friends and of his generosity to his enemies. Kidwai was the master politician, the prototype of the modern faction leader in Indian politics. He was also a great administrator, the man who is remembered for his decisiveness and his efficiency in solving India's food crisis when he was Minister for Food and Agriculture in the central government from 1952 to 1954.

Kidwai was the major election organizer and financer of the Congress election campaigns in Uttar Pradesh from the early 1920s when he organized the campaign of Motilal Nehru's Swaraj party through the 1937 and 1946 elections. After the successful Congress election campaign in Uttar Pradesh in 1937, Kidwai emerged as the most important figure in the state party organization, with a large personal following among the district leaders in the state. He also had a sizeable following among the legislators and was given the most prominent position in the state Cabinet after the Chief Minister (Pandit Pant). Kidwai performed a remarkable feat in Indian politics and in Uttar Pradesh politics in particular. In this state, with its long tradition of communal politics, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai was the only prominent Muslim political leader who rose to a position of power and influence in the state Congress and government by his own efforts and because of the attraction of his personality. Kidwai's followers in the Uttar Pradesh Congress were, inevitably, all Hindus (since there were few other Muslims in the Congress) and were all among the most secular-minded Congressmen in the state. Secular-minded is probably the only term that would apply to all of Kidwai's followers, for they were drawn from different castes and creeds and they reflected every conceivable political opinion from extreme conservatism to ardent socialism.

The secularism of Kidwai and his followers made them less concerned with the matters of language, culture, and region that were so dear to Tandon and those close to him. Acharya Narendra Dev and his band of followers, strangely enough, were closer to Tandon than to Kidwai. Narendra Dev, like Tandon, was a devotee of Hindi and was associated with prominent Hindi cultural organizations in Uttar Pradesh. Although Kidwai personally tended to be economically "progressive," the Socialists generally found Tandon a man more to their liking and, as will be shown later, the followers of Tandon and of Narendra Dev joined together to oust Kidwai and his men from their positions of power in state Congress politics.

The major difference between Kidwai and Narendra Dev personally, however, was one of political style. Narendra Dev, the man of ideology, had little sympathy—although there was never any personal enmity—for a man like Kidwai who could openly say, "It may be my vision is narrow. I

rely more on the number of heads than on ideological discourses." [8] The differences between these two men, despite a certain common ground, are well expressed by a Congressman who knew and loved them both:

> It was a painful thing to me that Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and Acharya Narendra Dev couldn't pull on. Kidwai's criticism of Narendra Dev was that the latter was too much of an idealist and perhaps Narendra Dev felt that Kidwai had no principles, that he was just a politician. However, one thing Acharya Narendra Dev used to tell me that, whenever there was a question of taking a progressive step, Kidwai would always agree; he [Kidwai] was very progressive in his views.[9]

The Arbiter: Pandit Pant

Of all the prominent political leaders in Uttar Pradesh before Independence, Pandit Pant had the least political power in the conventional sense. He was not a symbol of regional aspirations, nor did he represent any ideology. He had no group following whatsoever. Indeed, his lack of skill or, rather, his lack of interest in "politics" was such that he had no power even in his home district of Almora and had always to contest elections from some other district where local Congressmen had more respect for his talents. Pandit Pant was a parliamentary leader, rather than an organizational leader; he was esteemed by all Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh as a man of intelligence and integrity, but he had no group of his own. Yet, it was Pandit Pant who became the state's first chief minister and the dominating personality in state politics for the next 20 years, from 1937 until the late 1950s.

The selection of Pandit Pant as the first chief minister of Uttar Pradesh was partly the logical result of a process of elimination. Pandit Nehru was too deeply involved in national affairs to take the responsibility himself. Narendra Dev was eliminated automatically as a candidate for the chief ministership since the Congress Socialists refused to join the 1937 Cabinet. Kidwai's talents were in party organization, rather than parliamentary leadership; moreover, his selection might have precipitated internal political conflict within the state Congress party.

The only choice, therefore, was between Purushottamdas Tandon and Pandit Pant. In terms of seniority in the Congress, Tandon should have been the choice. Tandon was not only an older Congressman, but he had led the movements within Uttar Pradesh while Pant had been in the central Parliament. The choice of Pant over Tandon involved two fundamental decisions. It involved, first, a conscious acceptance by the Congress leadership of the responsibilities of office: seniority in the movement and agita-

[8] Letter from Rafi Ahmad Kidwai to Jawaharlal Nehru, April 20, 1936, in Jawaharlal Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters* (2d ed., Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p. 181.
[9] Interview in Meerut on December 20, 1962.

tional ability were passed over in favor of parliamentary and administrative talents. Second, the choice of Pant reflected the need for a noncontroversial chief minister, a man who had no group following and was aloof from group intrigues. Pandit Pant held no strong views likely to antagonize anyone inside or outside of the Congress; moreover, he was personally conciliatory in temperament. In short, Pant had all the qualities necessary to run the government efficiently and, simultaneously, to keep the party together. Pant performed these functions admirably from 1937 until 1955, when he was called to the central Cabinet to perform similar functions in government and party for the country as a whole.

The First Phase of Conflict

Pandit Pant's task was not an easy one. His management of the state government in the period between 1937 and 1939 firmly established his reputation as one of the great leaders in the country. However, Pant was sitting on a powder keg in his own state which, as has been mentioned above, exploded after Independence in a struggle which nearly split the Congress apart in the country. In this struggle, all the main contenders—Tandon, Kidwai, and Narendra Dev—lost something; only Nehru and Pant won unqualified victories.

In the pre-Independence period, conflict among political leaders in Uttar Pradesh was partly submerged because of the overriding importance of unity in the struggle for independence. Some preliminary skirmishes occurred, but no clear battle lines were drawn. After Independence, however, a long period of struggle began between Kidwai and his followers, on the one hand, and the followers of Tandon and Narendra Dev, on the other. The struggle reflected the differences of principle and of temperament sketched above among these political leaders. It was also a struggle for political power in state and national politics.

Two events in Uttar Pradesh are of crucial importance in the early post-Independence period for an understanding of later political alignments. One was the departure of Kidwai to the central government (actually just before Independence) and the other was the departure of Narendra Dev and some of the Socialists from the Congress. Since Pant had no group of followers of his own, Kidwai from the beginning had acted as Pant's political manager. However, Pant soon became embarrassed by Kidwai's power and had him removed to the center in 1946. Although this move freed him from Kidwai, it also left Pant temporarily without followers. Pant's problems were solved in 1948 when Narendra Dev left the Congress and most of the Congress Socialists decided not to go with him. As Pandit Pant had become "followerless," the Congress Socialists who remained in the Congress had become "leaderless." Since Kidwai's followers in Uttar

Pradesh remained loyal to Kidwai, the natural alliance was between Pant and the leaderless Socialists in the Congress. In the party organization, the leaderless Socialists turned to Purushottamdas Tandon, who was elected President of the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee (UPCC) in April, 1948. Thus, for the first time, a single group emerged in the Uttar Pradesh Congress in control both of the state government and the Congress organization.

Pant's position was improved further in the later stages of the struggle, when Tandon made his bid for national leadership. Although Tandon was elected national Congress president in 1950 in the contest against Acharya Kripalani, he was forced to resign the following year and he soon retired from active politics. Kidwai, who organized Kripalani's campaign, lost the struggle for votes against Tandon, but was ultimately responsible for Tandon's resignation.[10] In the meantime, however, Kidwai's influence in Uttar Pradesh politics was gone. During the struggle, the majority of his followers in the state legislature and in the districts had resigned from the Congress and gone into opposition. Narendra Dev had committed political suicide by leaving the Congress in 1948.

Only Pandit Pant emerged from the affray with enhanced power and increased prestige. Pant was willing to cooperate with Tandon to oust Kidwai and his followers from power in party affairs. However, when Tandon made his bid for national leadership and when this bid became a direct challenge to Pandit Nehru, Pant withdrew from the battle and adopted the role of mediator. When the dust of the battle had settled, Pandit Pant stood undamaged, in fact with his prestige reinforced and his reputation for impartiality and noninvolvement in group intrigues intact. Pant now towered over all other Congressmen in the state, for he was now the last of the leaders of the first rank who remained in a position of prominence in Uttar Pradesh Congress affairs.

A number of conclusions about the impact of conflicts in the pre-Independence years and in the years immediately after Independence upon the future patterns of Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh emerge from this summary. First, the conflict between Tandon and Nehru and the support which Tandon received in Uttar Pradesh reflected the strength of regional identification in the state. The eventual victory of Nehru in the struggle was a warning to Congressmen from Uttar Pradesh that cultural and linguistic nationalism must be kept within bounds. In effect, Hindu revivalism

[10] Kidwai, angry because of Tandon's refusal to include him or any of his supporters on the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, resigned from the Congress in August, 1951. Kidwai's resignation forced Nehru to act. Nehru then resigned from the Congress Working Committee. At this point, Tandon resigned as Congress president, Nehru replaced him as president, and Kidwai rejoined the Congress. Weiner, *Party Politics*, pp. 75-79.

became prohibited in the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh and the cause of Hindi and of Hindu culture was left to the communal parties, particularly to the Jan Sangh. Second, the departure of Narendra Dev from the Congress brought an end to ideology as a factor in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics. Extremes of both right and left were removed from the Congress and a moderate consensus emerged, more or less faithful to the principles for which Nehru stood—a moderate approach to questions of language and culture and a gradual, non-dogmatic approach toward "socialist" ideals. With literally nothing left to fight about, politics in the Uttar Pradesh Congress more and more revolved solely around personalistic group or factional politics. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, the virtuoso politician, established the pattern of factional politics in this state. Those who sought to defeat him had necessarily to imitate him. It is to this new pattern of politics that the analysis must now turn.

CONTEMPORARY FACTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE UTTAR PRADESH CONGRESS

The new men of power

Since Pandit Pant would not participate in party politics himself, he had to have a party manager both to defeat Kidwai and to replace Kidwai. For this task, he chose Chandra Bhan Gupta, one of the lesser known "soldiers" of the Congress and a man of a new generation in Congress politics. Chandra Bhan Gupta was born in a Bania family of Aligarh district in 1903. He received an M.A. and an LL.B. degree from Lucknow University and joined the Bar in 1925. He participated in all the Congress movements in the 1930s and 1940s and spent eight and a half years in jail. His association with Pandit Pant went back to 1926 when, as a young lawyer, he assisted Pant in the defense of the revolutionaries tried in the famous Kakori Conspiracy Case.[11] Gupta was one of the many Congress Socialists who decided to remain within the Congress. Like Kidwai, Gupta has devoted his entire life to politics and only to politics; he has never married.

Under the wing of Pandit Pant, he soon built up a very powerful political organization. Towards the end of 1946, after the departure of Kidwai for the center, Gupta was taken into the Uttar Pradesh government as Pant's Chief Parliamentary Secretary in charge of Licenses and Permits—a position of obvious importance for the distribution of patrongae. In the same year, Gupta was elected treasurer of the Provincial Congress Committee. Thus, in a very short time, Gupta was placed in control of an overwhelming proportion of both party and government patronage, which he

[11] Shyam Sunder and Savitri Shyam, *Political Life of Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant*, Vol. I: *1887-1945* (Lucknow: Shailanil, 1960), p. 82.

used as Pant's party manager to build simultaneously a following for Pant and an opposition to Kidwai. Gupta was instrumental in forging the alliance between the Congress Socialists and the followers of Tandon which effectively isolated Kidwai and his followers in the Uttar Pradesh Congress organization.

Another new man of power to come to prominence in this period of struggle was Mohan Lal Gautam, a Brahman, also from Aligarh district and of the same generation—he was born in 1905—as C. B. Gupta. Gautam also was a member of the Congress Socialist Party, but his closest ties were with Tandon. He had worked closely with Tandon in the peasant movement in Uttar Pradesh in the early 1930s. As Gupta was Pant's party manager, Gautam was Tandon's political organizer. When Tandon was elected president of the Indian National Congress, Gautam became his general secretary. Gautam had played an important role in the defeat of Kidwai's followers in Uttar Pradesh and had a reputation for ruthlessness in party political matters. In fact, it has been suggested that the appointment of Gautam as general secretary of the Indian National Congress, even more than the election of Tandon, precipitated the final crisis at the national level.[12] The rise of Gautam to the position of general secretary, where he could preside over the distribution of party tickets for the 1952 General Elections, was too much for the followers of Kidwai and Kripalani to bear.

When Tandon resigned the presidency, Gautam also had to leave his position. The return of Gautam to state politics marked the beginning of a new struggle for power in the Uttar Pradesh Congress. Although Gautam had been exiled permanently from Delhi, Pandit Pant had room for him in Lucknow. It is just possible that Pant did not care to trust anybody, even his own creations, with too much political power and that he brought Gautam into his Cabinet in 1952 to counterbalance the influence of Gupta. Whatever Pant's intention, this was the effect. Gautam was given the politically important position of Minister for Local Self-Government and it is said that he immediately began to form a separate group within the Gupta group by building support in the municipal and district boards through the patronage of his ministry. Within two years, Gupta and Gautam had become bitter personal enemies and the struggle which began between these two men in 1952 has not yet run its full course. It has brought disruption and division in the government and in the party, in Lucknow and in every district in the state.[13]

[12] See Pran Nath Chopra, *Rafi Ahmad Kidwai: His Life and Work* (Agra: Shiva Lal Agarwala and Co. [Pvt.], Ltd., 1960), p. 146.

[13] The foregoing analysis has excluded other important political leaders who rose to prominence in state politics during this period, for example, Kamlapati Tripathi. He has been the titular leader of the anti-Gupta group in recent years. Gupta and Gautam were selected to represent "the new men of power" partly because they have been the most skilled practitioners in the new style of Uttar Pradesh politics, but also because

The art of political management: Pandit Pant and Dr. Sampurnanand

A great gap was created in Uttar Pradesh politics when Pandit Pant left for the central government in 1955. Two important elements of stability which Pant gave to Uttar Pradesh politics went with him when he left. For one thing, Pant was the last of the prominent leaders of the nationalist movement in Uttar Pradesh, a man who occupied a position of unchallengeable authority and esteem because of his seniority in the movement and his sacrifices on its behalf, because of his integrity, and because of a certain touch of charisma drawn partly from his own personality and partly from his association with the great leaders of the nationalist movement in the country. Second, Pandit Pant was one of the most astute political managers Indian politics has produced. Although he rarely participated directly in political controversies, he knew how to make men work for him and he knew how to make enemies work together under him. Indeed, it was part of his political strategy to permit those under him to fight amongst themselves, a certain way of assuring that they would not fight him.

The transition involved in the transfer of Pant to the central government and the selection of a new chief minister for Uttar Pradesh was an easy one. The decision was made largely on the basis of seniority. There were some in the Congress who feebly attempted to nominate Tandon, but Tandon was clearly out of the running by then. The decision was made by Nehru and Pant. The choice was between Hafiz Mohammed Ibrahim, a "Nationalist" Muslim, and Dr. Sampurnanand. Ibrahim was the senior man in age, but Sampurnanand was the senior man in Congress politics. Neither man had any important group following, so that no conflict arose over the final selection of Sampurnanand.

Sampurnanand had some of the qualities which made Pandit Pant so successful a chief minister. He occupied a position of esteem in the Congress and in the society as a whole both for his political sacrifices in the nationalist movement and for his nonpolitical activities as a teacher and scholar in the Kashi Vidyapith of Banaras. Sampurnanand was one of the many Congressmen in Uttar Pradesh who managed to combine "socialism" with Hindu revivalism and cultural nationalism. A well-known socialist thinker, he was esteemed even more for his traditional learning in Sanskrit. He has been devoted to the spread of Hindi and was President of the All India Hindi Sahitya Sammelan in 1940, a cultural organization which, significantly enough, has always been led by politicians. (Tandon and Narendra Dev both were prominent leaders of this society.)

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their great enmity for each other has been of considerable importance in political developments in the state.

Like Pant, Sampurnanand had been more or less aloof from group intrigues and was involved in no controversies. He had been identified both with Tandon and Narendra Dev against Kidwai, but he was considered essentially "nonpolitical" and impartial in outlook and in his relations with others. However, unlike Pandit Pant, Sampurnanand had no astuteness in party political matters; he kew little about the art of political management which was the secret of Pandit Pant's success.

Pant had successfully played off the new men of power—Gupta and Gautam—against each other and had thereby maintained complete freedom for himself. Sampurnanand, on the other hand, lost his political freedom and his ability to maneuver as soon as he took office. He made the mistake of depending upon only one political manager—first Gupta, then Gautam—to keep the party organization under control. In the end, his reputation for impartiality was lost and he became identified as a leader of a particular faction rather than a leader of the whole party.

Sampurnanand relied first upon Gupta, who had a decisive influence in the selection of the new ministers. Gupta's most important decision was to exclude from the government his arch-foe, Mohan Lal Gautam. The exclusion of Gautam was the first act in the new drama of Uttar Pradesh Congress affairs, an act which split the state Congress apart in factional struggle eventually leading to the downfall of the Sampurnanand Government. The new Sampurnanand ministry was composed almost completely of the old group of Congress Socialists who had remained in the Congress. Gautam himself had been a charter member of the CSP in Uttar Pradesh, but he had been expelled in 1947 for reasons which are still somewhat clouded. Gautam has described his exclusion from the first Sampurnanand ministry in a way which indicates both the relations between him and Gupta and the stakes involved: "When Sampurnanand came into power, the old CSPers finally got their opportunity to work together and run the whole affair, but I was kept out. . . . I was kept out because C. B. Gupta wanted to be the Chief Minister after Sampurnanand and I would have been his only rival. I have never worked as C. B.'s junior; it has always been the other way around and C. B. wanted to keep me out."[14]

Within two years, however, the tables were turned. In the 1957 election, C. B. Gupta and many of his supporters in the government were defeated. Constitutionally, Gupta could not be taken into the government unless he held a seat in either the Assembly or the Legislative Council. With Gupta's entry into the Cabinet barred for the time being, Sampurnanand was left without a party manager in the government. He now turned to Gautam, who was taken into the Cabinet as Minister for Cooperation. The inclusion of Gautam in the ministry was a direct affront to C. B. Gupta,

[14] Interview in Lucknow on November 21, 1961.

who then began a systematic warfare against the Sampurnanand government. Gupta's position, despite his defeat and his exclusion from the government, was still very strong. He still controlled the party organization and finances and had loyal allies within the government as well: nine ministers in the Uttar Pradesh government owed allegiance to Gupta and maintained a second front for him in the government and the legislature.

For a time, efforts at compromise between the two groups were made. By the middle of 1958, however, open conflicts began to occur. Sampurnanand treated the conflicts as a challenge to him and his government and placed his prestige into the battle against Gupta. Events began to move rapidly now and more and more Congressmen in the legislature and in the party organization were forced to take sides and join either the "dissident" Gupta group or the "ministerialist" Sampurnanand group. In July, 1959, Gupta demonstrated his power in the Congress Legislature Party of the Legislative Council (upper house) of the state government. In an election for chairman of the Council, the nominee of Sampurnanand was defeated by a nominee of Gupta. In November, the nine Ministers in the Sampurnanand government who owed allegiance to Gupta resigned their posts. Not long afterwards another prominent Cabinet member, Charan Singh, also resigned, for reasons of his own, and joined the Gupta camp. In March, 1959, when an opposition motion of no-confidence in the government was being considered in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, ninety-eight dissident Congress members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) submitted a memorandum to the government, which was released to the press, declaring that, although they would not vote against the government, they had no confidence in it.

The final showdown, however, was put off for another year. The biannual elections of the Provincial Congress Committee (PCC) were scheduled for 1960, so that both sides spent the remainder of 1959 and the major part of 1960 enrolling party members and organizing support in the districts for the election of delegates to the PCC. When the time for elections came in October, 1960, Gupta had a clear majority of the delegates behind him and he decided to contest the election for president of the PCC. Sampurnanand made a prestige issue of the matter and declared that, if the government's candidate for president were defeated, he would resign his position as Chief Minister. The elections were held despite Sampurnanand's threat; Gupta won not only the presidency, but every important office in the PCC Executive Committee for his followers. Sampurnanand and his government resigned a month later and C. B. Gupta was elected leader of the party in the legislature and thus became the state's third chief minister.

Sampurnanand made the mistake of permitting himself to be dominated by one factional leader: first Gupta, then Gautam. What was worse, in

terms of political strategy, was his later adoption of one group as his own. Gupta never objected to Sampurnanand as Chief Minister; his targets were those who controlled the Chief Minister to the exclusion of himself. Sampurnanand placed his own personal prestige into the struggle on the side of one of the contending groups, with the result that his own prestige fell and he became identified as a factional leader, rather than the leader of the Congress and of the people of the state.

Party versus Government

Sampurnanand's fall can be traced to his personal failures as a political manager, but his fall and the rise of Gupta to the chief ministership were symbols of a struggle that dominated Congress politics throughout India in the last decade. In the context of all-India politics, Uttar Pradesh was the fourth state in the Indian Union where a Provincial Congress president became chief minister.[18]

Conflicts between the organizational and the governmental wings of parties of extra-parliamentary origin are common in democratic countries. In Uttar Pradesh, the formal debate between the opposing groups was carried on in terms of the respective roles of party and government. While Gupta was out of the government, his followers in the party demanded the right of consultation by government with the party organization on policy matters. Simultaneously, the nine Ministers in the Sampurnanand government who owed allegiance to Gupta demanded freedom of action in organizational matters—in effect, the right to remain in the government while working in the party organization against the government.

Although the debate was phrased in a language of principle, there were no real policy differences between the opposing groups. To give the debate a substantive policy content, the leaders of the "dissident" group in the party raised an issue relating to the retirement age of government officials—the "dissident" group favored a retirement age of 55, the government favored a retirement age of 58. The issue was of no importance in itself; it merely served as a convenient handle for the followers of Gupta in the party organization to criticize the ministry since the ministry's position was contrary to the national policy.

Both the question of freedom of action for members of government in matters relating to party organization and the policy issue were referred to the national party leadership. On these and other similar issues, the High Command (the national leadership of the Congress) has generally avoided

[18] A summary and analysis of the development of conflict between the organizational and governmental wings of the state Congress parties appears in Marcus F. Franda, "The Organizational Development of India's Congress Party," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXV (Fall, 1962), 248-260.

"constitutional" niceties and has acted pragmatically in an effort to maintain political stability at all costs. Thus, on the first question of "freedom of action," the High Command gave a decision so vaguely worded that each side could interpret it to its own advantage. The national leadership did not want to take the risk of precipitating a crisis by giving a clear verdict for either group. On the retirement age issue, which required a clear answer, the High Command supported Sampurnanand, with the obvious desire to maintain governmental stability.

By far the most important issues related to the resignation of Sampurnanand and the election of Gupta as Chief Minister. Sampurnanand had placed his personal prestige and that of the government into the struggle by threatening to resign if Gupta was elected president of the PCC. On November 12, 1960, Sampurnanand submitted his resignation to the Congress Legislature Party. The supporters of the government still retained a majority in the Congress Legislature Party and they succeeded in passing a resolution requesting Sampurnanand to continue in office. At this point, the question was referred to Pandit Nehru, who advised Sampurnanand to resign. Nehru and the High Command evidently felt that Sampurnanand had made a mistake in threatening to resign over a party matter,[18] but that he should now carry out his promise.

After the question of Sampurnanand's resignation was settled, the issue to be decided was whether or not the Congress Legislature Party should have the right to elect the new Chief Minister by a free vote. The High Command again refused to decide the formal issue. The national leadership decided against the right of the Congress Legislature Party, not because it wished to establish the ascendancy of the party organization, but because it felt that the selection of Gupta as Chief Minister would better guarantee political stability in Uttar Pradesh. The pragmatic approach of the High Command to this issue is clear in the following summary of the decision, contained in the *Report of the General Secretaries* of the Indian National Congress for 1960:

> The election of a new Leader posed a difficult problem. The Central Parliamentary Board was anxious to ensure orderly succession to Dr. Sampurnanand. It also desired that the new Leader should have as far as possible the full support of the Party so that he could be instrumental in strengthening unity in the Congress Assembly Party as also in the Congress organisation. A suggestion was put forward that Shri C. B. Gupta who has recently been elected the President of the PCC . . . should succeed Dr. Sampurnanand. It was, however, necessary that he

[18] The Central Parliamentary Board passed a resolution on October 18, 1960, regretting "that circumstances should have arisen which induced him [Sampurnanand] to offer his resignation." Cited in *Report of the General Secretaries, January, 1960 to December, 1960* (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1960), p. 46.

should do so in an atmosphere of general approval. . . . The reaction to the suggestion was not one of unanimous approval in the Congress Assembly Party. A section of Congress MLAs felt that the discretion of the Party should not be fettered by any suggestion from any high quarter. It was, however, necessary in the special conditions of Uttar Pradesh that succession to Dr. Sampurnanand should be smooth and orderly to the maximum extent possible.[17]

To ensure a "smooth and orderly" succession, frantic last-minute efforts by the national leadership were necessary. Pandit Pant and Lal Bahadur Shastri, two men noted for their powers of persuasion, flew to Lucknow from Delhi and, after considerable private negotiation, succeeded in prevailing upon the leaders of the Sampurnanand group not to press their right to elect the new leader and to accept Gupta as the new Chief Minister.[18]

Although the national leadership clearly avoided making a decision on the roles to be assigned to the organizational and governmental wings of the party, its intervention in favor of the unanimous selection of Gupta as Chief Minister involved a recognition of the fact that political stability could not be assured without the cooperation of the state party leadership. The victory of the party organization over the government, in Uttar Pradesh as in other states, marked a fundamental change in the character of the political leadership governing the Indian states. In Uttar Pradesh, an historical period ended when Pandit Pant left for the center. Pant was the last of the prominent leaders of the nationalist movement from Uttar Pradesh to take an active part in politics at the state level. Sampurnanand, though not of the first rank of political leaders in Uttar Pradesh, had some of the personal prestige associated with more prominent leaders. The new political leadership is singularly different. People like Gupta and Gautam have little stature in the society other than what they achieve through the party organization. For these men, politics is a vocation; they do not bring status and prestige to office, but rather seek status and prestige through office.

One important consequence of this twofold change in political leadership —the change in generations and the change brought about by the rise of party men to government office—has been an increase in the frequency and in the intensity of internal factional quarrels in the Congress party in the states. Largely for this reason, the national leadership of the Congress took the bold step in 1963 of attempting a wholesale reorganization of political leadership in the states. In Uttar Pradesh, the most significant change was the replacement of Gupta by a new Chief Minister and the forced return of Gupta to the party organization. It is useful to examine the events leading up to this change in Uttar Pradesh politics in the context of the whole range of center-state relations within the Congress organization.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
[18] *Leader*, November 30, December 1, 2, 1960.

Center-state relations

The evidence from Uttar Pradesh indicates that there are two important characteristics of center-state relations in the Congress organization. In the first place, the relationship between the central and national party leadership in the past has been largely informal rather than structured; it has been based upon the influence which people like Pandit Nehru, Pandit Pant, and Lal Bahadur Shastri have wielded in Uttar Pradesh politics because of their close connections with the state Congress and their reputations for impartiality. Second, the major role which the High Command plays in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics is one of mediation; the end of mediation is always to maintain the unity of the party and the stability of the state government and to prevent one group from liquidating another. Direct dictation from the national leadership to the state leadership occurs occasionally. The national leadership may insist upon the resignation of a PCC president or a chief minister who fails to maintain party unity and whose actions prejudice governmental stability. However, the High Command finds it difficult to impose new leadership upon the state Congress or upon the state government.

Although Pandit Pant was taken into the central Cabinet in 1955, one of his major tasks until his death remained that of maintaining a measure of stability in the Uttar Pradesh Congress. Thus, during the selection of candidates to contest the 1957 elections, Pant occupied a pivotal position on the state Parliamentary Board and saw to it that neither faction could liquidate the other through an imbalance in the ticket selections.[19] He also exercised all his powers of persuasion to postpone a showdown between the followers of Gupta and the followers of Sampurnanand. For example, Gupta had planned to show his control over the party organization in the 1958 PCC elections, but was persuaded by Pant not to force a contest at that time. Later in the year, Lal Bahadur Shastri (at that time a senior minister in the central government from Uttar Pradesh) performed a similar function at a requisitioned meeting of the PCC.[20] The last-minute flight of Pandit Pant to Lucknow in 1960 to ensure the unanimous election of Gupta as Chief Minister has already been mentioned.

During the prime ministership of Nehru, when all efforts at mediation failed, the last resort of the national leadership was a "suggestion" or a directive from Pandit Nehru personally. Thus, when Pandit Pant came to

[19] In the 1962 selection of candidates, which took place after Pandit Pant's death, state faction leaders deadlocked on a large proportion of the seats and left the decision to the Central Parliamentary Board. In this case, a structured relationship between the state and central party organizations replaced the informal one which existed while Pant was alive.

[20] *Times of India*, October 20, 1958.

Lucknow to supervise the transfer of leadership from Sampurnanand to Gupta, he arrived armed with a letter from Pandit Nehru to Dr. Sampurnanand and to C. B. Gupta expressing Nehru's wish that Gupta be elected leader of the party.[21] At times, however, even Nehru's wishes were not instantly accepted by state party leaders. After the selection of Gupta as Chief Minister, a new PCC president had to be elected to replace Gupta, according to the Congress constitution. In January, 1961, Pandit Nehru expressed his clear wish that Ajit Prasad Jain, a man sent from the center and unaffiliated to either group in the state Congress, be appointed the new PCC president.[22] Jain, as an old follower of Kidwai, was acceptable to the Sampurnanand group, but not to Gupta. In this case, there was considerable delay and much negotiation between the rival groups until finally Nehru addressed a personal letter to Gupta in March, suggesting the name of A. P. Jain.[23] Despite this second "suggestion" of the Prime Minister, Jain was not accepted by the Gupta group until May. Nehru's wishes again prevailed, but not without considerable delay.

In all of their activities in state Congress politics, the national leaders have been concerned primarily with maintaining party unity and government stability. Sufficient evidence of the High Command's role in this respect has been given. It should be stressed, however, that the High Command has been unwilling to achieve unity and stability at the expense of one faction and in favor of another. Since neither ideological nor policy issues are involved in state factional disputes, the central leaders have had no interest in the victory or defeat of local groups. A constant dilemma, therefore, is that the unity and stability which the High Command seeks can never be achieved for long. As long as opposing factions are tolerated in the state Congress, as they must be, conflict will continue. The greatest danger to the Congress organization in the future lies in the passing, not simply of Nehru, but of all the peacemakers at the center. After Pant's death in 1961, the entire burden of peacemaking in the Uttar Pradesh Congress fell upon Lal Bahadur Shastri and upon Nehru. The prospects for continued stability in the state Congress rest upon the continued existence of impartial arbiters at the center who command respect in state Congress politics.

Despite the important role of the central leadership in solving state factional disputes, the power of the High Command over state politics should not be overly stressed. The 1963 change of chief ministers in Uttar Pradesh illustrates both the extent and the limits of the power of the High Command in state Congress politics. In July, 1963, the Chief Minister of Madras publicly announced a suggestion, which was quickly approved by the

[21] *Leader*, December 1, 1960.
[22] *Statesman*, January 24, 1961.
[23] *Statesman*, March 8, 1961.

Prime Minister, that senior ministers in both the central and state governments all over India should resign from government to devote more time to party work and to strengthening and unifying the Congress organization. The "Kamraj Plan" (named for the Madras Chief Minister) was designed to check the growth of unrestrained factional conflict which had been going on in the Congress party at the center and in many of the states (particularly in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra, and Orissa) since the 1962 General Elections. In Uttar Pradesh, C. B. Gupta's resignation from the chief ministership was accepted and a new Chief Minister and a new Cabinet were selected.

The acceptance of Gupta's resignation had been preceded by months of intense factional struggle, reminiscent of the events leading up to the resignation of Dr. Sampurnanand. Differences between Gupta and A. P. Jain, the PCC President, had been growing bitter. Rifts occurred in the government also, leading to the resignation of ten ministers, deputy ministers, and parliamentary secretaries. On one occasion, Gupta found himself and his followers in a minority on the PCC Executive Committee.

Although the national leadership insisted upon Gupta's resignation, this time the High Command gave the Congress Legislature Party freedom to elect the new leader. A contest was held between a nominee of Gupta and a nominee of the opposing group. Gupta's candidate, Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, was successful and became the state's fourth chief minister in September, 1963.

Until the end of 1963, under the Kamraj Plan, the national leadership had done no more in Uttar Pradesh politics than fill its traditional role of ensuring party unity and governmental stability. After the election of Mrs. Kripalani, as after the election of Gupta, talks were held in Delhi with the new Chief Minister to express the High Command's wish that the new Chief Minister would carry out this double role and would form a Cabinet representative of both major groups in the state party. Both Gupta and Mrs. Kripalani showed considerable independence of the national leadership after taking office. Gupta did not admit factional opponents into his Cabinet until after the 1962 election. Mrs. Kripalani formed a more representative Cabinet shortly after her election, but differences over individual appointments between her and the national leadership occurred.

The question for the future is whether the national leadership intends to play a more positive role in state Congress politics. Until 1963, the High Command had played largely a negative role in the sense that it would not tolerate in office, either as PCC president or as chief minister, a Congressman who could not maintain unity and stability. If the national leadership were to interfere more actively in state Congress politics in selecting PCC presidents and government ministers, it would have to face considerable

resistance. Whatever role the national leadership adopts, the continuance of factional conflict in state Congress politics is a certainty.

Mrs. Kripalani, the wife of the Acharya, has no roots in state Congress politics. She joined the Uttar Pradesh government for the first time in 1960. It is likely that Gupta nominated her for this very reason, in the expectation that she would be dependent upon him as a party manager. Her selection as the Chief Minister and the manner of her selection have, at least temporarily, reversed the relationship between party and government in Uttar Pradesh politics. Unlike Gupta, she is a non-party person and, also unlike Gupta, she was elected in an open contest in the Congress Legislature Party. Clearly, the respective roles of party and government in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics remain undefined, either by decree or by precedent.

CONGRESS FACTIONS AND DISTRICT POLITICS

Some of the leaders and some of the issues involved in the internal politics of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh have been examined in the previous sections. In this section, the characteristics of factional conflict in the Uttar Pradesh Congress—the causes of conflict, the social composition of Congress factions, and the ties that bind leaders and followers—will be discussed.

Conflict and alliance

The first and most obvious characteristic of contemporary factional politics in the Uttar Pradesh Congress is the predominantly personal nature of factional groups. Although the language of conflict is often phrased in terms of important principles and although a policy issue may sometimes be seized upon as a pretext for factional struggle, factions and factional conflict are organized completely around personalities and around personal enmities among party leaders. A second characteristic of factional conflict in the Uttar Pradesh Congress is the shifting character of political coalitions. Alliances develop and splits and defections occur wholly because of the mutual convenience and temporarily shared power-political interests of group leaders. At times, the Congress appears to be split into two camps, as during the struggle between the party organization and the Sampurnanand government; actually, neither side in this struggle was ever monolithic. Gupta acquired his decisive position in party affairs as a result of gradual accretions of supporters, only some of whom owed him personal allegiance; the rest joined Gupta for reasons of their own. The pro-Government forces were similarly composed of a number of faction leaders, among whom Mohan Lal Gautam was only one.

What are called "groups" in Uttar Pradesh politics, for example the

Gupta group or the former Sampurnanand group, are actually very loose coalitions of local, district faction leaders, tied together at the state level partly by personal bonds of friendship, partly by caste loyalties, and most of all by political interest. The membership of these groups is constantly changing so that often it appears that there are no persistent conflicts and no permanent alliances, that all is perpetually in flux. In fact, lying at the core of factional conflict and constituting a boundary line for group conflict and for shifting alliances are lasting personal enmities between prominent leaders. It is personal politics with a vengeance.

The inner core of a faction, which is usually very small, is bound together by a relationship which is in many ways similar to the *guru*[36]-disciple relationship in education and religion—a relationship which is cemented by the warmest personal ties of affection and loyalty between master and disciple, leader and follower. It is the closeness of the ties among the members of the inner circle which often makes for the most intense hatred of those outside the faction. The faction leader is literally a potentate for a small circle of followers, for whom he holds a nightly *darbar* and from whom he expects unswerving and unquestioning loyalty. Men who are used to such esteem as part of their daily lives are quick to take offense when those outside the circle do not offer them sufficient respect. Trivial misunderstandings between faction leaders can lead to a lifelong enmity. As a result, an atmosphere of bitterness pervades contemporary politics in the Uttar Pradesh Congress.

To make sense out of changing factional alignments, it is essential not only to identify the participating factions, but to isolate the lasting enmities between certain faction leaders. Within the boundaries of such personal enmities, there is considerable fluidity. The enmity between C. B. Gupta and Mohan Lal Gautam was one important boundary line for Uttar Pradesh Congress factional conflicts. Since 1955, Gupta and Gautam have never formed an alliance for any reason. However, the allies of these two protagonists freely form coalitions with either side for temporary political advantage.

Alliances among faction leaders from the districts can be lasting or temporary. Like the faction itself, each group or coalition of factions has a relatively solid inner core. On the other hand, there are some faction leaders who will not form permanent political alliances with any group, but retain complete independence and switch alliances at their convenience.

The composition of factions and groups

The most important man in any faction, of course, is the leader. Moreover, there can be only one leader in a faction. Wherever there is more

[36] Spiritual teacher.

than one leader, at least for the purposes of this study, there is something broader than a faction—a group or a coalition of factions. Faction leaders differ widely in personal temperament, but an ideal type can be constructed, in many ways similar to the Japanese leader described by Scalapino and Masumi.[25] The ideal Indian faction leader has seniority, education, integrity; he has an understanding of people's personal problems and struggles; he is personally conciliatory in temperament (as long as he is shown proper respect) and is able to solve disputes. Like the Japanese leader, the Indian faction leader is politically adept; as Indians say, he has "tact" and knows the art of political manipulation. Most important, he is selfless and generous and provides money and jobs to his followers.

A faction in the Uttar Pradesh Congress might be described as a clique with a larger, fluctuating membership.[26] The inner circle of the faction remains with the leader through thick and thin, for the members of the clique are attracted to the leader by the character of his personality. The larger, fluctuating membership remains with the leader only so long as he can provide material benefits or the likelihood of material benefits in a not too distant future. These men represent the "floating vote" of internal Congress politics.

Both the members of the inner circle and the outer circle of followers generally come from diverse social and economic origins. This is true equally of the inhabitants of an *ashram*[27] and the members of a faction. It is not to say that there are no differences in the composition of factional groups. The most important social category in Uttar Pradesh politics, as elsewhere in India, is caste. Personal enmities between faction leaders occur more frequently and are more intense when the opposing leaders come from different castes. The inner core of a faction also is likely to be somewhat more socially homogeneous than the outer circle.

Table 3 shows the differences (and similarities) in caste and community composition of faction leaders in the Gupta and Sampurnanand (later called Gautam-Tripathi) groups at various times between 1958 and 1963. The predominance of Banias in the Gupta group and of Brahmans in the Sampurnanand (or Gautam-Tripathi) group are outstanding features of

[25] "The ideal Japanese leader is one possessing seniority, the personality and skill required to bring divergent elements together, and access to funds. He should be a man capable in effecting compromises, achieving a consensus—in these respects a man adept at political tactics and strategy." Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 18.

[26] The relationship between cliques and factions is described in the context of politics in a Mysore village by Alan Beals, "Leadership in a Mysore Village," in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, eds., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 433-437.

[27] A place of work and worship for master and disciples.

the table. Equally important is the broad spread among caste and community groups represented at all times on both sides. Social diversity dictates coalitions among caste and community groups as a political necessity. Politics works in the same direction by dividing the allegiances of various caste groups.

TABLE 3
CASTE AND COMMUNITY COMPOSITION OF GROUPS IN THE UTTAR PRADESH CONGRESS

Caste and Community	1958 Gupta[a]	1960 Gupta[b]	1960 Sampurnanand[c]	1963 Gautam-Tripathi[d]
Brahman	1	3	7	5
Kayastha	1	1	0	0
Rajput	0	2	4	0
Jat	0	1	1	1
Bania	5	4	1	1
Scheduled Castes	0	0	2	1
Muslim	2	1	3	0
Unknown	0	1	1	1
Total	9	13	19	9

[a] Includes the ministers who resigned from the Sampurnanand government in October, 1958.
[b] Includes the members of the Gupta group elected to the Executive Committee of the PCC in 1960.
[c] Includes the ministers of the Sampurnanand government who refused to join the Gupta government, but does not include Sampurnanand (a Kayastha) himself.
[d] Includes the ministers who resigned from the Gupta government in 1963.

There is more division among castes other than Brahmans and Banias. Since the prominent leaders of the Gupta group are Banias and the leaders of the Gautam-Tripathi group are Brahmans, the other caste groups and the Muslims tend to have weaker loyalties to either side. Political differences also divide Banias and Brahmans, so that there usually have been some Brahmans in the Gupta group and some Banias in the Gautam-Tripathi group.

The importance of district politics

The political differences which divide faction and group leaders are not differences over ideology or policy. For the most part, differences arise over political influence and patronage in a faction leader's home district. Control over the District Congress Committee (DCC) or over an important Congress-controlled district institution, such as the District Board or a municipal board, is a stepping-stone to power in state politics. Under the new system of politics that has been described in the preceding pages, the

state party organization, the Pradesh Congress Committee, has great influence over the state government. The delegates to the PCC are elected from the districts. Any district Congressman who can control the votes of the delegates to the PCC from his district is a man of potential power and influence in state politics. Conversely, any man who wants power in state politics must have support in the districts.

The rise of party men from the districts to positions in the government and the extent to which groups at the state level are collections of district faction leaders is clear from the composition of the last Sampurnanand government and the first Gupta government. Among the 19 ministers of the Sampurnanand government who resigned with Dr. Sampurnanand and refused to join the first Gupta government were men representing 17 districts. Only two districts were represented by more than one minister. For 14 of the ministers, detailed biographies are available. Of the 14, 8 occupied positions on the District Congress Committee or on the District Board or on a municipal board in their home districts before joining the ministry. Three of these 8 ministers were ex-presidents of their DCCs; 1 had been secretary of his DCC and president of his District Board; 3 others had occupied important positions on their district boards, 1 as president, another as vice-president, and a third as chairman of the Education Committee; the eighth had been a member of his Municipal Board.

The proportion of influential district leaders in the first Gupta government was much greater, as should be expected. The 22 members of Gupta's first government came from 16 districts. Biographies are available for 17 ministers, of whom 12 held important positions in their districts. Nine ministers had been members or officers of their DCCs—5 were ex-presidents; all the remaining 3 had been at one time presidents of their respective district boards.

It should be noted in passing that there are no significant regional differences in the composition of the two governments. In the two governments together, ministers from 27 districts were represented. In both cases, the regional distribution was very broad—including all the important regions in the state. Six districts were represented by ministers in both governments. In fact, an important way of defeating a factional rival in a particular district is to appoint one of his opponents from his home district as a minister; the minister may then use the patronage of his ministry to build a rival faction in the district.

The most important aspect of district factional politics that must be noted is the fact that local factional systems are largely autonomous. That is, factional conflicts in the district arise out of social and political differences in the local environment. For the most part, district faction leaders bargain with leaders of groups at the state level for positions of power and

patronage. However, group leaders at the state level can influence the course of factional politics in a district, as has been mentioned, by giving positions of power in the party and in the government to local faction leaders.

This integration of separate factional systems is facilitated by the institutional structure of the Congress party organizations. A detailed description of the structure of the Congress organization is given in the Appendix. Here, it is necessary to note only that the most important point of contact between the state and district party organizations comes in the selection of candidates to contest the general elections to the state Assembly and to Parliament and to contest important local elections, such as the chairmanship of district and municipal boards. The procedure followed is that the DCCs make recommendations to the state Parliamentary Board, which may accept the recommendations of the local committees, choose from a number of names when more than one candidate is recommended, or may even select a candidate not recommended by the DCC. Thus it is of some importance for district faction leaders to be associated with group leaders in the state party organization. The situation is very much like what would exist if the British system of party organization were imposed upon American politics.

It follows from this description of the internal politics of the Congress organization in Uttar Pradesh that state Congress politics cannot be understood without a knowledge of political behavior in the districts. The rest of this study will be concerned with the patterns of politics and with the struggle for power in five district Congress organizations. In each district, the analysis will center around the causes, the character, and the consequences of Congress factionalism for the functioning of the Congress organization at the grass roots level. The analyses will be organized around three aspects of Congress organization—the motivations and aspirations of faction leaders; the ability of the Congress to operate local institutions of self-government and cooperation; and the capacity of the Congress to win elections. A special chapter will be devoted to the relationships between the local Congress and the local administration. In all of the district case studies, the interrelationships between district and state politics will be shown.

A major concern of the case studies will be to relate the problems of Congress organization and the character of local factionalism to the social and economic environments in which the Congress must operate. Districts have been selected for case studies to present as sharply as possible some of the problems which exist in the environment of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh, to illustrate the diversity of that environment, and to discover the effect of different environments upon the ability of the Congress to func-

tion successfully. Although much of the analysis that follows is concerned with factions, the Congress will be studied as a political organization in all its aspects, so that factionalism may be seen in the context of the total political activity of the local Congress organizations.

The districts selected (see fig. 4) provide a cross section of the economic

Fig. 4. Districts selected for case studies.

and social environments in Uttar Pradesh.[28] In Gonda, the functioning of the Congress is analyzed in an environment traditionally dominated by the owners and managers of large landed estates. In Aligarh, the Congress oper-

[28] The socio-economic environment of each district selected is discussed in the introductions to the case studies. The following table summarizes some of the available

ates in a setting of Hindu-Muslim tension. Politics in Deoria district center around the problems of people involved in the sugar industry. Meerut provides a contrast to Gonda, for Meerut is a district where peasant proprietor castes dominate economic and political life. Finally, the working of the Congress organization will be studied in Kanpur, the great industrial city of Uttar Pradesh.

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statistics on area and population for the four rural districts (Gonda, Aligarh, Meerut, and Deoria) analyzed.

Characteristic[a]	*Gonda*	*Aligarh*	*Meerut*	*Deoria*
Area				
Square miles	2,829	1,941	2,322	2,087
Rank[b]	7	27	17	24
Population				
Persons	2,073,237	1,765,275	2,712,960	2,375,075
Rank	9	11	1	7
Rural Density (1951)				
No. of persons per square mile	635	672	802	982
Rank[c]	18	15	9	1
Urban population				
Percent	4.9	16.2	20.6	2.4
Rank	38	16	11	45
Literacy				
Percent	11.7	19.8	22.4	14.1
Rank	50	18	11	39
Scheduled Castes (1951)				
Percent	7.7	16.6	13.5	13.6
Rank[c]	50	28	40	39

Sources: *Census of India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1962: Final Population Totals; Census of India, 1951, Paper No. 1 of 1957* and Vol. II: *Uttar Pradesh*, by Rajeshwari Prasad, Pt. 1-A—*Report* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1953).

[a] Figures from 1961 census unless otherwise stated.
[b] Out of 54 districts.
[c] Out of 51 districts.

VII.

Meerut: Caste and the Congress

THE ENVIRONMENT

Meerut district is of particular importance in modern Indian history, for it was here that the famous Mutiny of 1857 began. Even before 1857, Meerut had been an important battleground. The proximity of the district to Delhi has meant that Meerut has been influenced by all the major events of north Indian history. It suffered from the early Muslim invasions, from the invasion of Timur in the late fourteenth century, and later on "was ravaged by Sikhs, Mahrattas and Rohillas."[1]

The prosperity of the district does not seem to have been affected by its constant use as a battleground, for Meerut is one of the most prosperous districts in Uttar Pradesh. The relative prosperity of the district stems from the agricultural skills of the peasant-proprietor castes of Meerut, among whom the Jats are the most important and the most enterprising. The district's favorable economic condition is, however, threatened by the increasing pressure of population on the land. Meerut's population of 2,712,960 is the largest of any district in Uttar Pradesh; density per square mile is 1,168, the third largest in the state.[2]

Some industrialization has been taking place in Meerut district, which now has eight large sugar mills spread throughout the district and some small and medium-sized industries in the two major towns of Meerut and Ghaziabad. The district has an "urban" or town population of over half a million, but only three towns are of importance—Meerut (with a population of 283,997), Ghaziabad (70,438), and Hapur (55,248).[3] Despite some

[1] *District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh*, Vol. IV: *Meerut*, by H. R. Nevill (Allahabad: Government Press, 1904), p. 154.
[2] *Census of India, 1961, Paper No. 1 of 1962, Final Population Totals*, p. 348.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

industrialization and a relatively large town population, Meerut district remains overwhelmingly rural; the urban population is only 20.6 percent of the total.[4] The major crops grown in the district are sugar cane, corn, wheat, *juar*, and *bajra*.

Like the rest of the districts in northwestern Uttar Pradesh, Meerut has a large proportion of Muslims, who form close to 25 percent of the total population. Among Hindus, Chamars predominate numerically, followed by Jats, Brahmans, Rajputs, Banias, Gujars, Tyagis, and Ahirs. Before *zamindari* abolition, the major proprietary castes were Jats, Banias, Tyagis, Rajputs, Gujars, Brahmans, and Muslims. All of these latter communities, except Banias, have also been the leading cultivating castes and thus remain the influential communities of the district.

Meerut district differs from the three previous districts studied in many ways. Its relative prosperity stands in sharp contrast to the extreme poverty of Deoria. Though it has eight sugar mills and though sugarcane is the major crop in Meerut, the sugar industry is flourishing here rather than declining, as in Deoria district. There are more Muslims proportionately in Meerut district than in Aligarh, but Hindu-Muslim differences do not have as profound an effect upon politics in Meerut district as in Aligarh. As Gonda district was an area of great estates, Meerut district has always been essentially an area of independent peasant proprietors.[5] Before *zamindari* abolition, Meerut district contained only four *zamindars* paying a land revenue of Rs. 10,000 or above, compared to ten in Gonda, eleven in Deoria, and twenty-three in Aligarh district.[6] As a *mahalwari* area,[7] with very few large proprietors and a relatively prosperous peasantry, political power in rural Meerut tends much more than in most other Uttar Pradesh districts to be in the hands of the leaders of the locally dominant castes.

Another difference between Meerut and the other districts analyzed above, which is important to this case study, is the special caste composition of the people of the district. The political and economic life of Gonda, Deoria, and Aligarh has been dominated by the elite proprietary castes of Brahmans and Rajputs. In Deoria district, the failure of the Brahman-dominated leadership of the local Congress organization to open leadership positions in the party to the middle agricultural castes gives the Socialists an

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 349.

[5] With a population approximately 20 percent greater than Gonda's, Meerut district in 1948 contained more than seven times the number of small zamindars, i.e., those paying a land revenue of Rs. 250 or less (161,729 for Meerut, 21,608 for Gonda district). *Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1948), II, 14.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] On the *mahalwari* land system, see chap. ii, p. 11 above.

important political rallying cry and a potential mass base. In Meerut district, the two most important proprietary communities are nonelite castes in terms of traditional ritual hierarchies. In their local environments, these two castes—Jats and Tyagis—have high social status commensurate with their economic power. Yet, both communities aspire to more generalized recognition as "elite" castes: the Jats aspire to Rajput status and the Tyagis to Brahman status.

Since most Rajputs reject the Jat claims and most Brahmans the Tyagi claims, the potential for caste conflict in Meerut district would appear great. Within the local Congress, internal political conflicts do partially reflect caste antagonisms. However, it will be argued in this case study that the Congress has shown a great ability to integrate diverse castes into the local party organization without significant friction. The Congress has been able to do this because of the integrative functions of its system of factional politics. Much attention has been given to the disintegrative impact of factionalism upon party organization in the preceding studies. This case study examines the integrative aspects of factionalism.

THE MEERUT CONGRESS: THE ENEMY OF AN ENEMY IS A FRIEND

The "Dictatorship" of Chaudhuri Charan Singh

According to many Congressmen in Meerut, the people of the district are living under a "dictatorship." The "dictator" is the leader of the district Congress organization, Chaudhuri Charan Singh. Chaudhuri Charan Singh, currently Minister for Agriculture in the Uttar Pradesh Government, has dominated the district Congress and district politics since the early forties and has successfully resisted numerous challenges to his leadership during his long rule. Chaudhuri Sahib, as he is reverentially called by his followers, has been an unusually successful faction leader in Uttar Pradesh politics. Inspired less by a desire for power than by an invincible belief in the rightness of his actions and policies, Charan Singh seeks neither friend nor favor and gives no quarter to those who oppose him. A look at the elements of Charan Singh's power will throw more light on the requirements for factional leadership and political influence in contemporary Uttar Pradesh politics.

Charan Singh is not exactly an intellectual in politics, but he is a well-read man, with an incisive intelligence which he has devoted to a continuing study of agricultural problems in Uttar Pradesh. Charan Singh is the leading ideologist in Uttar Pradesh of the peasant proprietor. As a prominent member of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee,

he worked hard to ensure that the Zamindari Abolition Act would contain no loopholes, which would permit the continued dominance of the *zamindars* in the rural economy of the state, and to make certain "that landlordism may not raise its head again."[8] In his most recent publication, *Joint Farming X-Rayed: The Problem and Its Solution*,[9] Charan Singh has opposed—partly on technical grounds, but also because of his belief in the values of peasant proprietorship—the new government policy of fostering cooperative farming. In the 1962 factional struggle within the Uttar Pradesh Congress over the question of placing a surcharge on the land tax in Uttar Pradesh, Chaudhuri Charan Singh provided the intellectual opposition to the tax in a confidential government memorandum, which reportedly objected to the burden which the tax would lay upon the small proprietors of the state.

Charan Singh's devotion to the cause of the peasant proprietor reflects his personal and community background. Charan Singh was born in 1902 in a Jat family of small proprietors in Noorpur village of Meerut district. The agricultural skills of the Jats are well known in northern India. The *Final Settlement Report of the Meerut District* notes that "the Jats are hard thrifty men, and, it is hardly necessary to say, admirable cultivators. . . . It is remarkable . . . that in nearly all parganas they have succeeded in getting the best tracts. Whenever possible they have chosen the naturally fertile soil to start with, and when they find that they have to work on a poorer basis they make the best of it."[10]

The Jats are a proud people, with a martial history. The major Jat settlements are in Rajasthan and in the eastern districts of the Punjab. Jats have prospered in peace and in war. In the periods of empire in the middle ages, the Jats maintained their independence; in wartime, they extended their domains. The Jats were an important military power in the entire northern Doab in the late eighteenth century, after the final breakdown of the Delhi Empire.[11] They are now the most influential community in the Meerut division, particularly in the districts of Saharanpur, Muzzafarnagar, Meerut, and Bulandshahr.

In Meerut district, Jats are the third largest community after Muslims and Chamars, but are by far the most influential rural community in the district. In 1940, Jats cultivated more than 30 percent of the land in the

[8] Charan Singh, *Agrarian Revolution in Uttar Pradesh* (Uttar Pradesh: Publications Bureau, Information Department), p. 13.

[9] Charan Singh, *Joint Farming X-Rayed: The Problem and Its Solution* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1959).

[10] *Final Settlement Report of the Meerut District*, by R. W. Gillan (1901), p. 10, cited in *Meerut*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[11] A brief account of Jat military activities in the Ganges-Jumna Doab in this period is given in W. Crooke, *The North-Western Provinces of India: Their History, Ethnology, and Administration* (London: Methuen and Co., 1897), p. 117.

district; no other community cultivated more than 11 percent of the land.[12] The settlement report of 1940 notes of the Jats that "on the whole, there are few big landlords among them, and their strength lies mainly in numerous communities of thrifty hard-working small farmers who cultivate their own land and are generally in comfortable, if not prosperous, circumstances."[13]

Chaudhuri Charan Singh has made the Jat way of life his political creed. As the only Jat cabinet minister in the state government, his popularity among the members of his community in Meerut and adjacent districts has been great. It has been reported that the resignation of Charan Singh from the Sampurnanand government in 1959[14] "was taken as an insult to the caste" and that "anti-Congress feeling was high among the Jats" at the time.[15] Charan Singh has successfully contested the Assembly elections in his Jat-dominated constituency three times; in 1962, he polled close to 70 percent of the vote in the constituency against four independent candidates.

Charan Singh's place as the undisputed leader of the most important community in the district is one factor in his long domination over district politics. Another factor, perhaps even more important, has been his position in the state government. Charan Singh joined the Pant government as a parliamentary secretary in 1946. He became a cabinet minister in 1951 and has remained a minister since then, with a break in 1959-1960 during the factional conflict which led to the downfall of the Sampurnanand government. Charan Singh was a favorite of Pandit Pant and enjoyed Pant's patronage until the latter's death in 1960. As long as Pandit Pant lived, there were no disputes over the distribution of Congress tickets for Meerut district. In 1946, 1952, and 1957, no Congressman who did not enjoy the favor of Charan Singh received a Congress ticket from any rural constituency in Meerut. Thus, thanks to his position in the state government and his special relationship with Pandit Pant, both party and government patronage for Meerut district filtered through the hands of Charan Singh and through his hands only.

Charan Singh has many of the qualities of the ideal Indian faction leader. He is known for his intellectual abilities and has a reputation for integrity. No one has ever charged him with a desire for material advantages for himself. The major criticisms levelled against Charan Singh as a party

[12] *Final Settlement Report of the Meerut District*, by C. H. Cooke (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1940), p. 15.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[14] See chap. iii above.

[15] Mahesh Chandra Pradhan, "Socio-political Organization of the Jats of Meerut Division" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1961), p. 343.

leader are that he is proud by nature and uncompromising in his relations with others. The following description of Charan Singh by a Congressman of Meerut district is typical of the comments made about him by his opponents:

> He is not accommodating; not being accommodating is not a virtue of a politician. He is not even accommodating to his own people to the extent he should be. Moreover, once he forms an opinion about a man, he's not likely to change it; he has very strong likes and dislikes. . . . Charan Singh wants abject loyalty. You must bow down and then accept some small grace from the omnipotent Chaudhuri Charan Singh. . . . Charan Singh wanted that no leader should come to Meerut except he alone; he wanted it [Meerut] as his own *jagir* [estate]. He wanted to be the undisputed leader of Meerut district, whom all would obey.[16]

Charan Singh is faithful to his friends, provided their requests for favors are both reasonable and just to his satisfaction. He is ruthless towards those he considers his enemies—even unto the second generation. One young Congressman of Meerut, the son of a large *ex-zamindar* with considerable influence in the area of the family estate, claims that he could be "of much use" to Charan Singh. But Charan Singh, who long ago struggled against the father, refuses to have anything to do with the son.

The cohesiveness of a faction depends upon the personal qualities of the leader and his ability to distribute goods and services to his followers. Most faction leaders can only hope that the favors they distribute will be returned by the loyalty of the beneficiary to the leader in a time of crisis and contest. Some faction leaders have enough power to withhold favors also—not only to grant favors to their followers, but to prevent favors from being granted to their enemies. It is a rare faction leader in Uttar Pradesh who has the full armory of powers of the American party boss—the power not only to give or to withhold, but the power to take away. At the peak of his control over Meerut politics, Charan Singh had even the power to take away. The Mool Chand Shastri episode is an example.

Mool Chand Shastri is also a Jat and came under the patronage of Charan Singh in 1953, when the latter saw to it that Mool Chand was elected president of the District Board. However, Mool Chand had ambitions of his own and tried to run the District Board and distribute its patronage in the way he thought fit. According to Mool Chand, Charan Singh resented the fact that the District Board President did not "act according to his [Charan Singh's] wishes and he resented that a man whom he gave the chance of the Chairmanship was not following his advice."[17] Early in 1954, the followers of Charan Singh brought a motion of no-confidence against Mool

[16] Interview in Lucknow on October 18, 1962.
[17] Interview in Lucknow on October 19, 1962.

Chand Shastri, which failed to carry. However, Charan Singh does not accept defeat easily. Three years later, Charan Singh succeeded in having a resolution passed by the state Parliamentary Board, ordering Mool Chand to resign. Since this episode, Charan Singh has placed the chairmanship of the District Board in more reliable hands. He also saw to it that Mool Chand Shastri was refused the Congress ticket in the 1957 elections in Meerut district. It is from actions such as these that Chaudhuri Charan Singh has acquired the reputation of a "dictator."

Charan Singh has been a more successful faction leader than most others in the districts of Uttar Pradesh in the sense that he has wielded nearly exclusive power in Meerut district for an unbroken period of close to twenty years. Some of the elements of Charan Singh's power have been illustrated—his personal character, his relations with the Jat community, and his long tenure of office in the state government. Charan Singh's personal syndrome of power illustrates the requirements for political influence in local and state politics. His position as the undisputed leader of the most influential rural community in the district enabled him to gain political control over the district Congress and the District Board. Control over the district has guaranteed him an important place in the state party organization and in the government. In turn, Charan Singh's influence in state party and government councils reinforces his political control over the district.

Jats, Tyagis, and other castes

An additional source of strength for Chaudhuri Charan Singh has been an alliance with the leaders of another influential rural community of Meerut district—the Tyagis. The Tyagis are a highly localized Hindu caste, found only in the northwestern districts of Uttar Pradesh, in Delhi, and in two eastern districts of the Punjab. Only in Meerut district, however, are the Tyagis in considerable numbers. Before *zamindari* abolition, Tyagis were, after Jats, the leading landed proprietors of the district. In parts of Hapur and Ghaziabad tahsils and in a few other areas of the district, the Tyagis hold more land than Jats.

Tyagis generally are less enterprising than Jats and have been motivated more by an aspiration for status commensurate with their economic power than by the desire to increase their economic prosperity. Tyagis claim descent from Gaur Brahmans, but few Brahmans are willing to recognize this claim. Some intermarriages between Tyagis and Gaur Brahmans have taken place in Meerut and adjacent districts, but not on any large scale.

Before *zamindari* abolition, the leading Tyagi family of the district was that of Chaudhuri Raghubir Narayan Singh of Asaura. Chaudhuri Raghubir Singh farmed the revenue of 27 villages in Meerut district and paid a land revenue of Rs. 18,000. He joined the Congress in 1905 and participated

in all the civil disobedience movements. In fact, Chaudhuri Raghubir Singh was the first prominent rural leader of the Congress movement in Meerut district and the Tyagi caste formed the first wave of the nationalist movement in the rural areas of the district.

The Tyagis are proud of the role of Chaudhuri Raghubir Singh and of the Tyagi caste in the nationalist movement. Their pride is mixed with some resentment at the later entry of the Jats into Congress politics and the rise to prominence of Chaudhuri Charan Singh. This mixture of pride and resentment is evident in a comparison between the two leaders, which appeared in the July, 1959, issue of the *Tyagi Brahman*, a community monthly magazine. Part of the comparison is reproduced below:

> Chaudhuri Raghubir Narayan Singh was born in a great landlord family. The atmosphere in which he was brought up was very aristocratic. At the call of Mahatma Gandhi, our Chaudhuri Sahib from a great landlord became a nationalist. From then on, he considered himself an enemy of the British and, in the view of the British Government, the Tyagi caste became a traitor caste because of Chaudhuri Raghubir Narayan Singh. When the British Government was pushing back the Tyagi caste, at that time the Jat people came into the good books of the British, and, under their rule, were acquiring high position; whereas we, because of being in the caste of Chaudhuri Sahib, were thrown away like a fly from milk. But the Tyagi caste never gave way and it became a nationalist caste. At that time, the Tyagi caste was considered a Congress caste.
>
> When our people were locked up in jails, the followers of Chaudhuri Charan Singh were enjoying the *Raj*. Times changed and Independence came to the country. Chaudhuri Charan Singh was a capable person. Because he was born in an ordinary family, he had ambitions to be a big man and, because of his determination, he tried to become a big man and cleared all the obstacles in his way one by one, like a clever diplomat, and the majority of Jat votes in the district brought him into the limelight.[18]

The leadership of the Tyagi community has remained with the House of Asaura. Despite some resentment amongst Tyagis at the new leadership of the Jats, Tyagis and Jats have generally worked together in local Congress affairs. In 1956, the son of Chaudhuri Raghubir Singh was elected DCC president, with the support of Charan Singh. In 1958, the grandson of Chaudhuri Raghubir Singh was elected to the same position, again with the support of Charan Singh.

The important position of Jats and Tyagis in the district Congress organization is evident from table 7. Jats or Tyagis are the single largest community in almost every segment of the district organization. Generally, the positions of the two communities are complementary; that is, in a

[18] *Tyagi Brahman* (July, 1959), p. 5; translated from Hindi with the assistance of D. P. S. Dwarikesh.

given tahsil, one or the other community holds the dominant position, while the other has few members. The nearly equal place of Tyagis with Jats in the district Congress organization reflects the early political consciousness of the Tyagis and their important role in the Meerut Congress before the entry of the Jats into the Congress. In the rural institutions of the district, Jat dominance is much more pronounced. Ten of the 26 Block Development Committee presidents are Jats, compared to only 4 Tyagis.

TABLE 7

CASTE COMPOSITION OF DISTRICT CONGRESS COMMITTEE AND OF PCC DELEGATES FROM MEERUT DISTRICT, 1962

Position		Jats	Tyagis	Brahmans	Vaish[a]	Rajput	Harijan[b]	Gujars	Muslim	Others	Not Known
DCC Executive	(18)	3	6	4	3	0	1	1	0	0	0
DCC Members	(19)	4	1	3	2	3	0	2	1	1	2
MCC Presidents											
Ghaziabad	(23)	1	5	3	2	3	1	2	1	2	3
Baghpat	(20)	8	0	5	2	0	0	0	0	2	3
Sardhana	(14)	6	1	1	0	1	3	1	1	0	0
Meerut	(11)	3	2	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	0
Hapur	(18)	1	10	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mawana	(12)	2	2	0	2	1	0	0	2	1	2
PCC Delegates	(17)	7	5	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Total[c]	(152)	35	32	23	15	8	7	6	6	8	12

[a] Bania, Bishnoi, and Jain.

[b] All Scheduled Castes, including Chamars.

[c] Since there are a few cases of overlapping memberships, the totals refer to the number of positions in the party organization held by members of various communities—not the actual number of individuals of each community in the district Congress.

On the District Board of 108 (nonofficial) members, 35 are Jats and only 11 are Tyagis. The Executive Committee of the District Cane Committee, which contains 9 members, has 7 Jats, but no Tyagis. Six of the chairmen of the 8 cooperative cane unions in Meerut are Jats; the remaining 2 are Tyagis. Since 1950, Fatch Singh Rana, a Jat and an important ally of Charan Singh, has been chairman of the powerful District Cooperative Development Federation.

The data on the caste composition of the Meerut Congress also support the more general proposition that the local Congress organizations are dominated by the major proprietary castes. The influence and position of a particular community in the district Congress organization is more in proportion to land ownership and social status than numbers. Table 8 shows the percentages of land owned and land cultivated by the major proprietary and cultivating castes at the last land settlement (in 1940)

before *zamindari* abolition. Chamars and Muslims, though numerically the largest communities in the district, have very little representation (in proportion to their population) in the local Congress and almost no real influence—this despite the fact that, in Meerut, as in most other districts (excluding Aligarh, of course), these two communities are considered major Congress supporters in the general elections.

The political alliance between the leaders of the Jat and Tyagi communities has not been designed to exclude other communities from political participation. Chaudhuri Charan Singh is not a community leader only. Some of his major supporters in the past have been Brahmans. In 1962, the President of the DCC was a Brahman and an ally of Charan Singh. In the 1963

TABLE 8

PERCENTAGES OF LAND HELD AND LAND CULTIVATED BY COMMUNITY, MEERUT DISTRICT, 1940

	Jat	Vaish	Tyagi	Rajput	Gujar	Brahman	Muslim	Others
Land held	24.7	14.7	11.8	7.5	6.0	4.7	15.2	15.4
Land cultivated	30.7	. . .[a]	10.8	10.1	11.0	7.1	7.8	22.5

Source: *Final Settlement Report of the Meerut District*, by C. H. Cooke (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1940), Statement 5, p. 13 and Statement 6, p. 13.

[a] The area cultivated by Vaish castes is insignificant and is included under "Others."

elections for president of the District Board, Charan Singh successfully supported another old ally in district politics, who happens to be a Vaishya. Relations between Jats and Rajputs, Gujars, Ahirs, and Rawas in district social life have traditionally been good. The Jats also aspire to higher status and claim recognition as Rajputs. However, unlike the Tyagis, the Jat aspirations for higher status are tempered by a more equalitarian ethic. Jats will take food from and smoke with both Rajputs and the middle castes of Gujars, Ahirs, and Rawas.

In a recent study of social and political organization among the Jats of Meerut division, Mahesh Chandra Pradhan claims that traditional Jat socio-political institutions, like the *khap* and *sarv-khap* (clan and interclan) councils are being used to unite for social and political purposes the various Jat clan groups and other castes of similar ritual status, such as Ahirs, Gujars, and Rajputs. Pradhan reports that, at two meetings of the *sarv-khap* council in the last decade, "it was emphasized by various leaders in their speeches, that these castes stand in the relationship of brothers to each other; have the same cultural and historical background; and, therefore, should unite under the banner of the *sarv-khap* council. Inter-caste mar-

riages between these castes were also suggested by various speakers." He even suggests that "these castes may come to form one cultural-political group to maintain their political dominance within their respective *khap* areas and in the area of the Meerut Division." [19] In fact, there is no evidence in the politics of Meerut district that such a political alliance of these castes is developing. Approaches by politicians to Jats and these other castes are not through the traditional caste councils, whose meetings are too rare to be of significance in any case, but through local influential leaders in each village, who themselves act quite independently and according to their own political interests.

Local party leaders claim that political tension between Jats and Rajputs, Gujars, and other middle castes, as well as among different groups of Jats, is increasing. One Jat political leader remarked that, in his constituency, relations between Jats and Rajputs have been particularly bad, since Jats make a claim for Rajput status, which is not conceded by Rajputs. As for the relations between Jats and other middle castes, he remarked that " . . . there were good relations among Jats, Gujars, and Rawas at one time because they [Gujars and Rawas] were also considered to be on the same level as Jats. Now, casteism is so [prevalent that] there is hatred; even among Jats, there is groupism. [Twenty years ago], there was peace in the villages and good relations among castes, with no quarrels; now, [even families] are quarreling with each other." [20] Nevertheless, the equalitarian attitude of the Jats toward other castes of similar status reduces the intensity of caste antagonisms and makes the political leadership of the Jats more acceptable than, for example, the leadership of the Tyagis, who aspire to more exclusive status as Brahmans.

In fact, one of the reasons for the transfer of political leadership in Meerut from the Tyagi family of Asaura to Chaudhuri Charan Singh was a temperamental difference in the character of the two leaders, which arose from their different cultural and economic backgrounds. Charan Singh was "a man of the people," with no desire for enhanced status in the ritual hierarchy. Before joining the Congress, Charan Singh was a member of the Arya Samaj, a Hindu religious revivalist organization which favored social reform measures, opposed the dominance of Brahmans over ritual Hinduism, and generally adopted an equalitarian approach in social matters, opening its organization to all castes. Many Jats, like Charan Singh, became Arya Samajists. One Jat politician claims that the Arya Samaj movement, many of whose tenets later became integrated into the nationalist creed and the creed of progressive leaders of all castes, was adopted first by Jats

[19] Mahesh Chandra Pradhan, *op. cit.*, p. 344.
[20] Interview in Meerut on December 14, 1962.

because the movement suited the Jats who, "by custom and habit . . . are reformers."[21]

The Tyagis also early sought social reform measures, but the aspiration for Brahman status is clearly exclusive, rather than egalitarian. Even the *Tyagi Brahman*, previously cited, admits that the transfer of leadership from Chaudhuri Raghubir Singh to Charan Singh was partly a result of a "weakness" in the character of the Tyagi leader who, "being from an aristocratic family, . . . could not make his place in the hearts of the people" because "he could not get rid of his aristocratic tendencies." Chaudhuri Charan Singh, on the other hand, was not inhibited in his relations with the people by "aristocratic tendencies"; he had neither the prestige derived from ownership of a large estate nor the desire to enhance his status in traditional Hindu society.

Brahmans and Banias

Opposition to the long rule of Chaudhuri Charan Singh has come largely from the political leaders of the Brahman and Bania castes in Meerut district. Superficially, one may receive the impression that factional conflicts in the Meerut Congress are based upon caste antagonisms or upon rivalry between rural-based communities and urban castes. Both caste antagonisms and rural-urban differences play a role in factional conflicts in the Meerut Congress. However, as in the other districts that have been discussed above, all factions in Meerut politics are multicaste in composition. The diversity of castes in Meerut, as elsewhere in Uttar Pradesh, makes it impossible for a faction seriously interested in obtaining power to restrict its membership to particular social groups. Every important community in Meerut district has its own political leaders, but faction leaders of different communities are oriented towards obtaining political power for themselves and not necessarily towards advancing the claims of their communities. Moreover, political leadership conflicts within each community lead to defections of Jats to Brahman-led factions, of Brahmans to Jat-led factions, and so forth. Faction leaders welcome such defectors from opposing factions and are willing to offer important positions in the local party organization and in local government institutions in exchange for the political support of influential leaders of different communities. Even more important in reducing the influence of caste antagonisms upon political behavior is the necessity for alliances among factions whose caste composition is different. The alliance between Jat and Tyagi political leaders has been mentioned. Here, the political alliance of Brahman and Bania political leaders in the Meerut Congress will be discussed.

Factional alignments in the Meerut Congress are more complex than in

[21] *Ibid.*

most districts in Uttar Pradesh. The reason for this complexity lies in the special political role of Charan Singh in state politics. Charan Singh is the only prominent leader in the state government who has refused to identify himself with either of the two large groups which have been struggling for control of the state party organization and the government since 1955. Charan Singh has a small following in the state party organization and among some of the legislators from the "backward" or middle castes, which enables him to act independently and forces the leaders of the two main groups to bargain for his political support. Thus, in 1959, when nine ministers of the Sampurnanand government resigned to show their solidarity with and loyalty to the party manager, C. B. Gupta, Charan Singh was not among them. Although he had differences with the members of the Sampurnanand group, Charan Singh chose to act alone and wait until his defection would prove of decisive importance to the Gupta group. It has been widely reported that, when Charan Singh resigned a few months later to join the dissident Gupta group, it was with the promise that he would be supported by C. B. Gupta for the chief ministership. The close balance between the two main groups in the state Congress has made Charan Singh and his small following a valuable prize for both sides. Yet the leaders of both sides would prefer to remove the unpredictable Charan Singh from his central role in state Congress politics.

Because Charan Singh's defection to C. B. Gupta was decisive in the downfall of the Sampurnanand government, the followers of the former Chief Minister have opposed Charan Singh in state Congress politics and have tried to help his political rivals in Meerut district. Relations between C. B. Gupta and Charan Singh have been equally bad. For various reasons, C. B. Gupta was not able to keep his promise to support Charan Singh for the chief ministership. In fact, C. B. Gupta was careful to see that Charan Singh, though Minister for Agriculture in an overwhelmingly agricultural state, had little political power. Most of the normal responsibilities of the Minister of Agriculture were taken away and divided among other ministries, whose portfolios were given to more reliable supporters of C. B. Gupta. Relations between C. B. Gupta and Charan Singh deteriorated still further when the latter joined the Gautam-Tripathi group in November-December, 1962, in opposition to the Government's proposal to levy a surcharge on the land tax in Uttar Pradesh. C. B. Gupta has also sought to undermine Charan Singh's power in Meerut district by helping the latter's political opponents. What gives factional alignments their peculiar complexity in Meerut district is that the followers of Gupta and the followers of Gautam and Tripathi are fighting each other as well as Charan Singh.

Charan Singh's oldest rival in Meerut politics is Kailash Prakash, like C. B. Gupta a Bania. Banias, who have traditionally been moneylenders,

shopkeepers, and merchants, form the bulk of the business and merchant class in the towns and cities of Uttar Pradesh. In Meerut and in many other districts of the state, Banias acquired quite considerable *zamindaris* in the rural areas also. By 1940, the Vaish or commercial castes (mostly Banias) had become the second largest class of rural proprietors in Meerut district (see table 8). However, most of the rural influence of the Banias disappeared with *zamindari* abolition, since hardly any Banias cultivate their own land.

Kailash Prakash was born in 1909 in a small town in Meerut district. His father was a moneylender and a *zamindar*. Kailash Prakash joined the Congress in 1930 and was jailed four times in the various Congress movements. In 1948, he was elected to the Legislative Council and in 1952 and 1957, he was elected to the Assembly from the Meerut City constituency. In 1962, he contested from Hapur constituency, but was defeated. Kailash Prakash has long been a loyal ally of C. B. Gupta. The latter brought Kailash Prakash into the Government in 1955 as a deputy minister. Kailash Prakash served as a deputy minister until 1959, when he resigned from the Government along with eight other ministers who were loyal to C. B. Gupta. He became a Minister of State in the Gupta government, formed in 1960. However, his defeat in the 1962 election prevented his return to the government after the election.

Kailash Prakash has little personal influence outside of his home town of Parikshitghar and the two major towns of the district—Meerut and Hapur. Meerut and Hapur towns have been two important enclaves where opposition to the leadership of Charan Singh and the Tyagi family of Asaura has been strong. In Meerut City, which became a separate Congress Committee in 1956, factional conflicts have been primarily intraurban in character and have related only secondarily to the struggle for power in Meerut district as a whole. However, the influence which Kailash Prakash has in Meerut City has provided him with the necessary political base to challenge the leadership of Charan Singh.

From his base in Meerut and Hapur towns, Kailash Prakash has tried to build a coalition capable of defeating Charan Singh. The difficulty facing Kailash Prakash is that he has little following in the rural areas of the district. In fact, Kailash Prakash is more of a symbol of challenge to Charan Singh than a powerful factional leader in his own right. It has been his close relationship with C. B. Gupta, the former Chief Minister of the state which has given him access to patronage and the ability to gather around him all those who have personal differences with Charan Singh.

The main rural opposition to Charan Singh comes from the Brahman leadership of the district Congress, who are allied with the Brahman-led, Gautam-Tripathi group in state politics. However, to oppose Charan Singh

in district politics, the Brahman leaders are forced to ally with the Kailash Prakash group, whose members in turn are allied with the Gupta group in state politics. One Brahman leader described the situation in this way:

> Now I am with Kailash Prakash. For a certain duration, I was with Kamlapati Tripathi. However, at present, in our district, that group cannot make any headway and I am seriously pitted against Chaudhuri Charan Singh. In 1960, I supported Uma Dutt Sharma for DCC President; he belonged to the Kamlapati Tripathi group. In the state, Kamlapati Tripathi is the dominant opposition group. In the district, most of us have decided to join hands with Kailash Prakash. . . . He too [Kamlapati Tripathi] recognizes the special circumstances prevailing in the district.[22]

Thus, the necessities and the intricacies of factional politics make apparently inconsistent alliances essential. Brahmans of Meerut have affinities with the Brahman-led group in state politics, as Banias have with the Bania-led group. However, Brahmans and Banias find it possible to combine when their political interests are identical. In short, it is the quest for power, not caste antagonisms, which ultimately motivates community leaders. The ultimate principle of politics in Meerut district is that the enemy of an enemy is a friend.

The alliance of Brahman and Bania leaders in Meerut district is strictly *ad hoc*. If one faction could win power without the other, the alliance would immediately be ended. Even within some of the local institutions in Meerut district, the alliance does not operate where it is not of mutual benefit to both sides. In fact, in the District Bank, alliances are reversed. The District Bank is one of the few important local institutions which the Kailash Prakash faction has been able to capture. So, on the Bank, Brahmans allied with Kamlapati Tripathi work with Jats allied with Charan Singh against a mixed group allied with Kailash Prakash. It is useless to probe into such alliances for any communal or economic principles of alignment. Factional and personal interests take precedence over all other ties.

Even Charan Singh and Kailash Prakash joined together for a short time, after both had resigned from the Sampurnanand government. Then these two old rivals worked together against the followers of Kamlapati Tripathi in the district.

The maze of factional politics in Meerut district illustrates sharply a fundamental feature of factional politics in Uttar Pradesh, which so far has prevented the development of any faction into a stable political "machine." This feature is the instability of both factional membership and of alliances between factional leaders. The instability of factional member-

[22] Interview in Meerut on December 16, 1962.

ship and of factional alliances has two primary causes—the availability of alternative sources of patronage and the status motivations of individual faction members and leaders. The effect of an unstable factional system is to produce continually a situation of parity or near parity between opposing groups of factions.

For example, in 1956 and in 1960, factional alignments in the contest for president of the Meerut DCC were completely different. Charan Singh and Kailash Prakash worked against each other in 1956 and worked together in 1960. Yet, in 1956, the vote for DCC president was a draw and the decision had to be taken by lot. In 1960, the vote was 73 to 70. The reason for the near parity between opposing groups of factions is that almost every shift of allegiance produces a counter-shift. If one side acquires the support of one factional leader, those who have antagonisms with the latter will join the opposite side. The situation is precisely the same as in Deoria, where the dominant faction leader lost "old friends" whenever he sought new alliances.

In recent years, Charan Singh has lost his nearly exclusive control over party and government patronage for Meerut district. For the first time since Independence, the selection of Congress candidates for the 1962 election in Meerut was bitterly disputed and several of Charan Singh's recommendations were not accepted. The existence of an alternate source of party and government patronage through Kailash Prakash undermines the cohesiveness of Charan Singh's faction.

Equally unstabilizing are the aspirations of faction members for leadership positions. Many of the defectors from Charan Singh have left or have been forced to leave the faction because they aspired to recognition and desired the right of independent decision and action which Charan Singh would not concede. Among the opponents of Charan Singh, the difficulties are just as great. Almost every minor factional leader in the opposition group claims to be the "real" leader of the entire opposition contingent. If the opposition group should achieve a victory over Charan Singh, these faction leaders would immediately begin to fight among themselves for the limelight and for the power to decide on behalf of the whole group.

Thus the existence of factional politics prevents the development of party loyalties. The availability of alternative sources of patronage and the pervasiveness of status motivations among faction leaders prevents the development of stable political machines in the districts of Uttar Pradesh. In the absence of either party loyalties or machine politics, there is an inevitable deterioration in the electoral strength of the party organization. Until 1962, the Congress organization in Meerut district had been one of the strongest in the state. Out of fifteen Assembly seats, the Congress lost none in 1952, only one in 1957, and three in the 1962 election. All three

of the seats lost in 1962 were lost as a direct result of internal factional conflicts in the local party organization. The Meerut Congress is still among the strongest Congress organizations in Uttar Pradesh. However, it seems clear that the Meerut Congress organization is beginning to be affected by the disintegrative impact of factional politics.

Rural-urban differences

Meerut district contains three towns with a population over 50,000—Meerut City, Ghaziabad, and Hapur. The growth rate in both Meerut and Hapur has declined, but that of Ghaziabad has increased in the last decade. Since 1951, Ghaziabad has replaced Hapur as the second town of the district. The prospects for a continued increase in the urbanization of Ghaziabad are good, since major plans are being put into operation for the industrialization of the town. Industry has for some time been spilling over from Delhi (only seventeen miles away) into Ghaziabad and there is every possibility that the entire area from Delhi to Ghaziabad will one day be a large industrial complex. Yet it is unlikely that the development of Ghaziabad will be so rapid as to alter significantly the rural-urban population proportions for some time to come.

Rural-urban conflicts have affected politics and the Congress organization in Meerut district in two ways. One kind of conflict developed during the nationalist movement in the 1920s and 1930s when the center of political activity and of political leadership began to shift from the towns to the rural areas. One old Congressman from a subdivisional town in Meerut described the transition from urban to rural political leadership which has taken place in the district in the following way:

> Before the noncooperation movement [of 1921], there were no branches of the Congress in the rural areas; the only branches were in the cities and they were led by eminent lawyers. . . . Pyarelal Sharma [a Brahman and a lawyer from Meerut City] was the father of the Congress organization in this district. After we went to jail in 1922, then Chaudhuri Raghubir Narayan Singh, the biggest *zamindar* of the district and a title-holder, gave up his title, was arrested, and took up the leadership of the district.[28]

Still, until the end of the 1930s, Chaudhuri Raghubir Narayan Singh shared the political leadership of the district with the "eminent lawyers" of the towns. The decisive change from urban to rural political leadership in Meerut district came in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Jats began to participate in the Congress movements. Since 1940, no DCC president in Meerut has come from an urban area.

At the same time that the shift from urban to rural political leaders was

[28] Interview in Meerut on December 12, 1962.

taking place, the leadership of the Congress in the cities and towns also was changing. In the towns, there was a gradual shift of leadership from the "eminent lawyers" and professional men to the middle class of businessmen, merchants, and shopkeepers. In short, in both town and country, the leadership of the Congress passed from the hands of the British-trained, Western-educated elite in the cities and towns to the rural and urban middle classes.

Although the notion of rural-urban conflict is kept alive in contemporary factional struggles between the Kailash Prakash and Charan Singh groups, the differences are largely coincidental and temperamental, rather than indicative of any real conflicts of interest between the rural and urban middle class. The state and national Congress leaderships have carefuly sought to avoid such conflicts by separating all large towns and cities from their rural surroundings and raising them to the status of independent Congress Committees. Meerut City acquired this status in 1956. The separation does not prevent attempts by opposing factional leaders from Meerut to undermine their rural rivals in the DCC or rural faction leaders from undermining urban rivals in the City Congress Committee. Nevertheless, the conflict which does exist, as has been seen in the previous section, relates to broader factional alignments and not to real conflicts of interest between urban and rural political leaders.

The kind of confrontation between rural and urban economic interests which one expects to see in an industrializing country has only begun to develop in Meerut district, primarily with respect to the industrial development of Ghaziabad. The major political problems which have arisen in connection with the development of Ghaziabad have been over the question of acquisition of village lands from the surrounding areas for residential and industrial development. Approximately fifty villages are affected by land acquisition proceedings for the development of the town. Peasants from these villages, usually assisted by opposition party leaders, have swamped state ministers who have visited the town with complaints against the acquisition proceedings and against alleged cases of exploitation of peasants by "colonisers" who purchase lands for profiteering purposes.[34] Largely as a result of the political pressures by rural interests against the land acquisition proceedings, the Government of Uttar Pradesh decided to reduce the amount of land to be acquired from 35,000 to 6,000 acres only.[35] In the final plan, some major shifts of location of industries were made also.[36] Numerous other minor concessions for landowners have been granted.

[34] *Hindustan Times* (Kanpur Supplement), January 17, 1961.
[35] *Statesman*, May 14, 1962.
[36] *National Herald*, August 12, 1962.

Although there has been considerable conflict over the development of the town of Ghaziabad, this conflict has had no effect on factional struggles in the district Congress for several reasons. In the first place, pressure has been directed against the state government, which has had the responsibility for preparing the master plan of Ghaziabad and for notifying acquisition proceedings. Second, political pressures on the issues involved have been strictly *ad hoc* and have reflected primarily the desire on the part of peasants either to save their land or at least get a better price for it. Finally, and most important, is the fact that the town of Ghaziabad, whatever its future prospects, is still a very small and insignificant place, a little town in a large rural district. The rural focus of Meerut politics is unlikely to be altered by the development of Ghaziabad for a long time.

THE 1962 GENERAL ELECTIONS: CASTE, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS

The role of caste in elections is easily the most discussed aspect of contemporary Indian political behavior. Among journalists in India, a common notion prevails that very little else matters in an Indian election but the caste of the candidates. It is often argued that the Congress has been so successful in winning elections in post-Independence Indian politics because it has carefully analyzed the caste composition of every constituency and has selected candidates from the largest or most influential community in each case. Very little systematic scholarly work has been done on the subject. A pioneering study by Selig Harrison appeared in 1956, which sought "to establish the crucial importance of caste manipulation as a source of Andhra Communist strength." Harrison went on to say more generally that "the institution of caste, so peculiarly integral to all Hindu social organization, pervades the entire political system in predominantly Hindu India. Whether caste in India lends itself more readily to political manipulation than do social factors elsewhere has not yet been explored. But Hindu caste discipline clearly wields a measure of political influence in India that cries for serious study."[27] In a later study, Harrison argues that caste is not only important in each constituency, but that "caste lobbies function coherently on the basis of entire linguistic regions."[28] Although the development "of regional caste lobbies is most noticeable in the south," Harrison claims that even in the "sprawling unit" of Uttar

[27] Selig S. Harrison, "Caste and the Andhra Communists," *American Political Science Review*, L, No. 2 (June, 1956), 378.

[28] Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 109.

Pradesh, "smaller castes that do not loom large separately . . . can through coalitions find political strength." Harrison refers specifically to an alleged alliance of Ahirs, Jats, and Gadariyas in Uttar Pradesh politics.[29]

Harrison's comments on caste and politics have been criticized in an unpublished paper by Baldev Raj Nayar, in which it is argued that Harrison has not been able to prove his thesis statistically and that he has been forced to bring in other factors, such as "appeals to patriotism, nationalism and economic programs," whose relative weight in determining voting behavior has not been established.[30] Nayar points to evidence in another study that an election does not necessarily solidify castes, but that it may also disrupt caste solidarity when contesting candidates belong to the same caste.[31] Still another survey of the role of caste in politics, however, tends to support Harrison's thesis and claims that, "for the greater part of India . . . caste-loyalty comes usually before party sentiment and ideological alignments."[32]

A recent series of studies of individual constituencies in India's third General Elections provides evidence to support both sides. Myron Weiner, the editor of the series, notes that, "in some constituencies the political cohesion of ethnic groups was high, but in others factional and leadership conflicts within the community made it possible for candidates of many parties to win some support." In general, the studies revealed that many different factors influence an election in India, as elsewhere in the world, and that Indian voters have "many loyalties to choose from," not only loyalties to caste but to "kin groups, factions, . . . and individual leaders."[33]

Clearly, there is room for more precision about the extent and limits of community voting in India. In this section, an attempt will be made to analyze the conditions under which "solid" community voting does or does not take place, the effect of community solidarity upon the election outcome, the role of intercaste alliances, and the role of noncaste factors in determining the election outcome in individual constituencies in Meerut district. It will be argued on the basis of statistics and interviews from three rural constituencies in Meerut district that the success or failure of individual Congress candidates depends more upon the ability of the can-

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 135. The alliance referred to is reported to have operated during the 1951-1952 General Elections (in unspecified constituencies), but there is no evidence in contemporary Uttar Pradesh politics to support Harrison's assertion on the same page that this alliance "twines its coils in and out of state political life."

[30] "The Study of Voting Behavior in India," n.d., p. 7. (Mimeographed.)

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[32] C. Von Fürer-Haimendorf, "Caste and Politics in South Asia," in C. H. Philips, ed., *Politics and Society in India* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 65.

[33] Myron Weiner, "The Third General Elections, Studies in Voting Behaviour I: Introduction," *Economic Weekly*, XIV, Nos. 28-30 (July, 1962), 1109-1110.

didate to win support from many castes rather than upon the ability of the candidate to win support from his caste fellows only.

Baghpat

It should be apparent from the material on the selection of candidates presented in the other district case studies that Congress tickets are usually distributed through the processes of factional bargaining and that the tickets are not always given to candidates who belong to the largest or most influential community in the constituency. For example, for Baghpat constituency in Meerut district, there were two claimants for the Congress ticket. Although the constituency is dominated by Gujars, one of the claimants was a Tyagi and the other a Muslim. The Tyagi claimant was the incumbent MLA and had the support of Chaudhuri Charan Singh. However, the ticket was given to the Muslim, who succeeded in winning the favor of the Uttar Pradesh Congress President and the Union Home Minister.

The constituency is almost wholly rural, containing only two small towns, in which are situated 13 of the 90 polling stations. As in every rural constituency in Uttar Pradesh, there is a great diversity of castes in Baghpat. Gujars are by far the largest caste in the constituency, comprising about 25 percent of the total population. Gujars are clearly dominant in 18 polling stations in the constituency. Jats come next with 11 polling stations clearly under their influence. After the Jats come Tyagis, who dominate in 9 polling stations. Three polling stations are dominated by Rajputs, 2 by Rors, and 1 by Ahirs. However, the largest number of polling stations are of mixed composition, with no particular community dominant. There are significant numbers of Muslims in several polling stations; but in none are Muslims numerically dominant.

Seven candidates contested the Assembly election in Baghpat, but there were only 3 main contenders—the Congress candidate, who was a Muslim; a Communist Jat candidate; and an independent Gujar candidate. The other 4 candidates (1 Jat, 1 Gujar, 2 not known) polled insignificantly, although one of them polled a plurality in 3 polling stations in or near his home village. Table 9 shows the distribution of the vote for the main candidates in Baghpat constituency, that is, the number of polling stations (by category) in which each candidate won a plurality of the total votes polled. In this constituency, the vote of all castes was divided to some extent. However, it is clear from the table that the independent Gujar candidate had significant strength primarily in polling stations dominated by Gujars. The Jat candidate won 15 of his 31 pluralities in polling stations dominated by Jats or Tyagis. The Congress Muslim candidate had no significant strength

among any of the three most influential communities in the constituency, but won the election on the basis of broad support from all other communities—Brahmans, Muslims, and Chamars primarily.

The Congress candidate himself gave the following analysis of the

TABLE 9

ELECTION RESULTS BY POLLING STATION FOR BAGHPAT ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY IN MEERUT DISTRICT, 1962

Community	Polling Stations Dominated[a] No.	Pct.	Number & Percentage of Total Pluralities Won Cong. (Muslim) No.	Pct.	Communist (Jat) No.	Pct.	Ind. (Gujar) No.	Pct.	Other No.
1. Gujar	18	20.0	3	9.4	1	3.2	13	54.2	1
2. Jat	11	12.2	2	6.3	9	29.0	...	...	...
3. Tyagi	9	10.0	3	9.4	6	19.4	...	...	...
4. Other castes[b]	6	6.7	2	6.3	1	3.2	2	8.3	1
5. Mixed[c]	24	26.6	14	43.8	4	12.9	5	20.8	1
6. Urban	13	14.4	7	21.8	6	19.4	...	...	...
7. Information incomplete	9	10.0	1	3.1	4	12.9	4	16.7	...
Total	90	99.9	32	100.1	31	100.0	24	100.0	3

Source for caste composition of polling stations: *Census of India, 1891, District Census Statistics, N.-W. Province and Oudh, Meerut Division* (Allahabad: Government Press, 1896).

[a] A polling station may contain a single village or part of a village or as many as five or six villages. I have classified a polling station as "dominated" by a particular caste where the 1891 census lists that caste as the largest in the village or villages. Where there is any doubt, the polling stations have been classified as "mixed." I have spot-tested the accuracy of the 1891 census data on village caste in a number of villages in several districts in Uttar Pradesh—villages which I have personally visited or whose caste composition has been given to me by candidates. However, the accuracy of the census data has not been checked systematically. For this reason and because of the age of the census data, I have not tried to correlate exact percentages of caste populations by village with the votes for various candidates. The proportion of the population of Gujars in a "Gujar-dominated" polling station, for example, probably has changed over the decades. However, it is much less likely that Gujar influence has disappeared entirely from the village.

[b] Rajput 3, Ror 2, Ahir 1.

[c] Polling stations containing villages where there are two large castes or containing two or more villages, each dominated by a different caste. For example, polling station number 3, containing three villages, one with a large population of Rors, another of Brahmans, another of Bhangis, has been classified as "mixed."

election outcome in this constituency: (1) the Gujar candidate "made things difficult because he took most of the Congress supporters [among Gujars] away from me in the name of the *baradari* [caste brotherhood]." (2) The major reason for his success was that there was no Brahman or Bania[34] candidate against him to draw votes from these communities. (3)

[34] The Bania vote comes from the two towns, but statistics are not available to isolate the Bania localities.

He received a majority of the Jat votes because his uncle, who had been a big *zamindar* and a member of the Assembly for thirty years, had developed good relations with Jats by "serving them as an MLA and as a Nawab, getting them jobs, etc." [88] The statistics support the Congress candidate's analysis in every respect but the support he received from Jats. Although he achieved a plurality in two of the eleven Jat-dominated polling stations, the remaining nine went to the Jat candidate.

Left out of the explanation is any reason for the Tyagi vote, which went largely to the Jat candidate. A possible explanation is that the Tyagis were dissatisfied with the failure of the Congress to give the ticket to a Tyagi, as in the past; but this explanation does not account for the Tyagis voting for the Jat candidate rather than for the Gujar. Since no depth analysis was made in this constituency, no other explanations can be offered.

The Congress candidate's analysis and the statistics do lead to some interesting conclusions, however. In the first place, it is clear that contradictory tendencies may operate in a constituency simultaneously. There is evidence of some caste solidarity influencing voting behavior—Gujars voting for the Gujar candidate and Jats for the Jat candidate. Yet it is most significant that the successful candidate and the runner-up both combined votes from different communities and that the successful Congress candidate had much greater diversity of support in the constituency than either of his opponents. In this constituency, electoral success depended upon the ability of the Congress candidate to combine votes of different communities.

Barnawa

In Baghpat, the candidate of the largest and most inflential community in the constituency polled third because he was unable to win support from other communities. An even more dramatic illustration of the failure of a "dominant" caste in a constituency to elect a candidate of the community is provided by the election results from Barnawa constituency. Barnawa is the only constituency in the entire state in which the majority of voters belongs to a single caste. Sixty percent of the population of Barnawa are Jats. The rest of the population is divided among various castes, of which the largest are Rajputs, followed by Rors, with a sprinkling of Muslims, Gujars, and Tyagis. Yet in 1962 a Jat candidate on a Congress ticket lost to an independent Rajput candidate.

The losing Congress candidate gave these reasons for his failure in the 1962 election from Barnawa: (1) There were nine candidates, of whom seven were Jats, thus dividing the Jat votes. (2) The Jats worked for Jat candidates, so that all other communities combined against them. (3) Re-

[88] Interview in Lucknow on October 18, 1962.

lations between Jats and other castes in the constituency are not good because of caste antagonisms. (4) There was "groupism" among Jats.[38] The election results support statistically the Congress candidate's analysis (see table 10). Thirty-nine of the polling stations in which the Congress candidate was successful were dominated by or influenced by Jats. The other Jat candidates drew just enough support away from the Congress to turn the balance in the election. Finally, 35 out of 48 of the Rajput candidate's

TABLE 10

ELECTION RESULTS BY POLLING STATION FOR BARNAWA ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY IN MEERUT DISTRICT, 1962

Community	Polling Stations Dominated No.	Pct.	Number & Percentage of Total Pluralities Won Congress (Jat) No.	Pct.	Other Jats Ind. (Rajput) No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	Other No.
1. Jats	43	43.4	28	68.3	8	88.9	6	12.5	1
2. Mixed (some Jats)	15	15.2	11	26.8	1	11.1	3	6.3	....
3. Rajput	9	9.1	....	....	....	....	9	18.7	....
4. Ror	7	7.1	....	....	....	....	7	14.6	....
5. Other castes[a]	5	5.0	....	....	....	....	5	10.5	....
6. Mixed (no Jats)	16	16.2	2	4.9	....	....	14	29.2	....
7. Information incomplete	4	4.0	....	....	....	....	4	8.3	....
Total	99	100.0	41	100.0	9	100.0	48	100.1	1

[a]Muslim 2, Gujar 2, Tyagi 1.

pluralities were in non-Jat polling stations. In every polling station clearly dominated by non-Jats—whether Rajputs, Rors, Muslims, Gujars, or Tyagis—the Rajput candidate won a plurality of the votes.

Again, opposing tendencies operated in the same constituency. Jats voted for Jat candidates, but the winning candidate succeeded by drawing support from different communities. A comparison of Baghpat and Barnawa constituencies reveals that there is no common voting pattern in the two constituencies. In Baghpat, it was the Congress candidate who drew support from diverse castes; in Barnawa, it was an opposition candidate who had broader intercaste support. In Baghpat, most Jats voted for the Communist Jat candidate; in Barnawa, most Jats voted for the Congress. A tentative conclusion from the election results in these two constituencies is that electoral success depends less upon selecting a candidate of the "dominant" community in the constituency than upon selecting a candidate who can gather diverse support from various communities. In Barnawa constituency, factionalism in the majority community and intercaste alliances among the minority communities determined the election outcome.

[38] Interview in Meerut on December 14, 1962.

Dasna

Religion is often a more powerful divider in Uttar Pradesh elections than caste. Hindu-Muslim rivalries are sharpest in the urban areas where there are large concentrations of Muslims, as in Aligarh town for example. However, there are many rural constituencies in Uttar Pradesh where Muslims are numerically and economically the most important community. Dasna constituency in Meerut district is one. More than 30 percent of the population of Dasna constituency is Muslim. Muslims too are divided into caste groups. In fact, every major caste in Meerut district, except Brahmans, has both Hindu and Muslim sections. In Dasna constituency, the most prominent caste of Muslims are the Muslim Rajputs who dominate or are in significant numbers in 12 of the 77 rural polling stations in the constituency; all Muslim castes together have significant influence in 28 polling stations. The largest single ethnic group in the constituency, however, are Hindu Rajputs who alone are influential in 25 polling stations. Seven polling stations are dominated by Jats, two by Chamars, and one each by Ahirs, Tyagis, and Brahmans; nine polling stations are of mixed composition and thirteen fall in two small towns.

Five candidates contested the election from Dasna constituency. The Congress candidate was a Muslim. The winning candidate was a Congress "rebel," a Hindu Rajput on an independent ticket. Only one of the other three candidates, a Chamar on a Socialist ticket, succeeded in winning a plurality in any of the polling stations in the constituency. The results of the election by polling stations are given in table 11.

The voting figures in the Hindu and Muslim Rajput polling stations are most striking. Every one of the 19 Hindu Rajput polling stations was captured by the Hindu Rajput candidate and all 8 of the Muslim Rajput polling stations were captured by the Congress Muslim candidate. More generally, the Hindu Rajput candidate scored an overwhelming majority of his successes in rural polling stations among Hindus; 38 of his 44 rural victories were in Hindu-dominated polling stations and 24 of his victories were in polling stations where Hindu Rajputs are numerous. In contrast, 21 out of 26 of the Congress Muslim candidate's rural successes were in polling stations where Muslims are in large numbers. Put in another way, the Hindu candidate polled a plurality in 38 of the 46 or 83 percent of the Hindu polling stations, whereas the Congress Muslim won a plurality in 21 of the 28 or 75 percent of the Muslim polling stations.

The successful candidate analyzed the election outcome in the following way: (1) He claimed that he received "about 90 percent of the Hindu Rajput vote." (2) Although there were two Muslim candidates, "not a single Muslim" voted for the non-Congress Muslim candidate "because

they [the Muslims] did not want to lose their votes." (3) In the predominantly Muslim polling stations, "I was utterly defeated." [37] All three of the candidate's perceptions are supported by the statistics. However, he denied that communal voting was the reason for his success. Instead, he claimed that those who supported him did so because he was a local man, whereas the Congress candidate was an outsider. Although the Congress candidate was the incumbent MLA, he "did not visit even a single village during his five years and does not even know the names of the polling stations." The successful candidate remarked that if the Congress candidate had been a Muslim from the constituency, he himself and the public in general would have supported such a candidate. To prove his point, he noted that some

TABLE 11
ELECTION RESULTS BY POLLING STATION FOR DASNA ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY IN MEERUT DISTRICT, 1962

Community	Polling Stations Dominated		Number & Percentage of Total Pluralities Won				
			Ind. (Hindu Rajput)		Cong. (Muslim)		Other
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.
1. Hindu Rajput	19	21.1	19	36.6	...	...	...
2. Mixed (some Hindu Rajput)	6	6.7	5	9.6	...	...	1
3. Muslim Rajput	8	8.9	...	...	8	23.5	...
4. Mixed (some Muslim Rajput)	4	4.4	1	1.9	2	5.9	1
5. Other Muslim	4	4.4	2	3.8	2	5.9	...
6. Mixed (some Muslim)	12	13.3	3	5.8	9	26.4	...
7. Jat	7	7.8	5	9.6	1	2.9	1
8. Other castes[a]	5	5.6	3	5.8	2	5.9	...
9. Mixed	9	10.0	6	11.5	2	5.9	1
10. Information incomplete	3	3.3	3	5.8	...	...	...
11. Urban	13	14.4	5	9.6	8	23.5	...
Total	90	99.9	52	100.0	34	99.9	4

[a] Chamar 2, Ahir 1, Tyagi 1, Brahman 1.

of his best election workers were Muslims, whereas some prominent Hindu Rajputs worked for the Congress. He also noted that some Hindu polling stations were carried by the Congress. Finally, he commented upon the importance of village factionalism; in most villages, one group supported him and the other supported the Congress candidate.[38]

It is likely that all the factors mentioned in the successful candidate's analysis had some effect upon the voting behavior of different groups in the constituency. Unlike the elections in Aligarh, communal issues did not pervade the campaign in Meerut district. Nevertheless, both the candi-

[37] Interview in Lucknow on October 24, 1962.
[38] *Ibid.*

date's remarks and the statistics support the conclusion that most Hindus voted for him and most Muslims for the Congress candidate. Clearly, communal voting, whatever the reasons, was the most important factor in the election outcome in Dasna.

Summary

Selig Harrison has remarked, in presenting his argument about the crucial importance of caste in Indian elections, that "invariably, the most perplexing election surprises become crystal-clear when the caste factors in a constituency come to light." [39] There is a great deal of truth in this statement. However, most of Harrison's data and his assumptions about the value of caste "manipulation" for political success are based on the notion, which may be true for the Andhra delta or other parts of south India, that victory goes to the candidate who can best mobilize the votes of the dominant community in a constituency. Some of the districts in the Andhra delta, for example, appear to have large Kamma majorities. In such districts, Congress and Communists pit Kamma against Kamma; the candidate who can win the most support from the Kammas succeeds. However, as Nayar points out and as Harrison's own analysis reveals, when Kamma is pitted against Kamma, caste solidarity is disrupted and appeals to noncaste factors become important.

The three constituencies analyzed above and the previous data presented on the Aligarh elections suggest some more precise conclusions. First, there is a definite tendency for an overwhelming majority of caste members to vote for candidates of their own community, irrespective of party label. However, the real test of the effects of caste solidarity or caste discipline in an election is what happens when caste or community members are presented with more than one candidate from their community in a particular election contest. Here, there is conflicting evidence. In Baghpat, there were two Jat and two Gujar candidates, but only one Jat and only one Gujar candidate secured the votes of their respective communities. In Dasna, where there were two Muslim candidates, only one was able to acquire community support because the Muslims "did not want to lose their votes." However, in Barnawa a multiplicity of Jat candidates and "groupism" among Jats created enough of a division of caste votes to give the victory to a non-Jat candidate, even though Jats are in an absolute majority in the constituency.

The election result in Barnawa points to the increasing importance of factionalism in elections in Uttar Pradesh, not only to the divisive impact of factionalism, but to its integrative aspects. For, in Barnawa, while the majority caste was divided by factionalism, the minority castes united in

[39] Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades*, p. 109.

a multicaste alliance to defeat the Jats. It is hardly surprising to find that the previously cited statement that "caste loyalty comes before party sentiment and ideological alignments" is largely true. Nor is it likely that party sentiment or ideology will play much of a role in local politics in India for some time to come, if ever. However, it is quite likely that factionalism will play a continuously increasing role in Indian elections, just as it has already come to dominate party politics not only in Uttar Pradesh, but in other Indian states as well. Thus, Harrison's statement about the importance of "caste factors" in a constituency must be qualified to take account of the increasing role of factionalism in Indian elections. Election results can be interpreted only when one knows which castes are united behind particular candidates, which castes are divided by internal factions, and which castes will ally with other castes for election purposes. The introduction of factional considerations in any constituency makes many other factors important. For the ties between a candidate and his factional supporters in a constituency are many and various—involving caste, community, and kinship loyalties, as well as loyalties based upon favors and services done or promised.

It is important to recognize that both "caste factors" and factional alliances vary from constituency to constituency and election to election. Members of a caste which votes Congress in one constituency may vote Communist in a neighboring constituency. Intercaste or intercommunity alliances rarely extend beyond the limits of a parliamentary constituency. Factions in party organizations, in separate constituencies, and in individual villages all operate autonomously and are only tied together by temporary alliances of mutual interest. The development of party loyalties among large sections of voters, which would give some stability to voting patterns, is not in sight.

The *ad hoc* character of factional and intercaste alliances makes unlikely Harrison's predictions, arrived at during the height of the linguistic states controversy, that "caste lobbies" operating "coherently on the basis of entire linguistic regions" will dominate Indian politics in the foreseeable future. There is increasing evidence, not only from Uttar Pradesh, but from Andhra itself [40] and from other states that, with the controversy over linguistic reorganization of states now settled, factional politics is coming into its own all over India.

[40] In Ponnur constituency in Andhra, Myron Weiner found that, in the 1962 election, "factional loyalties within Congress proved to be more powerful than party loyalties" and that "multi-caste village factions were the basic working units for each of the Assembly candidates," in "The Third General Elections, Studies in Voting Behaviour IX, Village and Party Factionalism in Andhra: Ponnur Constituency," *Economic Weekly*, XIV, No. 38 (September 22, 1962), 1517-1518.

CONCLUSION

Congress politics in Meerut district reveals another facet of factional politics in the Uttar Pradesh Congress party, which has been touched upon only briefly in the other district studies. This aspect of factional politics is the relationship between factions and the parochial social groups of Indian society. It is a major contention of this study that the strength of the Congress in Meerut district, in Uttar Pradesh in general, and increasingly in the rest of India lies in its proven ability to integrate and accommodate different caste groups and to tolerate intraparty factionalism. The integration of local caste groups into the internal factional system of the district and state Congress organizations prevents either the dominance of a particular caste or community over others in the Congress or the development of polarized conflict between large caste groups or between Hindus and Muslims.

The growth of political consciousness among an increasing number of different caste groups is making diversity a political as well as a social fact in contemporary Indian life. Any caste group or caste leader seriously interested in obtaining political concessions must bargain with other caste groups and leaders to get them. Simultaneously, the growth of factional politics limits caste solidarity and encourages intercaste alliances. The "dominant" castes split and the smaller castes join together in an endless process of fission and fusion, which makes every political coalition inherently unstable.

Most faction leaders in the district and state Congress party use their community ties as a stepping-stone to political power. Still, the reputation that a politician has within his own community is only a prerequisite for power. In addition the aspiring faction leader must be able to talk to and share power with faction leaders from other social groups. Thus, in Meerut district, Chaudhuri Charan Singh initially came to prominence as a leader of his Jat community. But, Charan Singh cannot control the Meerut Congress on the basis of Jat support alone. To maintain power, Charan Singh has allied with other community leaders. Those who have opposed Charan Singh have also had to seek inter-community alliances.

The same pattern of fission and fusion, alliance and counteralliance is evident among the electorate of Meerut district. It is useless to seek consistent and persistent patterns in these processes. Factional politics reveals neither consistent communal divisions nor meaningful economic divisions.

The ability of the Congress to integrate new caste groups and their leaders into its factional system gives the Congress great diversity of lead-

ership and electoral support. Those who wish to oppose the Congress must match that diversity. Strangely enough, it is this diversity of leadership and support operating in an ever-shifting system of factional alliances which, though it prevents the development of political "machines" in the districts of Uttar Pradesh, gives the Congress organization a resilience which explains its past ability to gain and maintain power and guarantees that the Congress will retain that ability for a long time to come.

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