CASTE, FACTION & PARTY
IN INDIAN POLITICS

Volume I

PAUL R. B[illegible]

CASTE, FACTION AND PARTY IN INDIAN POLITICS

Volume Two

ELECTION STUDIES

By the same author

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN AN INDIAN STATE:

THE CONGRESS PARTY IN UTTAR PRADESH

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LANGUAGE, RELIGION, AND POLITICS IN NORTH INDIA

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CASTE, FACTION AND PARTY IN INDIAN POLITICS,
Vol. I : FACTION & PARTY

Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics

Volume Two

Election Studies

PAUL R. BRASS

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by
Paul R. Brass

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Preface

The essays collected in this volume, except the introduction and the long essay on "Caste, Caste Alliances, and Hierarchy of Values in Aligarh District," appeared originally in various journals over the past twenty-three years. All but the last, my first publication on "Class and Community Voting in Kanpur City," have never been available before in India. The research and writing for most of the articles and essays in this volume were supported by numerous fellowship and grant-awarding agencies and institutions, whose support has been acknowledged in the footnotes for each article.

In the preface to the first volume, I expressed my gratitude for the help of several friends in India who have facilitated and encouraged my work during many of the twelve or thirteen visits I have made. The assistance of Dr. Pradip Mehendiratta, Director of the American Institute of Indian Studies, and Dr. D. P. Singh, Head of the Institute of Public Administration, University of Lucknow, are once again gratefully acknowledged here. I should like to add to this list Professor A. F. Usmani of the Aligarh Muslim University Department of Political Science, who has been especially kind and helpful to me during my recent visits to Aligarh, and Mr. S.P. Mehra of Kanpur, who has been a lively, stimulating, and gracious host during my visits to Kanpur.

The officers and staff of the Election Commission of India have been enormously helpful over the years in providing me election statistics, which were used in several of the articles in this volume.

Francis Robinson very kindly read through the introduction to this volume at short notice and made suggestions that have improved its style and clarity.

In the year that has passed since volume one was published

in India, major and shocking political events have occurred that are not the subject of the essays in this volume. Nevertheless, these events have provoked an atmosphere of suspicion in the political arena and in the press directed at American scholars. One can only hope that the recent atmosphere is temporary. This volume of essays, published exclusively in India, is, therefore, offered in the hope that it will contribute to the perpetuation of an interchange between Americans and Indians that deserves to be cherished.

Seattle **Paul R. Brass**
May, 1985

Abbreviations

AIKS	All India Kisan Sabha
AMU	Aligarh Muslim University
BKD	Bharatiya Kranti Dal
BLD	Bharatiya Lok Dal
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
DMKP	Dalit Mazdur Kisan Party
INC (O)	Indian National Congress (Organizational)
KMP	Kisan Mazdur Parishad
KMPP	Kisan Mazdur Praja Party
MLC	Member, Legislative Council
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
SSP	Samyukta Socialist Party
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UPPP	Uttar Pradesh Praja Party
UPRSP	Uttar Pradesh Revolutionary Socialist Party
SCF	Scheduled Castes Federation
RPI	Republican Party of India
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

This book is for my children,

DAVID MICHAEL BRASS,
born in Lucknow on November 6, 1962,

and

LEAH SARAH BRASS,
born in New Delhi on Novermber 11, 1966

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
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Where the district tahsil name differs from its headquarters town name, the former appears within brackets, for example, PAURI (Garhwal)
The headquarters of Tehri and Pratapnagar tahsils are located at Tehri
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Introduction: Uttar Pradesh Politics, 1962-1984

This book is the second volume in a two-volume series, comprising a collection of most of my articles on factions, parties and electoral politics in India. All the articles in this volume are election studies, all but the first based on my work over the past twenty-three years at different levels and in different parts of the vast and diverse state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.). All but one of the articles in this volume have never been published before in India. Also included is a previously unpublished piece, the longest in the volume, titled "Caste, Caste Alliances, and Hierarchy of Values in Aligarh Politics." The first draft of this article, which focuses on elections at several different levels—village, block, legislative assembly, and parliament—in Aligarh district in 1962, was completed in 1965. It has been revised specifically for this volume and includes a new Epilogue. All the other articles have been republished here without revision, except for correction of errors and occasional updating of footnote references. As in Volume One, they have been grouped thematically rather than in order of publication.

Part One consists of a review article on Indian election studies that focuses on the methodology of research on elections, with special reference to the value of ecological analyses based on aggregate data for the understanding of electoral patterns in India. Part Two consists of two articles that provide an overview of electoral patterns and trends in U.P. as a whole from

1952 to 1980. These articles also convey the specific argument that the rise of the middle peasantry and the intensification of conflict between the middle status (so-called "backward',) and the elite castes have been the most important developments in U.P. politics during the past thirty years, with major consequences for the structuring of the state's party system and for the differentiation of the rural support bases of the competing political parties. Part Three consists of two local electoral studies: a brief article on urban electoral politics in Kanpur and the much longer piece on rural electoral politics in Aligarh district. Both these chapters also take up the issue of continuity and discontinuity in electoral appeals, voting patterns, and party support bases at different levels in U.P. politics.

Although the articles and essays in this volume are devoted mostly to U.P., I believe they have relevance for comparisons with other Indian states and for understanding Indian politics generally. Many of the patterns and trends identified here concerning U.P. politics, particularly those pertaining to the rise of the "backward" castes and of elite-backward caste conflicts, are broadly similar to patterns and trends in the neighboring state of Bihar, which is, after U.P., India's second most populous state. I hope these articles and essays on U.P. also will facilitate contrasts with other states in India where patterns, processes, and trends in electoral mobilization and in the relationships among caste, class, and party conflicts have been different.[1] I have argued also, both in the essay that comprises chapter iii of this volume and in the last chapter of the previous volume, that the analysis of U.P. politics and politicians is valuable because of the critical roles they have played in the great changes and fluctuations in national politics, especially during the past decade.

I have also tried to use electoral analyses of U.P. politics as a basis for making some broader generalizations that are relevant to an understanding of major aspects of political conflict and political integration in India and in multi-ethnic developing countries. Three sets of issues recur and structure the arguments in all the essays of this volume. One set concerns the interplay among caste, class, and political parties in an enormously diverse, complex, and hierarchical social order. The second concerns continuities and discontinuities in patterns and

processes of politics at different levels in U.P. politics, which have been a major theme in the study of problems of national integration in developing countries. The third concerns trends and changes, continuities and discontinuities both in the relationships among caste, class, and party and in the types of loyalties and political mobilizations of caste and class groups that have been possible.

The remainder of this introduction is divided into four sections. The first will take up the methodological approaches used in the articles and essays contained in the volume. The second will discuss caste, class, and party. The third will summarize the arguments on continuity and discontinuity between levels of politics in U.P. The fourth will emphasize the development and persistence of a stable underlying structure to party politics in U.P. based on conflict between elite and middle status landed castes and the implications of this structuring for agrarian change.

Methodological Issues : Ecological Analysis and Survey Research

In the first article in this volume, I took up the hallowed issues of the relative merits of survey versus ecological analysis of elections and expressed my preference for the latter form in the conditions then prevailing in India. Survey research methods until 1978, at least, had not produced much work that deepened our understanding of Indian political behavior. That situation may be about to change, as it was demonstrated just before the 1984 parliamentary elections in a survey supervised by David Butler and Pranaoy Roy[2] that an election result in India could be predicted with a high degree of accuracy by such methods. It remains to be demonstrated that the results can be repeated and, more important, that they can be used fruitfully for more substantial kinds of research than the analysis of pre-election voter preferences.

Even if survey research should be on the point of coming into its own in India, ecological analyses that correlate electoral with other kinds of aggregate data will continue to have a useful place in Indian electoral studies. All the more so now that polling booth election results have been once again made

available since the 1980 elections. In any case, the advantages of ecological analysis for some kinds of election studies remain. They include their uses in identifying the underlying structural properties of party systems, in presenting time series data to discover trends in voting behavior, in identifying distinctive regional and other contexts in which voting choices occur, and in the possibilities for discovering unthought-of relationships through the manipulation of available data. At its best, ecological analysis should provide methods for uncovering deeper patterns, structures, trends, and relationships that go behind the expressed preferences of voters and the reasons they give for their choices.

In the long article in Part Two of this volume on "The Politicization of the Peasantry," I used aggregate electoral and ecological data to probe for such underlying structuring trends in U.P. party politics. I was able to show, through time series analysis of the electoral data, that there had been a secular decline in Congress support between 1952 and 1977 and to identify the particular areas of the state where the decline had been most pronounced. Through correlations of electoral data with available data on land tenure, landholdings size distributions, and proportions of agricultural laborers in the rural population, it proved possible also to make inferences, since supported by personal observations, concerning the voting behavior of broad categories of voters. The identification of a persistent support base for the BKD and the BLD forced a new view of this agrarian party as drawing upon deep-seated rural discontents rather than being a mere opportunistic coalition of political entrepreneurs. Moreover, through ecological analysis, a hitherto unknown and unimagined relationship was discovered between independent voting and agrarian discontent in western U.P. that preceded the rise of the BKD.

When, sitting at my desk in Seattle in 1976 reading computer printouts, I first discovered the relationships identified in the article on "The Politicization of the Peasantry," I was suspicious of the results. Consequently, I let the material go unpublished until I had an opportunity to travel again in the north Indian countryside. After doing so briefly in 1978 and 1979, I became more confident of the conclusions. But it had also become obvious that the patterns uncovered in the data were

distributed differently among different caste groups and that they, therefore, required further specification. Such specification, however, in the absence of survey research data, can only be provided on the basis of impressionistic personal observations.

In the article on the 1977 and 1980 parliamentary elections in U.P., published as chapter iii in this volume, I presented some impressionistic observations within the broader interpretive framework that had been developed in the "Politicization of the Peasantry" article. That framework in turn made me doubtful of some of the popular explanations of the 1977 and 1980 election results that emphasized either the alleged commitments of Indian voters to democratic values or the importance of transient and specific issues such as high prices and shortages of essential commodities. Instead, it seemed to me that there were deeper patterns, perceptible by means of individual interviews with voters, which went back to the 1950s and which persisted through the 1977 and 1980 elections and, for that matter, have persisted through 1984. The obvious conclusion from these observations is that ecological analyses need to be supplemented by survey research, but they also can be used to show underlying patterns which are not normally revealed by survey research methods. Ecological analyses also should be used to guide voter surveys to the critical populations to be surveyed and to important questions which should be asked.

In the meantime, however, since such surveys are not being done in India on a wide scale, ecological data provide the only source for systematic analyses of Indian election results. My own work leads me to suggest three strategies to follow in using such data. One is to use data from several sources wherever possible, especially when the data from one source contradict the other, as, for example, Indian census commission data and Indian state board of revenue data on size of landholdings do. The second strategy is to combine levels of analysis and not to confine oneself to one level alone, moving instead from state to region to district to tahsil to constituency to polling booth and vice-versa. Such a strategy not only helps to minimize the problems associated with the ecological fallacy,[3] but also to reveal relationships at one level not discernible at another The third strategy is to experiment with regional reaggregations of data, testing generalizations based on one kind of regional grouping

of the data by regrouping them in other ways. For example, most of the data analyzed in the "Politicization of the Peasantry" article were grouped by conventional historic-geographic regions. However, for some purposes, it proved desirable and instructive to regroup the data into two broad regions (which cut across the conventional regional divisions) comprising predominantly wheat-growing and predominantly rice-growing districts. Many such possibilities exist when using a large ecological data base.

Caste, Class, and Party

Election studies are sometimes dismissed as a favorite pastime of American political scientists who prefer to avoid more important issues such as class conflicts, the development of political movements outside the electoral arena, and the existence of forms of political exploitation in representative political systems in which regular competitive elections occur. Such criticisms of electoral studies are often justified, in particular those forms of survey research that do little more than celebrate the alleged commitments of voters to democratic processes through endless, superficial analyses of the correlates of high and low turnout rates, party identification, participation in electoral campaigns, and the like. Little attention is paid to such questions in the election studies collected in this volume. Instead, I have tried to use electoral studies as a basis 1) for analyzing the relationships among caste, class, and party groups, 2) for understanding the class structure and patterns of class and caste dominance in the countryside, and 3) for explaining the character of social and economic conflicts in north India.

Class vs. Ethnic Explanations of Political Behavior

A major recurring theme in Indian political economy concerns the relative weight to be given to class versus ethnic explanations of political behavior. Much political mobilization in modern and modernizing societies consists of developing broad categories into which people may be fit and then finding the symbols to appeal to them. Social scientists and journalists all too often are themselves partisans of one or another set of

such objectified categories. They look for the degree of class consciousness among the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, or they treat ethnic and religious categories such as Muslims or Sikhs in an undifferentiated way and seek to determine the extent of "separatist" consciousness among them.

While it cannot be denied that such categories are often successfully created and large numbers of people are mobilized from time to time on the basis of them, the categories tend to be variable, to contain internal sub-groups which can be mobilized on different bases, and do not exclude the potential for cross-category mobilization as well. Generalizations, therefore, which comment on the growth of class or ethnic group consciousness in societies so diverse as those in north India, have to be presented cautiously and must be attentive to the possibilities of future change.

Keeping these considerations in mind, two persistent underlying trends relating to caste and ethnic categories appear to have had a considerable effect on political processes in north India. One has been the turning of *some* caste and communal categories into voting blocs and the corresponding elevation of caste category for some caste groups to greater importance than *jati* at the supra-local level of legislative assembly constituency, parliamentary constituency, district, region, and province. The number of such categories which have been effectively created in this way is much smaller, however, than the number appealed to by the politicians.

In the supra-local political arenas, party leaders and spokesmen of different parties talk about Muslims, Harijans, the landless, the "backward castes," Hindu nationalists, and so forth. It is part of the everyday political strategy of state and national politicians in India to be on the alert for issues that can be dramatized effectively into appeals to whole categories of voters. Hindu-Muslim riots are exploited to persuade Muslims en bloc to seek refuge in the party out of power. Atrocities allegedly committed against Harijans in the countryside are used in the same way to appeal to the entire category of Scheduled Castes. Slogans such as "garibi hatao" have a similar purpose. State governments pass legislation to provide reserved places in government jobs and educational institutions for the "backward castes." The violence that often then follows is used

by different parties either to deplore the new policies or to defend them and to win the votes of either the "backward castes" as a whole or the upper castes as a whole.

In north India, "Muslims" and "Harijans" or "Scheduled Castes" have been two categories which have been used consistently in this way during the past two decades, although with varying effectiveness. The electoral studies in Part Three of this volume, which focus on the 1962 elections in Kanpur City and in Aligarh district demonstrate that, in both those widely separated areas, one urban one rural, Muslims and Scheduled Castes, particularly Chamars were hostile to the Congress, which had been severely weakened by disaffection within these two categories of voters. In the intervening years, however, the Congress has made special efforts to appeal to both these categories of voters. It has done so, moreover, with such success that these two categories are now presumed to form part of the Congress "committed vote". There have been fluctuations over time and often significant variations regionally, and even from constituency to constituency within a district, in voting behavior within these two categories. It has, nevertheless, been one of the accepted realities of U.P: politics that the Congress normally gets the bulk of the votes within these two categories and that, when widespread defections occur within them, as in 1967 and in 1977, the Congress may suffer a major defeat.

A third category of voters normally considered to be "committed" to the Congress are the Brahman castes. Their commitment is attributable in part to their persistent local importance, often dominance, in district Congress affairs and, in part, to their identification with the Nehrus as Brahmans. While there have been variations in Brahman voting behavior in particular constituencies, there has never been a widespread defection among Brahman voters in U.P.; they have provided a persistent core of support for the Congress among the dominant elite proprietary castes in the countryside.

The second persistent underlying trend of the past twenty years has been the politicization and increased cohesion of some of the middle castes of peasants. In particular, two of the great peasant castes of north India, the Jats and the Yadavs, have shown a persistent aversion for the Congress and a tendency to vote solidly for the party of Charan Singh in election after

election. There has also been a wider tendency for other backward castes to vote against the Congress, though not necessarily for the BKD/BLD/Janata/DMKP.

It will be evident already from this description of two major tendencies in voting behavior in U.P. over the past twenty years that it is often difficult to disentangle the separate effects of ethnic and class identifications in voting The intermixing of these identifications was evident in 1962 in both Kanpur City and in Aligarh district. In Kanpur, the successful non-Congress candidate, S.M. Banerji, had his greatest strength among laborers, but particularly among Muslim and Scheduled Caste laborers. Since Banerji's strength among Muslims extended to other social classes as well, it is difficult to separate the effect of anti-Congress Muslim voting in general from Muslim workers' identification with Banerji as a candidate of the Left. Similarly, in Aligarh in 1962, while it is possible to interpret the non-Congress voting in all areas dominated by non-Brahman proprietary castes as an expression of economic discontent on the part of these castes generally, in fact voting was fragmented along caste lines. Over the past twenty years, moreover, it has not become easier to disentangle the effects of ethnic and class factors in voting. In the 1980 elections, for example, in which high prices and shortages of basic commodities were the principal economic issues, persons from major caste categories distributed the blame for them more according to their voting preferences than distributing their voting preferences according to which party was "objectively" responsible. In this way, economic issues are superimposed on and supplement caste issues and identifications.

The Imperfect Correspondence of Caste and Class

The difficulties of disentangling ethnic or caste from class factors in voting is largely attributable to the fact that the correspondence between caste and economic class is imperfect in U.P. There is a sufficient correspondence between elite, middle, and lower caste ranking and control over land and other economic resources in the countryside for appeals based on economic-cum-caste inequalities to have some effect. At the same time, the imperfectness of the correspondence means that

the potential for such appeals also is limited. The distribution of Brahman castes in relation to landholdings and control of resources in north Indian districts will be skewed towards the higher side and that of the Yadavs towards the middle and lower ends. But, middle-size and smallholding Brahman kisans are probably no more likely to vote for the party of Charan Singh than the richer Brahman landholders; similarly, rich and middle Yadav peasants are more or less equally unlikely to vote Congress. The argument is then that, while the emergence of a persistent structuring of electoral competition could be seen as early as 1962 in Aligarh and elsewhere in north India, its full articulation in class terms was then and is still prevented by the persistent hold of caste sentiments and antagonisms.

The imperfect correspondence between class and caste in the north Indian countryside is both a function of and at the same time provides persisting strong support for the economic and political dominance of the self-sufficient landed castes in most districts of U.P. It is the central fact of north Indian agrarian class structure. A relatively small, but varying group of landed castes, usually consisting of three to five large castes in each district, comprising in the aggregate 20 to 30 per cent of the total population, controls 50 to 70 per cent of the land. Their control over the land is sufficiently decisive that their politically active members can use it as a base for building support in elections and gaining political control of local institutions that distribute economic resources: banks, cooperative societies, cane unions, and the like. Their ability to mobilize popular support also is virtually monopolistic or, rather, oligopolistic.

Only representatives of or persons who have the support of one or more of the major landed castes in the area can hope to win a legislative assembly constituency. At the same time, the support of only one landed caste is usually not enough to prevail, which means either that inter-caste alliances must be formed among the land controlling castes or that the poor and the landless, the minor backward artisan castes, or others must be added to a candidate's support base to achieve victory. However, the electoral contests in north India in non-reserved constituencies nearly always center around competition among representatives of locally dominant landed castes, who consti-

tute the central core of support for all leading political parties.

The importance of the land controlling castes and the structuring of local political competition almost exclusively around them, that is, around caste-based loyalties, means that class polarization is ruled out and peasant revolution is unlikely in U.P. Competitive elections themselves, which dictate inter-caste coalitions for success, support rather than threaten the dominance of the land controlling castes, despite the fact that the competition among the landcontrolling castes involves the political mobilization of the poor and the landless as well. The main lines of conflict in the U.P. countryside are not economic, based on different class interests between the dominant landed castes and the poor and landless, but political. They are struggles among caste groups with basically similar economic interests for political control over economic resources.

The displacement in U.P. over the past 30 years of all the Left parties by the Congress and the BKD/Lok Dal/DMKP supports this analysis of caste and class in north India. So does the weakness and the quick rise and fall of the Swatantra party and other even more ephemeral parties in U.P. which have attempted to build support from a base among the ex-zamindars and talukdars. So also does the ephemeral character of the Republican party success in Aligarh district in 1962 in creating a coalition in which Scheduled Castes and Muslims were the primary partners rather than the pawns of the landed castes. That brief success was soon overshadowed by the rise of the BKD and the development instead of a dual conflict between the BKD and the Congress, with both sides competing for support among the landed castes.

The facts of the rise of the BKD, the nature of its support base, and its displacement of all other non-Congress parties in U.P. as the principal opposition to the Congress illustrate the argument, but they also reveal a persistent structuring dimension to political conflict in north India. The competition between the BKD/Lok Dal/DMKP and the Congress in U.P. has been primarily a struggle among the land controlling castes, but one that has taken increasingly the form of a conflict between the old elite proprietary castes of Brahmans, Rajputs, and Bhumihars and the middle status proprietary castes of Jats, Yadavs, and fragments of others. This structuring is imperfect

and it does not prohibit inter-caste alliances which cross the elite-backward caste divide, but it is pervasive and persistent.

Class and Other Contradictions

The founder of the BKD and the leader of its current successor party, the DMKP, Charan Singh, has attempted to articulate a coherent economic view that emphasizes class and economic contradictions that go beyond elite-backward caste divisions. He has consistently argued that the two principal social-economic contradictions in contemporary India are: 1) between the peasant proprietors in general and the former landlords and 2) between the values and interests of small-scale owner-cultivators and those of the urban professional and bureaucratic classes promoting urban-centered capital-intensive industrialization. Although Charan Singh's policies ought to appeal to rural cultivating owners in general, the core of his support has come pirmarily from sections of the backward castes. Once again, therefore, caste and ethnic loyalties provide the structure to political mobilization which has economic and class bases as well, but which cannot be fully articulated in class terms because of the persisting importance of caste and ethnic ties.

A third social and economic contradiction in north India is that between the landed castes and the mostly low caste and lower backward caste laborers. This contradiction has been partly bridged by the Congress, which has built its "committed" voting base by combining the support of elite proprietary castes and former landlords with successful appeals to the lower castes, lower backward castes, and the poor. At the same time, Congress leaders have pursued a propaganda strategy that brands the Lok Dal and the Jats, in particular, as exploiters of the Scheduled Castes. The Congress leaders have also accused Lok Dal supporters of preventing Scheduled Caste persons from voting. In fact, the Jats have no monopoly at the local level in exploiting the low castes and the landless. It is done by all the landed castes, including the Brahmans. The only genuine difference between Congress and the Lok Dal in this regard is that the Congress wants the Scheduled Caste vote mobilized on its behalf because it is part of its winning coalition. But the

economic interests of local Brahman and local Jat peasant proprietors in relation to low caste landless laborers are identical. At the same time, the fact that the Congress has successfully built political support in north India by jumping over the middle status peasant castes to form an alliance between the elite proprietary castes and the poor also serves to blur economic class differences at the local level in the countryside and to blunt any potential for class mobilization of all the poor and landless against the landed castes

A fourth social contradiction in north India that complicates the economic structuring of political conflict is persistent Hindu-Muslim tension. The belief, often confirmed in practice, that Muslims can be mobilized to vote en bloc for the party or candidate perceived to be their protector leads to a competition for the Muslim minority vote, which is often the largest or second largest potential voting bloc in U.P. constituencies, along with the Chamars. The heavy concentration of Muslim votes in the small and medium-size towns facilitates such party competition for and mobilization of the Muslim vote. It also means, however, that it does not affect significantly local patterns of rural dominance and local conflict among the landed castes. Muslims, like the Scheduled Castes, are merely potential voting blocs whose weight can influence the outcome of elections but not the local patterns of social, economic, and political control in the countryside. The competition for the Muslim vote, however, in contrast to that for the Scheduled Caste vote, often leads to the nomination of Muslim in the general constituencies in an effort to add a Muslim bloc of votes to one or another of the local coalitions of the predominant landed castes.

The existence of these four social contradictions in north India and their cross-articulation in electoral politics means that there is a large element of structuring and also a large potential for disintegration of coalitions or for realignments that bring about the electoral waves that produce the massive voting shifts and lop-sided majorities of one coalition or another. When the Congress "committed" vote is solid and the opposition is fragmented, a huge Congress landslide will occur. When the opposition is united and major defections occur among the Muslims, Scehduled Castes, or elite castes, then a big non-Congress victory is likely. But there is a persisting core to both

the Congress and the opposition coalitions, with the Congress consistently drawing its strongest support from the top and the bottom of the class-caste hierarchy while the Lok Dal/DMKP draws primarily from the middle status peasant castes.

The Congress coalition, it should be stressed, is also broader and stronger than that of Charan Singh. Not only does it encompass a larger proportion of the voting population, but the elite landed castes remain economically and politically more powerful at the local level than the middle status peasant castes. Any comparisons, therefore, between the growing political importance of the backward castes in U.P. and the rise of the non-Brahman castes in Tamilnadu, Maharashtra, and Karnataka are superficial.[4] The middle castes in U.P. cannot displace the Brahman and Rajput dominant castes, who comprise a large proportion of the population and, in most districts, still control the highest proportion of the land in comparison with the middle status proprietary castes. Ultimately, therefore, it means that the base that Charan Singh has built up among the middle castes is not expandable to a voting majority or plurality among the backward castes alone. Only through broadening its coalition or through temporary defections from the Congress coalition can the Lok Dal/DMKP achieve power in the state or even in a district in the state.

Caste, Class, and Party

In the article on "The Politicization of the Peasantry," I have tried to show how, despite the imperfect correspondence between caste and class in U.P., a differentiation of party support bases by class, which is reflected also in party policies, has occurred and persisted in some cases for two decades. The primary basis for this differentiation has been persistent discontent in the rural areas among the non-Brahman cultivating castes with Congress policies and local administrative practices in relation to agriculture on such matters as product and input prices, corrupt distribution of locally scarce resources, land ceilings legislation, and the like. Since it has been easier to join the Congress than to defeat it, to gain access to the patronage system and the Congress protection system than to resdistribute resources, many politically active persons from the non-Brahman

cultivating castes, including both elite castes such as Rajputs and backward castes such as Kurmis, have entered the Congress or gone back and forth from Congress to the opposition.

The Congress coalition in U.P., therefore, has remained broad. At its broadest, it has encompassed former zamindars and talukdars, the locally dominant elite proprietary castes of Brahmans, Rajputs, and Bhumihars, sections of the middle status cultivating castes with self-sufficient holdings, and the bulk of the lower backward, Scheduled Caste, and Muslim minority vote. On the occasions when the Congress has drawn support from most of these sections of the electorate, it has polled a majority of the votes and most of the seats.

Such a broad coalition, however, is difficult to sustain. The politicians from the old elite landed castes, particularly the two most important, Brahmans and Rajputs, tend to fall out over the distribution of ministries, party nominations, and control of district institutions. Muslims desert from time to time when they feel threatened by Congress action or inaction to control Hindu-Muslim riots and police victimization of Muslims or to protect the Urdu language or the status of the Aligarh Muslim University. Scheduled Castes have defected on the matter of forced sterilizations during the Emergency. At its narrowest, however, leaving aside the 1977 election, the Congress coalition remains the broadest in U.P., its "committed" vote of most Brahmans, Scheduled Castes, lower backwards, Muslims, and fragments of other categories comprising a minimum vote of one-third of the electorate.

The principal source of opposition to this congress coalition has come from the middle band of peasant castes of backward caste status. This opposition has persisted from the 1950s to the present. It exists independently of any political parties, though Charan Singh has been the leading political spokesman for these peasant castes both in and out of the Congress. This discontent was expressed in voting for independent candidates in wastern U.P., for Socialist candidates in eastern U.P., and for the Jan Sangh in Oudh in the 1950s and 1960s and for the party of Charan Singh—BKD, BLD, Janata, Lok Dal, and DMKP—from 1969 onward.

Since the formation of the BKD in 1969, the division between the Congress coalition and the middle peasant coalition

of Charan Singh has come to structure conflict throughout most of the state from Aligarh to Deoria. The division has overridden and displaced all other party divisions which existed before.

In the "Politicization of the Peasantry" article, I traced the development of this dualistic structure of competition between the Congress and the party of Charan Singh. Before the rise of the BKD in 1969, the discontent of the middle peasantry was expressed through different parties in different regions of this huge state : the Jan Sangh in Oudh, independents in west U. P., and the radical Socialists in east U. P. The rise of the Jan Sangh, which showed a continuous increase in vote share and seats won in four consecutive legislative assembly elections between 1952 and 1967, was arrested with the entry of the BKD in 1969. The BKD immediately displaced the Jan Sangh as the principal opposition to the Congress in its first election contest. The Jan Sangh, which is usually thought of as a party of urban traders and rural elites, had in fact become the party of both big landlords and the leading peasant proprietors, including considerable backward caste elements, in Oudh. In west U. P., the middle peasant areas had been anti-Congress from 1952 to 1967. Anti-Congress sentiment was expressed in independent voting. Most of that sentiment was absorbed by the BKD in 1969 in both the middle and rich peasant proprietor areas. In east U. P., the SSP was the party that mobilized the bulk of the discontented backward caste vote. That too was absorbed by the BKD through its merger with the SSP and the formation of the BLD in 1974.

By 1974, then, the BKD/BLD had become the first non-Congress party in the history of post-Independence U. P. to have broad support across the entire state. Its support was naturally uneven, varying from region to region, but so was that of the Congress. Yet, in four of the five most populous areas of the state—Rohilkhand, the Eastern Districts, the Lower Doab, and the Upper Doab—the BKD vote share in 1974 ranged from 20 to 28 per cent. In Oudh, where the Jan Sangh retained significant support and where the former landlords continued to play important roles in politics in opposition to the BKD, the BKD vote share was 16 per cent.

In 1977, the BLD formed the core of the Janata coalition

that defeated the Congress by adding considerable Muslim and Scheduled Castes support to the middle and rich peasant base of the BLD. In 1980, when most of the Scheduled Castes and Muslims returned to the Congress, which simultaneously drew large segments of the old Rajput landed elites into its ranks as well, and the Janata coalition disintegrated, the Lok Dal emerged with the strongest non-Congress support base, with 29 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 1980 compared to 23 per cent for Janata.

The 1984 parliamentary and legislative assembly elections have brought about a further disintegration of the non-Congress opposition, leaving only the DMKP of Charan Singh as a major opposition party to face the Congress. Although the DMKP won only three parliamentary seats in U. P., it obtained 22 per-cent of the popular vote. In the legislative assembly elections, the DMKP won 87 seats, below the number won by the BKD and BLD in 1969 and 1974 respectively, but still a significant showing in the face of the Congress steamroller. Also significant in these elections is the fact that the distance between the DMKP and Janata, the next largest party (with 20 seats), is greater (4 to 1) than that between Congress (275 seats) and the DMKP (3 to 1). Leaving aside the DMKP, all the other non-Congress parties together, including the independents, won only 60 seats. It should be apparent, therefore, that the only significant opposition to the Congress in U. P. is the party of Charan Singh. It is also the only party with a state-wide following and with a core of support among the land controlling castes which has persisted for 15 years.

The Congress Support Base and Counter-Strategy

From the beginning, in the early post-Independence period, the Congress strategy was to rely on the support of the most prosperous peasant proprietors of high caste status and political importance in the villages. The former landlords, for the most part, resentful of Zamindari Abolition and land ceilings legislation, remained aloof from the Congress. Muslims sought protection in the Congress and low caste voters were considered to be part of the "vote banks" of the dominant castes in the villages. By 1962, when the Congress vote in the

legislative assembly elections fell to only 36 per cent in the state as a whole, it was evident that this strategy was costing the party major losses among large categories of voters. In both Kanpur and Aligarh in 1962, I found that both Muslims and Chamars had voted against the Congress and contributed to its defeat in those two places. Moreover, as already indicated above, the Congress never developed a strong base among the small and middle peasantry. In election after election from 1952 until its first loss of power in U. P. in 1967, when it polled less than a third of the vote in the legislative assembly elections, the Congress support base continued to shrink. It threatened to shrink even further to minority status with the defection of Charan Singh in April, 1967 and the formation in 1969 of his BKD.

After the national split in the Congress in 1969, Mrs. Gandhi began a nationwide attempt to rebuild the popular strength of the Congress with appeals to and programs and concessions for the poor, the landless, the backward castes, and the Muslim minority. Her efforts in U. P., however, were somewhat retarded by the fact that the Congress organization in the state and the districts had been largely reduced to a Brahman affair, with alliances here and there with other upper caste politicians in the districts. Although Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to win back the support of Muslims and Scheduled Castes in U. P. were quite successful, they did not compensate for the more significant loss of the middle status landed castes, most of whom were now being mobilized across the state by the party of Charan Singh. As a result, the Congress legislative assembly vote share continued to decline in 1974 and 1977, when it reached a low point of 31.95 per cent.

In 1980 however, the Congress adopted a new strategy of drawing back into its fold the former zamindars and talukdars, the new capitalist farmers, and the landed castes of elite status, particularly the principal landowning castes of Rajputs. These big farmers, former landlords, and locally dominant Rajput castes moved from scattered, fragmented, and divided opposition to the Congress to reconsolidation within the Congress in a position of equal strength with the Brahman leaders. In this way, the Congress was able to apply a vise to the Lok Dal, squeezing it into its base among the middle peasantry while the

Congress outflanked it on both sides, taking the bulk of its support from the top and the bottom of the U. P. social structure, from both the elite landed castes and from the poor and landless.

The Congress strategy, combined with opposition fragmentation and the receding of the memories of the Emergency excesses among Muslims and Scheduled Castes, enabled the Congress to regain sufficient electoral support (36 percent of the 1980 Lok Sabha vote and 38 percent of the legislative assembly vote in U. P.) to win a majority of the Lok Sabha and legislative assembly seats in the two 1980 elections. The trend toward upper caste consolidation and reorganization within the Congress was carried still further in the 1984 parliamentary elections as the BJP and Janata support bases crumbled and many RSS workers joined with the Congress in a campaign whose sole themes were Desh Akhand, preservation of the unity of the country, and protection of it from foreign agents.

The broader significance of the Congress strategy of uniting the opposite extremes against the middle levels of the agrarian social structure in relation to the questions of caste and class discussed above is that it crosses caste and class boundaries and confines the middle castes, whose possible allies above or below them have been captured and integrated in the Congress patronage and protection system. Those who would look for the bases of class polarization and conflict in such a system will look in vain. It is futile to expect any major agrarian reform and redistribution from a dominant Congress party which, while projecting an image of itself as the party of the poor and landless, depends upon elite castes and the wealthy for victory in its election contests.

It should be noted also that the Congress support base in the cities and towns similarly draws from the top and the bottom of the class structure. Although the Jan Sangh and the BJP have had some support among trading classes in the towns, the bulk of the commercial middle class in 1962 in Kanpur and up to the present in the major cities and towns of U. P. probably support the Congress, as do the industrialists and the new entrepreneurial classes. One can only expect, therefore, insofar as future Congress policies are concerned, measures that promote the interests of the commercial, indus-

trial, and entrepreneurial classes in the cities and the rural rich in the villages combined with ameliorative policies for the poor and landless.

Continuities and Discontinuities Between Levels

A major theme in the literature on national integration and political delvelopment in the 1960s was the idea that there was a "gap" between society and politics, between the high-minded and modernistic goals of the nationalist leaders for the economic development of their countries, for social change, and for the creation of modern nation-states in which diverse peoples would merge into a civil order, on the one hand, and the everyday concerns of villagers and local politicians, which focused on the satisfaction of immediate needs, the maintenance of traditional social bonds and inequalities, and the persistence of ethnic antagonisms, on the other hand. As far as Indian politics were concerned, this notion of the "gap" between society and politics and between levels was presented by Weiner in his article on "India's Two Political Cultures"[5] and by Morris-Jones in his discussion of India's political idioms.[6] The two presentations were similar in their argument that modern Indian politics were characterized by a gap between "elite" and "mass" (Weiner) or modern and traditional (Morris-Jones) cultures or idioms that also corresponded to the levels of Indian political activity, national versus state and local. Morris-Jones added a third, uniquely Indian political idiom, the "saintly" idiom, which derived from the Gandhian approach to political action in India and which, in some respects, bridged the other two. Both Weiner and Morris-Jones also allowed for some interpenetration of political styles. F. G. Bailey, who also saw a"gap" to be bridged, argued that, where it existed, specific types of persons arose at the local level whom he called "brokers" and whose job it was to link people across these cultures in ways that made the system function and made it accessible to villagers.[7]

The two articles on the Kanpur and Aligarh elections in Part Three of this volume are concerned with this broad set of issues, with continuities and discontinuities between levels in Indian society and politics. In them, two general arguments

are developed. One is that, while granting the existence of discontinuities between levels, it is not helpful to think of it as a "gap" to be bridged or to think of the discontinuities in dichotomous terms. Rather, it is important, first, to recognize the existence of a broad range of loyalties in Indian social and political life that change with the context. Nor is it useful to think of Indians, or of most people, as having one primary loyalty or set of loyalties to family, caste, village, or language group that must be displaced in order to foster the "terminal," higher loyalties to the institutions, values, and practices of the modern nation-state. Rather, Indians have a multiplicity of loyalties that are often used to structure their preceptions of issues, relationships, and conflicts in different ways at different levels.

Although, therefore, there is no sharp break between levels in Indian politics, but rather a hierarchy of available political loyalties, discontinuities do exist which are not always effectively linked by an easy, ascending ladder of loyalties from one level to another. Often enough, local loyalties are projected upward to higher levels of the system through alliances and coalitions or through parochialization of issues and conflicts. A person whose political loyalties at the local level are to his village and *jati* may vote for a party or a leader to represent him in parliament on the basis of loyalties or with reference to issues that are relevant only or primarily in that context. Others, however, may see state and national issues in local terms, in terms of how the state leader or M. P. may provide local benefits. The third possibility is simply the use of local loyalties as building blocks that are moved about to build support in larger arenas. In elections held before "delinking," politicians from a local caste might strike a deal with politicians from another local caste in the same assembly constituency to trade support in order to elect two candidates of different castes, one for the legislative assembly, the other for parliament. There are thus at least three potential processes that may come into play where there are discontinuities between levels in politics : (1) a broadening of loyalties, from locality, kin, and caste, upward to language group, religious group, state, and nation; (2) parochialization of state and national issues and contests; (3) pyramiding of local loyalties upwards, using them as build-

ing blocks for broader coalitions without changing their content or meaning.

The second general argument is that local caste or other alliances may aggregate to stable pluralism at higher levels or at least to broader patterns of support and opposition. For example, it is possible to interpret the caste alliances in different assembly constituencies in exclusively local terms and to note that persons from particular castes voted for candidates of their own castes of different parties. However, if it turns out that one party is generally left out, rarely fielding a candidate of a particular caste or rarely getting support from a range of castes, then it may be that a series of local decisions are aggregating into a pattern or that supra-local politicians are creating broader patterns out of local particularities. It appears to me now, though I was not aware of it at the time, for example, that the particular decisions of local caste group leaders in Aligarh district in 1962 to vote for candidates of their own caste or for candidates of other castes with whom a local alliance had been forged, aggregated into a broader picture of disaffection from the Congress among dominant non-Brahman peasant proprietor castes of both elite and backward caste status. My later discovery, therefore, of a state-wide pattern of agrarian discontent among the middle peasantry generally turned out to be consistent with and to provide a broader framework to reinterpret the 1962 Aligarh election results and to see them as early evidence for a pattern which has since spread widely in U. P., though it has been more clearly evident among the backward castes rather than the elite landed castes.

A major problem in detecting broader patterns in U.P. politics, particularly in the earlier post-Independence years, arose from the pervasiveness of factionalism, the low incidence of party loyalty, and the ephemeral character of many parties. A second problem is the enormous diversity that exists down to the village level in north India, where it is common for 20 to 25 *jatis* to be represented in a single village. The consequence of these two sets of factors, diversity combined with a pervasive, fluid factional politics, is that a premium is placed on the ability of local politicians to form multi-caste coalitions and inter-community alliances, particularly in assembly constituencies, but also in parliamentary constituencies. When elections at both

levels were held simultaneously or "linked", there was also a premium on the ability to form inter-community alliances across party lines in assembly and parliamentary elections.

Nevertheless, some broadening of loyalties could be detected even in 1962. Although *jati*, for example, was absolutely primary in voting for *pramukh* at the block level and was still the most effective political unit generally at lower levels, there was a broader identification with caste category at higher levels, in the legislative assembly and parliamentary constituencies. This broadening of loyalties, however, did not serve to educate the voters and to attune them to the grand economic and political issues of the day. Rather, a discontinuity persisted at the higher levels, with the parliamentary candidates especially talking about economic development or Hindu-Muslim relations while the actual election process rested on a base of pyramiding alliances of mutual convenience among caste and community groups.

This kind of discontinuity also had an effect on the ability of the low caste voters to play an effective role in politics in U.P., to have their needs attended to, or even to prevent traditional forms of oppression by the landed castes. At the lowest levels of U.P. politics, in the villages and the blocks, low caste voters simply could not affect the dominance of the landed castes and their effective control over the village councils and block development committees. They were no factor at all or extremely marginal. In the legislative and parliamentary elections, however, they could make their numbers felt and could influence the outcome of election contests emong persons from the land controlling castes. However, it rarely happens that a low caste person is put forward by a major party to contest a seat in a general constituency.

Mrs. Gandhi's "delinking" of legislative assembly and parliamentary election contests in 1971 was a recognition of the fact that local loyalties became attenuated at higher levels in Indian politics and the expression of a hope that she would be able to determine the issues that would be effective in parliamentary elections. She made use of appeals designed to draw the support of the poor and landless and hoped that their support would, at the parliamentary level, be untied from the dominance of the land controlling castes and local caste alliances. Although

she achieved some success in this regard, it has already been noted above that, from 1980, it was evident to Congress election organizers that, even at this level, one could not rely on the numbers of the poor alone but needed the numbers and the mobilizing and alliance power of the elite landed castes as well.

Nationalization and Parochialization

Looking back over the past twenty years, can it be said that, on balance, there has been either a nationalization or a "parochialization" of issues in parliamentary elections? Even in 1962, when parliamentary and legislative assembly elections were linked, I was told in Kanpur that the parliamentary constituency had a personality of its own. In the contest for parliament over several elections, a polarization of Congress and anti-Congress sentiment had become characteristic while fragmentation persisted in the legislative assembly constituencies. Moreover, parochial and communal sentiments were less important in the parliamentary than in the assembly constituencies.

The situation in Aligarh was more complex. Some polarization occurred at the parliamentary level and there was a broadening of appeals to the voters at that level also. Although the parliamentary election in Aligarh depended more upon pyramiding upward of local caste alliances, such alliances were even more prominent in the legislative assembly constituencies.

Most striking of all in both Kanpur and Aligarh was that two categories of voters with little local rural influence, Chamars and Muslims, had provided the bulk of the opposition vote that defeated the Congress. In retrospect, therefore, it appears that the 1962 election in U.P. was the beginning of a recognition of the importance of the low caste vote as well as the Muslim vote that affected Congress policies and appeals thereafter, especially under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership. In the late 1960s and 1970s, appeals for the votes of these two categories of voters became central to every parliamentary election campaign in U.P. and influenced considerably their outcomes. It appears, therefore, that the parliamentary elections, and the delinking of them, have made it possible to nationalize issues surrounding the conditions of the poor and disadvantaged and to give them a

prominence in those elections that might otherwise not have occurred.

There is another aspect, however, to the parliamentary election campaigns which has contributed to a deterioration in its function of voter education. This is the greater opportunity for national political leaders to make demagogic appeals to broad categories of voters or to the electorate as a whole, to manipulate symbols rather than to raise issues and offer solutions to real problems. In the 1950s and the 1960s, Jawaharlal Nehru set a standard in this regard that kept the public rhetoric, at least, at a high level. He went round the country castigating his own people for their susceptibilities to "casteism, linguism, and provincialism." He urged them to transcend these narrow loyalties and to focus on the need to develop the country economically. He criticized the superpowers for their reckless policies of militarization, confrontation, and intervention in the affairs of weaker countries and called for nonalignment of India in this struggle and for an independent foreign policy.

The parliamentary candidates of the Congress in those days perforce followed the same line. Moreover, many of them were themselves highly educated, cosmopolitan, secular politicians who were not involved in local caste, communal and factional struggles. For example, in 1962, it was the opposition in Aligarh that used caste slogans and appeals while the Congress candidates made high-minded appeals and dull speeches about economic development. It was the Jan Sangh and the Arya Samaj that stressed the themes of national unity and the alleged threats to it.

In the years since Nehru's death, however, the tone of the Congress campaigns has changed considerably. Indians are no longer blamed for their internal divisions, but the latter are seen instead as the work of foreign countries and their agents. Issues of economic development figure less than slogans promising the impossible. Opposition criticisms of national economic development policies are ignored rather than rebutted. Hindu-Muslim riots, murders of minorities and other groups, and local police violence are blamed on opposition parties, dramatized and distorted for use in the election campaigns, though often the authorities and members of the ruling party itself are implicated. In the 1984 parliamentary election campaign, Congress news-

paper advertisements, some of their posters, and the speeches of many national and local Congress candidates and their organizers in U.P. were pitched at a level that could only inspire hatred of foreign "enemies," distrust of neighbouring countries, and antagonism to minorities.

This kind of campaign is not "parochialization" for such fears, distrust, and antagonisms are not being thrust upward from the local level. They are part of the process of nationalization of issues, of using symbols to move millions, that has been a part of Indian public life since the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movements of 1920-21. Such symbols can be used constructively to unite a people for broad productive or unifying purposes or to direct attention to neglected issues and injustices. They can also be used to make appeals to chauvinism and national paranoia that create scapegoats to divert attention away from the real causes of the difficulties a country may be undergoing. Both uses of symbols have been evident in Indian parliamentary elections since the death of Nehru, but the second kind was more prominent in 1984 than at any time in the post-Independence history of India.

The Persisting Dualistic Structure of Party Conflict in U.P. and its Implications

The conflict between elite and middle status landed castes is the fundamental political conflict in north India today. Made possible by zamindari abolition and universal adult franchise, it began to influence party politics as early as in the 1950s. Most opposition politicians, however, failed to see its potential, absorbed as they were in armchair socialism of the PSP variety, the revolutionary rhetoric of the Communist party, or the Hindu nationalism of the Jan Sangh. It was Dr. Lohia and his radical Socialists who first articulated it in U.P. in the mid-1960s, but it was Charan Singh from 1967 onward who organized it into a province-wide movement. The opposition of the middle status, middle peasant castes has from 1969 to 1984 constituted a persistent, stable source of opposition to the Congress, comprising a fifth to a fourth of the electorate in most of the populous regions of the state.

The Congress too has had a stable base of support, much

larger usually than that of the BKD/BLD/Lok Dal/DMKP. Its core of "committed" voters, comprising about one-third of the electorate, draws primarily from Brahmans and other elite landed castes, Scheduled Castes, and Muslims. In unusual parliamentary elections, such as those of 1971 or 1984, that base is expandable to around 50 percent of the electorate when the Congress draws successfully on most of its support and also gains among some of the middle status castes, such as the Kurmis, and the lower backward castes. It goes below a third when it loses some of its core supporters among the elite castes or Muslims or Scheduled Castes without making compensating gains elsewhere.

This basic structure of competition between the Congress and its main opposition, in which other parties have become peripheral, is sustained by two sets of persisting inequalities. One, between all the dominant landed castes on the one side and their illegal tenants, sharecroppers, and the landless, on the other side, is so skewed in favour of the landed castes in general that the landless and the other rural poor have no ability to sustain an independent, revolutionary political movement. So they seek the patronage and protection of the Congress.

The second set of persisting inequalities is among the landholding castes themselves. Inequalities in landholdings, resources, status, and education exist among caste groups, but also among families and individuals within caste groups. The inequalities among caste groups provide an edge to elite-backward caste conflicts. The inequalities within caste groups blunt it. The conflicts become violent mainly outside the rural settings in the competition for urban education and government jobs where the inequalities between caste groups are extreme.

Insofar as the U.P. countryside is concerned, however, the principal persisting factor is the power of the peasantry. The principal lines of political conflict are struggles for political control of local economic resources and institutional structures of local power among the land controlling castes. Only in a few areas is the pattern overshadowed by the persistence of older structures of dominance maintained by the former big landlords.

The obstructive power of the peasantry in relation to the state government in U.P. was demonstrated as early as the 1960s

when the state government was unable to extract additional resources from them through increased taxation.[8] Their power has been strengthened by several measures passed by the state government since Independence. These include zamindari abolition, the establishment of village, block, and district panchayats, cooperatives, and banks, land consolidation, and increased rural development activities generally.

Although the poor, marginal landholders and the landless comprise a large majority of the population of U.P., the small and middle viable peasantry control most of the land. That control gives them local dominance. Politics at higher levels have tended to build upon these local systems of dominance, combining them and aggregating them, but never threatening them.

On the other hand, although the economic power of the middle peasants is decisive, their numbers are smaller than the numbers of the marginal landholders and the landless and they are internally divided, especially by caste. Their divisions leave room for the articulation and representation at higher levels in the system of interests and demands other than their own, such as those of the poor, the landless, the minorities, urban classes, and others. Their divisions do not, however, make them vulnerable to class revolution from below. In the nucleated villages of northern India, where the *lathi*' power is in the hands of the landed castes and their clients and where the low castes live in concentrated settlements, local resistance is untenable. Moreover, while the landed castes will use the support of the lower castes against each other in village political conflicts and in legislative assembly elections, the existence of the structures of local economic dominance is never in question in those conflicts.

If the middle landholding peasants in north India are not vulnerable to revolution from below, their relatively smaller numbers and internal divisions do make them vulnerable to concerted action from above, by the authorities against their interests. However, concerted action against the interests of the peasantry, such as has occurred in most Communist states, has not yet been attempted in India. For the most part, the system has "worked" for the peasantry in that such action has not been taken, many pro-peasant agricultural policies have been followed in U.P., and the resources made available for agriculture in the

state increased in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Moreover, the party system increasingly has come to articulate the interests of the landowning peasantry in U.P. and to pose those interests against the dominant pro-urban, capital-intensive industrialization policies of the Congress regime in Delhi. The defection of Charan Singh and his followers from the Congress in 1967, the disintegration of the Socialist movement and the merger of the BKD and the SSP in 1974, the persistence of the Lok Dal and the DMKP after the disintegration of the Janata coalition all testify to the persisting importance and discontent of the middle peasantry in this state. They have provided the central core of opposition to the Congress, the dominant underlying trend that structures electoral competition.

It is easy to overlook this underlying structure to electoral competition in U.P. during the great "wave" parliamentary elections when other issues come into play: "democratic values" in the 1977 election, high prices and shortages of essential commodities in 1980, unity of the country in the face of internal and alleged external threats in 1984. The underlying structure tends to be more evident in the legislative assembly elections, where the big national issues are less prominent, the Congress vote tends to decline significantly, and local caste alliances have more effect. The structure is, however, far from absent in the parliamentary elections. It is only weaker in its effects in the face of the broader issues which are used to move large categories of voters. It is easier to override the conflict between the middle peasantry and other rural classes and categories in the parliamentary elections and to use the greater resources of the former landlords above them and the greater numbers of the non-dominant classes and categories as well against them. It is largely for this reason that it is necessary to note that, although the system has "worked" for the peasantry to a degree, they remain vulnerable in the long term and may ultimately be sacrificed, as they have been nearly everywhere else in the world, on the altar of modernization and industrialization and in the name of the poor.

NOTES & REFERENCES

[1]In this connection, see the collection of studies in John R. Wood (ed.), *State Politics in Contemporary India : Crisis or Continuity?* Boulder : Westview Press, 1984).

[2]*India Today*, December 31, 1984.

[3]Briefly, the use of aggregate data to make inferences about individual behavior. However, see fn. 6 to chapter i below.

[4]*Cf.* Roderick Church, "Conclusion: The Pattern of State Politics in Indira Gandhi's India," in Wood, esp. pp. 236-241, where U.P. and Bihar are placed appropriately in quite different categories from Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Gujarat with respect to the relative balance among caste groups in power and political representation.

[5]Myron Weiner, "India's Two Political Cultures," in Myron Weiner, *Political Change in South Asia* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963), pp. 115-152.

[6]W.H. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964). cn. ii.

[7]F.G. Bailey, *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963.

[8]See Paul R. Brass, *Caste, Faction & Party in Indian Politics*, Vol. I: *Faction & Party* (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1984), pp. 267 ff.

[9]A long bamboo stick.

PART ONE

2

Indian Election Studies*

Western Europe, North America, and India are the three principal areas of the world where competitive elections and academic studies of them are pursued with vigour. In the first two continents, systematic and regular opinion surveys have become the predominant form in which election studies are carried out.[1] Among analysts of Indian elections, however, ecological analysis—that is, the correlation of available demographic and socio-economic aggregate data from census and

*The books reviewed for this article are as follows: Myron Weiner and John O. Field (eds), *Studies in Electoral Politics in the Indian States* (Delhi, Manohar Book Service, various years) (hereafter referred to as *SEPIS*], Vol. I: *The Communist Parties of West Bengal*, by John O. Field and Marcus F. Franda (1974), 158 pp., Rs. 50; Vol. II: *Three Disadvantaged Sectors*, with contributions by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Padma Desai, John O. Field, William L. Richter and Myron Weiner (1975), 199 pp., Rs 60; Vol. III: *The Impact of Modernization*, with contributions by John O. Field, Francine Frankel, Mary F. Katzenstein and Myron Weiner (1977), 193 pp., Rs 60; Vol. IV: *Party Systems and Cleavages*, with contributions by Marguerite R. Barnett, Craig Baxter, Paul R. Brass, Robert Hammond, Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., and Glynn Wood (1975), 209 pp., Rs 70; Biplab Dasgupta and W.H. Morris-Jones, *Patterns and Trends in Indian Politics: an Ecological Analysis of Aggregate Data on Society and Elections* (New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1976), 364 pp.; and P.D. Reeves, B.D. Graham and J.M. Goodman, *Elections in Uttar Pradesh, 1920-1951* (New Delhi, Manohar Book Service, 1975), 504 pp., Rs 100.

I want to express here my gratitude to my colleagues, W. Lance Bennett and Jonathan Pool, who read the first draft of this article and made suggestions that affected substantially its revision. They are, however, not responsible for any deficiencies that remain.

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similar sources with election results to identify patterns and variations in turnout, inter-party competition, and party support —continues to vie with the opinion survey as the preferred form for election studies, raising anew old questions about the relative merits of the two forms.[2] In general, it is usually conceded that survey analysis is the preferred mode to answer questions about individual voting behaviour. The disadvantages of survey analysis also are well known. Surveys are expensive and difficult to carry out properly, they are subject to sampling errors, they do not usually provide retrospective data, they are often insensitive to differing contexts of voter behaviour of persons otherwise classified in the same categories, the information they provide on delicate questions may be unreliable, they are frequently deficient for the analysis of the voting behaviour of small groups or of voting in regions of a country for which the sample survey does not provide large enough numbers of cases, and they provide to information on the properties of the party system as a whole. In most countries in Western Europe and North America, the first two problems have been largely resolved. However expensive or difficult, public opinion surveys are a regular feature of life in the industrialized democracies. The technique of the random sample survey has been developed to a point of accuracy that often permits close predictions of election results. Standard statistical procedures also are available to estimate sampling errors. Although ecological analysis must be resorted to for analysis of election results that occurred before the arrival of the opinion survey, such surveys now go back several decades in many countries. Ecological analysis remains a useful device in the Western democracies principally for historical election studies, for describing the properties of an entire party system, and for analysis of the relationship between voting and context variables rather than individual variables.[3]

In contrast to the situation in Western Europe and North America, none of the problems of survey analysis applied to election studies has yet been resolved for India. The proverbial complexities of Indian society render systematic and regular sample surveys of the entire population almost prohibitively expensive and difficult to carry out. Sampling errors are, therefore, unavoidable and indeterminate. Moreover, contextual

factors influencing voter choice are enormously varied, such as the persistence or not of patorn-client relationships, relative ease of communications and transport, and patterns of inter-caste relationships. While some of the election reports based on the national sample surveys of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies are useful, they are deficient in analysing regional variations in Indian political behaviour.[4] Consequently, the field remains open to the devotees of ecological analysis not only for time series and systemic analyses, but for answers to the basic questions concerning the conditions for different patterns of competitiveness and turnout and concerning the socio-economic bases of party support.

How suitable is ecological analysis as a device for studying electoral behaviour in India? Among the advantages of ecological analysis in general, as opposed to survey-based studies, is that the researcher deals with data already available in census reports and other statistical compendia. Insofar as such census reports have been published over a long time series, retrospective analysis is possible. Problems of sampling error do not arise or are much less severe either because the data are for the entire population or for a very large sample of it. Moreover, as already indicated, ecological analysis provides areal and contextual perspectives and is extremely useful in revealing the structure of a whole system.[5]

Ecological analysis, however, also presents many disadvantages and pitfalls. For one thing, in the absence of reliable survey information, ecological analysis is frequently used as a means of inferring individual behaviour from aggregate data, a procedure which is sometimes dubious.[6] Secondly, when context variables are used, their meaning is often unclear. For example, a high correlation between population density and turnout may be interpreted in several ways. It might mean that high density produces discontent that expresses itself in voting. Or, it might mean that high density facilitates greater interpersonal contact that in turn leads to more voting. Or, the correlation may simply reflect the fact that the government establishes more polling booths in high density areas that make voting easier.

A third problem with ecological analysis is that the available data are always inadequate. Governments do not take censuses to facilitate either social science research or even to provide an

accurate count of the several categories into which the population of a country may be divided. Censuses are taken to serve policy goals and, sometimes, in political systems where the demands of organized groups are taken into account, to record the numbers of people in such groups. The minorities, the oppressed, and all other categories of people whose existence government chooses to ignore will not be recorded except when some specific policies toward such groups are made the business of government. If, however, social scientists are doing their work properly, they will be especially interested in the problems and categories that governments ignore.

Finally, if problems of sampling error are less serious or non-existent with aggregate data, there are other statistica problems with ecological analysis that are very worrisome. One problem is whether or not the data are subdivided into a sufficient number of cases (areal units) to permit statistical analyses at all. A second concerns the congruence of census subdivisions with electoral districts or constituencies. If they are non-congruent, methods must be devised to aggregate or disaggregate both units to some point of congruence to permit correlation and regression analyses. A third problem concerns the size of areal units used for statistical analysis. If they are too large and too heterogeneous, it becomes difficult to isolate the effects of particular independent variables because, in such a situation where there are a large number of independent variables, many of them may be highly intercorrelated with each other.

Why then do serious scholars continue to use ecological analysis in election studies, particularly in India where all the problems noted above exist ? There are three reasons. First of all, with all their deficiencies, the Indian censuses and other government reports contain an enormous variety of data that appear socially and economically important and politically relevant. Secondly, many imaginative devices have been invented to resolve the problems of locating or creating a large enough number of appropriate units for statistical analysis. Third, despite the difficulties, ecological analysis can be carried out from university offices and computer terminals thousands of miles from the research site, a consideration which helps to

explain its greater popularity with non-Indian scholars than survey analyses, which are more conveniently done by Indians.

Ecological Analysis : Problems and Prospects

In the remainder of this article, I wish to discuss the ways in which the problems of ecological analysis have been handled in relation to Indian election studies, the principal findings produced by this type of research, and the prospects for useful and interesting work in the future. Because the possibility of arriving at valid and important findings depends upon a satisfactory resolution of the methodological problems, it is necessary to consider first how these have been dealt with and how well particular solutions cope with the level of analysis and other inference problems associated with the use of ecological data. During the past fifteen years of ecological research on electoral behaviour in India, work has been done at five different lavels—the polling booth, the constituency, the *tahsil* or *taluka*, the district, and the state. The earliest such study was the volume edited by Weiner and Kothari, *Indian Voting Behaviour*, which contained eleven case studies of the 1962 election results in individual constituencies, several of them based on analyses of the returns by polling booths.[7] The advantage of using polling booth data is that many of the booths are relatively homogeneous with respect to several variables such as religion, class, and even caste, which makes inferences from them about individual voting behaviour plausible. The principal disadvantage is that, unless the booths are selected randomly and in large enough numbers throughout a region of the country as a whole, it is not possible to generalize from them about electoral behaviour in such broader areas. However, the relative benefits and disadvantages of this approach are no longer much of an issue because the Government of India no longer permits the reporting of election results at this level.[7a]

The second level of analysis is the constituency. Three kinds of studies have been carried out successfully at this level. One type, of which the most thorough, detailed, and informative example is the volume on *The Communist Parties of West Bengal* by Franda and Field, confines analysis to the election results themselves, focussing on such matters as the level of support for

parties in particular constituencies, turnout rates, candidates per seat, and the percentage of lost deposits. Although the data are, therefore, rather limited, Franda and Field have demonstrated that it is possible to arrive at important findings concerning the institutionalization of particular political parties, the competitive structure of the party system as a whole, the geographical distribution of party support, and the impact of electoral alliances on election outcomes. That said, it has nevertheless to be pointed out that the Franda-Field study cannot be easily replicated in other Indian states because of the limitations of constituency-level data for time series analysis. Franda and Field were able to carry out their study of four consecutive elections in West Bengal only because of the instability of the state's politics in the period between 1967 and 1972 when four elections were held under the same delimitation of constituency boundaries. Normally, however, one does not have available more than two election results under one delimitation in India.

A second approach to constituency-level analysis makes use of the very limited ecological data that are available at that level such as the proportion of tribals in constituencies reserved for Scheduled Tribes and the urban-rural characteristics of constituencies. There are three fine examples of this approach in the Weiner-Field volumes, two by Weiner and Field on voting behaviour in urban and in tribal constituencies and one by Mary Katzenstein on the relationship between turnout and the proportion of migrants in Indian urban constituencies.[8] The limitations of these studies are that they concern differences in the behaviour of electorates, but do not reveal anything about the behaviour of sub-groups in the electorate. The contribution by Katzenstein, however, shows how one can extend constituency studies of the urban population to the analysis of subtypes of cities according to the composition of their populations—in this case migrants—and thereby make inferences or formulate hypotheses concerning the actual behaviour of individuals within these sub-groups. Such inferences or hypotheses can then be tested by surveys of voting behaviour.

A third approach to constituency-level analysis is not represented in any of the volumes under review here, but has been developed by Blair, who has applied to Indian electoral studies a unique technique for mapping demographic and elec-

toral data that matches all constituencies with census units in approximate fits.[9] The procedure, however, is quite complex; gives only approximate matches; can be used only with data that are not geographically discontinuous; and requires the conversion of interval data to ordinal data. Its value consists in the fact that it is the *only* technique so far devised that has the capacity to match *all* constituencies with census data thus avoiding the problems of aggregating constituencies to higher-levels.

The alternatives to Blair's technique involve aggregation of constituency-level election results to conform to the boundaries of *tahsils* and groups of *tahsils* or districts and then to correlate the grouped constituency data with census data at the corresponding levels. Both methods are represented in the volumes under review, in my own contribution on the Panjab,[10] in Frankel's analysis of Uttar Pradesh (UP),[11] and in the book by Dasgupta and Morris-Jones, as well as in two articles by Donald Zagoria.[12] My own method competes with Blair's for complexity. It involves the aggregation of *both* constituency and *tahsil*-level data—except for the cases where perfect matches occur—to the lowest level of perfect congruence, which may encompass two, three, or four *tahsils* and two to a dozen constituencies on the average. The principal advantage of this cumbersome procedure in comparison with the others so far discussed is that it offers the lowest level of aggregation at which all legislative assembly and most census data can be placed in perfectly matched units for correlation analysis. The disadvantages of the method in comparison to district-level aggregation are that new groups have to be constructed after each delimitation, the census data are somewhat less rich at the *tahsil* level than at the district level, and the groups are artificial constructions in comparison to the district, which is a real political and administrative unit. However, since the primary interest in ecological analysis is in the examination over time of the behaviour of the electorate in particular kinds of contexts and not in the analysis of the districts themselves, the last objection is not a material one. The only genuine advantages of the district over the *tahsil* are that it is much easier to aggregate the data to this level and that more census data are available by district. Otherwise, the district suffers even more than the *tahsil* groupings from statisti-

cal problems caused by large size, unevenness in size, and internal heterogeneity.

Having just pointed to the existence of statistical problems associated with the large size of units of analysis, it may seem strange even to consider the next highest level of aggregation, namely, the state, but useful and even indispensable ecological analyses can be done at this level also. The state is clearly a critically important political unit in India, the states do differ among themselves very much both in political and socio-economic respects, and ecological analysis can illustrate those differences and clarify the systemic properties that distinguish one state political system from another. It is important to be clear about what can and cannot be done at this level, however. It is sometimes said that a correlation is "spurious," but the spuriousness arises only when a correlation is interpreted. All correlations, at whatever level they are calculated, are accurate descriptions of associations between two variables. It is not the association that is spurious, but the interpretations or inferences that are drawn from it. The danger of drawing spurious conclusions from correlations is most serious when one attempts to make inferences about behaviour at lower levels from correlations at higher levels, but it is also possible to become entangled in spurious analyses at lower levels by ignoring significant and appropriate correlations at higher levels.

One important example of a set of state-level correlations concerning turnout will illustrate both the appropriateness of carrying out correlation analyses at this level and the pitfalls of ignoring such correlations at lower levels. Several comparative studies of variations in turnout within India have been carried out, including a long chapter based on district-level correlations in the Dasgupta and Morris-Jones volume and a discussion of differences between urban and rural turnout in the contribution by Wiener and Field on "India's Urban Constituencies" in volume III of their series.[13] Unfortunately, studies of turnout in India done since 1972 have completely ignored or not taken into account sufficiently the most important findings about turnout in India revealed in an article by Chandidas published in the *Economic and Political Weekly* in July 1972.[14] In that article, Chandidas demonstrated that between 72 and 85 per cent of the variation in turnout at the state level could

be explained by a single variable measuring the proportion of villages in each state with populations less than 1,000 persons. The importance of this variable arises from the fact that the state governments generally have established polling booths in villages with a population of more than 1,000, but have often required voters in smaller villages to vote in polling stations up to two kilometres away. The Spearman rank-order correlations between turnout and proportion of villages with a population less than 1,000 were —.92 for the 1962 Lok Sabha elections and —.85 for the 1971 elections. I have since run Pearson correlations[15] between turnout for the state legislative assembly elections and the ratio of polling stations to villages for all states and have had comparable results of .929 for the 1962 elections and .741 for the 1967 elections. Some of these correlations are so high as to leave very little unexplained variance to be accounted for by other factors that are commonly thought to influence turnout, such as literacy and urbanization.

In the larger and more heterogeneous states such as UP where both turnout and the size of villages—and consequently the distribution of polling stations—vary considerably, it is worthwhile to test this relationship at the district or *tahsil* level. In fact, in UP in both the 1967 and 1969 elections, when turnout varied from 34.5 per cent to 59.4 per cent in seven regions of the state in 1967 and from 37.9 per cent to 60.0 per cent in the same regions in 1969, there was a clear and nearly monotonic relationship between turnout and seven variables measuring the proportion of the population living in villages of different sizes. In 1967, the correlation between turnout and proportion of the population living in villages with a population less than 200 was —.482, with population between 200 and 499 it was —.315, and so on up to villages with a population between 5,000 and 9,999 with which the correlation was .361. Nearly all the correlations are significant at the .05 level or better. The results are similar for 1969. Moreover, there are few other variables from the 1961 census of UP that correlate as strongly with turnout as the village size variables.[16]

However, if one turns to Tamil Nadu, where there is a more even distribution of both turnout and polling stations, it would be pointless to run correlations between turnout and ratio of polling stations to villages or between turnout and pro-

portions of population living in different size villages unless one can find some areas within the state where there is some large variation. Similarly, in UP. at the regional level, where turnout becomes more even within each region, further correlations with village size become irrelevant. In this example, therefore, the explanation for the greater part of the variation in turnout in India is to be found by working with all-India data disaggregated by state and, for the larger states, with whole state data disaggregated by *tahsil* group (or district).

This discussion of turnout began as an illustration of problems associated with size of units in ecological analysis and with inferring that relationships found at one level also exist at lower/higher levels. However, it also serves to raise another worrisome problem in ecological analysis, namely that of grouping the units of comparison. The choice of the level of aggregation of the data also affects the possibilities for regrouping or disaggregation. In most ecological studies of Indian voting behaviour, one or more of four levels have been used for grouping the data—the country as a whole, pan-state regions, the individual states and intrastate or contiguous cross-state regions. The level of comparison for statewise correlations must, of course, be the country as a whole—that is, the country is subdivided into states for statistical analyses because there are only 21 or fewer units, according to available data. Studies that use the district as the unit of aggregation may select these four units for comparison—all districts in the country as a whole or all districts in the north, south, etc. or all districts in a single state or, in the case of states such as Madhya Pradesh, the states may be subdivided into regions. The principal disadvantage of the use of the district in this regard is that there are not enough units to make comparative analysis worthwhile for the smaller states, such as Haryana and Kerala. In contrast *tahsil* and constituency-level analyses both have at least as much flexibility as the district and can be disaggregated to lower levels.

The table compares the number of cases available for statistical analysis and the minimum number of regions for disaggregation at the constituency, *tahsil*-group, and district level for four states, using the 1966 delimitation of constituency boundaries. It is apparent that, in all states, the method of grouping by *tahsils* produces a larger number both of cases and

of regions than district-level aggregation. The ratio of *tahsil* groups to districts ranges from approximately 1.5 to 1 in the case of Panjab to nearly 4 to 1 in the case of Gujarat.

Comparison of numbers of Cases and Regions by Different Units of aggregation in Indian Electoral Studies, 1966 Delimitation of Legislative Assembly Constituencies, for Four States

State	*Constituency*	*Tahsil Groups*[a]	*District*
Uttar Pradesh			
Cases	425	111	54
Regions	10 (*or more*)[b]	6	3
Bihar			
Cases	318	30	17
Regions	4 (*or more*)[b]	2	1
Panjab			
Cases	104	17	11
Regions	5 (*or more*)[b]	1	1
Gujarat			
Cases	168	64	17
Regions	2 (*or more*)[b]	2 (*or more*)[b]	1

Notes (a) The method used to arrive at *tahsil* groups is described in detail in Brass, "Ethnic Cleavages and the Punjab Party System," in *SEPIS*, IV, 65-9.

(b) The number of potential regions is shown as variable, depending upon the customary regional divisions used by census authorities, administrators and scholars, and the needs and purposes of the analyst.

It remains to determine, however, what differences in practice occur when different levels of aggregation and grouping of the data are chosen. In fact, the level at which the cases are grouped matters a great deal more than the unit of aggregation chosen for the data. Failure to regroup cases from the all-India level to the state level and from the state level to the regional level will often have at least two serious consequences—spurious correlations and missing of important relationships. An example of the former danger is noted by Dasgupta and Morris-Jones, who point out that the all-India district-level correlation between the Communist vote and literacy is high because the Communist vote is highest in the districts of Kerala and West Bengal,

which have high literacy rates. However, within Kerala itself, there is no such relationship.[17] This example is particularly instructive because one scholar using all-India district correlation did, in fact, infer that literacy was a key variable in explaining the Communist vote, which turns out to be untenable as far as Kerala—one of the two most important Communist strongholds in India—is concerned.[18]

It is even possible with district and *tahsil*-group analysis to obtain correlations at the provincial or all-India level that are completely opposite to what would be obtained through regional correlations. To take an example from my own data on UP, the correlation between the Congress vote in 1967 and the proportion of landholders holding between 5.0 and 7.4 acres of land is -.35, which is significant at the .05 level. However, the correlations at the regional level are as follows: Rohilkhand,—.04; Upper Doab, .42; Lower Doab,-.55; Oudh .22; and the Eastern Districts, .07. The state-wide correlation has reflected the strong negative relationship, significant at the .05 level, in the Lower Doab, but it has missed completely the strong positive relationship also significant at the .05 level in the Upper Doab.[19]

Also common is the tendency for state-level or all-India correlations to "wash out" significant correlations at the regional level. To use my own UP data again, the whole state correlation for the Swatantra vote in 1962 with landholders holding between 7.5 and 9.9 acres of land is .00, reflecting a pattern of mixed positive and negative, mostly non-significant correlations at the regional level, but missing a strong correlation of .56 for the Upper Doab.[20]

There is, therefore, a persistent tendency for correlations to differ markedly depending upon the level at which the cases are grouped. At a particular level of grouping, there is a general tendency for the correlations to be similar whether they are done for districts, *tahsil* groups, or constituencies, but anomalies do occur particularly between constituency-level correlations, on the one hand, and *tahsil*-group and district-level correlations, on the other hand. Consider, for example, the question of party votes in relation to the Scheduled Caste population in the Punjab legislative assembly elections of 1972. Congress contested 88 seats in that election, 69 general and 19 Scheduled Caste seats, and won 53 or 76.8 per cent of the general and 12 or 63.6 per-

cent of Scheduled Caste seats. Clearly, the Congress won a greater proportion of the general than the Scheduled Caste seats, but this fact is somewhat misleading since the mean percentage Congress vote in both types of constituencies did not differ substantially—53.8 per cent in Scheduled Caste and 52.5 per cent in non-Scheduled Caste constituencies. Consequently, there is no reason to expect significant correlations between the Congress vote and percentage of Scheduled Caste persons, for which data are available at three levels—the constituency (N=88),[21] *tahsil* group (N=17), and the district (N=10). The correlations for the three levels are as follows: -.03 for the district, -.14 for the *tahsil* groups, and .03 for the constituency, with none significant at the .05 level. However, one must still be alert to potential distortions, as the example of Akali Dal (Sant) illustrates for the same election. In this example, although the *tahsil* and district-level correlations are consistent at -.17 and -.29, respectively, with the percentage who are Scheduled Caste, the constituency-level correlations are strongly positive at .36, significant at the .001 level. This is a clear example of the problem of the ecological fallacy, for the negative correlations are clearly spurious and are probably caused by the difficulties involved in disaggregating the Scheduled Caste category itself as between Hindu and Sikh Scheduled Castes and separating the independent effects of the percentage caste Sikh from percentage Scheduled Caste Sikh on the Akali Dal vote.

Although the danger of the ecological fallacy looms with regard to differences in correlations at the constituency level as opposed to data aggregated to the district and *tahsil*-group levels, there does not appear to be as much difference between district-level and *tahsil*-group-level correlations. I have compared the district-level correlations from Dasgupta and Morris-Jones for the state of UP (pp. 268-89) with my *tahsil*-group-level correlations for all variables on which I have data equivalent to theirs. Since the number of cases is larger for the *tahsil* groups, the correlations are nearly always of smaller magnitude than those for the districts, but the signs for all significant correlations they report at the district level are the same at the *tahsil*-group level and most of the *tahsil*-group correlations also are significant at the .05 level or better. However, once again the larger number of cases provided by *tahsil* group

often gives an advantage over districts. For example, Dasgupta and Morris-Jones report (p. 211) a high, but non-significant correlation of .51 between the vote for the Akali Dal and the percentage who are Sikhs in the Panjab districts in 1967, but the *tahsil* group correlation is .65, significant at the .01 level.[22] Also, they report (p. 213) "only one significant correlation" in UP for the 1957 and 1962 elections between Independents and their 24 socio-economic variables— −.27 within crease in population for 1957—but the *tahsil*-group correlations give others, e.g., Scheduled Castes 1957 (-.23), total non -Hindu 1962 (.23), hired workers 1957 (.23). Consequently, strong associations identified by means of district-level correlations are not likely to be invalidated by *tahsil*-group correlations, but a greater number of such assiociations are likely to be discovered by using the *tahsil*-group level of aggregation.

Ecological Analysis : A Critical Examination

It is time to examine the principal findings of ecological electoral analysis in India to consider whether they justify the enormous amount of time and effort expended in attempting to cope with the methodological problems discussed above. I also wish to consider here the relationship between findings about electoral behaviour at different levels in Indian politics. The earliest studies, based on polling booth data, focussed largely on the relationships between ethnic factors, particularly caste and religion, and other potential influences, such as party organization and patronage, ideology, trade union organization, the personal influence of local notables, and the like, on individual and group voting behaviour. One of the principal conclusions of these early studies was that, although ethnic factors were of critical importance in the calculations of the candidates, in the decisions of voters, and in the outcomes of elections, the ways in which ethnic factors manifested themselves were complex. In individual constituencies, candidates and parties tended to draw heavy support from some castes and communities and not others, but groups also often divided their votes among different candidates. Moreover, the ethnic complexity of most legislative assembly constituencies in India was such, it was argued, that it often became necessary to form ethnic

coalitions to win an election. Finally, caste and community voting behaviour varied from constituency to constituency in such a way that one could not predict that a caste group whose members voted Congress or Communist in one constituency would necessarily do so in a neighbouring consitituency. The complexities of ethnic group behaviour in Indian elections, it was found, were partly caused by and in part made possible the coming into play of other factors. Village factions, based on patron-client ties, tended to be multi-caste in composition and to contribute to division of ethnic group votes in a constituency and to shifts in voting patterns from one election to another. Party organization and the distribution of patronage sometimes succeeded in capturing the allegiance of most members of a caste or religious group, sometimes in dividing such groups. Local notables, such as former landlords, were often able to draw broad support across caste lines. In the cities, trade unions were able to mobilize some blocs of working class votes comprising different ethnic groups. Last and least, party policies and ideology were found to have very little appeal in comparison to the other factors listed above, but some individuals and groups also were affected by issues.[23]

When serious attention began to be paid to the study of aggregate election data for large numbers of constituencies, the question naturally arose whether such aggregation made any sense at all given the importance attributed in single-constituency studies to local factors, the distinctiveness of coalitions even in adjacent local areas, and the shifts in group alignments from one election to another. To this objection, it was responded that, since the single-constituency studies did not constitute representative samples, it might still be possible that broader-based studies would reveal that distinctive local behaviours fall, in the aggregate, into broader patterns.[24]

In fact, one of the most surprising and repeated findings of studies of Indian electoral behaviour based both on survey and aggregate data has been that there is a high degree of stability of voting patterns. Stability has been found in survey studies of partisan identification,[25] in the support for the Communist parties of West Bengal,[26] in the strength and communal base of the Akali Dal in the Panjab,[27] and even in the structure of some state party systems.[28] Moreover, it is now

possible also, with the benefit of hindsight, to look back at some constituencies that previously seemed to be affected largely by local factors and to argue that the very individuality of such constituencies may have reflected a dissatisfaction that found no other channels of expression. For example, constituencies in Meerut district and western UP generally that were won by Independents, Congress rebels, and others in 1962 and 1967 on apparently local issues were transformed into strong support areas for the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) in the elections of 1969 and 1974.[29] Moreover, BKD support, while it certainly has some basis in strictly local issues, displays a definite rural socio-economic underpinning in areas where the middle and big peasant proprietors are concentrated.[30]

The ecologically-oriented studies also have reached definitive conclusions about voting behaviour in particular types of constituencies—urban and rural, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, former princely state areas, and the like.[31] Moreover, the conclusions reached from some of these studies have had broader implications for our understanding of the Indian political system as a whole and for general theories of political behaviour. The Franda-Field study of the Communist parties of West Bengal, whose purpose was to demonstrate the stability of the vote for the Communist parties there, also implies that these parties have become deeply involved in the parliamentary system. Even if it cannot be concluded that their involvement represents a commitment to its values, the extent to which they have become involved suggests their absorption into non-violent, even non-revolutionary politics. Richter's study of electoral behaviour in ex-princely and non-princely areas and the Weiner-Field studies of urban and rural, tribal and non-tribal constituencies not only provide information on these types of constituencies, but their conclusions also demonstrate a general convergence of voting patterns in all types of constituencies within the Indian states while differences between the states persist. In other words, regional factors distinguish the Indian peoples from each other more than any urban-rural, tribal-non-tribal distinctions across the country as a whole.

Frankel's analysis of the association between the vote for the BKD, the predominance of the middle peasantry, and the presence of agricultural modernization in UP suggests to her

the rise in importance of class over caste factors and the decline of patron-client ties in the countryside.[32] In this case however these conclusions can be considered only hypotheses, since the presence of the associations she reports could coexist with the persistence of traditional caste and patron-client relations. In fact, a polling booth-based study of the 1969 elections in a western UP constituency only partly supports the conclusions drawn by Frankel.[33] The study shows in fact that, although the Jat caste has developed in this region from being a source of clients for their former Thakur overlords into competitors with them, the election outcome here was heavily influenced by the same kinds of caste calculations that have so often been reported from early consitituency studies. Moreover, there is no evidence from this single case about the extent to which patron-client ties in general have declined even in this one constituency, where it is possible that both Thakurs and Jats continue to recruit clients in traditional ways. The most likely conclusion about contemporary electoral behaviour in this region is that class, caste, and patron-client considerations coexist and have independent influence in determining individual election outcomes and that the class considerations, which might otherwise be missed in individual constituency studies, are being picked up by ecological analysis.

Ecological analysis also has been valuable in describing the structural properties of Indian state party systems and in identifying stabilities and continuities in the midst of apparent instabilities and persisent opposition in the shadow of pre-1977 Congress one-party dominance. In the Panjab, I argued that the "basic structure" of the party system was dualistic, that the competition between the Congress and the Akali Dal "provided the primary dynamic of the system", and that this competition was likely to persist.[34] Barnett has drawn similar conclusions concerning the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Congress in Madras.[35] Hardgrave has pointed out that instability in coalition formation in Kerala has masked the fact that the party system is strongly institutionalized.[36]

These contrasts between patterns revealed by electoral analysis in individual constituencies, groups of constituencies, and whole states, suggest two inportant conclusions about

politics in India. One is that discontinuity between levels in the political system is a principal characteristic. Instabilities and idiosyncratic behaviour at the constituency level may aggregate to stability and pattern at the state level. However, even when voting behaviour demonstrates consistency and patterning throughout a state, the patterns themselves may be plural and may cause instability at the governmental level. If one wishes to predict the future of a state political system in India, therefore, it is advisable not to ignore the evidence of aggregate data which may suggest a potential for stability and structure in the face of apparent instability. The transformation of Kerala from one of the more unstable to one of the most stable states in India reflects the existence there of such a plural pattern.

A second conclusion suggested by the apparent differences in political behaviour at different levels in the Indian political system is that behaviour that appears local and idiosyncratic may not in fact be so. In Chhata constituency in UP in 1969, Congress nominated a Jat candidate to undercut the BKD appeal to the Jats. The BKD nominated a Thakur, hoping thereby to draw support away from this dominant caste upon which the Congress had previously relied. The Congress and the BKD each hoped by these devices to combine Jat and Thakur votes. The result was that both Jat and Thakur votes were divided, with the Jat and Thakur candidates nevertheless gaining stronger support from their respective caste fellows.[37] But, what about the Jats who voted BKD and the Thakurs who voted Congress? The Jats who voted BKD may also have been responding to a caste appeal by voting for the provincial Jat leader, Charan Singh, but some may have been voting for their class interest. Similarly, the Thakurs who voted Congress may have done so because of internal caste rivalries or because they saw the Congress as the party that best represented the interests of the dominant landed elites.

There are two ways to find the answers to the preceding questions. One is to go back to the constituency and ask the voters, but their answers may be misleading because an individual voter may vote for his class interest while articulating it in caste terms or *vice versa*. The second way is to aggregate the constituency results to see if they resolve themselves into broader patterns, especially over several elections, which again

brings us back to a justification for the ecological approach.

The ecological approach does, however, have limitations that were suggested at the outset. It is, for example, more difficult to pinpoint precisely the socio-economic support bases of individual political parties by this method than by survey research. Attempts to do so often uncover a good part of the support bases of parties, but mistakes are made. Zagoria, for example, has made two noble efforts to pinpoint the support bases of the Communist party in India.[38] One emphasized the importance of two variables in combination—density of population plus landlessness. In the second attempt, he introduced literacy as a third, "intervening" variable between the two. However, while the landless variable holds up in a detailed examination of Kerala districts, the density and literacy variables do not. Consequently, Zagoria's inference from his second effort that the "literate landless" vote Communist was probably incorrect.[39]

Nevertheless, Zagoria's approach contrasts favourably with the efforts by Dasgupta and Morris-Jones to construct profiles of the socio-economic support bases of all the leading political parties in India. They have used a "buckshot" approach, taking 24 socio-economic variables to see how they correlate with the parties they have selected in the country as a whole and state-by-state. Although they are careful to specify in advance the hypotheses they are testing, their work is not oriented in terms of a carefully designed research question or questions framed in relation to the theoretical literature on a subject. In contrast, Zagoria's specific study of the support bases of the Communist parties was framed in terms of a broader theoretical concern with the conditions for peasant mobilization. The Dasgupta and Morris-Jones approach also lacks depth because the support bases of the parties are not explored in detail. One is left only with a scattering of "significant" correlations and some rather vague impressions concerning the strength of the various parties in "more" and "less" developed areas, a type of conclusion which is open to numerous conflicting interpretations.

The analysis by Dasgupta and Morris-Jones of the correlates of turnout and competition also suffers from both methodological and substantive problems. The authors devote 65 pages of text and statistical tables to turnout and competition, from which

some of the principal findings are that turnout, particularly high turnout, tends to be consistent over time in particular areas; that turnout is positively related to the degree of development in the districts, but that the less developed districts are catching up with the more developed ones; and that turnout and competition are to some extent negatively related. The latter finding is attributed by the authors especially to the fact that competition, unlike turnout, is not associated with degree of development. To deal with the methodological issue first, they have used the district level when the better data for most of their questions are available at the constituency and the state level. There is no point in correlating turnout with competitiveness or party vote shares at the district level when these data are accessible at the constituency level.[49] Moreover, for the determinants of turnout, Chandidas demonstrated that the first place to look is the state level, where the decisions are made for allocating polling booths. Only after determining how much of the variance in turnout is explained by the convenience of polling booth accessibility does it make any sense to look for the socio-economic correlates to explain the unexplained variance. It is not that Dasgupta and Morris-Jones' conclusions are incorrect. Their data show that turnout is positively related to development and accessibility, but they have no explanation for the relationship, which is in large part caused by state-level policy decisions that naturally assign more polling stations to the more densely populated and the more developed areas.

Guidelines for Future Election Studies

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Ths review of the literature on the ecological study of voting behaviour in India leads me to suggest a few methodological and substantive guidelines and proposals for future research. Methodologically, I have four recommendations. First, as a general rule, correlations should be carried out using the lowest, smallest unit for which data are available. Higher-level data should not be used when lower-level data are available unless one is seeking information about the unit itself. A second exception to this rule is when between-group variation is great at higher levels and when one has theoretical gounds for developing hypotheses to explain such variation. In the case of

turnout and polling booth accessibility, there are good reasons to begin at the state level because turnout between states varies more than turnout between districts or constituencies within a state and because the decisions on allocation of polling booths are made at that level. One should then turn to lower levels to see if, when internal heterogeneity is reduced, relationships found to hold at the state level also hold at the district, *tahsil*, or constituency level or whether it is necessary at these levels to examine other variables. However, the decision to test a hypothesis at the lower level should, ideally, be guided by a theory that gives reason to expect the relationships to hold at that level.

Secondly, whatever the level of aggregation, all-India data must be grouped by state and state data by region. It is practically a certainty that there will be great differences in the correlations for nearly all variables when moving from all-India to within-state correlations and from within-state to within-region correlations.

Thirdly, the "buckshot" approach should be avoided for anything but exploratory purposes. Correlations should be reported either to test specific hypotheses and/or to explore in detail the importance of a single variable or combination of variables. In other words, the Zagoria approach of selecting variables on the basis of a theoretical perspective and then exploring through regrouping of the data by region how much variance can be explained by the variables selected is preferable to simply running a large number of correlations to see what turns up. However, it is desirable to explore the importance of a particular variable or set of variables by the buckshot method before examining their associations with the dependent variable, for the sake of insuring that they do in fact have an independent association with the dependent variable.

A final methodological point is to urge that scholars in this field be wary of constructing highly abstract theories and models. The imaginative capacities of social scientists are very great and are usually more complex than the motivations of ordinary citizens, who tend to vote according to their convenience and interest. Although the authors of the volumes under review here, for the most part, avoided excessive abstraction and grandiose model-building, there is a widespread

tendency in the social sciences to do so, which appears to increase in inverse proportion to the data available. In election studies, such approaches often involve inferences twice removed from the data, the construction of complex composite indexes, and highly abstract explanations of voting behaviour. The example of the turnout-polling station relationship once again is relevant here, for it is a very simple explanation that accounts for a great deal and does not require and probably invalidates in whole or in part some more complex explanations of turnout variations that have been developed by others.[41]

Substantively, more work is needed along directions that have already proved fruitful. We now have much valuable information concerning the dynamics of the party systems of Panjab, West Bengal and Kerala. Their underlying properties are becoming as well known as those of the party systems of some of the European countries, although we do not know nearly as much about the support bases of the parties. The work done on the structure and stability of inter-party competition in Punjab, West Bengal and Kerala should be replicated as far as possible in all the Indian states.

Secondly, we need basic information at the state and regional level on the support bases of all the leading parties in India. Ecological analyses can serve the purpose for some of this research, but it is really a task for Indian social scientists to construct and carry out periodic surveys of voting behaviour in all the Indian states.

Thirdly, there are some sets of socio-economic data available for most of the states in India that hold out promise for important findings through correlation analyses with party votes. One such set includes variables on rural social structure and agriculture, particularly types of land tenure, size of landholdings, rural density, and the spread of the new agricultural technology. Some of the data sets are very faulty, but many are rich and usable. Some of these data are available at the tahsil level, but many exist in published form only at the district level. My own, as yet unpublished, research on these data in UP and Bihar suggests the existence of widespread political discontent among the vast majority of the north Indian peasantry. The bases, sources, and forms of expression of this discontent clearly need to be uncovered since the future course of Indian politics

largely depends on how this discontent finds expression.

A second kind of data that needs more exploration comprises the familiar variables of caste, religion, tribe, and language. It is true that many of the best data on these categories are simply not available at any level, but more are available than is commonly thought. The readily available data on Scheduled Castes are, of course, insufficient for any serious work on caste and politics in India. However, if one searches in archives and government book depots or pores over even the published census volumes, some unexpected finds do occasionally turn up. Some years ago, for example, I found in the UP government depot in Allahabad district census handbooks for four divisions of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh from the 1891 census containing the exact figures for the largest caste in every village.[41a] I have also occasionally picked up here and there scattered volumes of district census handbooks from the 1911 and 1921 censuses from UP and other states, which sometimes contain valuable data for sub-district units not otherwise available. These district volumes are, however, very scarce. Even the 1951 district census handbooks are now difficult to obtain. They are, however, worth the trouble to locate. For example, the 1951 district census handbooks for Bihar contain, among other data, breakdowns by revenue *thana* of occupation for Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes, and "Non-Backward Classes". While this three-fold division is less elaborate than one would want, it is much more than is usually available, especially with the breakdown according to occupation. Clearly, a world library inventory needs to be done to find out exactly what district census handbooks are available from previous censuses of India.

Language and dialect data also are sometimes available below the district level, even in the more recent censuses. The 1961 district census handbooks for Bihar, for example, contain mother tongue data by both sub-division and community development block. These data are not available in the 1971 volumes, however! Data on religion below the district level also are often available. For some states, Hindu-Muslim breakdowns by *tahsil* were contained in the 1961 district handbooks.

However difficult, it is nevertheless possible to assemble valuable data for analyses of ethnic categories and for their

correlation with political data. Since the question is frequently raised whether caste or class, economic or ethnic variables are more critical for explaining Indian—and American or European—political behaviour, any analysis that makes use of only one type of data, economic or ethnic, suffers from incompleteness.

This discussion of the relative availability of old census data raises two final issues. One is that, even when one finds such data, the correlation of old census data with contemporary political data raises additional methodological issues to those already discussed. Before engaging in such an enterprise, one would have to select census data from areas where there are convincing reasons to believe that demographic changes have not been so great as to render the old data irrelevant. One cannot use urban data from any previous census to correlate with contemporary election results, but one can with reasonable confidence use 1931 district census data on caste for most rural districts to correlate with 1952 election results.

The second issue concerns the pre-independence election data. Until the publication of the Reeves, Graham and Goodman volume, such data were simply not available in any usable form. That situation has now been rectified for one province with the presentation in that volume of all the provincial and central legislative election results by constituency for every election in UP from 1920 to 1951. The volume has been prepared with the most meticulous attention to detail and to accuracy that one could wish for. It contains all available information on the delimitation of constituencies, on the electorate, and on the candidates, and even includes a list of election petitions filed—a much-neglected source of valuable information on constituency electoral behaviour. Both the authors and the publisher of this volume deserve thanks for producing a source book of this quality.

Reeves has already published an excellent article, based on this data, on changes in political alignments in the 1937 and 1946 UP legislative assembly elections,[42] which has clarified the political history of this critical period for UP (then the United Provinces) and for India, when the Muslim League used the province as its base for organizing the final stages of the drive for Pakistan. In that article, Reeves provided for the first time a

systematic state-wide analysis of patterns of political competition among the Congress, the Muslim League, the National Agriculturists' Parties of Agra and Oudh, Independents, and a few minor parties. The article also contains a series of maps that show the areas of geographical concentration of support for the main political groups. The next logical step in the analysis of pre-independence election returns is to attempt to correlate the returns with census and land revenue data by district to identify more precisely the social bases of Congress and Muslim League support. The fact that the pre-independence franchise was a restricted one means that census categories that comprised the whole population cannot be correlated directly with the election returns. However, some socio-economic data for this period are available that are divided into categories that correspond to the franchise restrictions. For example, the franchise was partly related to the size of payment of land revenue. Pre-independence figures are available that divide the *zamindars* according to the amount of land revenue they paid[43] so that one could attempt to pin-point the relative strength of the Congress in areas where petty, middle, and big *zamindars* were concentrated.

At present, pre-independence election returns are available only for UP. One can only hope that others will follow the example of Reeves, Graham and Goodman and produce comparable volumes to theirs for the other Indian provinces. Without such volumes and studies based upon them, important aspects of the development of modern nationalist and other political movements in India cannot be fully understood.

NOTES & REFERENCES

[1]This fact is reflected in the comprehensive and comparative survey of voting behaviour in twelve European and North American countries by Richard Rose (ed.), *Electoral Behavior: a Comparative Handbook* (New York, The Free Press, 1974), in which sample surveys are the principal source of data and are available for comparable variables in nearly every country included in the volume.

[2]Explicit comparisons of the relative advantages and disadvantages of survey techniques and aggregate data analysis in election and public opinion studies may be found in Angus Campbell, "Recent Developments in Survey Studies of Political Behavior" and Austin Ranney, "The

Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior", *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics*, ed. Austin Ranney (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 31-46 and 91-102. Both of these contributions, while still useful, are in some respects out of date. See also Ralph H. Retzlaff, "The Use of Aggregate Data in Comparative Political Analysis", *Aggregate Data Analysis: Political and Social Indicators in Cross-National Research*, ed. Charles L. Taylor (Paris, Mouton, 1968), pp. 63-78, and Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development* (New York, David McKay, 1970), pp. 169-80.

[3]Context variables, strictly speaking, describe the environment in which people live rather than attributes of individuals, but aggregated data on individual attributes also become context variables in heterogeneous environments. For example, population density or proportion of buildings used for commerce are context variables in the narrow sense, but so are proportion Catholic and proportion Protestant The advantage of survey techniques is that they can provide estimates of how many Catholics and how many Protestants voted for particular political parties, but aggregate data on the same attributes can be used only to show that particular parties received a given percentage of the votes in areas (contexts) where large numbers of Catholics or Protestants resided, from which it may or may not be possible to infer the voting behaviour of individual Catholics and Protestants, depending upon other information that is available to the researcher.

[4]See especially the articles in Richard Sisson (ed.), *Elections and Party Politics in India: a Symposium, Asian Survey*, X no. 11 (Nov. 1970), entire issue, and D.L. Sheth (ed.), *Citizens and Parties: Aspects of Competitive Politics in India* (Bombay, Allied, 1975).

[5]One of the most famous examples of the value of ecological studies of voting in demonstrating the historical, contextual and structural features of a political system is V.O. Key, Jr, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), which presented a strikingly graphic picture of the development of the system of one-party politics in the American South, its geographic spread, and the critical importance of the so-called "black belt" counties in its maintenance.

[6]It is not invariably so, however. An extreme argument against the validity of such inferences was made in the famous article by W.S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals", *American Sociological Review*, XV (June 1950), 351-7. However, the more recent literature on this question is more tolerant of such inferences under specified conditions. See, e.g., Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (Oslo, Universitatsforlaget, 1967), pp. 45-8; John S. Hammond, "Two Sources of Error in Ecological Correlations", *American Sociological Review*, XXXVIII no. 6 (Dec. 1973), 764-77; and the useful discussion of the "ecological fallacy" in Dasgupta and Morris-Jones, *Patterns and Trends*, pp. 346-53.

[7]Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari (eds), *Indian Voting Behaviour : Studies of the 1962 General Elections* (Calcutta, Mukhopadhyay, 1965).

Another major study based on polling booth data is Harry W. Blair, "Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar State, India : the Elections of 1967" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1969).

[7a]Since 1980, election returns by polling booth have once again become available in the district election officer.

[8]Myron Weiner and John O. Field, "How Tribal Constituencies in India Vote", *SEPIS*, II; Myron Weiner and John O. Field, "India's Urban Constituencies", and Mary F. Katzenstein, "Migration and Electoral Participation in India", *SEPIS* III.

[9]Harry W. Blair, "Minority Electoral Politics in a North Indian State : Aggregate Data Analysis and the Muslim Community in Bihar, 1952-1972", *American Political Science Review*, LXVII no. 4 (Dec. 1973), 1275-87.

[10] Paul R. Brass, "Ethnic Cleavages and the Panjab Party System, 1952-1972", *SEPIS* IV.

[11]Francine Frankel, "Problems of Correlating Electoral and Economic Variables : an Analysis of Voting Behavior and Agrarian Modernization in Uttar Pradesh", *SEPIS*, III.

[12]Donald S. Zagoria, "The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India", *American Political Science Review*, LXV no. 1 (March 1971), 144-60, and "A Note on Landlessness, Literacy, and Agrarian Communism in India", *Archives européennes de sociologie*, XIII (1972), 326-34.

[13]Other district-based studies of turnout in India are: David J., Elkins, *Electoral Participation in a South Indian Context* (Durham, N.C. Carolina Academic Press, 1975) and Roger W. Benjamin *et al*, "Modernization and Political Change: a Comparative Aggregate Data Analysis of Indian Political Behavior", *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XV no. 2 (May 1971), 219-61.

[14]R. Chandidas, "Poll Participation Slump", *Economic and Political Weekly*, VII no. 29 (15 July 1972), 1359-68.

[15]The Pearson product-moment correlation and the Spearman rank-order correlation each provide a measure, in the form of a single number ranging between -1.0 and +1.0, of the assocation between two variables. They differ in that the Pearson correlations are computed from the absolute values of the variables whereas the Spearman correlations are computed from the ordinal ranking of the variables. Computation of these correlations is conveniently done nowadays by packaged computer programmes, of which SPSS is the most convenient. Brief descriptions of these two statistics and the SPSS programmes available for them may be found in Norman H. Nie *et al.*, *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed., 1975), ch. xviii.

[16]The correlations reported in this paragraph come from my *tahsil* group data files.

[17]Dasgupta and Morris-Jones, *Patterns and Trends*, pp. 320-1. See also Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr, "The Communist Parties of Kerala: an Electoral Profile", *SEPIS*, IV, 204.

[18]Zagoria, "A Note on Landlessness, Literacy, and Agrarian Communism".

[19]These correlations are reported in "The Politicization of the Peasantry in a North Indian State," republished as ch. iii of this volume.

[20]*Ibid.*

[21]It is not commonly known, but the exact figures on the Scheduled Caste populations by constituency are available in the files of the Election Commission of India. I am grateful to Mr P.I. Jacob, Deputy Election Commissioner, and Sri R.D. Sharma, Under Secretary, Election Commission of India, for access to these data.

[22]There is, incidentally, a clear error in the correlation of -.59 reported on the same page by Dasgupta and Morris-Jones for the 1962 elections between the Akali Dal vote and percentage of the population who are Sikh. It is more likely to be a positive .59 since the *tahsil* group correlation is .57, significant at the .05 level. Cf. Brass, "Ethnic Cleavages and the Punjab Party System", *SEPIS*, IV, 46.

[23]For these findings, see the essays in Weiner and Kothari *Indian Voting Behaviour*, and Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State : the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965), pp. 155-64.

[24]W.H. Morrris-Jones and B. Dasgupta, "India's Political Areas: Interim Report on an Ecological Electoral Investigation", *Asian Survey* IX no. 6 (June 1969), 400-2, and Dasgupta and Morris-Jones, *Patterns and Trends*, pp. 218-19.

[25]Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The 1967 Indian Election: Patterns of Party Regularity and Defection", *Asian Surrey*, X no. 11 (Nov. 1970), 1015-30

[26]Field and Franda, *Tne Communist Parties of West Bengal.*

[27]Brass, "Ethnic Cleavages and the Punjab Party System".

[28]*Ibid.*; see also Marguerite R. Barnett, "Cultural Nationalist Electoral Politics in Tamil Nadu", *SEPIS* IV, esp. p. 106, and the introductory remarks by Weiner in *SEPIS*, IV, x-xiii. However, there are still considerable differences in the degree of institutionalization both of state party systems and of support for particular parties. Craig Baxter, e.g., remarks that, "in UP no party is highly institutionalized"; see his "The Rise and Fall of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh", *SEPIS*, IV, 138.

[29]Brass, "The Politicization of the Peasantry" ch. iii in this volume.

[30]*Ibid.*; see also Baxter, "Rise and Fall of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal", p. 142, and Frankel, "Problems of Correlating Electoral and Economic Variables".

[31]See especially Weiner and Field, "India's Urban Constituencies," *SEPIS*, III, William L. Richter, "Electoral Patterns in Post-Princely India" and Weiner and Field, "How Tribal Constituencies in India Vote", *SEPIS*, II.

[32]Frankel, "Problems of Correlating Electoral and Economic Variables", pp. 153-68 *ff.*

[33]H.B. Chaturvedi and Ghanshyam Shah, "Fusion and Fission of Castes in Elections: a Case Study of Chhata, UP", *Economic and Poli-*

tical Weekly, V, No. 40 (3 Oct., 1970), 1642-8).

[34]Brass, "Ethnic Cleavages and the Punjab Party System", p. 60.

[35]Barnett, "Cultural Nationalist Electoral Politics in Tamil Nadu", pp. 101-2.

[36]Hardgrave, "The Communist Parties of Kerala", p. 168.

[37]Chaturvedi and Shah, "Fusion and Fission of Castes", pp. 1646-7.

[38]Zagoria, "The Ecology of Peasant Communism" and "A Note on Landlessness, Literacy, and Agrarian Communism".

[39]Zagoria, "A Note on Landlessness", p. 331.

[40]It is also undesirable to do so because it is likely that there will be important differences in at least some of the district-level and constituency-level correlations, given the logic of the "ecological fallacy". Weiner and Field concluded from their constituency correlations that there was no meaningful relationship in India as a whole between turnout and competition; see "India's Urban Constituencies", *SEPIS*, III, 42. I compared the Dasgupta and Morris-Jones correlations for turnout with party vote shares for the 1967 elections in UP (pp. 97-9) with my constituency-level correlations for five parties. In four of the five cases, the discrepancies in the correlations were of no consequence, but in one—that for the CPI—the discrepancy was notable. The correlation reported by Dasgupta and Morris-Jones in the latter case was a non-significant -0.19, but the constituency-level correlation was a positive 0.19, significant at the .03 level.

[41]The most elaborate model to explain turnout variation in India is that presented by Elkins in *Electoral Participation*, which also makes use of several composite indexes. I do not know how his findings would be affected by the turnout-village size relationship, but it is worth exploring. For example, I have computed the Pearson correlation between the grand means calculated by Elkins (p. 196) for four elections and the percentage of villages with a population of less than 1,000 in the districts of Andhra. The correlation coefficient is -.641, which alone explains more than 41% of the variance in turnout in that province.

[41a]A complete set is available in the India Office Library, though the senior library staff there has denied knowledge of it for two decades. The volumes can be called up after getting the numbers from the card catalogue. However, it is useless to inquire by mail.

[42]P.D. Reeves, "Changing Patterns of Political Alignment in the General Elections to the United Provinces Legislative Assembly, 1937 and 1946", *Modern Asian Studies*, V, Pt 2 (April 1971), 111-42.

[43]Government of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, *Report of the United Provinees Zamindari Abolition Committee*, Vol. II—Statistics (Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1948), pp. 12-21.