The Indian states, because of their lack of sovereignty, have generally gone unrecognized and unstudied. There have been many studies on each of the new nations of Asia and Africa, but little has appeared on the Indian states, even though each of them is in area and population larger than most of the member nations of the United Nations. This neglect is unfortunate because the Indian states present a special opportunity for studying processes of development. The states can be studied as constituent units of a larger system, and the units themselves are large enough to be studied as total systems.

The essays in this book compare and analyze the political processes of eight of the seventeen states within the Indian Union—Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Punjab. The contributors have attempted to treat the various states within a common framework, illuminating changing patterns of political participation in India, the problem of integration within the states, the many state party systems that have developed, and the performance of the state governments. In certain cases the authors have also dealt at length with special problems of particular states.

This volume, which grew out of seminars at the University of Chicago and at MIT, is the result of the work of the Committee on State Politics in India, an informal group organized by Myron Weiner under the auspices of...
STATE POLITICS IN INDIA
STATE POLITICS IN INDIA

EDITED BY MYRON WEINER

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1968
Preface

This volume is the result of the work of the Committee on State Politics in India, an informal group organized by the editor under the auspices of the Committee on South Asia of the Association for Asian Studies to further our understanding of political development in the states of India.

This symposium represents a first effort to deal systematically with politics in the Indian states, and we are painfully aware of its limitations. It was not possible to include studies of all seventeen states, and we very much regret the omission of nine of them. We are hopeful, however, that this volume will both direct the attention of scholars to the vacuum that now exists and stimulate the research already under way on state politics in India. We believe that the eight studies in this volume shed light on the changing patterns of political participation in India, the problems of integration within the states, the variety of state party systems which have developed, and the performance of the state governments. These studies were completed before the 1967 elections but all the authors have made some modifications and additions to take these elections into account.

Although each author takes full responsibility for his chapter contribution, I believe I speak for all the contributors when I say that we have all profited from a frank exchange of ideas at two seminars, one at the University of Chicago in April 1961, and another at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in late 1964. The introductory chapter represents the editor's attempt to bring together some of the insights provided by the authors in the several chapters. Complete responsibility for such interpretation, however, rests with the editor.

We acknowledge with appreciation support from the Committee on South Asia of the Association for Asian Studies, the Committee on South Asian Studies of the University of Chicago, and the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

I wish to extend my personal appreciation to several people who read and commented on my introductory chapter or who provided critical guidance on the manuscript as a whole: Bernard S. Cohn, Carolyn Elliott, Gilbert Etienne, Selig Harrison, and Richard Lambert; to Vineeta Singh who aided in the editorial work and prepared the tables for chapter 1; and to Mrs. Eleanor Mamber, Nancy Weber, and Helaine Levi, who provided splendid secretarial assistance.

Myron Weiner

Paris

May 1967
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UTTAR PRADESH
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

- NATIONAL BOUNDARY
- STATE BOUNDARY
- DISTRICT BOUNDARY
- STATE CAPITAL
- DISTRICT HEAD QUARTER

DISTRICT HEAD QUARTERS BEAR
THE NAME OF THE DISTRICTS UNLESS
OTHERWISE MENTIONED
IN RECENT YEARS, politics in Uttar Pradesh (U. P.) has entered a state of political crisis and instability, the signs of which have appeared in the party system, in the government, and in the processes of policy making and policy implementation. The maintenance of a stable party system has been placed in doubt by persistent Congress factionalism and continued opposition fragmentation. The persistence of internal divisions in the Congress has made it increasingly difficult for the party to provide stable and effective government. Finally, the crises in the party system and in the government have made it more difficult for planners and politicians to formulate, enact, and implement policies designed to accelerate economic development. The last problem has become more serious as it has become clear that there has been little economic progress in the state since independence. This chapter will focus on the origins and development of these three crises in the state's political process—the crisis in the party system, in the government, and in the policy-making process.

THE ENVIRONMENT**

Area and Population

The area of U. P. is 113,654 square miles,¹ almost exactly that of the state of Arizona. The population, according to the 1961 census, was

¹ Most of the material in this chapter is entirely new. However, in order to provide information for comparison with the other studies in this volume, I have drawn in some places from material previously prepared for and published in my article "Factionalism and the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh," Asian Survey, iv (September 1964), 1057-47, and Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

Preparation of the manuscript was made possible by grants from the Committee on South Asian Studies of the University of Chicago and the Madge Miller Research Fund of Bryn Mawr College. I am grateful to Professor W. H. Morris-Jones, who read the first version of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions for its improvement. However, I am solely responsible for all statements, opinions, or errors.

² Some portions of the material in this section have been adapted from Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), Chap. ii.

close to 74 million—a figure surpassed only by the largest and most populous countries of the world. In parts of the state, the land has passed beyond the point of population saturation—rural densities exceeding 1,000 per square mile in many districts—and yet the growth rate continues to increase. The decade from 1911 to 1921 saw the last population decline in this state. Since 1921, the population has increased decennially by 6.7 per cent, 13.6 per cent, 11.8 per cent, and in the last decade, by 16.7 per cent.\(^3\)

The population of the state is overwhelmingly rural; only 12.9 per cent of the people live in urban areas.\(^4\) The urban population is unimpressive only in relation to the total population of the state. The 1961 census lists 244 cities and towns with a combined population of approximately 9.5 million. Even excluding most of the small towns, which lack real urban characteristics, there are 17 cities with a population of more than 100,000, 7 with more than 250,000, and 3 with more than 500,000.\(^5\)

Administratively, U. P. is divided into 54 districts, ranging in area from under 1,000 square miles to over 4,000 and in population from 100,000 to 2.7 million. Rural population densities range from 41 in the hill district of Uttar Kashi to 1,138 per square mile in Deoria district. All districts, even those with large urban centers, are predominantly rural; only Lucknow district is almost evenly balanced between urban and rural areas. Literacy varies from under 10 per cent in Badaun district to close to 40 per cent in Dehra Dun.\(^6\)

### Geographic and Historical Regions

In broad terms, there are three major geographical areas in U. P.—the northern mountains, the central plains, and the southern hills. The central plains account for close to 70 per cent of the area of the state and 90 per cent of the population. The northern mountain region, Kumaon, forms the central part of the central Himalayan range, with Himachal Pradesh on the west, Tibet on the north, and Nepal on the east. The southern hill and plateau districts—including Mirzapur on the southeastern tip of the state and Jhansi, Jalaun, Hamirpur, and Banda on the southwest—lie on the fringe of the Vindhyan mountain range which separates North India from the Deccan.

\(^2\)Ibid.
\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 236-44.
\(^6\)Ibid., pp. 348-51.
The southwestern districts belong historically to the region of Bundelkhand, the greater part of which lies in Madhya Pradesh.

All of the central plains area of U. P. forms part of the Gangetic basin, but there are some important geographic differences within the area. Spate divides it into two portions—the Upper Ganges Plain, comprising all of the western and central plains districts, and the Middle Ganges Plain, made up of the eastern districts of the state and more like the plain of Bihar. The Upper Ganges Plain generally has a light rainfall, is irrigated primarily by the canal systems of the Ganges and Jumna rivers, and is mainly a wheat-growing area, with sugar an important cash crop in the northwestern districts. The eastern districts of the state have a heavier rainfall and grow rice and sugar, a major cash crop in several districts.

Within the central plains area, there are five regions which have had some historical importance and sometimes separate political identities. The Doab, between the Ganges and Jumna rivers, has been the scene of warfare where empires have been founded and destroyed. Three of the state's five great cities are located in the Doab, each representing a different civilization. Agra, in the northern part of the Doab, was the capital of the Mughal Empire during its greatest period; further south, Kanpur, a modern industrial city, was created by British entrepreneurs in the late nineteenth century; finally, Allahabad, at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna, is the oldest of the three and one of the most sacred of Hindu cities.

North of the Jumna, there are four other distinguishable historical regions—Rohilkhand, Oudh, Gorakhpur, and Banaras. Rohilkhand includes seven districts in the west—Bijnor, Moradabad, Rampur, Badaun, Bareilly, Pilibhit, and Shahjahanpur. The region takes its name from the Rohilla Afghans who rose to dominance here in the eighteenth century. Rohilkhand has the heaviest concentration of Muslims in the state; in three of the districts, the proportion of Muslims is more than a third of the total population. Rampur district remained an autonomous Muslim princely state until 1949.

Oudh, the north-central portion of the plains tract, containing twelve districts, is the area in U. P. with the longest historical identity. The borders of Oudh have fluctuated throughout its history, the twelve being only the last to be annexed by the British in 1856. Oudh was an

8 On the importance of the Doab (particularly the "Delhi-Agra axis") in Indian history, see ibid., p. 150.
important province under both the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire. The annexation of Oudh in 1856 and the land settlement which antagonized the talukdars were among the most important causes of the spread of the Mutiny of 1857. Lucknow, the last capital of Oudh, is now the capital of U. P.

Finally, on the eastern borders of the state are the regions of Gorakhpur and Banaras. The Gorakhpur region was sometimes part of Oudh, sometimes part of the old province of Bihar under the Mughal Empire. The Banaras region has more historical individuality. Jaunpur, in this region, was the seat of an independent Muslim kingdom which challenged the authority of the Delhi Sultanate in the fourteenth century. Later, the area became a part of Oudh; but by the time of the British arrival, the Raja of Banaras had become effectively independent of Oudh. The city of Banaras is the most important center of Hindu pilgrimage for all of India.

Uttar Pradesh is largely a collection of geographic and historical regions. Yet for the most part, the differences between regions are shadings rather than sharp distinctions. Moreover, the borders of the state are in hardly any respects natural. On all sides, U. P. merges into the physical and cultural environment of its neighboring states and countries. Kumaon merges into the central mountain belt, Bundelkhand into Madhya Pradesh, the eastern districts into the plain of Bihar. Even the northern boundary of the state is artificial, for there is tarai on both sides of the Nepal border. The Jumna forms a natural boundary between U. P. and the Punjab in the northern districts of the Upper Doab, but the same river cuts the districts of Mathura and Agra in half. The desert of Rajasthan encroaches on the tip of Agra district.

Historical Background

Uttar Pradesh is essentially an artifact, put together by the British gradually, by conquest and annexation, over a period of three-quarters of a century. The British first acquired formal sovereignty in a portion of the area of present-day U. P. when the province of Banaras was ceded to them in 1775. Wellesley acquired the lower Doab, Rohilkhand, and the Gorakhpur region in 1801. The upper Doab and Bundelkhand were acquired next, in 1803, as a result of the Anglo-Maratha War. Kumaon, except for Tehri Garhwal, was added after the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1815. Other small enclaves were added in piecemeal fashion. The last major territorial acquisition in the area of U. P. was the province of Oudh, annexed in 1856. The states of

9 The tract of marshy and jungly land between the Himalayas and the plains.
Rampur and Tehri Garhwal retained their autonomy until after independence.

The territories acquired by the British in the area of U. P. were not administered as a single unit until 1902 when, after several administrative changes, Oudh was merged with the rest of the area (then called the North-Western Provinces) into the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The name of the province was changed to Uttar Pradesh ("Northern Province") after independence.

A general consequence of the way in which the state was formed and administered is that regional identification with U. P. as a cultural or linguistic unit is weak. People there, particularly Hindus, tend to think of U. P. as the heart and center of Hindu India, but their identifications are generally either wholly parochial and sub-regional or supra-regional, embracing the whole of the Hindi-speaking area or Hindustan.

The Land System

The British established two entirely different systems of land revenue administration in Oudh and in the North-West Provinces. In Oudh rights of revenue collection and ownership over the land were granted primarily to a small body of talukdars, most of whom controlled areas comprising a large number of villages. Their control was both economic and political since the talukdars of Oudh retained some of the attributes of petty local chiefs. In the rest of the province, the land was settled with individual zamindars or with joint zamindari bodies where the latter existed. Some of the individual zamindars farmed the revenue of hundreds of villages, as did many of the talukdars. The big zamindars also tended to wield both economic and political power. In the joint zamindari areas, economic and political control tended to be exercised over small areas, comprising a mahal or estate of one or a few villages. The joint proprietors generally belonged to a single caste lineage which maintained economic and political dominance over other caste groups in the villages under their control.

Altogether, there were more than two million zamindars in U. P.,

10 In Oudh and the North-West Provinces before British rule, "the talukdar was the large-scale revenue farmer and semi-independent political chief," whereas "the zamindar was a local political power and the manager of a few villages, a single village, or a part of a village." Walter C. Neale, Economic Change in Rural India: Land Tenure and Reform in Uttar Pradesh, 1800-1955 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 42. Under British rule, while this difference between the two categories of landholders remained largely valid, some of the talukdars became revenue farmers and landlords of only a few villages, while some zamindars acquired rights over many villages.
most of them collecting only a few rupees in revenue from tenants to whom their small holdings were rented. However, there were also many large zamindars and talukdars collecting tens of thousands of rupees in revenue from hundreds of villages. After independence, the entire system of intermediaries was abolished by the Congress government of U. P. under the terms of the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1951. The act has had very little effect on the condition of the former tenants and the petty zamindars, except that the tenants now pay their land revenue directly to the state and they have greater rights of ownership over the lands they cultivate. The large landlords were deprived of their rights to collect revenue, but they retained lands in their private possession and received compensation for the lands taken away from them. Consequently, although the economic and political power of the big zamindars has been reduced, many of them retain considerable influence in the countryside. The continued influence of the former big zamindars and talukdars in the countryside is an important factor in contemporary party politics in U. P.

The Economy

Despite two Five Year Plans, the economy of Uttar Pradesh is characterized by agricultural stagnation and industrial decline: although agricultural and industrial output increased in the decade of the first two plans, production failed to keep ahead of population growth. In agriculture, the pressure of a dense population, cultivating the land by primitive technological methods, has produced a situation in which the small holdings of most peasants can barely sustain them and their families. U. P.'s agricultural problems are most severe in the eastern rice-growing districts of the state where population densities are over 1,000 per square mile, landholdings are very small, and few industries exist to absorb the increasing numbers of unemployed. Villagers from the eastern districts are often forced to leave their homes and seek employment in the big cities of Kanpur, Calcutta, and Bombay. Those who remain live under the constant threat of famine.

The state's industrial base rests very heavily on two old and declining industries—the sugar refining industry and the textile industry. These two industries together provide 57.4 per cent of the total value of indus-

11 Government of Uttar Pradesh, Planning Department, Third Five Year Plan (Lucknow, 1961), i, 5; problems of economic development in U. P. are discussed in more detail below.

12 For a poignant account of conditions in a village in Ballia district in eastern U. P., see Kusum Nair, Blossoms in the Dust (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., 1961), Chap. x ("Poverty Unlimited"), pp. 81-87.
trial production in the state and 62.4 per cent of the employment in large-scale industries.\textsuperscript{10} Employment in large-scale industries of all kinds in U. P. during 1962 was only 217,148. Small-scale industries provided employment for another 51,731 persons.\textsuperscript{14}

Economic development in U. P. has failed by almost every standard of measurement to keep pace with the rest of the country. Increases in income, in agricultural production, in industrial production, and in the number of students in schools have all been much smaller than the average for the country as a whole.\textsuperscript{15} The state's planners and government leaders are very much aware of the problems of economic development. The political problems faced by the state government in increasing the pace of economic development in U. P. will be given special attention in this chapter.

\textit{Caste and Community}

Caste and religion are the two basic social divisions in U. P. During the nationalist period, the most bitter social and political conflicts in the state were those which divided Hindus and Muslims. Muslims form only 15 per cent of the population of the state, but their historical position in the province was much more important than their numbers both before and during the British period. The Muslim aristocracy remained important in British administration in the United Provinces. Some elements reminiscent of the Muslim period of dominance in North India were retained by the British. For much of the British period, Urdu in Persian script remained the only court language in the United Provinces. In addition, Muslims received more than their share of government jobs in the administrative services as a whole\textsuperscript{16} and held dominant positions in certain departments (for example, the police) until independence. U. P. is also a center of Muslim culture for all of India. The two most prominent Muslim educational institutions in the country are in U. P.—Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarh district and Deoband in Saharanpur district.

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Times of India Directory and Yearbook 1963-64} (Bombay: Bennet, Coleman and Co., Ltd.), pp. 956-57.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, national income increased by 41.6 per cent, state income by only 20.6 per cent in the decade 1950-51 to 1960-61; foodgrains production increased by 52 per cent in India, but only by 22 per cent in U. P.; the index of production increased by 94 per cent in India, by 1.7 per cent in U. P.; the number of students in schools increased by 85.5 per cent in India, by 56.6 per cent in U. P. Figures from Government of Uttar Pradesh, \textit{Third Five Year Plan}, i, 5, Table iv.

A tradition of Hindu-Muslim conflict, primarily over the issues of language and jobs, developed in the nineteenth century in U. P. Of particular importance was the controversy which arose in 1883 to replace Urdu in Persian script with Hindi in the Devanagari script as the official court language. It was only in 1900 that Hindi acquired official status in U. P. along with Urdu. The special privileges which Muslims in fact enjoyed made the demands of Muslim leaders for separate electorates and special representation in administrative services appear unjust to some U. P. Hindus, even though Muslim grievances existed in other provinces. Conflict and tension increased during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Aligarh Muslim University soon became the Muslim center of opposition to the main current of Indian nationalism represented by the Congress. Hindu communalism grew and found its organizational expression in the Hindu Mahasabha, and conflict became increasingly violent. Hindu-Muslim riots, often resulting in many deaths, became a common occurrence in the life of the province. The bitterness which developed between the two communities in this period has continued to be an important element in U. P. politics.

In contrast, caste conflict has been less marked than in many other provinces. Caste identifications in the state remain very largely restricted to local caste groups. State-wide caste associations exist only among the low caste (Scheduled Caste) groups and these are often paper organizations. The strongest caste movement so far has been that of the Chamars, a low-caste group of leather workers and field laborers in the countryside and of menial laborers in the cities and towns. Discontent among the Chamars, the largest caste group in the state, over their social status and economic position has been reported in a village in eastern U. P.,18 in Kanpur City,19 in Delhi district20 (on the U. P. border), and in the western districts of the state.21 Clearly, the potential for a state-wide caste movement exists among the Chamars, but so far the protests of local Chamar castes have not been coordinated in such a movement.

17 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
21 See below, pp. 95-97.
The dominance of the traditional landowning castes continues in both economic and political life. The "dominant castes" are Brahman and Rajput in most parts of the state, but other landowning castes are important in certain areas, for example, the Jats in western U. P. and the Bhuinhars in eastern U. P. Between the dominant landowning castes and the usually landless low castes, such as the Chamars, there exist thousands of cultivating and artisan castes, most of them very small and known only in particular areas. Two large caste groups in the state are the Ahirs and Kurmis, the major cultivating castes of central and eastern U. P. Generally called "backward," they were often tenants of Rajput and Brahman zamindars before zamindari abolition; they are behind the Brahmans and Rajputs in education, and have only recently begun to show their potential importance in politics.

In the cities and towns, two important caste groups are the Kayasthas and Banias. Kayasthas are prominent in all modern professional occupations and are generally given the status of elite castes. Banias predominate in trade and commerce. Members of both caste groups have occupied prominent positions in the political life of the state.

According to the last caste census (1931), the largest caste groups in the state were, in descending order, Chamars, Brahmans, Ahirs, Rajputs, and Kurmis. These five caste groups accounted for over 40 per cent of the total population of the state. The Chamars accounted for 13 per cent of the state's population, while the Kurmis, the smallest caste group of the five, accounted for only 3.5 per cent of the population. Other caste groups constituted only 2 or 3 per cent or less of the total population.

The Nationalist Period

The Congress in U. P. The Congress was the dominant force in U. P. politics throughout the nationalist period. Like its counterparts in other states and like the Indian National Congress as a whole, the U. P. Congress organization integrated diverse social and economic groups, personalities, and viewpoints. In other words, the Congress before independence was a movement rather than a political party.

In social and economic composition, the Congress represented a fusion of the professional and business classes in the cities and towns with the middle class of petty and middle zamindars and the more prosperous tenants in the countryside. Disputes arose within the Congress over the extent to which the organization should take part in agitations by the tenants against their landlords. Many prominent Congress-

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men, including Pandit Nehru, did participate in such agitations, particularly against the talukdars of Oudh, where tenant grievances erupted in peasant agitations in the early 1920s and again in the early 1930s. However, Congressmen in U. P. generally worked through separate kisan (peasant) organizations on such occasions and tried to avoid identifying the Congress with a role of promoting class conflict. Even the proponents of peasant agitation stressed the integrative character of the kisan movement. Acharya Narendra Dev, the U. P. Socialist leader, advocated an alliance of kisans and "the smaller zamindars," arguing that the interests of the latter were with the kisans rather than with the big zamindars.

The Congress also integrated diverse viewpoints and personalities during the nationalist period. Hindu revivalists, like Purushottamdas Tandon, worked side by side with secularists like Pandit Nehru. The Congress Socialist party also occupied a very important position in the U. P. Congress before independence. In addition to Congressmen who held more or less pronounced views on cultural and economic issues, there were many leaders in the Congress whose positions were based on their skill in politics rather than on their beliefs. That is, there were personal groups as well as ideological tendencies in the U. P. Congress. All of these groups and tendencies existed in a state of balanced tension in the period before independence. Only the common desire for independence united Congressmen; after its achievement, many found that they could no longer work together.

Political conflict in the pre-independence period. Although the Congress was an integrative movement in the pre-independence period, it did not succeed in uniting all classes and groups in the society. The big zamindars and talukdars only rarely joined the Congress. Congressmen, as has been mentioned, supported the tenants in their struggles against the landlords. The latter, in turn, supported the government against the Congress and organized political associations for the purpose. During the Non-Cooperation movement of 1921-22, the zamindars and talukdars, with the assistance of administrative officials, organized "loyalty leagues" to combat Congress influence. In the 1936 elections to the provincial legislative assembly, many landlords fought against Congressmen on the platform of the National Agriculturalist party. However, largely because of internal divisions among the landlords,

landlord associations and parties were never very effective in U. P. politics.25

A more serious problem for the Congress in U. P. was its failure to integrate most Muslims into the organization during the nationalist period. The Congress did win the support of some Muslims, both secularists like Rafi Ahmad Kidwai and the more traditionalist Muslims of the Deoband School.26 However, most modern, Western-educated Muslims, particularly those trained in the Aligarh Muslim University, remained aloof from the Congress for some time, and most of the politically minded among them eventually supported the Pakistan movement. In fact, U. P. was one of the most important areas in the mobilization of support for the Pakistan movement. The Muslim League, which had polled poorly in the 1936 elections in U. P., reorganized itself after the breakdown of Congress-League unity negotiations in 1937, and succeeded finally in winning the overwhelming support of U. P. Muslims in the 1946 elections.27

Thus, the U. P. Congress, despite its secularism and despite the fact that some Muslims occupied important positions in the party organization, was very largely a Hindu organization. Nor did the Congress have the support of all Hindus. The pre-independence leadership of the U. P. Congress came largely from elite castes, such as Brahmans and Kayasthas. The 1936 provincial Congress ministry was called the "all-Brahman Ministry" because all of its Hindu Cabinet ministers—there were two Muslims in the Cabinet—were Brahmans. The Congress never seriously attempted to organize the low castes, which remained largely outside the mainstream of nationalist politics in U. P.

Thus, although the U. P. Congress before independence may be characterized as an integrative movement, it must be recognized that the Congress failed to integrate many important groups in the society. In some cases, those who opposed the Congress formed other political organizations. The National Agriculturalist party (NAP) and the Muslim League were two such organizations. Neither of these organizations exists in contemporary U. P. politics, but a tradition of opposition to the Congress continues among both landlords and Muslims. Other groups in the society remained relatively unorganized during the

26 A recent and important book on the Deoband School and its role in Indian politics during the nationalist period is The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan by Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963).
27 Ram Gopal, op. cit., pp. 247 ff., 304. The League won only 27 out of 66 Muslim seats in the 1936 elections, but won 54 of these seats in 1946.
nationalist movement. For the most part, the low castes did not form a significant political force in the pre-independence period and their demands were not clearly articulated.

In the development of political parties after independence, three processes have been at work, which clearly derive from the pre-independence situation. First, a process of disintegration began in the Congress, which led to the development of new political parties. Second, old political parties like the NAP and the Muslim League disappeared, with the result that their supporters had to form new political allegiances. Third, with the adoption of adult franchise and the spread of education, groups which were inarticulate and unorganized in the pre-independence period began to find leaders to voice their demands. The operation of these three forces will be examined in the next section.

**THE POLITICAL PROCESS: POLITICAL PARTIES**

Table 2.1 shows the relative strength of the various political parties in U. P. in the three elections since independence. A number of general features of the party system are immediately apparent from the table. First, the major parties in the 1962 election were "national" parties (Congress, Jan Sangh, PSP, Communist, Swatantra), or at least had strength outside of the state (Socialist, Republican). There are no parties in the state which operate exclusively in U. P. Second, since independ-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1952 % of Vote</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>1957 % of Vote</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>1962 % of Vote</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Sangh</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSPa</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialistb</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 1952 PSP vote is the combined vote of the old Socialist party and the KMPP.

b In 1957, the Socialists ran as Independents and won 25 seats.


*28 Parties which receive 3 per cent or more of the total national parliamentary vote in a general election are given official recognition as "national" parties.*
ence there has been a multi-party system with one party, the Congress, dominant. Although it has experienced a steady decline in its voting strength in the state, no opposition party by itself has acquired sufficient strength to represent a threat to the Congress. Only the Jan Sangh has experienced steady and significant growth in electoral support over the three elections. Third, a considerable proportion of the total vote in the state in every election has gone to independents and minor parties. The large independent vote affects the stability of the party system as a whole. Thus, the party system in U. P. is characterized by single-party dominance, opposition fragmentation, and continued evidence of an absence of allegiance on the part of many politicians and voters to any party.

The Congress

The growth of factional politics. From a movement, the Congress after independence became a political party. The most important consequence of this transformation in the Congress party organization in U. P. has been the growth of personal and factional politics. Personal politics and factional politics existed in the U. P. Congress before independence alongside a politics of issues. However, internal quarrels and antagonisms were subordinated to the struggle for independence; since independence, personal and factional politics have come to dominate the internal affairs of the state Congress.

In the first years after independence, conflicts which had arisen earlier among Congressmen in U. P. but had been contained during the struggle for independence, developed into major internal political crises. The first crisis was the defection of some of the Socialists from the Congress in 1948. Their departure brought an end to ideological conflict over social and economic issues as a factor in U. P. Congress politics. The second crisis was the great struggle of 1950-51 over the election of Purushottamdas Tandon as the President of the Indian National Congress. Tandon, who came from U. P., was the symbol in his home state and in the country of Hindi and Hindu culture, of Hindu revivalism as opposed to secularism. The resignation of Tandon under pressure and the assumption of the presidency by Pandit Nehru in 1951 had an important effect on the Congress in U. P. In effect, Hindu revivalism came to be prohibited in the U. P. Congress party, and the cause of

29 The material in this section has been adapted from Paul R. Brass, "Factionalism and the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh," Asian Survey, iv (September 1964), 1037-47.
Hindi and Hindu culture was left to the communal opposition parties. The departure of the Socialists in 1948 and the defeat of the Hindu revivalists in 1951 removed the political extremists from the Congress organization in U. P. A moderate consensus emerged, more or less faithful to the principles which Nehru represented, i.e., a moderate approach to questions of language and culture and a gradual, non-dogmatic approach toward "socialist" ideals. With no issues of substantial importance left to fight about, politics in the U. P. Congress more and more revolved around personalistic group or factional politics. Moreover, as the Congress demonstrated its strength in by-elections and in the general elections of 1951-52, defeated factions became less inclined to leave and more inclined to continue their struggles within the organization than to risk defeat in opposition to the Congress.

In the period of conflict and crisis in the years immediately after independence, a generational change in political leadership also took place. The leaders of the nationalist movement from U. P. either withdrew from the Congress and went into opposition or joined the central Cabinet. However, the final change of generations did not take place until 1955, when Pandit Pant left for the center. His departure marked the end of an historical period in U. P. politics. Pant had been the dominating personality in the U. P. Congress since 1937, when he became the state's first chief minister. He was an authoritative leader with great personal prestige, which enabled him to mediate and arbitrate internal conflict in the U. P. Congress. After he left, the whole tenor of U. P. politics changed. Authoritative political leadership was replaced by group and faction leadership.

Since 1955, there have been three new Congress chief ministers within a shorter period of time than that of Pant's tenure of office. The internal politics of the Congress party in U. P. has revolved around a struggle to gain or control the office of chief minister by dominating the party organization. Two broad groups with a fluctuating membership have grown up inside the Congress organization; the group in power is called the Ministerialist group and the group out of power the dissident group. The Ministerialist and dissident groups have the same structure and the same ends. Both are collections of factions, coalitions of district faction leaders who seek position and power in the state government. The dissident group, the minority, becomes a majority group through gradual accretions of supporters, most of whom switch allegiances for personal reasons. The pro-government forces at any time are

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31 Dr. Sampurnanand, from 1955 to 1960; Chandra Bhan Gupta, from 1960 to 1963; and the present incumbent, Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani.
similarly composed of a number of faction leaders. Each group will have a leader, the chief minister or his heir apparent on the government side and the aspirant for the chief ministership on the dissident side. The groups are often called by the name of the leader, that is, the Gupta group or the former Sampurnanand group, after the last two chief ministers of the state. Dissident faction leaders are permitted by the looseness of Congress discipline to form alliances freely to replace the party leadership. When a dissident group succeeds in becoming the majority group, the process of factional alliance to replace the new leadership begins again. Congress factions play an important role in the political process in U. P., as well as in the internal politics of the party organization. The role of Congress factions in elections and in political conflicts with opposition parties will be described below.

Leadership and sources of support. The leadership of the Congress in U. P. comes very largely from the locally dominant rural communities in the countryside and from the middle class of professional people, merchants, and businessmen in the cities and towns. In the districts, the Congress organizations generally are led by coalitions of the “dominant castes” in the local communities—often Brahmans and Thakurs. However, electoral support for the Congress has been broader than its leadership. The Congress generally does not try to rely only upon its influence with the “dominant castes” to win elections, but seeks to form coalitions of caste and community groups. After independence it was particularly successful in winning the support of Muslims and Scheduled Castes in most districts. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with the Congress among some Scheduled Caste and Muslim voters.32

The Congress has benefited in the last three elections from the financial support of the industrialists and big merchants in Kanpur and the mill owners in sugar-producing districts. Another factor of great importance in maintaining the Congress organization both during and after elections is government patronage. In the countryside, villagers have come to expect favors and services from their elected representatives. Villagers want their MLAs to intercede with local administrators on their behalf, to provide jobs and scholarships for their children, and to bring schools and irrigation facilities to their villages. Congressmen are, of course, in the best position to satisfy such requests. Finally, the Congress benefits from opposition fragmentation. The Congress polled only 35 per cent of the Assembly vote in the 1962 election, but the next strongest party, the Jan Sangh, polled only 15 per cent. Opposition fragmentation

32 See below.
makes the position of the Congress relatively secure in U. P. and allows Congressmen to compete among themselves, rather than against others, for the rewards of politics.

Table 2.1 shows a sharp overall decline of support for the Congress in U. P. in the last two general elections. Although the Congress organization in U. P. is now the weakest state unit of the Congress in India, the decline does not necessarily indicate that the party organization in the state is disintegrating. An analysis of the election results by district indicates that many of the district Congress organizations are able to arrest electoral decline and even increase their votes from election to election. Most districts, 44 of the 51, do show a decline in the Congress vote from 1952 to 1962. Moreover, 25 of the 44 districts show a continuous decline from 1952 to 1957 and from 1957 to 1962. However, in 7 districts, the Congress proportion of the total vote increased over the decade, and in 15 districts, the Congress organizations increased their proportions of the total vote—albeit, in most cases only slightly—from 1957 to 1962.

In general, the Congress vote in U. P. is marked by considerable instability from election to election (see Fig. 1). The instability of support for the Congress is a measure of the low degree of party loyalty in U. P. politics. Habit, tradition, and ideology, factors which tend to produce some stability in voting patterns in older democracies, are relatively unimportant in U. P. elections. In urban centers, there are educated voters who vote Congress for ideological reasons. In the rural areas, ideology is hardly a factor. Neither in urban nor in rural areas are there many people who vote Congress because of habit or family tradition. Partly, of course, the absence of habit and tradition as factors in U. P. elections reflects the relative newness of elections in the state and in the country based on universal adult franchise. However, even among the firmest supporters of the Congress, such as the headmen and panchayat presidents in the villages, very little attachment to the Con-

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33 Although there are 54 administrative districts, there are only 51 electoral districts. The three new defense districts of Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, and Pithoragarh are combined by the state election office with the districts of Tehri Garhwal, Garhwal, and Almora, respectively, from which they were separated for defense purposes.

34 The wide scattering of dots in Fig. 1 demonstrates the absence of any consistency or of any degree of evenness in the patterns of change in the Congress vote from 1957 to 1962 in the districts of U. P. The conclusion supported by the diagram (and by the analysis in the text) is that local factors primarily determine the variations in the Congress vote. Compare the diagrams (figures 8 and 9) in V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949, Vintage Book edition), pp. 50-51.

Instability of Support for Congress: Relation between Percentages of District Vote Polled by Congress Candidates for Legislative Assembly in U.P. in General Elections of 1957 and 1962

In addition to the general pattern of instability of support for Congress, there are frequent cases of very pronounced changes in particular districts from one election to another. Internal party factionalism may transform a very strong Congress district into a very weak one. In addition, sudden changes in the allegiance of a class of voters (such as a particular caste or community) or the acquisition or defection of powerful leaders (such as ex-Rajas) who control large blocs of votes may completely transform voting patterns in a district. The important point about such sudden and often extreme fluctuations is that they indicate that factors are at work in such districts which cause a deviation
from the state-wide pattern of slow decline in support for the Congress.

Because of the instability of the Congress vote, attempts to correlate support for the Congress with various environmental factors generally yield ambiguous results. For example, the regional distribution of Congress strength has shifted over the three general elections (see Fig. 2). In the first general elections, the Congress was strongest in all of the northwestern districts, in most of Kumaon, and in parts of the central plains area. It was weakest in the eastern districts and in the southern hills. By 1962 the areas of Congress strength had shifted away from the northwestern districts and the central plains to the southern hills and the eastern districts. The shift in Congress strength is, of course, only relative since it has taken place simultaneously with an overall decline in support for the Congress in the state as a whole.

Nevertheless, the regional distribution of Congress strength and the shift in areas of support over the decade indicate that there is no apparent connection between poverty and opposition to the Congress. If anything, the distribution indicates exactly the opposite, that is, that the Congress is stronger in the poorer and more backward areas of the state. Kumaon, Bundelkhand, and the eastern districts are three areas of U. P. which have been selected by the state government as the most backward and which are to receive special help in the Third Plan. Although Kumaon has the lowest population density in the state and the eastern districts the highest, the problems of both areas relate to pressure on the cultivable land—a result of overpopulation in the eastern districts and a relative lack of cultivable land in Kumaon. In Bundelkhand, where population densities are also very low, agricultural productivity suffers from a severe shortage of irrigation facilities.

Thus, the wide differences in the characteristics of the three regions in which the Congress has its strength, combined with the instability of voting patterns, makes it difficult to find state-wide patterns of support for or opposition to the Congress. The Congress, as has been noted above, tends to get its support from the dominant peasant proprietary body in each district. In addition, it seeks to build caste coalitions which tend to vary not only from district to district but from constituency to constituency. The Congress has somewhat greater strength in the few urban constituencies in U. P. than in the rural constituencies and is stronger in the Scheduled Caste constituencies than in the general constituencies. However, there is no apparent correlation between the vote for Congress and such factors as rural density, literacy, or the proportion of various ethnic groups in each district. Thus, the decline of the

36 Government of Uttar Pradesh, Third Five Year Plan, 1, 47-61.
Fig. 2. Distribution of Support for Congress in U. P. Elections for Legislative Assembly
Congress is not clearly related to any state-wide environmental factors. Rather, it is the product of internal party factionalism in both the local and state Congress organizations and of a series of unrelated or loosely related changes in individual districts or in groups of districts. In some areas, in fact, the vote for the Congress has remained stable or has even increased.

Leftist Parties

The socialist parties in U. P.—the Praja Socialist party (PSP) and the Socialist party (SP)—have been stronger than the Communist party. The Communist party in U. P. is among the weakest state units in India. The combined vote of the PSP and the Socialists in the 1962 election was proportionately greater in U. P. than anywhere else in India, the two parties together polling 20.4 per cent of the total vote in the state in 1962. The U. P. Socialist party was the strongest state unit in India and polled 8.5 per cent of the vote in the 1962 elections.

Origins and development of the socialist parties. The socialist tradition in U. P., as elsewhere in India, has its origins in the Congress Socialist party (CSP), which was formed as a group within the Congress in 1934. The CSP in U. P. was always very strong, and its leaders were among the most prominent Congressmen in the state. Acharya Narendra Dev, the most important leader of the party in U. P. was a respected Congress leader in the province, with a large personal following. When the decision to leave the Congress was taken by the national executive of the CSP in 1948, members of the U. P. unit occupied important positions in the party organization and some had been offered offices in the Congress government. Consequently, most members of the CSP in U. P. were reluctant to leave the party. It is estimated that less than 20 per cent of the membership of the CSP in U. P. left the Congress in 1948. In the U. P. legislature, where there were thirty-five to forty CSP MLAs, only twelve followed the lead of Acharya Narendra Dev and resigned their seats to contest against the Congress in by-elections. All twelve were defeated.

The second major addition to the socialist opposition in U. P. came from a group of followers of Rafi Ahmad Kidwai who were defeated in a struggle for power in the Congress organization in the years after independence. In December 1949 twenty-one Congressmen, led by Tri-

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37 Since the abortive merger with the PSP in June 1964, the Socialist party has been known as the Samyukta Socialist party (SSP). See below.
38 See Weiner, op. cit., p. 61; and Sampurnanand, Memories and Reflections (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 82.
39 Interview in Lucknow on October 12, 1961.
loki Singh, crossed the floor of the house. These twenty-one MLAs formed a Jan Congress, which merged with Acharya Kripalani's Kisan Mazdoor Praja party (KMPP) in June 1951. The Socialist party and the KMPP fought the elections separately in 1952 but merged into the PSP after the election. In 1955 the Lohia split occurred, again creating two socialist parties in the state and in the country—the PSP and the Socialist party. The split was most serious in U. P., where Lohia's followers controlled the Executive Committee of the PSP.40

The socialist parties, like the Congress, have been afflicted with factionalism and with the struggles of individual leaders for personal prestige. The leadership of both the socialist parties originally came out of the Congress, partly because of ideological differences but also because of factional quarrels within the Congress. The state leaders of the socialist parties took with them out of the Congress party local leaders in the districts who had been defeated in factional conflicts for control of the district Congress organizations. The result is that neither socialist party has strong district organizations throughout the state. Both parties are essentially coalitions of local politicians in the districts, politicians who have influence in a very restricted area—enough to win an Assembly election perhaps, but not enough to build a district-wide organization. Moreover, throughout the post-independence period, there has been a constant movement of political leaders from the Congress to the PSP, from the PSP to the Socialist party, and very often from one of the socialist parties back to the Congress. Both the socialist parties were weakened in recent years by the return of many important district leaders to the Congress. Since 1950, there has been no major defection from the Congress to the socialist parties.

Socialist unity. Socialist politics in U. P. and in the country and the political balance between the two socialist parties in U. P. were fundamentally altered in the period between December 1962 and January 1965. In December 1962, a major attempt at the reunification of the two socialist parties in India was begun with the merger of the PSP and the Socialist party in the U. P. Assembly into the United Socialist party. The merger of the two parties in the U. P. Assembly proved to be the beginning of a long process of reunification of the two parties throughout the country, culminating in the merger of the PSP and the Socialist party at the all-India level in June 1964 into the Samyukta (United) Socialist party (SSP). The merger lasted only seven months until January

1965 when the PSP re-established its separate existence. In U. P., the PSP was seriously weakened by these events, for those who opposed unity with the Lohia Socialists joined the Congress in June 1964 and those who favored unity remained in the new SSP.

It is not possible to examine here all the events leading to the reunification and subsequent split of the two socialist parties in the country as a whole. However, an examination of the course of events in U. P. will provide some insights into the nature of the political process in the state. The decline in PSP strength from 1957 to 1962 (see Table 2.1), the stagnant condition of the Socialist party in the state, and the emergence of the Jan Sangh as the largest opposition party in the new Assembly had led to thoughts of a fresh attempt at the merger of socialist forces in U. P. after the 1962 election. It was reported in the press as early as March of 1962 that merger negotiations were taking place between the leaders of the PSP and the Socialist party in the U. P. Assembly.41 The demand for merger came from many in the rank and file of both parties and from some of the leaders of the PSP. Most of the state and national leaders of the Socialist party, however, remained hostile to the idea of merger with the PSP except on terms set by the Socialist party. Consequently, when the merger of the two parties in the U. P. Assembly was announced in December 1962,42 it came as a surprise to the national leadership of both parties. The merger was welcomed at first by the state and national leadership of the PSP, but was greeted with shock and anger by the national leaders and by some state leaders of the Socialist party.

There was some logic in the move for unity originating in U. P., but fortuitous circumstances were also involved. Both parties had been disappointed by the election results in U. P. in which only the Jan Sangh had benefited from the decline of Congress strength. Second, the PSP and the Socialist party were more closely balanced in strength in U. P. than elsewhere. Third, a merger in the U. P. Assembly promised the immediate benefit of recognition, in place of the Jan Sangh, as the main Opposition in the Assembly. These three factors were present as a background to the merger negotiations, but the merger itself took place suddenly after an unexpected change in the leadership of the PSP in the Assembly. Genda Singh, a senior PSP MLA and the leader of the party in the Assembly, had resigned his leadership of the party early in December after an agreement he had made with government leaders was disapproved by the rank and file.43 Genda Singh was replaced as leader

42 Ibid., December 14, 1962.
43 See below, pp. 106-107.
by a younger man who had once been a follower of Lohia. The merger of the PSP and the Socialist party in the Assembly took place a week after this change of leadership in the PSP. The terms of the merger were the acceptance by the PSP legislators of the Socialist Manifesto of 1962, but not the constitution, basic principles, and discipline of the Socialist party.

Although the national leadership of the Socialist party had been consistently opposed to merger with the PSP except on terms of a complete acceptance by the PSP of the Socialist party program and discipline, the announcement of the creation of the United Socialist party in the U. P. Assembly presented Lohia and his closest associates with a fait accompli. The U. P. merger was a major topic of debate at the annual conference of the Socialist party in Bharatpur held at the end of December 1962. Strong opposition to the merger was expressed at the conference, but a resolution was nevertheless passed accepting (but not approving) the formation of the United Socialist party and authorizing further steps toward socialist unity.

Contradictory trends soon developed in U. P. Socialist politics, with divisions developing within both parties on the question of unification. Doctrinally, the lines of division were over Socialist policy on language (immediate replacement of English) and caste (60 per cent reservation of seats in government and legislatures for “backward castes”). There were also disputes over the Socialist policy of alliance with the Jan Sangh and Communists in opposition to the Congress and on the use of militant tactics by the Socialists to oppose the Congress. The merger in the U. P. Assembly soon broke up on the latter issue. In March 1963, the Socialist legislators engaged in disruptive tactics in the U. P. Assembly in opposition to certain rulings by the Speaker of the House. Twenty-two members of the United Socialist party were expelled and suspended from the House. However, only two PSP legislators joined in the disorderly scenes. Ugra Sen, the leader of the United Socialist party, thereupon announced the dissolution of the merger, on the grounds that the PSP members had refused to join in a struggle with the Socialist party members. Ugra Sen’s action was opposed by most PSP legislators and some of the Socialists as well. Consequently, the leadership of the United Socialist party was reconstituted and retained a separate existence in the Assembly. There were now two socialist groups in the Assembly again, a Socialist group under Ugra Sen and a United Socialist party composed of most of the old PSP members and some of the old Socialist party legislators.

44 The text of the resolution may be found in the *Indian Affairs Record*, ix, No. 1 (January 1963), 47.
Despite the new split in the U. P. Assembly, considerable support continued to be expressed among U. P. socialists for further efforts at unification. Socialist unity conferences were held in several districts. In June 1963, a major conference of socialists of both parties was held in Lucknow at which an appeal was made to the leadership of both the PSP and the Socialist party "to take note of the mass urge for the unity of the socialist forces in the country." These unity moves were soon complicated, however, by the development of an opposite trend among PSP members for unity with the Congress rather than with the Socialist party. The move among some PSP members to join the Congress received impetus with the acceptance by Asoka Mehta, the national PSP leader, of the position of Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission in September 1963, an act which was followed by his forced resignation from the party and his formal joining of the Congress in June 1964. The PSP was now split three ways, with some members favoring unity with the Socialists, some favoring joining forces with the Congress, and a hard core favoring the continued existence of the PSP as a party of democratic socialism in opposition to the Congress.

In U. P., the party did in fact split three ways. In June 1964, Genda Singh and several other PSP legislators joined the Congress. Genda Singh himself was made Minister of Agriculture, replacing a "dissident" member of the U. P. government in that position. In the same month, the Samyukta Socialist party was formed. When the PSP re-established itself in January 1965, it was reported that many former PSP members in U. P. chose to remain in the SSP.

The merger and subsequent split of the two socialist parties demonstrate some important features of the party system in U. P. They demonstrate first the fluidity of the system. The movements of socialist politicians in these two years represented a major readjustment in the party system, but the pattern itself of movement of politicians from party to party is a persistent feature of the party system. The adoption by the Congress in 1964 at Bhubaneshwar of a commitment to "democratic socialism" has facilitated such movements from a doctrinal point of view. However, there is much pursuance of personal political advancement beneath the doctrinal cloaks. The second point which these party maneuvers demonstrate is the intimate connection between conflict in the dominant party and conflict within and among opposition parties. Just as opposition parties provide a haven for discontented Congress politicians, so the Congress in turn provides a haven for dissatisfied opposition politicians. Faction leaders in the Congress are eager to recruit sup-

porters wherever they can be found. Third, the Congress clearly has
greater strength than its low popular vote would indicate because of its
absorptive capacity. If one wishes, therefore, to gauge the strength of
the Congress, it is not sufficient to examine merely the party mem-
bership figures or the popular vote. One must also consider the continued
ability of the Congress to integrate and absorb new members directly
from the ranks of the opposition, which by the same token must be con-
sidered much weaker than it appears in election figures.

Communist party. The Communist party has made no significant pro-
gress in U. P. since independence. Although its share of the popular
vote in the state has increased from 0.9 per cent in 1952 to 5.4 per cent in
1962, the increase mainly reflects the larger number of candidates which
the party ran in the last election. Divisions within the Communist party
in U. P. on the Chinese issue have not been significant. The overwhel-
mimg majority of the U. P. Communists belong to the Dange wing of the
party, which is now the CPI (Right). The U. P. leadership responded to
the Chinese aggression of October 1962 with a quick and unequivocal
condemnation of the Chinese.48 A few U. P. Communists, however, have
been accused of pro-Chinese sympathies. The U. P. government arrested
twenty-three allegedly pro-Chinese Communists after the Chinese in-
vansion.47 Even though most U. P. Communists publicly condemned the
Chinese invasion, the party has been damaged in the public mind by the
Chinese action. One Communist in Kanpur claimed that the party had
been set back fifteen years by the Chinese invasion. However, except in
Kanpur and two eastern districts, the party had not made much progress
in the state in the past fifteen years.

Party programs. The programs of the three leftist parties have been
addressed to specific policy issues which have developed as a result of
Congress action or inaction. The 1962 election manifesto of the PSP in
U. P. called for the granting of bhumidhari rights of land ownership to
sirdars without payment of ten times their land revenue as required by
the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1951,48 for a land ceiling of twenty
acres (as opposed to the forty-acre ceiling established by the Congress

46 Ibid., October 23, 1962.
48 The Zamindari Abolition Act created two classes of landholders in U. P. One
class, called bhumidhars, acquired full rights of ownership over lands they cultivated
and a 50 per cent reduction in land revenue by paying the state government a fee
ten times their current annual land revenue. The second class, called sirdars, essen-
tially became state tenants and continued to pay land revenue at the old rate. The
state government required the payment of a fee for the right to become a bhumidhar
in order to raise money to compensate the former zamindars. However, most tenants
were unwilling or unable to make the payment and remained sirdars.
government in 1960), for the nationalization of the sugar and power industries, for encouragement of small and medium industries and their protection against competition from large industries, and for the protection and encouragement of Urdu.49 The Socialist party has also expressed some specific demands—abolition of land revenue for peasants who cultivate uneconomic holdings, annulment of "fictitious" partitions of land carried out by large landholders to avoid loss of land under the Land Ceilings Act, fixing of prices of manufactured goods within a narrow range, and the like. The Socialist party has distinguished itself by its approach to two other issues. On the question of language, the party has militantly opposed the official use of English in government, in the courts, and in the schools. The language issue, however, is not very significant in U. P. where most official transactions already are carried on in Hindi. A second distinctive aspect of the Socialist party program has been its demand for the reservation of 60 per cent of positions in administrative services and seats in the legislatures to the "backward castes." In some parts of U. P., the Socialist party made a direct appeal to the "backward castes"—particularly the Ahirs and Kurmis—in the 1962 election. In some of the districts, the Socialist party tried to implement the 60 per cent policy for its own party positions and gave prominent posts in the party to members of these middle castes. The Communist party in U. P. has been less active and less articulate in making demands and framing policies than the PSP and the Socialist party. Occasionally, it has joined with other opposition parties in agitation against Congress policies, but the Communists have been more inclined to support the Congress on many issues than have either the PSP or the Socialists.

Party tactics. All of the leftist parties consider satyagrahas or non-violent agitations and demonstrations to be not only a legitimate way of expressing demands and mobilizing public opinion, but also a fundamental right.50 The Socialist party has been the most militant in this respect. Two large-scale civil disobedience movements were carried out by the Socialist party in U. P. in 1957 and in 1960. In the 1957 satyagraha, carried on over the issues of stopping the use of English and removing public statues and monuments to British figures, approximately 5,000 party members were arrested.51 In the 1960 satyagraha, somewhat over a thousand party members were arrested. Neither of these agitations posed a serious threat to law and order in U. P. In addition to agitations

50 See, for example, statements by PSP leaders and others in ibid., June 25, 1962.
51 Pioneer, September 25, 1957.
and demonstrations, the Socialist party legislators in the U. P. Assembly have sought to disrupt the proceedings of the House by defying the chair and then refusing to leave unless carried out by the sergeant at arms. The Socialists, sometimes with the aid of other opposition parties and independents, effectively blocked normal parliamentary procedures throughout most of the winter session of 1965. Disorder in the House reached its peak in March when a full day was devoted to the suspension and expulsion of twenty-two members of the Socialist party; fifteen members had to be carried out.62

The PSP legislators and party members have been less disrespectful toward parliamentary procedures than the Socialist legislators. One of the first major disagreements between the two parties after their merger in December 1962 occurred when PSP members refused to participate in the disorders in the Assembly in March 1963. However, the PSP leaders have also engaged in satyagrahas, demonstrations, and fasts on specific issues. In Deoria district, Genda Singh, formerly a prominent PSP leader, was identified with various agitations for increases in the price of sugar cane paid to cane growers. In the past he also led agitations on the issue of starvation deaths in the eastern districts and in 1958 engaged in a fast on this question. The Communists too have sometimes sponsored peasant agitations in the eastern districts of the state.

Agitations, demonstrations, and fasts sometimes lead to concessions by the Congress government on specific issues. When the government finds it impossible to satisfy specific grievances, it usually offers the demonstrators or fasters the face-saving concession of appointing an inquiry commission. The government thus indirectly encourages future demonstrations. Agitations, demonstrations, civil disobedience movements, and fasts of prominent leaders must be considered a permanent part of the political process in U. P., as in other Indian states.

Leadership and electoral support. A major weakness of the left parties is that their leadership and sources of support come partly from the same elements which support the Congress party. The similarities between the left parties and the Congress are understandable since all the left parties grew out of the Congress. For the most part, the party offices of the PSP, the Socialist party, and the Communist party in U. P. have been run by Western-educated intellectuals, while the MLAs have come from middle peasant or petty zamindar backgrounds.

However, both the PSP and the Socialist MLAs have attempted to organize new sources of support. One PSP MLA from Deoria district in eastern U. P. remarked that most government services are

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given to friends of the Congress, to the headman and important people of the village. Thus, we have to galvanize the support of those who are below the chaudhuri [headman]. The traditional vested interests in the villages exploit the landless laborers and the common villagers. If the chaudhuri is a good man, we become weak. If he is a bad man, we thrive because of his evil and generally they are bad men.8

In the same district, the Socialist party in the 1962 elections sought the support of the middle agricultural castes, such as the Ahirs. These middle castes were generally tenants of Brahman or Rajput zamindars in their villages, but became landowners after zamindari abolition. The Socialist candidates in the district attempted to exploit this economic difference and to organize support from these middle castes that oppose the ex-zamindars in the villages.

The leftist parties have had some success in identifying themselves with peasant discontent. For the most part, the PSP, the Socialist, and the Communist MLAs were elected from high density districts (see Fig. 3) where landholdings are very small and where there have been frequent agitations on various economic issues. The backbone of support for the parties of the left is in the eight eastern districts of Deoria, Gorakhpur, Ballia, Azamgarh, Ghazipur, Jaunpur, and Allahabad. In most of these districts, densities are over 1,000 persons per square mile, landholdings are usually an acre or half an acre per person, the resource base is very narrow, and flood and famine conditions are recurrent. Forty of the seventy-six left party MLAs were elected from these eight districts. The Communist party has its only significant rural strength here in the two districts of Azamgarh and Ghazipur, which returned eight of the fourteen Communist MLAs in the 1962 general elections.

Jan Sangh and Swatantra

The parties of the “right” in U. P. politics—Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, and Swatantra—polled a combined popular vote of over 21 per cent and won 66 seats in the Assembly in the 1962 general elections. The Hindu Mahasabha polled only a little over 1 per cent of the vote and won only 2 seats. The Jan Sangh emerged after the 1962 election as the largest opposition party in the state, polling more than 15 per cent of the vote and winning 49 seats in the Assembly. The U. P. Jan Sangh is the second strongest state unit in India after the Madhya Pradesh party. Swatantra had very limited success in U. P., polling less than 5 per cent of the vote and winning 15 seats in the Assembly.

8 Interview in Lucknow on May 18, 1962.
Fig. 3. High Rural Density and Support for Left Parties: U.P. Districts with Highest Rural Densities and Districts which Elected PSP, Socialist, or Communist MLAs, 1962 General Elections
Origin and development of the Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh is one of three Hindu communal parties which have fought the post-independence general elections. The other two, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad, have faded into insignificance and left the Jan Sangh alone as the only important Hindu political party in India. A major reason for the survival and success of the Jan Sangh, at a time when other Hindu political parties have declined, is the support which the Jan Sangh has always had from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS was originally a non-political youth organization, organized on semi-military lines and maintaining rigid discipline. It became active politically in the period between 1947 and 1951 when its workers provided assistance to Hindu refugees from Pakistan and “defended” Hindus in the communal riots of this period. The Jan Sangh was formed by RSS leaders in 1951 to fight the general elections. The RSS maintains a continuing interest in the Jan Sangh; RSS members are in controlling positions in both the legislatures and the party organization. The RSS does not tolerate factionalism either in its own organization or in the Jan Sangh. Members of the Jan Sangh who break party discipline are quickly and permanently expelled from the organization.

The Jan Sangh differs from the other major opposition parties in U. P. in that it did not develop out of the Congress. Many Jan Sangh leaders did not participate in the Congress movements for independence. Most Jan Sangh members have joined the party because they feel that Congress policies since independence have threatened Hindu cultural and religious values.

The development of the Jan Sangh in U. P. since its formation in 1951 has been one of steady growth. The party has increased its percentage vote in the general elections from 6.4 per cent in 1952 to 15 per cent in 1962 and its representation in the Assembly from 2 to 49 members. The number of districts which have elected Jan Sangh MLAs has increased from 2 in 1952 to 22 in 1962.

Swatantra. The Swatantra party was formed on an all-India basis in 1959. It acquired a base in U. P. by winning the affiliation of some ex-Congressmen of conservative views and a few big landlords. The Swatantra party in U. P., like the socialist parties, essentially has brought together in loose coalition a group of district leaders who have left the Congress generally for personal reasons related to local disputes. Swatantra, unlike the Jan Sangh, does not have a strong party organization in the state. Ten of its fifteen Assembly seats in 1962 were won from

84 Weiner, op. cit., p. 78.
the three adjacent districts of Bahraich, Basti, and Gonda, where the party was dependent upon landlord support.85

Party programs. Both the Jan Sangh and Swatantra tend to be conservative on economic issues. In the 1962 election campaigns, both parties strongly opposed government schemes for cooperative farming. Both parties are against state control over most aspects of the country's economic life. However, the two parties are divided by their attitudes toward traditional Hindu society and toward non-Hindus. The Jan Sangh in the past has been concerned primarily with communal and cultural issues whereas Swatantra has been concerned primarily with economic issues. Many Swatantra party members consider the Jan Sangh a communal party, whereas the Jan Sanghis tend to consider Swatantra a party composed merely of right-wing Congressmen. Many Swatantra party leaders are open admirers of Western institutions and Western ways, whereas many Jan Sanghis favor the maintenance of traditional Hindu institutions such as the joint family, the caste system, and traditional Hindu law. A major demand of the Jan Sangh is for the replacement of English, wherever it is still used officially both in U. P. and at the center, by Hindi. The Jan Sangh favors a Sanskritized Hindi, as free as possible of words of Persian origin.

What most prevents cooperation between the Jan Sangh and Swatantra or other parties is the feeling that the Jan Sangh is anti-Muslim. The Jan Sangh has been extremely critical of the role which Muslims have played in Indian life. In U. P., for example, the Jan Sangh has criticized the functioning of the Aligarh Muslim University and has demanded the affiliation of the three predominantly Hindu colleges of Aligarh town with the University.86 It has been alleged that the Jan Sangh participated in the Hindu-Muslim riots of October 1961 in Aligarh.87 In the election campaigns, it is generally believed that, although Jan Sangh candidates publicly espouse Hindu-Muslim unity, their workers appeal to anti-Muslim sentiments in private.88

86 See the Organiser, vi, No. 47 (July 8, 1963), 8; xv, No. 6 (September 16, 1963), 6; xvii, No. 8 (September 30, 1963), 7. The affiliation of the three Hindu colleges with the University would make it a Hindu-majority institution. At present, the majority of students and faculty members of Aligarh Muslim University are Muslims.
There is evidence of some ambiguity of attitudes among Jan Sangh members in the districts on the question of the role of Muslims in contemporary Indian society. One successful Jan Sangh candidate for the Assembly in 1962 from Gonda district claimed that he appealed to and won the support of Muslims, who constituted about 40 per cent of the population of his constituency. Yet he has been a member of the RSS since 1951; he feels that Hindus should not show weakness before Muslims; and he distrusts the loyalty of Muslims to India.59 Many Jan Sanghis are concerned more with protecting their view of Hindu culture against perceived threats from the Congress than with attacking Muslims. Increasingly, the Jan Sangh has given its attention to economic issues. Participation in electoral politics has forced the Jan Sangh to devote attention to the demands and needs of peasants and other villagers, who are often less concerned with Hindu culture and the loyalties of Muslims than with the price of sugar cane, relief loans for flood damages, and securing intervention with administrative officials.

The Jan Sangh has also adopted a militant anti-Communist posture since the Chinese invasion of 1962. In March 1963, Jan Sangh and RSS members played a leading role in the organization of a public exhibition, called “Maa-ki-Pukar” (“Call of the Mother”), in a Lucknow park. The exhibition was designed to arouse patriotic feeling against the Chinese, but it created a public furor because many Congressmen and others felt that Pandit Nehru had been ridiculed and defamed in posters for his handling of the Sino-Indian dispute.60

Party tactics. The Jan Sangh, like the leftist parties, engages in agitations and demonstrations to oppose government measures. For example, in October 1962 Jan Sangh party members picketed the Council House of the state government in protest against government tax proposals. Nearly 400 Jan Sangh members were arrested during the month for obstructing the entrance of legislators to the chamber.61 The Jan Sangh has not, however, launched any major civil disobedience movements in the state. On the whole, it appears less inclined toward agitational methods than the socialist parties and more inclined toward propaganda and education. Jan Sangh and RSS members are active in educational activities of all sorts. Many RSS members teach in schools and some have founded educational institutions. The Jan Sangh is attempting to establish in U. P. a network of private schools, controlled

59 Interview in Gonda on August 14, 1962.
61 Ibid., October 6, 1962.
by party members and sympathizers, where the values which the party supports may be taught.

**Leadership and electoral support.** The leadership and the main sources of support of the Jan Sangh in U. P. come largely from the merchants, shopkeepers, and businessmen in the towns and from the big landlords in the countryside. Although the party does have support among Hindu businessmen in the towns, almost all of its successes in the 1962 election in U. P. were in rural constituencies. Of the forty-nine seats won by the Jan Sangh in 1962, only one constituency was wholly urban, two were partly urban, and the rest were rural constituencies. Swatantra is even more dependent upon rural, landlord support than the Jan Sangh and has little strength in the towns. Swatantra had no successes in urban or semi-urban constituencies in the 1962 elections.

Most of the MLAs elected on Jan Sangh and Swatantra tickets in 1962 in U. P. came from districts where the great estates were located (see Fig. 4). Jan Sangh and Swatantra successes were greatest in Oudh, where the talukdars have traditionally dominated in the rural economy and in local politics. Ten Oudh districts returned 32 of the 64 Jan Sangh and Swatantra MLAs elected in U. P. in 1962.

In post-independence politics, all the political parties in U. P. have tried to win the support of individual ex-zamindars and talukdars and have offered the former landlords party tickets to contest the general elections. Although it has been over a decade since the abolition of the zamindari system in U. P., most of the ex-zamindars retain considerable prestige in their former estates. Many of the ex-zamindars have used their traditional influence to build political bases for themselves. The conservative economic policies of the Jan Sangh and Swatantra have an appeal to the big landlords. Moreover, Jan Sangh and Swatantra probably benefited from the discontent among landlords who have felt threatened by the new Land Ceilings Act passed in U. P. in 1960. The Land Ceilings Act is, in some respects, a greater threat to the landlords than zamindari abolition. Zamindari abolition deprived the zamindars of their revenue, but the Land Ceilings Act threatened to deprive them of their personal landholdings.

Some ex-zamindars and talukdars have occupied important positions in both Jan Sangh and Swatantra. The Raja of Jaunpur was for a while after the 1962 election the leader of the Jan Sangh in the Assembly and was elected President of the U. P. Jan Sangh in 1963.\(^2\) The first leader of the Swatantra party in the U. P. Assembly was the Raja of Mankapur, a former talukdar of Gonda district.

\(^2\) *Organiser*, xvi, No. 26 (February 4, 1963), 14.
Fig. 4. Large Landed Estates and Support for Jan Sangh and Swatantra: U. P. Districts in which there were 6 or more Zamindars Paying Rs. 10,000 or above in Land Revenue before Zamindari Abolition and Districts which Elected Jan Sangh or Swatantra MLAs, 1962 General Election.
The Republican party, the political vehicle in U. P. of the militant Scheduled Caste movement founded by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, polled slightly under 4 per cent of the vote in the state in the 1962 election and won 8 seats in 4 districts. The development of the political consciousness and effectiveness of the Scheduled Castes as a group has been hindered by the continued educational backwardness of most low castes and by the diversity among the hundreds of low-caste groups which come under the legal definition of Scheduled Castes. The center of Scheduled Caste political activity has been in and around Bombay city and has only recently spread to other parts of the country. In U. P. the Chamars or Jatavs are the best educated and the most politically conscious group among the Scheduled Castes, and they dominate the Republican party in U. P. The Chamars are invariably close to the very bottom in the economic and status hierarchies of rural U. P. Throughout the state, they are employed in the rural areas primarily as agricultural laborers, and in the urban areas, in inferior menial occupations—as leather workers, factory hands, coolies, or bicycle-rickshaw drivers.

Until fairly recently, the Chamars in U. P., although they are the largest single caste group in the state, have lacked dynamic political leadership. However, in the last decade, a young lecturer of Aligarh Muslim University, B. P. Maurya, has risen to prominence as the leader of the Chamars in Aligarh district. Maurya comes from the small town of Khair in Aligarh district. His father was a field laborer on a farm in Khair, but Maurya was able to attend high school and then the Aligarh Muslim University. He took a B.Sc. and an L.L.M. degree from the University and then joined the Faculty of Law as a Lecturer in 1960. Maurya has led the movement in Aligarh, begun earlier in Bombay, for the conversion of the Scheduled Castes to Buddhism. In 1957 Maurya and one of his followers contested two Assembly constituencies in the district unsuccessfully. As a result of his work among the Chamars and his education, Maurya has become the hero of his community. In May 1961 a criminal case was registered against him for allegedly assaulting a policeman who, Maurya claims, had been beating a rickshaw driver in a dispute over a traffic violation. During the Hindu-Muslim riot of 1961, Maurya acquired some popularity among Muslims also for his criticisms of the Hindu community and for carrying out relief work among

Portions of the material in this section have been adapted from Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State*, Chap. v.

The conversion to Buddhism by some Scheduled Castes represents a protest against the inequalities of Hindu society.
Muslims. In the University, Maurya has been sponsored by the Dean of the Faculty of Law, a leading member of a group of conservative Muslims in University politics.

The Scheduled Caste vote has been a mainstay of the Congress in U. P. since independence. Until the 1962 election, the Republican party and its predecessor, the Scheduled Caste Federation, achieved no successes in U. P. politics. For the most part, the Scheduled Castes in U. P. have accepted the patronage of the Congress government and have given their votes to the Congress party in return. The Scheduled Caste leaders who have been given Congress tickets in the reserved constituencies are non-militant and have no power in the local or state Congress organizations. The numerous organizations in U. P. for the advancement of the Scheduled Castes have been content to serve as agencies for the distribution of Congress patronage.

The Republican party leaders feel that Scheduled Caste members who join the Congress betray the aspirations of the low castes. The Republicans are militant opponents of the Congress, which, they claim, is dominated by the elite Hindu castes. To oppose the Congress, Republicans are willing to seek alliances with any parties or individuals whose principles are not opposed to their own.

In 1962, the Republicans formed alliances with conservative Muslim leaders in the western districts of the state. The alliance of Muslims and Chamars in the western districts of U. P. in 1962 was made possible because of the development of a feeling of bitterness among some Muslim leaders toward the Congress and the government after the Hindu-Muslim riots of 1961 in these districts. The riots of October 1961, which originated in the scuffle between Hindu and Muslim students at the Aligarh University, spread to the neighboring districts of Meerut and Moradabad and led to the death of thirty-six people, most of them Muslims. One Muslim who successfully contested an Assembly constituency on the Republican party ticket described his disenchantment with the Congress after the riots:

I continued to be a member of the Congress till now; but, I found that the Congress was not playing fair game to the minorities and

66 Under the Constitution of India and various acts of legislation, members of Scheduled Castes are entitled to certain privileges and special concessions, such as reservation of seats in the legislatures, posts in the administrative services, scholarships in colleges and universities, and so on.
67 A report on the riots was presented to the U. P. Assembly by the Home Minister in November 1961 and was published in the National Herald, November 15, 1961.
the downtrodden classes. [Before the Aligarh riot, there were the Jabalpur riots]; . . . justice was not done there and there was a report by some MPs which indicated this. . . . Then, these riots spread and the Government did nothing to stop it. If the Government wanted to stop it, there would be no riots.⁶⁸

In areas where the Muslim-Chamar alliance was in operation in the 1962 election campaign, communal antagonisms were aroused. Slogans were reportedly used extensively by Republican party workers referring to Muslims and Jatavs as brothers and attacking Hindus, particularly the elite Brahman and Thakur castes. An election tribunal in Aligarh overturned the election result in Aligarh City Assembly constituency, where a Muslim candidate had won on the Republican ticket, on the ground that communal propaganda had been used by the successful candidate.⁶⁹

Republican party successes in the 1962 election in U. P. were confined to the four western districts of Aligarh, Agra, Moradabad, and Badaun. All four districts have large Muslim populations; in three of the districts, Chamars are the largest Hindu caste group and, in the fourth, Chamars are the second largest Hindu community. Of the eight MLAs elected, three were Muslim and five were Scheduled Caste. Four of the five Scheduled Caste MLAs were returned from general constituencies. The strength of the party in the four districts rested heavily on the urban Muslim vote. Three of the constituencies won by the Republicans are urban constituencies and two others are partly urban. In the huge rural state of U. P., the success of the Republican alliance of Chamars and Muslims largely in urban constituencies is a relatively insignificant matter. However, the limited success of the Republican party in 1962 did reflect the fact that there is considerable discontent with the Congress among members of the state’s most important religious minority and its largest Hindu caste group.

Independents

Independent candidates play an important role in U. P. elections. There are always far more aspirants for each seat in the Legislative Assembly than there are party tickets. Many of the independent candidates in every election in U. P. have applied for the ticket of one of the parties in their districts, have been rejected, and have then filed nominations as independents. In the 1952 election, there were over 1,000 independent candidates. The number of independents has been smaller.

⁶⁸ Interview in Aligarh on September 14, 1962.
in the last two elections—549 in 1957 and 694 in 1962. However, the independents contribute significantly to the splintering of the opposition vote. In the 1962 election, there were three independent candidates for every two constituencies. The total vote for all independent candidates in the state was close to 14 per cent, a proportion higher than that for any opposition party except the Jan Sangh.

The large number of independents in each election largely reflects the low degree of party loyalty in U. P. politics. The Congress has found that rejected candidates for party tickets, even those who have signed the party pledge not to oppose the official candidate if they are rejected, do not hesitate to contest against the official candidates of the party. In 1952, 343 Congressmen contested against the official Congress candidates in U. P.; the figures for 1957 and 1962 were 122 and 166, respectively. Some of these Congress "rebels" contested on opposition party tickets, but most filed their nominations as independents.

In 1962, 31 independent candidates were returned to the Assembly. Of the 31 MLAs, 13 were Congress rebels. The number of independents in the Assembly is usually reduced during each term as opposition parties and factions within the Congress try to win new adherents. For example, in March 1963 five independents (as well as nine opposition party members) were admitted into the Congress. Successful independent candidates thus find that, even though they have contested against and defeated the official candidates of the major parties, the parties are willing to forget their opposition and bargain for their allegiance.

Party Politics in Uttar Pradesh

Political parties in U. P. differ in many important respects. Ideologically, there is a distinction between the secular, non-communal parties (the Congress, the socialist parties, the Communist party, and Swatantra), whose programs and policies are oriented primarily toward the issues raised by economic planning and development, on the one hand, and parties whose programs are oriented more toward cultural and communal issues (Jan Sangh and the Republican party) on the other.

Ibid., February 2 and 13, 1962.

The Statesman, March 24, 1963. The admissions caused considerable controversy in the Congress, particularly because one of the independent MLAs admitted was a Congress "rebel" in the 1962 election.

This kind of division is used by Norman Palmer in The Indian Political System (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), pp. 186 ff. The division cannot be considered a very rigid one; for one thing, since economic issues have legitimacy in Indian politics and communal issues do not, communal issues are often phrased in economic language; second, certain cultural issues are raised by the secular parties, e.g., Socialist militancy on the issue of the use of English.
Organizationally, there is a division between the loosely organized parties in which discipline is weak and factional loyalties are often stronger than party loyalties (Congress, the socialist parties, and Swatantra) and the tightly organized parties which attempt, albeit not always successfully, to maintain firm discipline and to eliminate factionalism (Communists and Jan Sangh). Another common distinction between democratic and non-democratic parties divides the parties in exactly the same way as does the distinction based on party organization. The Communists certainly and the Jan Sangh in many respects are both non-democratic parties.

Another division, which has been followed here, distinguishes the parties in terms of their leadership and popular support. The leadership and the major sources of support for the Congress in U. P. come from the locally dominant peasant proprietor castes. Opposition parties, to defeat the Congress, must either win influence among the dominant peasant proprietors for themselves or they must organize alternate sources of support. In U. P. the moderate leftist parties, led largely by ex-Congressmen, compete with the Congress for the support of the peasant proprietary body. Other opposition parties, such as Swatantra, Jan Sangh, and the Republicans have different social bases. Swatantra and Jan Sangh rest heavily upon the support of the ex-talukdars and the former big zamindars, whose influence in the countryside continues to be substantial. The Republicans, in contrast, draw part of their support from the landless, the field laborers who depend economically upon the peasant proprietors. A third alternative source of support for opposition parties lies with the "backward classes" such as the Ahirs and the Kurmis, who became proprietary castes after zamindari abolition. In many cases, these middle castes occupy a secondary position in Rajput or Brahman-dominated villages. In such villages, conflict tends to be organized around differences between the Rajput and Brahman ex-zamindars and their former tenants. The PSP and the Socialists, in some areas, have both attempted to exploit these differences.

Thus, there are many ways of distinguishing the political parties which operate in U. P. Not all political parties are equally interested in the same kinds of issues nor are all organized in the same way. Some are less devoted to the democratic process than others. Some appeal to certain communities, others appeal to economic classes. Nevertheless, there are certain common features which often blur distinctions. Most of the parties use similar tactics; all of the parties are affected in

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73 This division is used by Weiner, op.cit., p. 244.
some degree by factionalism and the low degree of party loyalty in the state; parties like the Jan Sangh and the Socialist party, which differ on most issues, are equally militant on the language issue; most parties tend, at least in party manifestos and on the public platform, to speak in the language of economic development. As in other aspects of life in U. P. and in India, there are unifying elements as well as diversities in the party system.

Political Conflict in Uttar Pradesh: A Case Study

The Third Five Year Plan for Uttar Pradesh called for an expenditure of Rs. 497 crores, of which Rs. 350 crores was to be provided by the central government and Rs. 147 crores by the state government from its own resources. In formulating the plan, the state government was aware that the bulk of the resources would have to be raised by new taxation. It was estimated that Rs. 109 crores of new taxes would have to be raised, most of it from the agricultural sector. State governments in India have been reluctant to resort to rural taxation, even though a very small proportion of the value of agricultural output is taken by taxes on the land and even though rural taxation provides a very small proportion of total tax revenues in the country. State governments have feared the political repercussions that would result from an attempt to increase taxes on land. Nevertheless, in 1962 the Uttar Pradesh government (and other state governments) reluctantly decided that there was no alternative, if the Third Plan expenditures were to be met, but to find new revenues by increasing taxes on the land. Conflict over the passage of a land tax bill in U. P. dominated the political life of the state throughout most of 1962. The conflict over the passage of the bill provides material for a case study of the political process in U. P.

The tax bills. The U. P. government's first proposal for a tax on landholdings in the state was introduced in the Assembly on September 4, 1962 as the U. P. Landholding Tax Bill. The bill was introduced only after long deliberations among government leaders and senior administrative officials of the state. The bill, in its original form, called for a 2½ per cent tax on the capitalized value of landholdings in the state or, more simply, for what amounted to a 50 per cent increase in the land revenue. All landholdings in the state were to be taxed, except

74 Government of Uttar Pradesh, Planning Department, Third Five Year Plan, 1, 44.
those of one acre or less. The provisions of the bill aroused such opposition among both Congressmen and opposition party members that debate on the bill had to be postponed. The Planning Commission in New Delhi was consulted and the bill was altered. The new bill raised the exemption from the tax to exclude landholdings of eight acres or less, an exemption which eliminated 90 per cent of landholdings in the state from the tax. The altered bill removed the objections of some Congressmen, but all opposition parties in the state and some Congressmen as well remained hostile to the bill and voiced some important criticisms of its new provision for an increased exemption. Opposition remained so bitter that the government was reluctant to use its majority in the Assembly to force the passage of the bill. However, a new spirit of compromise arose in the state after the Chinese invasion of India on October 20th, leading to meetings between the Congress and opposition leaders. As a result of the meetings, an entirely new bill was framed and presented to the Assembly as the U. P. Emergency Surcharge on Land Revenue and Rent Bill. The new bill eliminated the larger exemption and reverted to the previous exemption of one acre or less; but the Surcharge Bill provided for only a 25 per cent increase in the land revenue rather than the original increase of 50 per cent. The Surcharge Bill was passed by the Assembly on December 10, 1962.

The controversy over the tax bill agitated political life in the state for more than half a year. The controversy involved both state and national government leaders, Congress factions, and all opposition parties. Some insight into the state's political process can be gained by examining the roles of the various groups involved in the dispute, the methods which they used, and the influence which they were able to exert in modifying the tax proposals.

Division within the Congress. Division within the Congress over the land tax bill existed at every level in the Congress party organization and the government in U. P. and in Delhi. The controversy rekindled factional rivalries among state Congress leaders, but it also involved rank and file MLAs from the districts. In addition, conflict developed between Congress leaders in U. P. and Congressmen from U. P. in the central government and in Parliament.

The course of the controversy indicated that the concept of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet for policy decisions operates only in a very limited way in U. P. That is, state ministers will not openly express their disagreements with Cabinet decisions on policy matters, but their views are well known to politically informed people in the state and the existence of differences among Cabinet members is publicized
by the newspapers. Thus, it was announced in the press in July that the state Cabinet had completed the formulation of its tax proposals, and it was reported, but denied by the chief minister, that differences of opinion existed over the proposals among members of the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{17} In September, after the introduction of the bill into the Assembly, it was reported that the Finance Minister and the Agriculture Minister, both identified with the "dissident" group in the Cabinet, sharply opposed the land tax proposals. The Agriculture Minister, Charan Singh, prepared a forty-page memorandum which was circulated only privately. However, direct quotations as well as paraphrases from the memorandum appeared in the press. It was reported that the land tax bill was described by the Agriculture Minister as a measure "spelling breach of faith with the masses"\textsuperscript{78} and one which was unjustified in view of the fact that the per capita income of the peasantry had not increased in the last fifteen years.\textsuperscript{79}

Opposition to the government's tax proposals was widespread also among rank and file Congress MLAs. Some of this rank and file opposition was expressed openly in breaches of party discipline. One Congress MLA voted with the Opposition against the introduction of the Landholding Tax Bill in the Assembly on September 4th. Other Congressmen expressed their discontent in private letters to the chief minister.\textsuperscript{80} Opposition to the bill among Congress MLAs was sufficiently widespread to prompt the government to hold meetings of the Congress Legislature party to discuss the bill. At the meetings, during which seventy speakers participated in the discussion, opinions ranged from complete support for the government's proposals, to qualified support, to complete opposition.\textsuperscript{81} The government announced after the meeting that the basic principles of the bill had been approved by the Legislature party, but that the bill had been referred back to the Cabinet for amendments which would take into consideration the views of the members.\textsuperscript{82} Despite this announcement of agreement, open opposition was expressed by some Congress MLAs during the Assembly debates.\textsuperscript{83} Even after the

\textsuperscript{77} National Herald, July 13, 15, 1962.

\textsuperscript{78} A charge commonly made against the government was that the tax proposals were a breach of the promise made to one category of peasants (bhumidkars) at the time of zamindari abolition that their land revenue would not be increased for forty years. The government replied that its proposals were for taxes on the capitalized value of landholdings, not for an increase in the land revenue.

\textsuperscript{79} National Herald, September 11, 1962.

\textsuperscript{80} The Statesman, September 6, 1962.

\textsuperscript{81} National Herald, September 18, 1962.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., September 19, 1962.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., September 4, 6, 17, 1962.
Cabinet revised the bill to provide for an increased exemption, discontent continued. On October 18, two days before the Chinese invasion, sixty dissident Congressmen sought permission to vote according to conscience if the Land Tax Bill was not withdrawn. In a government move to close debate on the bill on October 20, one Congressman voted against the motion and another abstained. Mass rank and file opposition within the Congress ended after the Chinese invasion, but one Congressman opposed even the final Surcharge Bill when it was introduced into the House for discussion in December.

A third source of opposition to the state government from within the Congress came from Congressmen from U. P. in New Delhi. The leadership of the New Delhi Congressmen from U. P. was provided by Keshav Deo Malaviya, a central minister at the time, and Mahavir Tyagi, a prominent MP. Both of these men had old quarrels with Chief Minister Gupta, dating back to the years when they were followers of Rafi Ahmad Kidwai. A signature campaign against the state government's tax proposals was carried on among Congress members of Parliament from U. P. Thirty MPs signed a letter which was sent to the chief minister, urging him to withdraw the Land Tax Bill.

The chief minister of U. P. was thus under great pressure from members of his own party, both from prominent ministers in the state and central governments and from rank and file Congressmen from the districts, to withdraw his tax proposals. Some of this opposition was based upon a fear of popular discontent over the imposition of new taxes. Some of the rank and file opposition came from Congress MLAs in the eastern districts where landholdings are very small and where any new tax might be a serious hardship for most peasants. The opposition of the Agriculture Minister, Charan Singh, was to be expected since he has been an ardent advocate of the peasant proprietor and has argued in his writings that most landholdings in U. P. are uneconomic in size.

Thus, some of the opposition to the tax proposals from within the Congress was based both upon principle and upon a fear of popular discontent. However, much of the opposition to the government's proposals came from factional rivals of the dominant group in the state government. For many prominent Congressmen, the controversy over the Land Tax Bill was a convenient issue to embarrass the dominant group in the state Congress.

88 See, for example, Charan Singh, Abolition of Zamindari: Two Alternatives (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1947), pp. 210-16.
The Planning Commission. The central government has tended to intervene in state disputes when intractable controversies have arisen which threaten the stability of the state government. Three days after the Land Tax Bill was introduced into the U. P. Assembly, Prime Minister Nehru himself intervened in the dispute by announcing in Parliament, in response to an adjournment motion on the U. P. situation, that he was referring the question of increases in land taxes in U. P. and other states to the Planning Commission. Five ministers of the state government, including two ministers who opposed the measure, left for New Delhi to discuss the Land Tax Bill with the members of the Commission. The results of the discussions were not made public. The chief minister announced that the idea of a land tax had been accepted by the Commission "in principle." However, it was reported that the Commission had added its weight behind those who favored the exemption of small landholdings. Thus, both the Planning Commission and the "dissidents" in the Congress influenced the state government toward a major modification in the bill.

The role of opposition parties: Tactics. If the Land Tax Bill created division in the Congress, it also impelled the usually fragmented opposition parties toward a high degree of unity. Opposition pressure against any increase in land taxes began even before the Land Tax Bill was introduced into the House. Throughout the month of August, opposition parties in the Assembly attempted to force the government into discussions on the proposed tax measures. Opposition parties displayed some ability in embarrassing the government, both through parliamentary devices and by creating unparliamentary disturbances in the Assembly. During the month, opposition parties succeeded in forcing the discussion of a motion to reduce the land revenue, a motion of no-confidence in the government, and a motion that no new tax and no increase in existing taxes be imposed during the current year. All opposition parties engaged in a protest walk-out when the Land Tax Bill was finally introduced into the Assembly in September.

Opposition agitation against the tax proposals reached its peak after the bill was taken up for discussion at the end of September. Agitations and demonstrations were carried on both inside and outside the Assembly throughout the first three weeks of October, until the news of the Chinese invasion. Although some parties threatened mass civil disobedience movements, these never materialized. The focal points for agitation remained inside and outside the Council House. Inside the Assembly, the

Socialists played the leading role (although other parties contributed) in disrupting the proceedings of the House by shouting, disobeying the Speaker, engaging in walk-outs, and the like. Outside the Council House, the Jan Sangh played the most prominent role by picketing the entrance to the Assembly. The intent of the picketing was not wholly clear since Jan Sangh MLAs continued to participate in the proceedings of the House. Jan Sangh activity outside the House forced the government to station a police detail at the entrances. Some incidents of man-handling of MLAs (both Jan Sangh MLAs and others not involved in the picketing) occurred.

PSP and Communist activities were mild in comparison with those of the Jan Sangh and the Socialists. Leaders of both the PSP and the Communist party were critical of the more extreme tactics of other opposition parties. The major activities of the PSP and the Communists were simultaneous (but not cooperative) processions on September 10 of peasants from various districts through the streets of Lucknow to the Council House where speeches were heard by party leaders. The processions of September 10 were the only important instances of mass participation in the opposition agitations against the government's tax proposals. Of the major opposition political parties in U. P., only Swatantra did not participate in agitations either inside or outside the House, although Swatantra party members did participate in the protest walk-out of September 4th.

Thus, the major opposition parties in U. P. agreed in opposing the government's tax measures but adopted different methods to express their opposition. Jan Sangh and the Socialists adopted militant (although non-violent) agitational methods, the PSP and the Communists favored peaceful public demonstrations, while Swatantra made only symbolic protests.

_The role of opposition parties: Issues._ Three major issues were discussed during the debates on the government's tax proposals—the exemption issue, the question of the possible fragmentation of landholdings, and the issue of rural versus urban sources of revenue. All opposition parties were at first agreed that "uneconomic" landholdings should not be taxed at all. In the discussion on the opposition motion to reduce the land revenue in the state, PSP, Communist, and Swatantra spokesmen all argued that uneconomic landholdings should be exempt from land revenue altogether. There were differences among the

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93 For example, see the PSP criticism of Jan Sangh methods in *ibid.*, October 16, 1962.
opposition parties as to what constitutes an uneconomic landholding. Swatantra and PSP spokesmen thought that any landholding below ten acres was uneconomic, whereas a Communist spokesman thought that three acres should be the dividing line. This kind of debate is obviously a sterile one both because of the difficulties in determining what is an economic holding, and because most holdings in U. P. are uneconomic by every standard so far proposed.

Opposition party spokesmen thus added their weight to those in the Congress who favored a higher exemption limit. However, even after the eight-acre exemption was added to the government's Land Tax Bill, all opposition parties continued to oppose the tax. In fact, opposition spokesmen succeeded in raising a very cogent objection to the eight-acre exemption, despite the fact that most had previously favored such an exemption. During the debates on the Land Tax Bill, opposition leaders pointed out that an eight-acre exemption might encourage peasants with large holdings to partition their lands, thus adding to the fragmentation of landholdings. The government was bound to be particularly sensitive to this argument since it was then engaged in major land consolidation proceedings throughout the state. It is possible that the government was prompted by opposition arguments on this question, as well as by a desire to be accommodating in the wake of the Chinese threat, in withdrawing the Land Tax Bill. It was after consultation with the leaders of all opposition parties in the state that the U. P. government decided to eliminate the exemption and to propose instead the Emergency Surcharge Bill, which sought to increase the land revenue by 25 per cent on all landholdings above one acre.

The Emergency Surcharge Bill did not win the support of all opposition parties when it reached the House, but it did succeed in breaking the opposition front against the tax proposals. In presenting the new bill, government spokesmen claimed that all opposition leaders had agreed to the measure. The Socialist and Jan Sangh leaders denied that they had agreed to the new bill and continued their opposition in the House. The leader of the PSP in the House admitted that he had agreed to the new bill, but resigned his leadership of the party because of continued rank and file PSP opposition to the tax. However, Swatantra, the Communists, the Republican party, and most independents supported the new Surcharge Bill. The division among opposition parties on the

96 Ibid., August 3, 1962.
96 For an interesting discussion, see Charan Singh, loc.cit.
97 Nearly 56 per cent of the landholdings in U. P. were under 2 acres in 1949; see pp. 109-111 below.
98 National Herald, October 6, 19, 1962.
final bill did not reflect differences of ideology; both Swatantra and the Communists agreed to support it. The division reflected more the general tactical differences among the parties. That is, both the militant parties, the Jan Sangh and the Socialists, remained opposed to the tax proposals until the end. The PSP finally split on the issue and a new, more militant leadership was elected. A week after the PSP change in leadership, the party merged with the Socialists in the Assembly. The Communists and Swatantra, who are generally less militant than the other parties—the Communists partly for tactical reasons, Swatantra for temperamental reasons—were willing to reach a compromise with the government. Thus, the real differences among the parties were not over the tax bills, but over their general attitudes toward the party in power.

A third issue discussed during the debates on the tax bills was the issue of rural versus urban sources of revenue. All opposition parties agreed that it would be preferable to raise new tax revenues from the urban areas. The government passed, before the land tax proposals came up for discussion, a bill imposing new taxes on urban lands and buildings, as well as increases in sales and passenger taxes. Nevertheless, many speakers on the land tax bills argued that cultivators were discriminated against under the present tax structure as compared to town dwellers. Other speakers pointed to the fact that there were large arrears of taxes due from "capitalists and industrialists" and argued that these arrears should be collected before the peasants were taxed. Swatantra spokesmen vied with the Communists in urging that urban residents and big capitalists should be taxed rather than the peasants. All opposition spokesmen seemed to agree with a PSP leader who argued that a land tax "would amount to subordinating the interests of the majority for the benefit of a small minority of town dwellers and capitalists."

Conclusion. The course of the land tax controversy in U. P. in 1962 provides some insight into various aspects of the political process in the state. Some general conclusions emerge from the case study about the capacity of the state government to govern, about the ways in which policy is influenced in U. P. politics, and about the roles and attitudes of Congress factions and opposition parties in the state's political process.

The state government knew very well that considerable opposition would be aroused by its tax proposals. The chief minister was certainly aware of the division in his own Cabinet on the issue. Moreover, opposition parties had given the government clear warning that all peaceful methods, including agitations, would be used to oppose any proposals

to tax the peasants. Since much of the opposition both from within the Congress and from opposition parties was designed only to embarrass the government on a sensitive issue, it might be argued that there was no choice for the government but to meet the opposition head on. However, the government did not exhaust all possibilities of winning advance support for its tax proposals. For example, the meetings of the Congress Legislature party were held only after pressure from rank and file Congressmen made the meetings unavoidable.

Throughout the controversy, the government appeared vacillating. It was handicapped in meeting opposition attacks by division within the Congress party. However, the government also feared the possibility that opposition parties might be able to use the tax issue to arouse popular discontent. It twice made major revisions in its tax proposals, the first time largely as a result of pressure from within the Congress, the second time largely as a result of opposition pressures.

Opposition parties showed that, despite the comfortable majority of the Congress in the Assembly and despite the fragmentation of opposition forces, they could seriously embarrass the government and disrupt the process of orderly parliamentary government. Not all the opposition parties were equally militant or equally disrespectful toward parliamentary procedures; nor did they all work together out of choice. There were important differences among them, but these were subordinated throughout most of the struggle because it would have been politically disastrous for any opposition party not to oppose the government’s tax proposals. Ideological differences were not important in the debate. All opposition parties opposed the land tax, and all favored taxing urban residents rather than the peasantry. There were differences in tactics, however, which reflected more basic differences in the degree of militancy of the opposition parties.

The ineffectiveness of the Congress government in U. P. in the face of internal factionalism and determined opposition was further demonstrated in September and October 1963 when the land tax controversy was resumed. In September 1963, the U. P. Assembly was again disrupted by the controversy in connection with a misunderstanding over the application of the tax. Opposition party spokesmen and many Congressmen as well interpreted the Emergency Surcharge Bill as a measure which was to apply for one year only. The government argued that the bill was meant to apply for the duration of the national emergency, which had not yet officially ended. The U. P. Assembly was forced to adjourn three days ahead of schedule because of the dispute, and opposition parties began to make plans to launch agitations throughout the
state for a withdrawal of the tax. The Congress government was even more divided than usual at this moment because a change in chief ministers was about to take place under the famous “Kamaraj Plan.” A meeting of the executives of the Congress Legislature party on October 16, 1963 found a consensus among its members in favor of withdrawal of the tax. The next day, the new chief minister, Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, announced that the surcharge would be withdrawn. The chief minister’s statement, announcing the withdrawal, reflected fully the dilemma of a government in need of resources, but unable to use its majority to maintain a necessary but unpopular measure:

Financial commitments arising out of the Emergency, as well as the Plan, do not admit of any curtailment in expenditure. Nevertheless, it has been decided that the surcharge on land revenue will not be levied for the second year. It cannot, however, be overlooked that our financial commitments still continue and may even increase in the implementation of the Plan and defense schemes. The gap between the resources and the requirements of funds is bound to increase by this decision.

GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE

Governmental policies in U. P. since independence have had four major objectives—the abolition of all intermediaries between the cultivator and the state and the creation of a system of peasant proprietorship, increases in agricultural productivity and output, the provision of more non-agricultural sources of employment and income, and the decentralization of government through the readaptation of old institutions of local self-government and the spread of new ones.

Agricultural Problems, Policies, and Achievements

Since independence, the Congress government in U. P. has attempted to deal with three distinct problems in the agricultural sector of the economy—land reform, the existence of fragmented and uneconomic

100 The “Kamaraj Plan” emerged out of a meeting between Kamaraj Nadar, then chief minister of Madras state, and Prime Minister Nehru in July 1963. The plan was designed to restore unity to the Congress organization and put a stop to factional strife, which had become severe in many states by that time, by asking all central ministers and all chief ministers to resign. The resignations provided the national leadership of the Congress a rare opportunity to reorganize central and state governments. In U. P., the resignation of C. B. Gupta was accepted and Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani was elected chief minister in his place. The plan by no means succeeded in stopping factional conflict in the U. P. Congress.

101 National Herald, October 18, 1962.
holdings, and low productivity. In the area of land reform, the government has sought to abolish the system of intermediaries and to substitute in its place a system of peasant proprietorship. The government passed two important acts to implement these objectives—the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1952 and the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act of 1960. The first act eliminated all intermediaries between the cultivator and the state but left the former landlords in possession of their private lands. It thus essentially substituted the state government as zamindar in place of the landlords and confirmed all cultivators in the possession of their lands on a new legal basis. The act did not attempt to strengthen the economic position of the peasant proprietors by redistributing land. It was not until 1960 that a Land Ceiling Act was passed which ostensibly sought to bring about “a more equitable distribution of land” by limiting the size of landholdings in the state to 40 acres and redistributing all individual landholdings above the limit. In fact, the Land Ceilings Act offers little prospect of significant land redistribution in U. P., since a 40-acre limit frees at most only 1.3 per cent of the cultivable area in U. P. for redistribution and will certainly free much less than this amount because of provisions in the act permitting landholders to retain grovelands.

The most serious limitation upon the efforts to create a large and prosperous body of peasant proprietors in U. P. has been the existence of fragmented and uneconomic landholdings. According to the 1948 Report of the Zamindari Abolition Committee, 56 per cent of all cultivators in U. P. held less than 2 acres of land; 86 per cent less than 6 1/4 acres; 94 per cent less than 10 acres. Since there has been no significant land redistribution and population has increased rapidly, it is certain that the number of small holdings has increased. The problem of uneconomic holdings has been compounded by fragmentation, i.e., by the splitting and separation of the holdings of most cultivators into many tiny plots, adding to the labor of the cultivators and decreasing the efficiency of their operations. The government of U. P. has attempted to solve the

102 Neale, op.cit., p. 240.
104 The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.
106 In addition, the land to be redistributed is intended to go to landless laborers rather than to the existing small holders, thus creating new peasant proprietors rather than strengthening the old.
problem of fragmented landholdings by a massive program of land consolidation, currently being carried out under the terms of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1953. At the end of 1961, consolidation operations had begun in 37 districts, and the work of consolidation had been completed in 30 tahsils, with a combined area of 5.6 million acres. Consolidation in half of the state was expected to be completed at the end of the Third Five Year Plan.108

Consolidation of landholdings may increase the efficiency of agricultural operations on small holdings but in itself can only mitigate in part the increasingly acute problem of uneconomic landholdings. There are at least three possible approaches toward a solution of the latter problem—extensive redistribution of land, some form of joint or cooperative farming, or a combined program to increase agricultural production (thus making small holdings more economic) and to provide alternative sources of employment to ease the pressure on the land. The Zamindari Abolition Committee rejected extensive land redistribution on both economic and political grounds, i.e., because there is proportionately very little land that could be made available for redistribution and because any large-scale scheme of land redistribution would cause considerable discontent and opposition. Experimental schemes of cooperative farming have been implemented in various parts of U. P., but the state government has not shown any intention of substituting a large-scale scheme of cooperative farming for the prevalent system of peasant proprietorship. The only practical solutions, in terms of both economic and political considerations, appear to lie, first, in increasing the productivity of the available land, and second, in creating non-agricultural sources of employment through the development of industries.109

Unfortunately, progress in both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the state’s economy has been disappointing to U. P. planners. The Third Five Year Plan Report notes that “Per capita output of agricultural commodities has increased only nominally in the State [in the decade from 1950-51 to 1960-61], while per capita output in the industrial sector shows a decline.”110 Economic development in U. P. has not been faster than the rate of population growth in the state and has lagged behind the national average by most measures. For example,

108 Interview with the Joint Director, Consolidation in Lucknow, on December 20, 1961.

109 For a more complete statement of economic problems in U. P., see Neale, op. cit., parts iv and v.

110 Government of Uttar Pradesh, Planning Department, Third Five Year Plan, 1, 6.
population increase in U. P. during the decade 1950-51 to 1960-61 was 16.7 per cent compared to 21.1 per cent for the whole of India, while the increase in state income was 20.6 per cent compared to 41.6 per cent for the country. Foodgrains production increased by only 22 per cent in U. P. compared to 52 per cent for the country as a whole.

The state government has steadily expanded the system of national extension and community development throughout U. P. Progress has been made in some programs designed to increase agricultural production, particularly in the construction of irrigation works. Seed multiplication farms have been developed, chemical fertilizers are being distributed, and improved agricultural practices are being adopted. However, progress has been slow in most programs and unforeseen obstacles have arisen. A general factor which appears to be partly responsible for the slow rate of economic progress in U. P. compared to much of the rest of the country is the low rate of public investment in the state. Per capita expenditure in U. P. in the first two plans was the lowest in the country and will again be behind all other states during the Third Plan. The Third Five Year Plan Report of the U. P. government, published in 1961, saw no solution to the problem of economic development in the state, except through "a bold policy of raising resources to the maximum even at a sacrifice to the present generation, and making the best possible use of the outlays available for accelerating the growth of the State's economy." The land tax bills of 1962 represented an attempt to implement that "bold policy." The controversy aroused by the tax bills throws into sharp relief the political problems of economic development in a stagnant economy. It is politically difficult for the state government to raise additional tax resources when the economy is stagnant or in decline, but the decline is likely to continue unless new tax resources are found to implement the state's Five Year Plans.

**Employment**

The Five Year Plans in U. P. have not been able to provide adequate alternative sources of employment to those who are being forced off the land. The number of unemployed in U. P. has been increasing very nearly in geometric proportion in each plan period. Employment...
ployment opportunities sufficient even to absorb the new entrants to the labor force are not being created by the plans. The state government has declined to "undertake any sizeable programme of industrialization itself" because of "its limited resources." The state government must therefore "depend on the initiative of the private sector, and on the establishment of industries under the public sector by the Government of India." Despite the generally favorable attitude of the U. P. government to the desires of entrepreneurs for licenses, permits, and state loans, very little new industrial development has been undertaken in the private sector. Nor has the government of India established many new large industries in U. P., a fact sometimes resented by U. P. planners and politicians. The state government has increasingly turned to the development of small-scale industries both in rural areas and in urban "industrial estates" to provide new income and employment opportunities. In the Third Plan an effort is being made to integrate the small industries program with the community development program and thus create an industrial "cluster" for approximately every ten community development blocks. However, the total number of persons for whom the village and small industries program is expected to provide employment in the Third Plan is less than 58,000. There appears to be no prospect in the immediate future that either government or private enterprise will provide anything but a small fraction of the employment required to absorb those forced off the land.

**Political Problems**

There are no easy solutions to the problems of economic development in U. P. The state government has many programs in hand and has many achievements to its credit in terms of the goals which it has set for itself. If progress has been slow in terms of the usual indices of economic development, much of the difficulty has been the nearly intractable character of the problems. However, there have been some obvious political difficulties in the efficient functioning of the state government which certainly have had an impact upon its ability to carry out programs of economic development.

The factional structure of the U. P. Congress party has affected the orientation of government leaders, the efficiency of government departments, and the functioning of local administration. The constant struggle for power within the Congress has caused most state government ministers to be concerned primarily with questions of patronage and political support rather than policy. Ministries have fluctuated

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117 Ibid., p. 157.
118 Ibid., p. 70.
greatly in size; they tend to be huge when unity moves are taking place and "composite" governments are formed and small when factional conflict is intense and resignations are being submitted. The result is that portfolios are shifted about frequently; departments are joined together when governments are small, separated when governments are large. At all times, the chief minister tries to keep as much power and patronage as possible in his own hands and those of his closest associates, while giving as little as possible to the less reliable members of the government. When a prestigious portfolio must be given to a political rival, the patronage power is taken away to make the position less dangerous politically. The result is often a fragmentation of authority and responsibility, which leads to confused lines of administrative control in the districts. In addition, factional conflicts between opponents in the government often involve the administrative staff in the districts. Ministers will sometimes clash over appointments and transfers of local officials. Local administrative officers have even been drawn directly into factional disputes, gathering information about the activities of local politicians and preparing charges of corruption against them on the orders of ministers. It is not possible to measure precisely the impact of such political maneuvering on the administration and implementation of government programs, but it is clear that the preoccupation of ministers with problems of gaining and maintaining political support and the consequent politicalization of the administrative staff interfere with the processes of rational, orderly planning and plan implementation.

**Panchayati Raj**

The introduction of "panchayati raj" or "democratic decentralization" in U. P. is likely to increase the difficulties in the way of economic development and rational planning. Government planners are aware that the granting of greater powers to local bodies will probably lead to administrative inefficiency, but they consider local self-government a value worth pursuing for its own sake. It is also hoped that, in the long run, democratic decentralization will create public enthusiasm for and participation in the planning process and will thus contribute to the progress of economic development programs.

Under the U. P. scheme of democratic decentralization, begun in 1961, a three-tiered structure has been introduced into the districts. The three tiers are the local village panchayats, the *kshetra samitis* (block development committees), and the *zila parishads* (district boards). Great powers over planning and administration have been vested in these
local bodies. At the lowest level, the village panchayat is directly elected by the villagers. The higher bodies are composed of indirectly elected members, government appointees, nominees of local municipal, cooperative, and educational institutions, and MPs, MLAs, and MLCs from the area.

The program has barely been launched in U. P., but some tentative hypotheses about the probable impact of these institutions on economic and political development may be stated. Insofar as the local bodies are given major roles in the planning process and control over local administration, it is likely that demands for allocation of scarce government resources will lead to increased political participation and competition. Unless the allocation of government resources is linked very strictly to local production plans, the emphasis of the whole planning process may well become even more heavily oriented to the distribution of patronage, which may not always go to those who would use it for purposes of planned development. Another likely effect of the decentralization of government on the political process in U. P. is an increase in the strength of the local Congress organizations. The use of indirect elections, nominations, and appointments to the local bodies above the village guarantees that most of these bodies will either be controlled directly by Congressmen or at least not easily fall into opposition hands. Of course, continued Congress control over the new institutions of local self-government in turn depends upon the maintenance of Congress control over the state government.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused upon three interrelated problems of political development in U. P.—the problem of factionalism in the ruling party, the problem of the fragmentation of opposition parties, and the consequences of both conditions for the effective functioning of the processes of policy making and administration. It has been demonstrated that the effectiveness of the Congress majority in U. P. politics is limited by the persistence of internal divisions within the Congress. In contrast, opposition parties, despite their fragmentation, are able to exercise more influence than is warranted by their actual strength in the legislature. The effectiveness of opposition parties in limiting the freedom of Congress action is partly a consequence of the divisions within the Congress. In addition, some opposition parties have acquired greater influence than their popular support warrants because of their militancy and their willingness to disrupt the normal working of the parliamentary process to prevent government action. Finally, it has been
shown that factionalism in the Congress and the aggressiveness of opposition parties both tend to make it difficult for the government to pass desired legislation and to administer efficiently programs designed to accelerate economic development.

The problems discussed in this chapter are likely to become even more difficult in the immediate future. There is no prospect of an end to factionalism in the Congress party in U. P. unless the party is somehow transformed into a mass totalitarian party. There are two more likely patterns of development for the U. P. Congress. One possible pattern is a drift into anomy and the consequent continuation of the disintegration of the Congress organization in the state. A second possible pattern is the stabilization of factional struggle in the U. P. Congress and its containment within bounds which will permit the Congress to regain some of its lost electoral strength. Experience in other states and in some U. P. districts suggests that the latter possibility is the more likely one. However, it is also likely that anomic tendencies will continue to operate in the U. P. Congress indefinitely even if factional conflict becomes stabilized, and it is possible that the Congress may experience a further decline in electoral support before it begins to rebuild its strength.

The possibility of a further decline in Congress strength must be viewed in the context of the continued fragmentation of opposition parties. No opposition party in U. P. can by itself provide an alternative government to the Congress in the foreseeable future. The alternative to Congress rule in U. P. is either coalition government or an unstable minority government supported by the Congress. The most likely prospect for the immediate future, i.e., for the 1967 election, is either a slight decline or a slight increase in Congress strength. A slight increase in the Congress vote would leave U. P. politics much as it is today. A slight decline would accentuate present problems and would probably make it necessary for the Congress to rule either with a precarious majority or in coalition with another opposition group. In either case, the frustrations of a permanent minority status are likely to continue to force some independents and opposition party members to join the Congress and to force those who remain in opposition to continue to use militant tactics to draw attention to themselves and to their demands.

Finally, the likelihood of a continuation of or a further disintegration in the present structure of the party system in U. P. makes it difficult to foresee any significant changes in the policy-making process or in the process of plan implementation. The economy of U. P. may continue to stagnate or even decline in some respects in relation to the needs of an
increasing population. Economic discontent is bound to grow under such conditions. The pressure of increased economic distress in a population where some social groups are just beginning to enter the political process and to make demands is likely to place great strains on the political system as a whole.

Demands for change in the political or social system are not likely to take the form of a violent mass revolution. The state is too large and diverse and the degree of political organization is too low for such a movement to take place. Rather, the threats to the system lie in the continuance of drift, the spread of anomy, and the growth of sporadic violent movements in restricted areas among deprived social and economic groups.119 The danger to the system of politics in U. P. is the threat of utter chaos and the possibility that outside intervention by the central government may eventually be required.

POSTSCRIPT

The 1967 general elections and their aftermath have brought about a regime change in the political system of Uttar Pradesh. After twenty years of unbroken Congress rule, the Congress for the first time failed to win a majority of the seats in the legislative assembly. Although the Congress at first succeeded in forming a government by attracting a few defectors from opposition parties and by winning the support of most of the independents in the legislature, the government was brought down after seventeen days as a result of a major defection from its own ranks. The motion of thanks to the Governor’s address was defeated on April 1, and the Congress government resigned immediately thereafter. Chaudhuri Charan Singh, the leader of the defectors from the Congress, was unanimously elected leader of the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal, a joint legislative organization of all opposition parties in the assembly, and was invited to form the government the next day. The new chief minister was sworn in on April 3 and his council of ministers on April 6. With the formation of a non-Congress coalition government on April 6, the one-party dominant system in U. P. politics came to an end.

Although a fundamental change in the state’s political system has

119 This writer heard of one case in an eastern district where an opposition MLA with a long police record for dacoities and other offenses was characterized by a prominent fellow party member as “a staunch peasant worker” and a “mass hero,” whose “dacoities” had really been attacks on the former zamindars of the district. One case means little, but it is suggestive. The extent to which dacoity provides “employment” for those forced off the land is a subject on which it would be difficult to do research. However, if discontent in the rural areas becomes violent, an increase in dacoities might well be the first sign.
taken place, there are important elements of continuity as well as a change in patterns of political behavior in U. P. The defeat of the Congress in the elections and the success of all opposition parties in achieving a united front after the election can be attributed in part to the growth of discontent among several well-defined groups in the state's population. This discontent developed into what one correspondent characterized as a general "climate of hostility" against the Congress, especially among the middle class groups in the state. However, the Congress continued to suffer from intense internal factionalism, which in itself was at least as important as any other factor in the defeat of the Congress at the polls. Moreover, the underlying instability of the party system, a result of the uncertain loyalties of the independents and many members in most of the parties, continues. In fact, the political entrepreneurs and independents now hold the balance in the state's political system and can, at any moment, decide the fate of the coalition government.

With respect to the non-Congress parties, the most significant aspect of the 1967 elections is the continued rise of the Jan Sangh to a position of pre-eminence among the non-Congress parties in the state. A comparison of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows that the Jan Sangh has benefited not only at the expense of the Congress, but to an even greater extent at the expense of the combined socialist strength in the electorate. The Jan Sangh increased its popular vote by over 6 per cent and thereby nearly doubled

TABLE 2.2
UTTAR PRADESH ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Polled</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>6,862,030</td>
<td>32.10</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Sangh</td>
<td>4,602,257</td>
<td>21.53</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>2,178,845</td>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swatantra</td>
<td>1,011,770</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>859,937</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>856,727</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist (R)</td>
<td>732,776</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist (L)</td>
<td>254,704</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>4,020,631</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21,379,677a</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>423b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were, in addition, 1,507,439 invalid votes.

The 1967 delimitation of constituencies reduced the total number of seats in the U. P. Assembly from 430 to 425. Elections in two constituencies were not held at the time of the general elections.

its representation in the assembly. Although the SSP vote shows a slight increase between 1962 and 1967, this increase stems solely from the additional strength it acquired at the expense of the PSP in the aftermath of the PSP-SP merger and subsequent split. However, the present electoral strength of the SSP is less than that of the PSP in 1962, and there has been an absolute decline in both the combined vote of the two socialist parties from 20.4 to 14.2 per cent and in the number of seats they hold in the assembly from 62 to 55. The PSP has been relegated to the position of one of the minor parties in U. P. politics, along with Swatantra, the Republican party, and the two Communist parties. In fact, the separate votes of these parties is so insignificant as to be even smaller by a wide margin than the number of rejected ballots; and the combined vote of all the minor parties is less than that of the independents. Nevertheless, the present tenuous balance in the state assembly gives real power to every party, in fact to every member. Although there is no doubt that the Congress has become extremely unpopular among many educated people and among significant sections of middle class voters in the cities and towns, it remains the strongest political force in the state. The Congress popular vote declined by only 2.8 percentage points, although it lost 88 seats.

The wide discrepancy between the relatively small drop in the popular vote and the number of seats lost by the Congress cannot be fully explained without a detailed analysis of the elections by district and constituency. However, there are a few obvious factors. Probably the most important factor in the Congress decline was again intense internal party factionalism, rebellion, and sabotage in the constituencies and districts. There was a record number of applicants for the Congress tickets in the state in this election, over 2,300 compared to 1,838 in 1962. Far from reflecting the popularity of the Congress ticket, however, the large number of applicants in 1967 reflected the fact that three groups were competing for Congress tickets instead of two. Mrs. Kripalani, in her three years in office, succeeded in establishing a Congress group separate from both the Gupta and Tripathi groups. The leaders of both groups were eager to replace Mrs. Kripalani and absorb or eliminate her group followers, but they were prevented from doing so by their own continued group rivalries. A superficial air of cordiality and unity was established at the state level before the elections among the leaders of the two main groups in the Congress, but this failed to have an impact on the local level where the number of Congress "rebels" contesting against the official Congress candidates was higher than ever before and some sabotage was
nearly universal in the constituencies. Seventeen Congress "rebels" were returned either as independents or on opposition party tickets, but the effect upon the Congress in the state was much greater and contributed to the defeat of many more Congress candidates.

The second factor of obvious importance was the impact, especially upon the middle and lower middle class of salaried employees in the cities and towns, of the great increases in the prices of food and other commodities in the state in the last three years as a result of the food shortage created by three successive bad monsoons. The last monsoon, in fact, resulted in the worst drought and famine in living memory for several parts of the state. The drought and food shortage were, however, largely indirect factors which affected the middle class through rising prices.

The most articulate expression of discontent over rising prices came from the 500,000 state employees, many of whom were on strike throughout most of the election campaign, agitating for an increase in dearness allowance. Teachers in the privately managed colleges and in the secondary schools of the state were also agitated over the rise in prices and were demanding a similar increase in allowances. Finally, there was widespread student unrest, indiscipline, and vandalism in the cities and towns of the state in the months preceding the elections. Student grievances were extremely diverse, but there is some evidence that the student unrest may have been instigated in part by the teachers themselves. The state employees and the students engaged in organized disruption of Congress election meetings and, in some places, physically attacked the cars of Congress candidates and even the candidates themselves. It is probable that most of the votes of the state employees and the teachers went against the Congress. The students had few votes, but they did support and canvass for opposition candidates in many constituencies as well as engage in harassment of the Congress candidates.

The third factor of some importance in this election was the articulation of Muslim discontent over the problem of Urdu and other matters, and the formation of an openly anti-Congress Muslim organization, the U. P. Majlis-e-Mushawarat, which supported non-Congress candidates of various parties in constituencies throughout the state. Muslim discontent began to express itself in 1962 in a few areas of the state, but it was much more widespread this time. Again, it will require detailed constituency analyses to determine how many seats were lost by anti-Congress Muslim sentiment, but even a 20 or 30 per cent shift of Muslim votes, especially if concentrated in constituencies where Muslims are in large numbers, could have lost a large number of seats for the Congress.
There were other issues which may have affected some voters in the state: the food shortage; peasant antagonism to the 25 per cent surcharge on the land revenue (which was re-imposed after the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965); business antagonism to the Congress among goldsmiths and jewelers over the Gold Control Order and among traders over police raids for hoarding, profiteering, and black-marketeering; the cow slaughter issue; and the ever present administrative corruption. However, the slight decline in the Congress vote and the continued strength of the Congress in the countryside will not support the argument that there has been a significant change in rural voting behavior, which seems still to depend upon a combination of local caste and factional alignments.

Nevertheless, the hostility towards the Congress which has developed in recent years among both opposition politicians and the politically conscious segments of the population propelled all opposition parties in the state from Swatantra to the Left Communist party to join together to form a united legislature party called the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) on March 6, with a 33-point minimum common program. The program promised abolition of land revenue and certain other taxes, concessions to the various interest groups agitating for increased dearness allowance and other favors, increased irrigation facilities, and provision of fertilizers, among other points. The combined strength of the parties comprising the coalition on that day was 188, but the leadership claimed the support of 27 independents and a total strength of 215, a majority in the assembly. However, the Congress claimed the support of 34 independents on March 9, giving it a claimed strength of 223. The Governor was placed in a delicate position since it was quite obvious that many of the independents had committed themselves to both sides. The Governor concluded that the Congress claim was the more valid one and invited Mr. C. B. Gupta to form the government on March 12. In the first test of strength in the assembly on the election of the speaker, the Congress won by 226 to 188 or a margin of 38 votes, clearly indicating that almost all the independents had voted for the party called to power.

The Gupta government, however, had its difficulties from the beginning. Gupta's main rival in Congress group politics, Kamalapathi Tripathi, had been defeated in the elections and did not create any significant obstacles to the formation of the Congress government. The downfall of the Gupta government was brought about by Chaudhuri Charan Singh, a senior minister in the previous Congress governments and a man who has been consistently discontented with the functioning of the Congress gov-

120 And abolished again after the formation of the Congress government in March 1967.
ernment and the Congress party in U. P. for more than a decade. Negotiations were carried on between the Gupta group members and Charan Singh, but they failed to bring about an agreement on the composition of the new government. Gupta made the fatal mistake of forming a government composed predominantly of his closest followers. Charan Singh refused to join the government, and negotiations between the two sides finally broke down completely on March 31. On April 1, Charan Singh crossed the floor of the House with sixteen other discontented Congressmen. The motion of thanks to the Governor's address was defeated on the same day by 215 to 198 votes, the margin of 17 made possible by the shifting of allegiance of a number of independents.

The position of the coalition government formed on March 6 is obviously precarious. As of that date, a shift of nine votes would bring the government down. However, it is equally likely that shifts of allegiance may favor the new government.

There is no point in speculating on the future of the present government, which may last anywhere from a few months to five years. However, certain features of the system as a whole do stand out. No matter how long the government lasts, the present party and government structure is essentially unstable. It is an extremely fluid system which depends for its maintenance upon the actions of political opportunists. The two relatively stable components of the system are now the Congress and the Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh is the dominant party in the present cabinet, with five members in a cabinet of sixteen. The second largest contingent in the cabinet is the Jan Congress, which is a new legislative party formed from the Congress defectors, who now number twenty-one, of whom four, including the chief minister, are in the cabinet. For the rest, the SSP has contributed three members; the Communists (Right), the PSP, and Swatantra, one each; and there is one independent in the cabinet. Barring a wholesale defection from the Congress to the Jan Congress, the latter party has no future. The SSP suffers from severe internal divisions and poor local organization, which have so far prevented it from becoming a stable force in the party system. None of the other parties can hope to increase its strength significantly in the foreseeable future. Thus, U. P. at present has an unstable multi-party system.

Ideological differences have yet to make an impact on the functioning of the party system in U. P. Ideological differences or, at least, fundamental differences of approach do exist in the manifestos of the parties in U. P. However, there are four factors which currently prevent them from operating in a significant way. The first is the present determination of all the parties to make a non-Congress government a reality and to compro-
mise or put aside their fundamental differences. The second is the danger to the popular esteem of the first party to break away for any reason. The third is that the immediate problems of food shortage and inflation are so severe that pragmatic action has become inescapable. Finally, ideology cannot come into prominence in a system which depends for its functioning on appeals to independents and political entrepreneurs.

Policy differences do exist, however, within the present government, and they received public expression on the first major task undertaken by the government—that of procuring surplus foodgrains from the surplus districts and prosperous farmers in the state. Conflicting policy statements were issued, especially from Jan Sangh party leaders, whose party manifesto opposes grain levies on the peasants. The controversy was resolved and a compromise was reached among the parties in the cabinet. The danger to the government still exists, however, for there is a continuing possibility that discontented members of various parties and the independents may make use of such an issue to bring down the government.

The problems before the present government are formidable. Promises and concessions have been made by the government simultaneously to increase the dearness allowance of state government employees and to abolish land revenue and other taxes levied in recent years. The problem of resources has now become even more acute than before. The dominant partners in the coalition government, especially the chief minister and the Jan Sangh leaders, are pragmatic—if socially conservative—men who could reach workable compromises if left to themselves. However, any bold decision taken to face the problems of this state will always raise the possibility of defections which could bring the government down. Yet, the fact that the present government has a program, even though it is a minimum program, is bound to give a new policy orientation to politics in the state and force a confrontation with the basic problems of food and resources for development. In that confrontation, the prospect of a breakdown and the imposition of President’s Rule on the state is not the least likely possibility.

Kasauli, Himachal Pradesh
June 13, 1967

REFERENCES


THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLT
India, 1857-1870
BY THOMAS R. METCALF

THE AFTERMATH OF REVOLT, which is based on the official records of the Indian government and the private papers of various Viceroy and Secretaries of State, concentrates on the hitherto unstudied post-Mutiny decade. The decade following the great upheaval was possibly the last great creative period of British rule, and one in which the nature of many of the institutions that lasted to independence were shaped. Mr. Metcalf examines in detail the way in which the Indian Empire in the later nineteenth century was shaped by the events of 1857.

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