PART TWO

3

The Politicization of the Peasantry in a North Indian State*

I. Introduction

This article focuses on the state of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), the largest state in India, with a population of over 90 million, a land area of 113,000 square miles, and a considerable diversity in political patterns, social structure, and agricultural ecology. My purpose in writing this article is to demonstrate how a program of modest land reform, designed to establish a system of peasant proprietorship and reenforced by the introduction of the technology of the 'green revolution', has, in the context of a political system based on party-electoral competition, enhanced the power of the middle and rich peasants. The land-holding classes in U.P., particularly those with landholdings above 2.5 acres, have become the arbiters of the fates of governments and parties and their interests have become decisive in critical areas of government policymaking affecting economic development. The rise to political prominence of these peasant classes also has forestalled both peasant revolution and class polarization as the leading political parties in the state have vied for the support of those who control most of the land.

In order to understand how the politicization and political dominance of the peasantry have developed in U.P., it is necessary to refer back to the period of British rule. Before Independence, the British controlled the countryside in what

*Reprinted with permission from *Journal of Peasant Studies*, July 1980, 7: 395-456, and September 1980, 8: 3-36.

was then known as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh with the collaboration of a group of tax-farmers known as *zamindars* in most parts of the province, and as *talukdars* in the region of Oudh. Most of these tax-farmers owned lands of their own, whose cultivation they supervised personally or through their agents, but they collected revenue also on lands held in various types of tenures by others. There were more than two million of these-tax farmers at Independence, but the vast majority of them had only medium-size landholdings and collected only a petty revenue for the state. The biggest tax-farmers, those who collected rent on hundreds of villages and paid revenues to the state of more than Rs. 5,000 per year, numbered less than a thousand (*Government of the United Provinces, 1948, II: 32-33*). It was upon these larger tax-farmers whom the British authorities relied to maintain political control in the countryside and whom they rewarded with titles of honour and positions of political weight in the provincial government and in the districts.

For its part, the Indian National Congress, which was the principal nationalist organization in the province and which emerged to lead the government after Independence, based its rural organization and its rural appeal on the high caste tenants of the big zamindars and talukdars and on the petty and middle zamindars, those paying less than Rs. 100 per year in land revenue. The Congress supported struggles and demands for security of tenure, for rent reductions, for cheap credit facilities, and for an end to abuses such as forced labour, fines, and 'illegal exactions' (*Narendra Dev, 1946: 59*). These tenant movements were strongest in the region of the state known as Oudh, where the talukdars, holding semi-princely status and privileges, allegedly oppressed the tenantry more relentlessly than the zamindars did in other parts of the state.

Although the tenant movements in U.P. and Congress control over the government of the province from 1937 to 1939 resulted in some modest reforms and some amelioration of the condition of the tenantry, the zamindari system remained essentially intact throughout the period of British rule. After Independence, however, the Congress acquired complete control over the government of U.P. and moved to displace the zamindars and talukdars economically and politically and to

substitute for the old agrarian system a new rural social order based primarily upon owner-cultivation of family-size farms. Two major pieces of land reform legislation were enacted by the Congress to achieve these goals—the Zamindari Abolition Act of 1952 and the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act of 1960.

The Zamindari Abolition Act, as its name implies, eliminated the former system of tax-farming by removing the zamindars and talukdars from their positions as intermediaries between the cultivator and the state. It also eliminated the heterogeneous forms of land rights and types of tenancy that had existed previously and created in their place two principal categories of landholders, called *bhumidhars* and *sirdars*. The only difference between these two categories was that the *bhumidhars* acquired transferable rights to their lands and a reduced land revenue by making an initial payment of ten times their land revenue whereas the *sirdars* could not sell their landholdings and paid a higher land revenue. A third category of land tenure also was created, called *asami*, but it was meant to be a minor form of tenure for persons engaged in 'shifting or unstable cultivation'[1] and for those letting land from *bhumidhars* and *sirdars* who were not able to cultivate their own land.

It must be stressed that the Zamindari Abolition Act did not dispossess the former zamindars and talukdars. It removed them as tax-farmers and displaced them from control over lands they did not own, but it left them in possession of lands traditionally presumed to be under their personal cultivation or supervision, which were called *sir* and *khudkhaskt* holdings. It also provided for rather generous monetary compensation to the ex-zamindars and talukdars. In some cases, the former tax-farmers were able to retain both large incomes and possession of very large tracts of land.[2]

The Land Ceilings Act of 1960 was designed more with a view to reduce the size of the largest landholdings in U.P. than to redistribute and equalize landholdings on a large scale. It set a rather high ceiling of 40 standard acres per individual, which meant that many families still could hold 150 to 200 acres of land. Moreover, the exclusion of grovelands left some of the former zamindars who had converted their lands to fruit trees in anticipation of the law, in control of quite substantial acreage

and incomes. The act was stiffened somewhat in 1973 in conformity with the National Guide Lines established by Mrs. Gandhi's government in 1971. The basic ceiling was reduced to 27½ acres per family. Although most big farmers had by then divided their lands sufficiently among family members and relatives to avoid confiscation of their lands, some actually lost lands after the enactment of the amendments of 1973. Nevertheless, loopholes remained to be exploited by the skillful and politically well-connected farmers and ex-landlords, many of whom still retain hundreds of acres of lands by such devices as establishing bogus cooperatives or educational and charitable trusts (*Government of India, 1976: 77 and 143*).

In general, therefore, the Congress land reforms were designed principally to eliminate the old system of tax-farming, which was accomplished effectively, and to limit the size of the largest farms, which also was achieved for the most part. However, these reforms were in no sense radical. They left most landholders in possession of lands they and their families had always cultivated, they involved very little redistribution of land, and they left a considerable range in the size of land holdings in the countryside and, therefore, considerable inequality among landholders and between the landless and the landholders.

Although there have always been a minority of Congressmen in U.P. and in New Delhi who have argued in favour of more radical land reforms and for extensive redistribution and equalization of landholdings, the predominant leadership of the Congress in the state remained content to dismantle the system of intermediaries and to establish a land system in which most cultivators held exclusive rights to the land they tilled. In fact, the ruling Congress drew its local leadership from the leading rural proprietary groups (*Brass, 1965: 229*). During the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, several measures were taken by government which further strengthened the position of the peasantry and which made it nearly impossible to carry out policies that were contrary to the interests of the more prosperous among them. These measures included consolidation of landholdings, the introduction of a system of rural self-government known as *panchayati raj*, an effort to increase rural taxation that encountered stiff opposition,[3] and the introduction of the techno-

logical changes in agriculture known as the 'green revolution'.[4]

Consolidation of landholdings brought together into compact and contiguous plots of land the fragmented holdings of the peasanty in U.P. The consolidation operations, which began after the passage of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1953, had encompassed more than half the cultivable area of the state by the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1971) [*Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. 1976 : 234*]. Although consolidation made more efficient cultivation possible for all landholders, it clearly had even greater significance for the middle and larger landholders, who were now in a position to make effective use of the new agricultural inputs and, in the case of the bigger farmers, to adopt some forms of mechanization.

The introduction in the 1960s of the system of rural self-government known as *panchayati raj* enhanced the political position of the peasantry, again favouring the middle and larger farmers among them. The system provided for a three-tiered structure of rural institutions, including the directly-elected village *panchayat* (council) and village *pradhan* (president), a middle-level block development committee elected by the village *pradhans*, and a district council composed partly of indirectly-elected and partly of state-appointed members. The system of directly-elected, indirectly-elected, and appointed members at different levels worked in such a way as to enhance the power of both the locally influential landed castes and the district Congress leadership, for only the most prosperous landed groups in the villages had the time and influence to mobilize support and, until 1967, patronage in the system was channelled exclusively through the Congress-controlled state government to the Congress-controlled district boards, whose members were linked to the local landed castes [*Brass, 1965 : 224-227*].

It was apparent in the early 1960s that any measure that ran contrary to the interests of the peasantry as a whole would be politically difficult to enact in U.P. This fact was most clearly demonstrated in 1962 when, operating under the prompting of the Planning Commission of India, the state government attempted to raise new resources from the peasantry to finance the Third Five Year Plan by imposing a 50 per cent surcharge on the land revenue. The attempt to enact this bill nearly led to

the toppling of the government. A surcharge bill ultimately was passed only after the Chinese invasion of 20 October made it possible for government to justify the measure in terms of the 'national emergency' and only after the surcharge was reduced to 25 per cent. However the surcharge was withdrawn the following year. Moreover, in subsequent years, the issue has become transformed in the U.P. political arena into a question of whether or not the entire land revenue should be abolished and replaced by a graduated agricultural income tax. On the face of it, this type of proposal favours the smaller peasantry. However, an agricultural income tax is extremely difficult to collect, as opposed to land revenue which is based on historical records of rights and assessments on particular holdings, and is therefore not much of a threat to the more prosperous peasantry either.

Finally, in the late 1960s, the new emphasis placed by Indian government on agriculture and the introduction of the package of improved seeds and agricultural practices that goes by the name of the 'green revolution' also affected the peasantry in U.P. There is considerable controversy in the literature on the 'green revolution' as to whether or not all agricultural groups have benefited from it, but there is no real dispute on two points. First, the 'green revolution' in north India has been principally a revolution affecting wheat which, in U.P., means that its benefits have extended primarily to the Doab districts between the Ganges and the Jumna rivers and to the western part of the state. Second, however much or little the 'green revolution' may have benefited the middle or small peasants and the landless, there is no doubt whatever that the rich peasants with holdings of 15 acres or more have benefited most.[5]

This brief survey of government policy towards the landed classes in U.P since Independence has revealed four important features. First, the old system of tax-farming was eliminated, but ex-zamindars and former talukdars retained some economic power and potentical political influence in the countryside. Second a number of laws, structural changes in government, and policies were introduced that enhanced the economic and political positions of the peasant cultivating classes generally. Third, however, most of those measures benefited the peasants with

larger landholdings more than others. Finally, it became apparent in the 1960s that no state government could function effectively if it attempted to extract resources from the peasantry or in other ways went against their interests.

These four features of land-government relationships in U.P. suggest only the broad outlines of rural social structure and political patterns in U.P. In the remainder of this article, the agrarian class structure in in U.P. will be examined in greater detail and the relationship of political parties to the different rural social classes will be shown.

The Rural social strutcure in Uttar Pradesh

The data on rural social stucture for this study have been derived from the following sources: from the statistical volume of the *Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee*, from the 1951, 1961 and 1971 censuses of Uttar Pradesh, and from the 1971 *Agricultural Census* of Uttar Pradesh. The Zamindari Abolition Committee Report contains district-level data from land record and revenue reports for 1945 through 1947. The data from the state censuses are available at the tahsil-level, an administrative unit subordinate to the district,[6] those from the 1971 *Agricultural Census* at the district level only. From these several sources, data have been derived on the distribution of rural categories by type of tenure and by size of landholdings. Data also have been calculated on the distribution of agricultural labourers. In the statistical analyses to be presented later in this article, these data are manipulated at the district and tahsil-level. In this section, however, they will be presented at the state and regional level in order to reveal the broad patterns and ecological variations that exist in the state.

Seven regions are specified in the tables in this section (see figure 1). They are as follows: Kumaon, the predominantly mountainous Himalayan districts; Bundelkhand, the rocky hill and plateau region in the southeastern part of the state; Rohilkhand, comprising the districts of the Upper Gangetic plain where wheat and rice both are grown, but with wheat acreage predominant; Oudh, the home of the talukdars, another mixed zone of wheat and rice cultivation, with rice more predominant here than wheat; the Eastern Districts, a region of extremely



Figure 1: Regions of Uttar Pradesh

high density rice cultivation; and the Upper and Lower Doab districts between the Ganges and the Jumna rivers where gram and wheat are the principal crops and little rice is grown.[7] The regional discussions in the remainder of this article will focus on the five plains regions, where most of the population of the state live and which are agriculturally the most important regions of the state. For some purposes, however, the data will be regrouped into two broader divisions comprising the upper half of wheat-growing and rice-growing districts respectively, in order to detect possible specific political differences that may be associated with the different ecologies and economic bases of wheat and rice, the two principal crops in this state.

A. Zamindars, Talukdars, and Land Tenure before Zamindari Abolition

Table 1, compiled from the 1951 census, shows the distribution of four agricultural categories in U. P. just before the abolition of the tax-farming system. Three of the four agricultural categories represent a combination of a wide variety of types of holdings, land rights, and wealth.[8] The first category, non-cultivating owners, consisted principally of zamindars and talukdars who paid a land revenue greater than Rs. 25 per annum. The petty zamindars were included in the 1951 census in the category of owner-cultivators, which also comprised several categories of tenants who were about to become owner-cultivators under the Zamindari Abolition Act. In other words, the category 'owner-cultivators' comprised all those groups who were to be favoured under the terms of the Zamindari Abolition Act with permanent and heritable rights in the lands they cultivated. The third category, non-owning cultivators, consisted of sub-tenants who did not have occupancy rights to the lands they cultivated and were, therefore, to remain tenants after the Zamindari Abolition Act until their leases expired. The denial of ownership rights to these sub-tenants was a clear indication that the Zamindari Abolition Act was designed to favour the more substantial proprietors and was not meant to secure all cultivators in possession of the lands they tilled. The fourth rural social category defined in the 1951 census was agricultural labourers, those without land before zamindari abolition who

TABLE 1
Mean Distribution of Agricultural Classes and Their Dependents in Uttar Pradesh by Region, 1951 Census (in percentage of total population)

	Uttar Pradesh	*Kumaon*	*Rohil-khand*	*Oudh*	*Eastern Districts*	*Lower Doab*	*Bundel-khand*	*Upper Doab*
Non-Cultivating owners	1.09	0.18	1.61	1.18	0.57	1.95	1.72	0.70
Owner-Cultivators	63.34	78.60	65.85	70.25	67.75	60.51	59.24	47.72
Non-owning Cultivators	5.14	4.55	2.88	6.80	6.35	5.14	6.53	3.56
Agricultural Labourers	5.55	1.12	2.73	4.56	8.37	4.57	9.89	6.65

Source: Calculated from Government of India [*1952,Table* E: *114—189*] Means are based on groups of tahsils, clustered to correspond to groups of Legislative Assembly constituencies for the correlation analyses to be presented in part IV of this article. The Ns for this table are as follows: Uttar Pradesh (116); Kumaon (9); Rohilkhand (16); Oudh (26); Eastern Districts (20); Lower Doab (12); Bundelkhand (9); Upper Doab (24). The mean percentages are very close to the actual percentages based on total population for the state as a whole and for each region. For a description of the clustering technique used to group and match tahsils and constituencies, see Brass [*1978: 95-96*].

were to remain without land after abolition.

It is clear from the numerical distribution of the four agricultural classes in U.P. in 1951 that the Zamindari Abolition Act was meant to favour or at least not disadvantage the overwhelming majority of the rural population of the state, who in turn comprised a majority of the total population. The owner-cultivators comprised nearly 84 per cent of the rural population and more than 63 per cent of the total population.[9] The leading intermediaries who were to lose rights over land and long-term income under the Act comprised only 1.42 per cent of the agricultural population and only 1.09 per cent of the total population. The sub-tenants, who were to have even less security of tenure after the passage of the Zamindari Abolition Act, comprised only 6.94 per cent of the agricultural and 5.14 per cent of the total population of the state. The landless constituted 7.70 per cent of the agricultural population and 5.55 per cent of the total population. Of these latter three classes, only the

TABLE 2

Distribution of Agricultural Holdings by Size of Holding and by Acreage, Uttar Pradesh, 1945 (in percentages of total agricultural holdings and total acreage).

Size Category (in Acres)	*Holdings* %	*Acres* %
Under 0-5	21.5	2.2
0 5.1	16.3	3.7
1-2	18.0	8.2
2-3	11.6	8.8
3-4	8.1	8.5
4-5	5.7	7.8
5-6	4.2	6.9
6-7	3.1	6.0
7-8	2.3	5.2
8-9	1.8	4.5
9-10	1.4	4.0
10-12	1.7	5.6
12-14	1.1	4.3
14-16	0.8	3.5
16-18	0.5	2.8
18-20	0.4	2.3
20-25	0.6	3.7
Over 25	0.9	12.0

Source: Compiled from Government of the United Provinces, (*1948, II, Table 14: 34-39*).

bigger zamindars and the sub-tenants suffered major losses because of the Zamindari Abolition Act, although the petty zamindars also lost the right to collect the small revenue that was under their control and some may also have lost rights over some small plots of land not under their personal cultivation.

One major inequality in the rural areas of U. P. after the abolition of zamindari, therefore, clearly was that between the landed, on the one side, and the sub-tenants and landless, on the other side. That inequality was not the only one, however. Table 2 shows the distribution of the landed classes by size of holdings and by the amount of acreage controlled, according to the 1945 records of rights. Unfortunately, the 1945 data are based on holdings rather than on persons or households so that two or three separated plots of land held by one person were

each listed separately, sometimes under the names of different family members. Consequently, what appears to be a striking inequality in the enormous concentration of landholders holding fewer than three acres of land, who collectively comprised 67.4 per cent of the cultivating households, but controlled only 22.9 per cent of the acreage, is an exaggeration. The figures also show a considerable disparity in the over 25-acre category. However, in this case, the disparity may be underestimated by the way the figures were compiled. In the middle levels, the disparity was of the order of one to two, with 31.7 per cent of households holding between three and 25 acres controlling 65.1 per cent of the acreage.

The Zamindari Abolition Committee, lacking accurate figures on holdings per family and arguing on the assumption that a minimum economic holding was 10 acres, saw no prospect of a redistribution of landholdings that would be both equitable and provide sufficient land to give all landholders a landholding approximating the size considered necessary for efficient cultivation. Moreover the Committee felt it would be politically unwise 'to arouse opposition among the substantial tenants and increase the difficulty of zamindars in adjusting themselves to changed conditions' [*Government of the United Provinces, 1948, I: 389*]. The conservative bias in the setting of 10 acres as a minimum economic holding and the concern not to arouse the larger landholders both suggest that it was upon these bigger landholders that the Congress leaders wished to rely to maintain political control in the countryside, that is, upon the approximately six per cent of proprietors who controlled more than a third of the land and were the men generally of high caste status and political importance in the villages of U. P.

B. Class and Caste in the U.P. Countryside after Zamindari Abolition

The censuses of 1951, 1961, and 1971 provide roughly comparable data on the cultivating population and on agricultural labourers. Because of shifting census definitions, however, the differences in the data from one census to another cannot be taken at face value. Table 3 shows a very substantial increase in the proportion of the working population recorded

TABLE 3

Mean Distribution of Cultivators and Agricultural Labourers in Uttar Pradesh by Region, 1951-1971 (in percentage of total workers).

	1951	*1961*	*1971*
UTTAR PRADESH			
Cultivators	68.54	64.54	59.59
Agricultural Labourers	5.80	10.50	19.65
Kumaon			
Cultivators	89.74	88.30	76.18
Agricultural Labourers	0.39	0.54	4.62
Rohilkhand			
Cultivators	66.80	64.29	66.68
Agricultural Labourers	3.19	6.88	12.15
Oudh			
Cultivators	77.50	71.92	68.90
Agricultural Labourers	4.76	11.99	16.82
Eastern Districts			
Cultivators	72.59	63.44	53.30
Agricultural Labourers	8.11	17.80	30.61
Lower Doab			
Cultivators	66.41	64.93	58.20
Agricultural Labourers	4.58	8.87	19.26
Bundelkhand			
Cultivators	66.15	63.91	55.87
Agricultural Labourers	10.06	13.49	26.13
Upper Doab			
Cultivators	53.68	51.87	47.51
Agricultural Labourers	7.57	7.73	16.66

Sources: Compiled from Government of India [*1952, Table E: 114-189*]; [*1964, Union Primary Census Abstract*]; [*1975, State Primary Census Abstract*]. Means are based on groups of tahsils.

as agricultural labourers from 1951 to 1971. Even if the figures were in error by half, it is apparent that there was a very great increase in the population of the landless in this state in those twenty years, particularly in the high density, rice-growing Eastern Districts, where the 1971 census showed the proportion of agricultural lobourers at over 30 per cent. It is possible that

a part of the increase in the proportion of agricultural labourers may be attributable to the displacement of many small holders into the landless labourer class, but there is no way of making this determination from the available data.[11]

Figures also are available from the 1961 census and from the 1971 *Agricultural Census* on the distribution of holdings in various size categories. Unfortunately, there are striking differences in the proportions of the landholding population placed in the same categories in the two censuses because of differences in the unit of enumeration, that for the 1961 census being the cultivating household and that for the 1971 *Agricultural Census* being the 'operational holding'. Moreover, because of the considerable differences in the economics of wheat and rice production and in the product and income that can be gained from irrigated and unirrigated land, aggregate figures on landholdings can give only a rough guide to class structure in the countryside. Finally, there are some differences among economists and anthropologists in assessing the economic and class status even of peasants with comparable holdings, particularly in the middle ranges.

At the lowest level, there is agreement that the landless and those with less than 2½ acres constitute a category of rural poor [*Mencher, 1974: 1499; Mellor 1976: 76-77*]. It is generally agreed that those with less than 2½ acres of land even in rice-growing areas cannot be economically self-sufficient and that some family members in such households may also do labour on the fields of others. Some observers argue that 2½ acres in rice areas and five acres in wheat areas constitute the minimum size holding that separates the middle peasants from the rural poor, but others place the minimum holding somewhat higher [*Mellor, 1976: 76-77; Torri, 1976: 27*]. The small or middle peasants, those who produce a surplus and also hire some labourers for work in their own fields, would comprise those holding between 2½ and 7½ acres in rice areas and between five and ten acres in wheat. The upper middle and big peasants, then, are those with holdings above 7½ acres in rice and above 10 acres in wheat. These farmers are the ones, particularly in the wheat areas, who are likely to have benefited most from the spread of the green revolution. Beyond 15 or 20 acres, we leave the class of peasantry entirely and enter the realm of the

TABLE 4

Mean Distribution of Agricultural Classes and Landholding Size Groups in Uttar Pradesh by Region, 1961 Census (in percentages of total cultivating households)

	UTTAR PRADESH	*Kumaon*	*Rohil-khand*	*Oudh*	*Eastern Districts*	*Lower Doab*	*Bundel-khand*	*Upper Doab*
AGRICULTURAL CLASSES								
(1) Proprietors	89.94	64.07	92.47	87.78	91.65	90.50	87.67	95.81
(2) Tenants	3.21	16.48	2.40	3.75	2.33	2.18	3.65	1.16
(3) Mixed Proprietor Tenants	6.85	19.46	5.21	8.47	6.03	7.32	8.69	3.02
LANDHOLDING SIZE CATEGORIES IN ACRES								
(1) Less than 1	10.23	28.06	6.30	12.41	16.44	8.85	1.83	4.66
(2) 1.0-2.4	24.46	40.90	19.65	30.96	31.64	26.14	10.41	14.74
(3) 2.5-4.9	26.13	20.03	28.60	29.18	24.93	28.16	19.44	24.91
(4) 5.0-7.4	15.94	4.70	19.80	14.05	11.83	17.45	18.67	19.46
(5) 7.5-9.9	7.94	1.45	10.08	5.36	5.16	7.25	11.11	12.45
(6) 10.0-12.4	5.12	0.53	5.38	3.19	3.23	5.14	9.92	8.10
(7) 12.5-14.9	2.72	0-17	3.20	1.36	1.68	2.00	5.67	4.75
(8) 15.0-29.9	5.44	0.24	5.30	2.54	3.56	3.84	16.63	8.62
(9) 30.0-49.9	1.00	0.03	0.83	0.44	0.75	0.56	4.89	1.23
(10) More than 50.0	0.33	0.01	0.30	0.17	0.27	0.19	1.49	0.31

Source: Calculated from Government of India [*1966b, Table B-XI*). Means are based on groups of tahsils.

former landlords and the modern capitalist farmers.[12]

In the statistical correlations of landholding size data with party votes to be presented later on in this article, most of the landholding size data have been drawn from the 1961 census because of its proximity to the 1957 and 1962 elections and because only the 1961 census provides tahsil-level data that are essential for regional analyses. However, since it is the author's personal impression that the 1971 *Agricultural Census* more accurately reflects the distribution of control over the land by various size groups, the interpretation of U.P. social structure in this section will be based on the 1971 census, which will also be used where necessary and appropriate in later parts of the text to supplement, confirm, or correct interpretations based on 1961 census information and for correlation with party vote shares for the 1974 and 1977 elections.

The census authorities for U. P. have divided the 1971 data on size of landholdings into twelve categories ranging from less than 0.5 hectares (1.25 acres) to 50 hectares (approximately 125 acres) and above. However, in presenting and discussing the data, they have grouped them into four broader categories—less than one hectare (approximately 2.5 acres), one to three hectares, three to ten hectares, and more than ten hectares, which they describe as 'marginal, small, medium and large holdings and which correspond roughly to the distinctions made in the previous paragraph. In terms of these divisions, two-thirds of the holdings (66.7 per cent) in the state were found to be in the marginal category, nearly one quarter (24.3 per cent) were small holdings, 8.3 per cent were medium-size holdings and only 0.7 per cent were large holdings.[13] Regional differences in the distribution of the four size-classes were however, found to be substantial, as indicated in table 5, which shows that more than 75 per cent of the holdings in the Eastern Plains Districts fall in the marginal category compared to less than 51 per cent in the Upper Doab.

Figures such as these often have been used to paint a two-fold picture of rural social structure in this state as being characterized by hopelessly small landholdings and grinding poverty, on the one hand, with no reasonable prospect of land redistribution because of the relatively small number of large landholdings in relation to the large number of landless

TABLE 5

Mean Disribution,[a] by of Number and Area, of Operational Holdings in Different Regions According to Size-Classes, 1971

REGION	Size-Class (In acres)[b] Up to 2.5 No.	Up to 2.5 Area	2.5—7.5 No.	2.5—7.5 Area	7.5—25 No	7.5—25 Area	25 and above No.	25 and above Area
KUMAON	67.75	37.41	26.73	43.62	5.14	15.49	0.38	3.48
ROHILKHAND	60.33	19.32	29.24	39.16	9.80	33.65	0.63	7.87
UPPER DOAB	50.89	12.36	31.73	33.29	16.29	44.83	1.10	9.51
LOWER DOAB	66.68	22.92	25.01	38.05	7.79	32.09	0.52	6.94
BUNDELKHAND	38.70	6.79	34.21	23.33	22.86	44.79	4.24	25.09
OUDH	70.02	27.68	23.93	40.51	5.68	26.04	0.37	5.77
EASTERN DISTRICTS	75.36	28.54	18.44	34.54	5.58	27.60	0.63	9.32
TOTAL[c]	63.77	23.57	26.13	37.08	9.24	30.88	0.86	8.48

Source: Government of Uttar Pradesh, Board of Revenue, 1973.

[a]Means are based on districts.

[b]The source data were in hectares, the original categories being as follows: up to 1, 1 to 3, 3 to 10, and 10 and above. For the sake of consistency with the 1961 census data and to avoid the confusion of switching from acres to hectares in the text, the size-classes were converted to their approximate corresponding units in acres.

[c]The figures here differ somewhat from those given in the text at page 406, because the figures here are district means whereas those cited in the text are actual totals.

and dwarf landholders, on the other hand. The situation is generally also described as particularly grim in the Eastern Districts and somewhat less severe in the west plain. This description of rural social structure in U.P. is, however, misleading in two respects. It ignores the different economies of wheat and rice production and it fails to convey an accurate picture of the dominant social forces in the countryside.

Table 6 brings out clearly the differences in patterns of landholding in wheat and rice districts. The table shows the expected distribution of the proportion of landholdings in the different size categories, with the majority of holdings being in the marginal category, with a greater proportion of holdings

TABLE 6

Mean Distribution of Number and Area of Operational Holdings by Size Categories for Wheat and Rice Districts,[a] 1971 (In Percentages), Plains Districts Only (Excluding Kumaon and Bundelkhand)

SIZE CATEGORY[b]	*Wheat Districts (N=22)*		*Rice Districts (N=22)*	
	No.	*Area*	*No*	*Area*
MARGINAL (Less than 2.5 acres)	61.92	20.74	70.77	26.43
SMALL (2.5 to 7.5 acres)	27.34	37.70	22.14	36.83
MEDIUM (7.5 to 25 acres)	10.08	34.35	6.51	28.28
LARGE (above 25 acere)	0.65	7.21	0.58	8.46
TOTAL	99.99	100.00	100.00	100.00

[a]"Wheat" and "rice" districts have been selected by ranking the districts with respect to per cent of gross cropped area sown with wheat and rice, respectively, and taking the top half districts in each case. The resulting selection involves some overlap and the elimination of those districts in which neither wheat nor rice is the principal crop.

[b]The source data from the U.P. *Agricultural Census* are in hectares, but have been transformed here into the closest approximate categories in acres for the sake of consistency with 1961 census data presented in other tables.

in the marginal category in rice districts than in wheat districts, and with a very small proportion of large landholdings in either wheat or rice zones. However, the distribution of the proportion of acreage held by the different size groups is a more relevant criterion for assessing rural social structure than the mere number of persons in different size categories. Whether one uses the groupings suggested by the census authorities or a different grouping of categories for wheat and rice districts to take account of the differences in the economies of wheat and rice production, it is clear that the bulk of the acreage in the state is held not by the poor dwarf landholders eking out a bare subsistence nor by the former landlords or capitalist farmers, but by the small and middle peasantry with economic or potentially economic landholdings.[14] If one adopts the criterion of 5 acres for a minimum economic landholding in the wheat districts, then nearly 81 per cent of the holdings are uneconomic (table 7). However, by the same criterion, more than half the acreage in those districts is controlled by an elite of peasantry with economic holdings between 5 and 25 acres, who comprise less than 20 per cent of the rural population. These 20 per cent come primarily from the dominant rural classes and castes in the countryside—the Brahman, Rajput, Jat and Ahir peasantry. The pattern of landholdings in the rice districts is somewhat similar (Table 6). Taking 2.5 acres as the dividing line between marginal cultivation and minimal self-sufficiency in the rice districts, more than 70 per cent of the

TABLE 7

Mean Distribution of Number and Area of Operational Holdings by Size Categories for Wheat Districts, 1971 (In Percentages), Plains Districts only (excluding Kumaon and Bundelkhand)

SIZE CATEGORY	*No*	*Area*
Less than 5 acres	80.85	42.60
5 to 10 acres	12.72	26.87
10 to 25 acres	5.77	23.32
Above 25 acres	0.65	7.21
TOTAL	99.99	100.00

See footnote b to Table 6.

cultivators are at or below the subsistence level, but the remaining nearly 30 per cent of the landholders control the great bulk of the land, close to 75 per cent of it. In rice districts, the dominant castes whose members control this acreage are the Brahmans, Thakurs, Bhumihars, Ahirs, and Kurmis.

Within the broad groupings of 'wheat' and 'rice' districts, the quintessential regions are the Upper Doab for wheat and the Eastern Districts for rice. There are several striking differences in the social structure of these two regions that are brought out in table 5. First, the Eastern Districts are clearly a region of small holdings with more than 63 per cent of the acreage in holdings of less than 7.5 acres compared to less than 46 per cent in the Upper Doab. By the same token, the Upper Doab is the domain principally of the prosperous peasantry, for here more than 54 per cent of the acreage is controlled by peasants with a minimum holding of 7.5 acres. Second, the stratum of 'middle' peasantry holding 7.5 to 25 acres is much more important in the Upper Doab than in the Eastern Districts. Third, inequality is more extreme in the Eastern Districts, where the middle and rich peasantry comprise only 6.2 per cent of the cultivating population but control 36.9 per cent of the land, than in the Upper Doab, where 17.4 per cent of the cultivators control more than 54 per cent of the land. The political implications of these differences are that the social base for a party of the viable and prosperous peasantry is much stronger in the Upper Doab than in the Eastern Districts and that the political appeals for a party that seeks strength in both regions must perforce be different.

It is evident from these figures that the political stability of the U.P. countryside depends to a considerable extent on the contentment of the middle peasantry. On the other hand, their numbers alone, even if concerted action on their part were assumed, are insufficient to provide majority support for an agrarian-based party in a one man-one vote system. Moreover, there are important internal divisions among the dominant peasant classes both with respect to the size of their holdings and with respect to caste.

Although the Zamindari Abolition Act benefited the former occupancy tenants and the small and middle ex-zamindars irrespective of caste, the leading castes among these groups in

size of landholdings and local influence were Brahmans and Rajputs in most of the state, Jats and Tyagis in western U.P., and Bhumihars in eastern U.P. [*Brass, 1965: 16-18*]. These five castes together accounted for less than 20 per cent of the population of the state, but owned a much larger share of the land in U.P. before zamindari abolition. Although zamindari abolition affected adversely the very largest landlords among these castes, it left many of their members with substantial holdings of land. The result was that, as a body, the landowning segments of these castes retained their leading positions as landholders after zamindari abolition and acquired an enhanced political position in U.P. villages as a consequence of the reduction of the economic hold and the political authority of the former big zamindars and talukdars. The leadership of the Congress in the rural districts after zamindari abolition also was drawn overwhelmingly in nearly all cases from these locally dominant rural castes (*Brass, 1965: 16-18*). Moreover, as the Congress established its control over local self-government and cooperative institutions and developed a new system of local self-government under *panchayati raj*, these castes became the principal beneficiaries of the considerable patronage that became available through these institutions. Thus, in the aftermath of zamindari abolition and the establishment of Congress rule in the rural districts of U.P., the middle and large peasantry from among the elite proprietary castes benefited economically and politically.

A second group of castes that benefited to some extent from zamindari abolition were the middle cultivating castes of Ahirs, Kurmis, Lodhi Rajputs, and a few other smaller castes, most of whose members were tenants of the elite castes before zamindari abolition. However, although these castes benefited psychologically by the removal of their former overlords as collectors, most members of these castes probably became *sirdars*, paying the same amount of revenue as before to the state instead of to the tax collector and not holding the right to sell their land. Moreover, they did not acquire as much political influence after zamindari abolition as the elite proprietary castes. In many districts in U.P., these middle or backward castes often occupy secondary positions both in size of landholdings and in political influence in Rajput and Brahman-dominated

TABLE 8

Percentage of Votes Polled by Political Parties in Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly Elections, 1952-1977

POLITICAL PARTY	*1952*	*1957*	*1962*	*1967*	*1969*	*1974*	*1977*
1. Congres	47.93	42.42	36.33	32.20	33.70	32.29	31.95
2. Congress (O)	(Founded in 1969)		—	—	—	8.36	—
	47.93	42.42	36.33	32.20	33.73	40.65	31.95
3. BKD	(Founded in 1967)	—	—	—	21.29	21.22	
4. SP	12.03	7.45	8.21	—	—	2.90	—
5. KMPP	5.70	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. PSP	—	14.47	11.52	4.09	1.72	—	—
7. SSP	(Founded in 1964)		—	9.97	7.82	—	—
8. KMP	(Founded in 1969)		—	—	0.84	—	—
9. UPRSP	0.40	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. SSD	(Founded in 1974)	—	—	—	—	0.69	0.31
	18.13	21.92	19.73	14.06	10.02	3.59	0.31
11. Jan Sangh	6.45	9.84	16.46	21.67	17.93	17,12	—
12. HMS	1.43	—	1.06	—	0.29	0.30	0.04
	7.88	9.84	17.52	21.67	18.22	17.42	0.04
13. Swatantra	(Founded in 1959)		4.60	4.73	1.25	1.13	—
14. UPPP	1.87	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1.87	0.00	4.60	4.73	1.25	1.13	—

15. CPI	0.93	3.83	5.08	3.23	3.05	2.45	2.56
16. CPM	(Founded in 1964)		—	1.27	0.49	0.71	0.58
	0.93	3.83	5.08	3.23	4.50	3.16	3.14
17. SCF/RPI	1.49	—	3.73	4.14	3.48	—	0.07
18. Muslim League	—	—	—	—	—	1.38	0.20
	1.49	—	3.73	4.14	3.48	1.38	0.27
19. Janata	(Founded in 1977)		—	—	—	—	47.84
20. Unsuccessful Parties and Independents	21.77	21.99	13.01	18.70	8.50	11.45	16.45
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Sources : Compiled from official reports of the Election Commission of India and of the Chief Electoral Officer of Uttar Pradesh.

FIGURES FOR UNSUCCESSFUL PARTIES ARE AS FOLLOWS :

1952 : RRP, 1.74%; RSP, 0.44%; BOLSHEVIK, 0.01%.

1957 : RRP, 0.76%;

1962 : RRP, 0.30%;

1969 : BCP, 0.15; BOLSHEVIK, 0.02%, MAZDOOR PARISHAD, 0.56%
PBI, 0.17%; RPI-A0.23% RRP, 0.01%; SOCIALIST CONGRESS, 0.27%;
SUC, 0.01%; MM, 0.01%; UPSPB, 0.05%; BHOJPURI SAMAJ, 0.01%;
SAMAJVADI CONGRESS, 0.01%; JC, KRP, BAS, UPSSP, less than 0.01%.

1974 : Other parties, 1.20%.

1977 : RPI (K), 0.23%; RSP, 0.01%; FB, 0.04%; RRP, 0.03%; SVC, 0.01%;
Other parties, 0.01%.

villages. And, as already indicated, the Congress structure of rural influence was built upon the elite castes rather than the middle castes. Consequently, it should be expected that Congress would not receive strong support in areas where these middle castes are most heavily concentrated and that they would form a potential source for opposition mobilization.

The bottom of the economic hierarchy in rural U.P. corresponds strongly with the status hierarchy in the sense that most of the landless come from the lowest caste groups. Consequently, common action on economic grounds between the landless and the small and middle peasants would have to cross a social as well as an economic barrier. It should, however, be stressed here that the correspondence between caste and economic class or political influence is far from perfect. Many elite caste persons are small holders in U.P. whereas many middle caste households belong to the middle and big peasantry. There are also some small holders among the lower castes, but very few middle or big peasants. In general, therefore, the socioeconomic structure of rural U.P. does provide a basis for political mobilization that plays upon the dual theme of economic and caste inequalities, but the cross-cutting of class and caste lines also limits the potential for such appeals.

III. Political Geography: The Electoral Evidence for Agrarian Discontent

A. State Patterns and Party Politics

Table 8 shows the percentages of votes polled by all political parties that won seats in the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 1952 to 1977. It is evident from the table that the party system moved over time from 1952 to 1974 from a relatively high degree of political integration to disintegration followed by the reintegration of the system in the 1977 elections in the aftermath of the relaxation of the Emergency regime of Mrs. Gandhi, which led to the formation of the Janata coalition.

In Table 8, the 19 parties that won at least one legislative assembly seat in one election have been arranged into eight groupings. The first three groupings consist principally of the

Congress and parties that splintered from it (except for the tiny KMP, UPSP, and SSD). The first group comprises only the Congress itself and the Congress (O) that emerged from the split in the party in 1969. The second 'group' consists of the BKD only, which emerged after the defection of Charan Singh from the Congress in 1969. The third group is comprised of seven parties of the non-Communist left, of which the first four were the most important and underwent numerous splits and mergers in relation to each other. The fourth group comprises two Hindu communal parties, Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha. The fifth group is comprised of two parties of the Right, Swatantra and the U.P. Praja Party, which contested the 1952 elections only. The sixth group consists of the two Communist parties. The seventh group contains two parties representing minority interests—the Scheduled Caste Federation (later renamed the Republican Party of India) and the Muslim League. The eighth 'group' is the Janata party. In the seven elections taken together, more than 90 per cent of the seats were won by eight parties—Congress, the BKD, the Socialist Party, the PSP, Jan Sangh, the CPI and Janata.

From the point of view of agrarian policy and leadership structure, the principal state parties in this period can be placed in terms of their electoral appeals as follows. The electoral appeal of the Congress, as befits a party of the Centre, has cut across the entire spectrum of agrarian social structure.[15] It has supported minimum wages and rural works programs for the landless and special educational and employment benefits for persons of low caste generally. It has proposed joint cooperative farming for small holders, but has never implemented the proposal. It has distributed most agriculture-related patronage through the more substantial peasants of elite caste status, but has also set up special agencies to help small farmers. It abolished the tax-farming system, but provided generous compensasation to the former zamindars and found places for many of them in its organization. Finally, it has consistently favoured reduced land ceilings, but Congress state governments have never implemented them fully. Under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership from 1967 to 1977, the emphasis of party policies was to favour the poor and the small farmers, but Mrs. Gandhi did not alter the social composition of the party leadership in U.P. at least.

Nor were any changes in the agrarian structure of the state carried out during that period.

Moving from Right to Left among the non-Congress parties, two parties in U.P. have appealed directly to the former zamindars and rich farmers—the U.P. Praja Party (UPPP) and Swatantra. The UPPP was a purely state party that fought the 1952 elections with little success and disappeared thereafter. Swatantra, formed as a national party in 1959, had only modest success for a time in U.P. It was clearly oriented to landlord and rich farmer interests. Five of its fifteen legislative assembly members elected in 1962 were former big zamindars [*Meyer, 1969: 157-158*]. The party program in 1966 described land ceilings as 'meaningless and unenforceable' and called for their removal, opposed compulsory levies and procurement of food grains, favoured high prices for farm products, opposed any direct charges to the peasantry for the costs of new irrigation works, and favoured abolition of the land revenue [*Masani, 1966: 19-20*].

To the left of Swatantra on agrarian policies were the Jan Sangh and the BKD. Both these parties appealed to the peasantry generally, but paid particular attention to the interests of the middle and rich peasants. The Jan Sangh drew between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of its legislative assembly membership in 1952, 1957 and 1962 from former medium and large zamindars and talukdars. More than 50 per cent of its legislative assembly and party committee members have been drawn from elite castes [*Meyer, 1969: 157-158, 175-181 and Srivastava, 1976: 359-360*]. Although, therefore, the Jan Sangh made strong overtures to the former landlord classes, its appeal was directed principally to peasants and farmers holding between five and 30 acres of land. The party accused the Congress of following policies that would not 'create a social order in the countryside based on peasant proprietorship but would rather move rural society toward collectivization. Although the Jan Sangh expressed its support for redistribution of large landholdings, it proposed that such redistribution should take place by direct sale on the part of the landowners rather than through the state bureaucracy [*Jan Sangh, 1973: 51-52, 61-66, 69-70, 91-94, citation from p. 63*].

The BKD's appeal was similar to that of the Jan Sangh,

except that its feet were planted even more firmly on the soil of the peasant proprietors holding between 2.5 and 27.5 acres of land [*Bharatiya Kranti Dal, 1969: 4ff.*]. The BKD made no attempt to appeal to or to draw leadership from the former zamindars. Moreover, although its manifestoes were not explicit in this regard, it is generally known that the BKD leadership, particularly its founder, Chaudhuri Charan Singh, had a particular interest in the welfare of the middle castes.

To the left of the Jan Sangh and the BKD on agrarian issues has been the CPI. Although the CPI top party leaders have come predominantly from elite castes, most of its legislative assembly members have come from the middle and lower castes. It has drawn very few of its legislative assembly members from the former zamindars [*Meyer, 1969:157-158 and Srivastava 1976:359-360*]. Although the CPI has wished to avoid antagonizing the rich peasantry and has called for the unity of all 'the rural masses', its appeal has been directed more to the middle and poor peasants than that of either the Jan Sangh or the BKD. It has called for further reduction in land ceilings and more effective implementation of existing ceilings, for protection of tenants, and for distribution of small plots of land to landless labourers as well as increased wages for agricultural labour.[16]

Farther to the Left on agrarian issues has been the radical wing of the Socialist movement, represented in U.P. in the 1960s by the SSP. This party appealed especially to the landless and the poor peasants and to the backward and lowest castes. It called for a reduced ceiling on landholdings to a maximum of three times an economic holding per family, for redistribution of surplus land to the landless and the low castes, for abolition of land revenue on small holdings, and for an income tax on big farmers. It also called for preferential policies in granting jobs to backward and low castes and other disadvantaged groups [*Samyukta Socialist Party, 1971*]. With the exception of the specific appeal of the SSP to the most disadvantaged castes, the policy of the PSP was similar to that of the SSP [*Praja Socialist Party, 1971: 89-90*].

The Janata party in U.P. was a coalition formed principally from the former BKD, SSP, Jan Sangh and Congress (O). The *Election Manifesto* sections on agriculture appealed directly to

the interests of market-orie nted and input-oriented farmers. It called for 'primacy' in economic development 'to agriculture and rural reconstruction'. It charged that, heretofore, the farmer had 'been consistently denied reasonable and fair prices' for his produce and that 'allocations for agriculture and related development' had 'been grossly inadequate'. The *Manifesto* promised to rectify these problems by insuring that the farmer would 'get remunerative prices' for his produce, that he would be able to purchase 'inputs at reasonable prices', and that 'rural resources' would be reinvested in rural development'. Existing land ceilings legislation would be 'honestly' implemented and the surplus land distributed to the landless, but once implemented, the Janata party promised stability in the countryside without recurring threats of 'frequent changes' in agrarian land relationships. Finally, all landholdings below 6.25 acres would be exempted 'from payment of land revenue' [*Janata Party, 1977: 12-14*].

Independents have played a more important role in U.P. elections than most political parties. Independents, of course, have no program as such, but it is possible that independent candidates and independent voting may reveal a widespread source of discontent not adequately expressed through the established parties. In the first three elections in U.P., between a third and a half of elected independents were from the former big zamindars and several others came from other classes of ex-zamindars. The majority of the successful independent candidates also came in those elections from elite castes [*Meyer, 1969:157-158, 175-181*]. However, no information is available on the social composition of independent legislators from 1967 onwards. Moreover, almost nothing is known about the backgrounds of the large numbers of unsuccessful independent candidates who, in the aggregate, have polled a more substantial vote in most elections than unsuccessful candidates from the registered parties.

How did these parties and independents fare over time in the electoral history of U.P.? Table 8 reveals a number of prominent trends and changes over time. Four features stand out in regard to the electoral strength of the Congress and its splinter, Congress (O). First, the Congress was consistently the strongest political party in U.P. Second, however, there was a

steady decline in Congress strength over the first four elections, with a general levelling off from that point on through 1974 at the low level of less than a third of the popular vote. Third, the decline in Congress strength is clearly related to, though not necessarily entirely explained by, the spread of factional conflict at the state and national leadership levels of the party in the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the split in the party in 1969 which largely reflected earlier factional cleavages in the state Congress. Fourth, Mrs. Gandhi did not succeed in U.P. even before the declaration of Emergency in 1975 either in rebuilding the party organization or in restoring the electoral strength of the Congress. However, it is also apparent from the tables that Mrs. Gandhi's Congress succeeded in maintaining the electoral strength of the party intact up to 1974 at roughly the 1967 level in the face of the creation of the BKD and of an alternative Congress organization, both formed from former leaders and factions within the parent Congress. Moreover, despite the massive victory of the Janata coalition in the 1977 elections in which the party won 83 per cent of the seats in the U.P. Legislative Assembly, the Congress popular vote share declined only marginally from 1974 when it won 50 per cent of the seats against a fragmented opposition.

Among the more striking features revealed in Table 8 is the sudden emergence of the BKD as the leading non-Congress party in U.P. politics. Charan Singh's party emerged in its first election contest in 1969 not only as the strongest non-Congress party in U.P. in that election, but with the highest popular vote and the largest number of seats ever won by a non-Congress party in any election since independence. Even more impressive is the fact that the BKD maintained its strength in 1974 in the face of the massive intervention of Mrs. Gandhi and her lieutenants in state politics in their efforts alternatively to absorb and destroy the power of the new party. One of the most important tasks of this article is to explain the rise of the BKD and its social and economic significance and the relationship between the rise of the BKD and the great victory of the Janata coalition in 1977.

The third group of parties, comprising the parties of the non-Communist Left has been the most fragmented of all the groups of parties in U.P. In the first general elections of 1952,

three parties from this group won seats, but only the SP and the KMPP won a significant percentage of votes. Moreover, the SP was clearly the dominant party in this group and the principal opposition party in the state at that time. After the 1952 elections, the SP and KMPP merged into the PSP, but the Lohia group split off in 1954 and re-formed the SP. The PSP, however, emerged as the stronger of the two parties in the 1957 elections in both electoral support and seats won. Once again also, a party from this group, the PSP, was the leading party of opposition in the state Legislative Assembly. The relative strength of the two parties in relation to each other was more or less maintained in the 1962 elections, but the PSP declined to third place in strength in the state party system after the Jan Sangh. From this point on, in fact, the Socialist movement entered a decline that approached disintegration in 1974, when the entire non-Communist Left polled only 3.59 per cent of the votes and won only six seats. Between 1962 and 1974, the movement went through several splits and mergers whose cumulative impact was to weaken the main Socialist parties irretrievably [*Brass, 1976*]. Its principal wing in U.P., the SSP, merged with the BKD after the 1974 elections into the BLD.

For a time, it appeared that the party system in U.P. might be moving towards a dualistic competition between the Congress and the Jan Sangh, which showed a steady increase in its electoral strength and seat-winning capacity over the first four elections. However, the rise of the BKD in 1969 contributed to a decline in Jan Sangh strength and to its relegation to third position in the U.P. party system in the 1969 and 1974 elections. Nevertheless, the Jan Sangh remained a strong force in 1969 and even more so in 1974. Thus, by 1974, there were two leading parties in opposition to the Congress—the BKD, presenting an economic appeal and a direct challenge to Congress dominance in rural areas among the leading proprietary groups, and the Jan Sangh, whose appeal emphasized Hindu nationalism and Hindi-speaking regional sentiment more than economic issues, but which also appealed to the general body of peasant proprietors. These two parties also formed the principal components of the Janata coalition in the 1977 election.

The most noteworthy feature of the next three groups of parties is their persistent weakness over time. No party in U.P.

has been able to build strong support by appealing to ex-landlords (Swatantra and the UPPP), by promoting Communist ideology (CPI and CPM), or by appealing principally to the sentiments of Scheduled Castes or Muslims (SCF/RPI and the Muslim League).

The last feature of Table 8 that requires attention is the relative weight in the system of minor parties and independents, which was rather higher in the first four elections than in the next two, after which it increased again. It will be demonstrated below that the decline in the independent vote in 1969 and 1974 and the rise of the BKD were interrelated.

B. Regional Patterns

Uttar Pradesh is an enormous state in terms of population, is also among the largest of the Indian states in land area, and is geographically and in social and economic structure quite diverse. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that political patterns also would vary considerably from one region of the state to another. For purposes of further analysis of the support bases of political parties in U.P., the state has been divided into seven regions described previously that follow, more or less, well-known geographical, historical, and social-structural differences.

Table 9 shows the percentage of votes and the rank position by region for turnout (based on valid votes only) and for the six leading parties in U.P. and independents over the seven elections from 1952 to 1977. Looking first at the regional distribution of turnout, it is apparent that there is a very clear-cut east-west division in turnout rates that has been quite consistent over the seven elections. In the first six elections, turnout was highest in the most agriculturally advanced, wheat-growing, Upper Doab districts. In the 1977 elections, the Upper Doab districts dropped slightly in rank position to second place. The second region of consistently high turnout comprised the west plain districts of Rohilkhand, which ranked second on this measure for the first five elections, dropping slightly to third and fourth places in 1974 and 1977. At the other extreme, with consistently low turnout rates over time, were Kumaon and Oudh. In between, with middling turnout rates were Bundelkhand, the Lower Doab, and the Eastern Districts.

TABLE 9

Turnout and Vote for Leading Political Parties by Region: Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly Elections, 1952—1977

			Kumaon	*Rohilkhand*	*Oudh*	*Eastern Districts*	*Lower Doab*	*Bundelkhand*	*Upper Doab*	*STATE TOTAL*
Turnout										
	1952	%	26.87	39.68	34.12	35.82	39.15	33.50	48.24	39.16
		Rank	7	2	5	4	3	6	1	
	1957	%	25.83	46.24	40.85	45.17	45.23	42 33	53.07	44 92
		Rank	7	2	6	4	3	5	1	
	1962	%	27.91	50.44	45.28	49.26	49.55	44.45	54.79	48 59
		Rank	7	2	5	4	3	6	1	
	1967	%	34.45	55.42	46.85	50.96	50.88	52 03	56.95	50 93
		Rank	7	2	6	4	5	3	1	
	1969	%	38.45	57.24	46.13	52.06	52.70	53 96	59.89	52 23
		Rank	7	2	6	5	4	3	1	
	1974	%	42.76	57.86	49.33	54.92	56.89	59.15	61 87	55.20
		Rank	7	3	6	5	4	2	1	
	1977	%	33.34	46.71	39 59	47.11	45.51	55 53	49.93	45 52
		Rank	7	4	6	3	5	1	2	

Congress									
	1952	%	45.02	44.39	46.91	45.96	46.54	47.43	54.58	47.93
		Rank	6	7	3	5	4	2	1	
	1957	%	50.00	39.09	40.11	42.57	40.44	46.36	47.20	42.42
		Rank	1	7	6	4	5	3	2	
	1962	%	55.63	32.47	37.17	37.94	32.97	40.19	36.29	36.33
		Rank	1	7	4	3	6	2	5	
	1967	%	38.47	27.57	33.95	33.40	31.52	34.77	30.72	32.20
		Rank	1	7	3	4	5	2	6	
	1969	%	40.75	32.45	38.24	33.09	30.84	38.46	30.30	33.69
		Rank	1	5	3	4	6	2	7	
	1974	%	46.72	28.01	33.76	30.22	32.10	32.49	34.07	32.29
		Rank	1	7	3	6	5	4	2	
	1977	%	34.90	30.22	32.21	31.24	29.48	28.11	36.40	31.95
		Rank	2	5	3	4	6	7	1	
Jan Sangh										
	1952	%	1.03	9.06	8.76	5.76	4.96	1.30	5.87	6.45
		Rank	7	1	2	4	5	6	3	
	1957	%	7.98	10.39	13.53	8.65	8.46	4.16	8.83	9.84
		Rank	6	2	1	4	5	7	3	
	1962	%	10.14	18.44	24.64	16.04	11.92	7.66	11.74	16.46
		Rank	6	2	1	3	4	7	5	
	1967	%	15.21	24.56	26.19	22.62	18.33	32.34	13.87	21.67
		Rank	6	3	2	4	5	1	7	
	1969	%	19.14	18.08	23.59	18.14	16.78	21.83	11.00	17.93
		Rank	3	5	1	4	6	2	7	
	1974	%	12.84	16.27	22.06	14.85	18.07	26.48	12.52	17.12
		Rank	6	4	2	5	3	1	7	

			Kumaon	Rohilkhand	Oudh	Eastern Districts	Lower Doab	Bundelkhand	Upper Doab	STATE TOTAL
SP/SSP										
	1952	%	15.71	13.63	9.55	14.41	13.15	9.33	10.60	12.03
		Rank	1	3	6	2	4	7	5	
	1957	%	1.75	2.63	11.66	7.15	9.45	1.06	5.64	7.45
		Rank	6	5	1	3	2	7	4	
	1962	%	1.18	3.95	9.03	11.90	7.46	2.25	7.43	8.21
		Rank	7	5	2	1	3	6	4	
	1967	%	1.89	2.80	9.91	13.83	15.81	5.07	7.38	9.97
		Rank	7	6	3	2	1	5	4	
	1969	%	2.10	3.10	9.15	10.80	11.22	2.50	5.01	7·82
		Rank	7	5	3	2	1	6	4	
	1974	%	4.56	1.18	2.83	4.53	3.11	2.14	1.77	2.90
		Rank	1	7	4	2	3	5	6	
PSP										
	1957	%	15.91	18 40	13.85	12.99	22.46	18 37	7.79	14·47
		Rank	4	2	5	6	1	3	7	
	1962	%	10.42	12.55	7.28	11.63	18 05	27.13	7.86	11.52
		Rank	5	3	7	4	2	1	6	
	1967	%	8.54	4.41	4.50	4.23	2.95	2 51	4 00	4.09
		Rank	1	3	2	4	6	7	5	
	1969	%	3.70	2.80	1.52	1.92	0 87	1.81	1.34	1.72
		Rank	1	2	5	3	7	4	6	

Independents									
	1952	%	35.81	22.51	16.42	18.89	19.90	20.31	20.21	19.58
		Rank	1	2	7	6	5	3	4	
	1957	%	24 35	26.39	14.71	20.87	17.48	26.81	28.18	21.23
		Rank	4	3	7	5	6	2	1	
	1962	%	19.54	18.60	10 43	6.60	13.15	11.70	18.63	12.71
		Rank	1	3	6	7	4	5	2	
	1967	%	23.70	22 87	15 85	11.60	17.86	17.88	28.81	18.70
		Rank	2	3	6	7	5	4	1	
	1969	%	15.49	10 03	5.36	5.07	7.82	8.75	6.72	6.93
		Rank	1	2	6	7	4	3	5	
	1974	%	12.38	13.94	9.66	9.06	10.42	9.82	9.81	10.25
		Rank	2	1	6	7	3	4	5	
	1977	%	15.93	26.41	18.95	15.22	15.53	11.88	9.86	16.13
		Rank	3	1	2	5	4	6	7	
BKD										
	1969	%	10.83	27.15	14.90	17.74	21.71	14.97	31.35	21.20
		Rank	7	2	6	4	3	5	1	
	1974	%	3.26	20.24	16.30	25.08	20 54	9.99	28.29	21.22
		Rank	7	4	5	2	3	6	1	
Janata										
	1977	%	46.68	40.36	45.52	48.86	50.79	44.46	52 35	47.84
		Rank	4	7	5	3	2	6	1	

Two aspects of the regional pattern of turnout rates need to be particularly noted. The first is that politicization, as measured by turnout rates, has been highest in the districts where agriculture is most advanced in terms of yields, input use, and commercialization, namely, in the wheat and sugar cane districts of the west plain. Second, politicization has not been very high, relative to other regions of the state, in the less advanced, predominantly paddy-growing Eastern Districts, where holdings are smaller and landlessness is higher than in other regions of the state.

Turning to the regional distribution of party support for the Congress, Table 9 shows that the Congress vote share declined over time in every region of the state. However, the Congress decline was most dramatic in the Upper Doab, which was by far the strongest support region for the Congress in 1952, when the party polled nearly 55 per cent of the vote there, but had become the weakest Congress support region by 1969 when the Congress polled a mere 30 per cent of the popular vote. In 1974 and 1977, Congress support in the Upper Doab increased somewhat, but it was still 20 and 18 percentage points, respectively, below its support level in 1952. Taking all the regions together, the Congress has been strongest over time in the two least populous, most remote and backward regions of the state, Kumaon and Bundelkhand (see Table 10). It has also been relatively stronger over time in the Upper Doab than in other regions of the state in the first two and last two elections, but suffered a dramatic decline of support there in the three elections held during the 1960s. It was during this period that the market-oriented and cash crop farmers of the Upper Doab would have found considerable grounds for discontent with Congress food and agriculture policies, when the government was importing wheat and distributing it at below the prevailing prices, thereby keeping down prices paid to the farmers, when compulsory procurement of foodgrains was most intense, and when interstate restrictions on the movement of food grains were in effect that also prevented surplus-producing farmers from marketing their grain at the best possible prices.

The non-Congress parties also have drawn support differentially from the several regions of the state. Moreover, the leading parties have, for the most part, had distinctive regional

TABLE 10

Regions Highest in Turnout and Principal Support Regions[a] for the Leading Political Parties and Independents in Uttar Pradesh, 1952—1977

TURNOUT	CONGRESS	JAN SANGH	SP/SSP	PSP	BKD	JANATA	INDEPENDENTS
Upper Doab	Kumaon	Oudh	Eastern Districts	Rohil-khand	Upper Doab	Upper Doab	Kumaon
Rohilkhand	Bundelkhand	Rohilkhand	Lower Doab	Kumaon	Rohil-khand	Lower Doab	Rohilkhand
Bundelkhand	Upper Doab	Bundelkhand	Oudh	Lower Doab	Eastern Districts	Eastern Districts	Upper Doab

[a]The regions are listed in order of the relative strength that each party had in them over time, based on a cumulation of the rank position of the party strength by region for the five elections.

areas of support. For example, Oudh has been a consistent bastion of Jan Sangh support. The second region of Jan Sangh strength has been Rohilkhand, particularly during the first four elections, followed by Bundelkhand and the Eastern Districts. The Jan Sangh, therefore, has had its principal strength in the northern plains, in the districts north of the Ganges, but its support has been consistently strong relative to other regions in the state only in Oudh. The SP and the SSP had a more central-eastern orientation of political support, with their strength concentrated primarily in the Eastern Districts, the Lower Doab and Oudh. Support for the PSP was more scattered than that for any other of the leading U.P. parties, with its pockets of strength having been concentrated in Rohilkhand and Kumaon, with less consistent support in the Lower Doab and the Eastern Districts.

It deserves to be especially noted that none of the longer established opposition parties in U.P. had their principal area of regional strength in the Upper Doab, where the Congress decline was most marked. Moreover, although Rohilkhand was a region where three opposition parties and the independents did relatively well, only the PSP, among the older opposition parties, had its principal strength over time in Rohilkhand. Consequently, there was for four elections in U.P. in these two populous regions a vacuum left by Congress weakness that was not filled or was filled only partially by the major opposition parties. Instead, this vacuum was filled by independents, whose principal concentrations of strength were in Kumaon and in these two regions. Then, in 1969, the BKD moved in strength into western U.P., winning over 31 per cent of the vote in the Upper Doab and a greater share of the vote than the Congress in this region and more than 27 per cent of the vote in Rohilkhand. In 1974, the BKD retained its principal strength in the Upper Doab and remained strong also in Rohilkhand, but it broadened its base of support to include the Eastern Districts. Averaging the two elections, the BKD polled marginally better in the Eastern Districts than in the Lower Doab, but it is clear that the latter region also was one of strong support for the party. Thus, we begin to see the significance of the inverse relationship between the independent vote and the BKD vote shown in the previous section. The independent vote between

1952 and 1967 reflected in large part the existence of discontent with the Congress in two regions of the state particularly. When the BKD organized and contested the 1969 and 1974 elections, the bulk of that discontented vote was transferred to the BKD.

As for the Janata party, formed as a coalition principally of the BLD, the Jan Sangh, and the Congress (O) in U.P., three features of its regional distribution of strength deserve special notice. The first is that it built upon the previous discontent that the BKD drew upon in the Upper Doab in 1969 and that the BKD in union with the old SSP drew upon in 1974. The second notable feature is that the alliance with the Jan Sangh, with its firm base in Oudh, did not mean that Oudh became one of the top regions of Janata support. Third, Rohilkhand, which had been the second most important regional bastion of the BKD in 1969 and which had lost ground in this respect to the Eastern Districts and the Lower Doab in 1974, dropped to last place in terms of its relative contribution to the Janata victory of 1977. Both Oudh and Rohilkhand seemed least contented with the Congress-Janata choice and gave very high vote shares to independent candidates in 1977. Overall, the principal significance of the regional distribution of Janata support is that, as in the case of the BKD-SSP alliance in 1974, it bridged the traditional regional differences between the western and eastern districts of the state.

The Janata and the BLD alliances also bridged previous differences in party support bases between wheat and rice districts. Before 1974, two political parties in U.P.—the SSP and the BKD—and independents in 1967 had shown a strong differentiation of their support bases with respect to wheat and rice-growing plains districts as measured by the Pearson correlations between party vote shares and per cent of cropped area devoted to rice and wheat (RPERCROP) and (WPERCROP). The SSP had strong support in the rice growing districts in the 1969 elections ($r = .33$, $s = .017$, $n = 40$ with RPERCROP), but was decidedly weak in the wheat-growing districts in the 1967 and 1969 elections ($r = :.42$, $s = .003$, $n = 41$ for 1967 and $r = -.46$, $s = .001$, $n = 40$ for 1969 with WPERCROP). The BKD had a strong negative correlation with RPERCROP in 1969 ($r = -.44$, $s = .002$, $n = 42$) and a positive correlation with WPERCROP ($r = .39$, $s = .006$, $n = 42$). The third clear

pattern was that displayed in the independent vote in 1967, which was negative with RPERCROP ($r = -.41$, $s = .003$, $n = 43$) and positive with WPERCROP ($r = .36$, $s = .008$, $n = 43$). These correlations are of particular interest in light of later shifts in U.P. politics. The correlations for the Independent vote in 1967 reflected the existence of discontent in the wheat-growing districts, which found expression in the BKD vote in 1969. The complementary correlations between the SSP and the BKD votes explain and demonstrate clearly the political wisdom of the BKD-SSP merger before the 1974 elections, which had the effect of smoothing out the correlations between the BKD vote and per cent of cropped area devoted to rice and wheat cultivation. The strong negative correlation with RPERCROP does not appear in 1974. The correlation remains negative, but weakly so ($r = -.15$, $s = .173$ $n = 43$). The correlation with WPERCROP is also weak ($r = .07$, $s = .335$, $n = 43$). The 1977 correlations between the Janata vote and RPERCROP and WPERCROP are also weak, being -.12 ($s = .231$, $n = 43$) and .06 ($s = .356$, $n = 43$), respectively. Those for the Congress in the same elections are also unremarkable at -.19 ($s = .105$, $n = 43$) for RPERCROP and .05 ($s = .366$, $n = 43$) for WPERCROP.

In regional terms, therefore, the political history of U.P. can be divided into two periods. The first period is between 1952 and 1969 when discontent with the Congress developed and expressed itself most strongly in the western, wheat-growing districts through independents and then the BKD, but also in the rice-growing Eastern Districts, where the radical Socialists were strong. The second period begins in 1974 and, in retrospect, should be seen as an attempt by the non-Congress political parties to build a viable winning coalition that transcended regional differences, building particularly on the complementary discontents in the Upper Doab, the Lower Doab, and the Eastern Districts. It remains to explore the social bases of this regional discontent and to determine whether or not the BKD, the BLD, and Janata drew their support from similar or different social categories in the different regions of the state.

IV. Rural social structure and party support in Uttar Pradesh: the critical role of the middle peasantry

A. Party Support Bases, 1952-69

In this section, the data from the *Zamindari Abolition Committee Report* and from the censuses of Uttar Pradesh at the tahsil level will be correlated with party support data in order to explore the relationships between political party support and rural social structure. Intercorrelation matrixes were prepared for the census variables.[17] Adjacent landholding size categories tend to be highly intercorrelated, which means that it will not be possible to separate with precision the effects on the dependent variables of each landholding size category. Rather, the data will be examined for general patterns. The temptation to over-interpret isolated, individual correlations, however high, will be avoided.

There are, of course, some critical data missing that are relevant to an analysis of rural social structure and party support. It would be useful, for example, to know the distribution of the leading castes in UP by landholding size. Nevertheless, the UP data on landholding groups and agricultural labourers are rich enough to make analysis of them worthwhile. In the following pages, these data will be used to pursue three broad questions. First, an attempt will be made to determine whether or not and to what extent the leading political parties in UP established stable bases of electoral support in areas where particular rural social groups and classes are concentrated. Second, the data will be analysed to determine to what extent shifts over time in the support for political parties can be related to shifts in support in areas where different rural groups and classes are concentrated. Third, and more broadly, an attempt will be made to ascertain to what extent there is evidence for a general pattern of rural social class differentiation that is reflected in distinct bases of support for UP political parties.

Congress. In the nearly twenty-five years in which the Congress exercised power in UP after Independence, it established both a record of legislation and administration of land reforms and other rural programs and built an effective political organization that drew its leadership from particular social groups in

the rural districts in the state. It is to be expected, therefore, that its support bases in the countryside would have been influenced by both these factors. Actually, the two factors are interrelated. The leadership groups in control of the Congress organization after Independence influenced the development of rural programs that either benefited directly or at least did not harm castes and classes from which they came and through which they continued to derive political support in the countryside. On balance, the system of land settlement and political control in post-Independence UP was one that should have established for the Congress relatively stable bases of support in areas where the middle and rich peasantry of elite caste status are concentrated. The largest landholders, however, and the middle and smaller sections of the peasantry should have been less content overall. Consequently, the Congress should have done less well in areas where these two groups are concentrated. Moreover, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as pressure for introducing cooperative farming and land ceilings measures increased within the Congress, it should be expected that there would have been some nervousness and loss of support for the Congress among the richer sections of the rural proprietors, even though cooperative farming has not been introduced in fact and the land ceilings law is quite generous and full of loopholes. The discontent of the richer peasantry, however, would have been countered in the middle and later 1960s by the impact of the 'green revolution' and the increased availability of agricultural inputs under the Congress regime, which benefited principally the farmers with a minimum of 10 or 15 acres of land. Finally, the defection from the Congress in 1967 of Charan Singh—the principal architect of the Zamindari Abolition Act, the leading spokesman for the interests of the middle-level and rich peasant proprietors, and a man considered sympathetic also to the welfare of the backward castes—and the formation of the BKD in 1969, should have led to further loss of support for the Congress in areas where the middle proprietors and backward castes are concentrated.

Unfortunately, as already indicated, caste data are not available from the 1961 census. Even though it is a safe assumption that the proportion of elite castes, particularly Brahmans and Rajputs, to the total population increases with landholding

size, there simply are no available figures on landholding size by caste. Consequently, the analysis of the tahsil-level data must be confined to rural economic categories only. Tables 11 through 16 show the correlations between Congress vote shares and selected rural social structure and landholding size variables for elections between 1952 and 1977 for the state as a whole; for the whole state with the effect of the regional distribution of votes controlled; for the plains districts only, excluding Kumaon and Bundelkhand; and for each of the five plains regions.

The correlations show several patterns, some of which conform to expectations and others that do not. Looking first at the relationship between the Congress vote in 1952 and the expropriated class of zamindars (Table 11), all the correlations for the state as a whole and within all the regions of the state except Oudh and the Upper Doab are, as expected, negative. The positive correlation in the Upper Doab is too small to represent evidence of a significant deviation from the pattern here. However, the strong positive correlation in Oudh, the land of the semi-princely class of talukdars, requires some comment. The evidence available from election returns and from case studies in this region does *not* suggest that the zamindars and talukdars in Oudh generally supported the Congress in 1952. Although there were some cases where they did so and one well-documented case where a talukdar dominated a district Congress organization in Oudh [*Brass, 1965*: *ch. iv*], the general pattern in 1952 was for the talukdars either to support opposition parties or to remain aloof from the elections. Moreover, the census category of non-cultivating owners of land, although it included the big talukdars, was comprised mostly of thousands of considerably smaller zamindars, whose political behaviour may well have differed from that of the talukdars. There is also some evidence to suggest that the positive correlation here is a classic example of the potential dangers of inferring individual behaviour from aggregate data. An examination of the ordinal ranking of the grouped constituencies in Oudh by their degree of support for the Congress revealed that the highest vote for the Congress occurred in a group of six constituencies in Pratapgarh district completely dominated by Brahman leaders who rose to power in the district in an anti-talukdar, *kisan* movement.[18] In contrast, the weakest support for the Congress occurred in a group of

TABLE 11

Correlation Coefficients for per cent Non-cultivating Owner (Zamindars) 1951 Census with Party Vote Shares, 1952-1962, Uttar Pradesh

Region/Election Year[a]	*Congress*		*UPPP/ Swatantra*[c]		*Jan Sangh*		*Independents*		*SP*		*KMPP/PSP*[d]		*CPI*	
	r	(*N*)	*r*	(*N*)	*r*	(*N*)	*r*	(*N*)	*r*	(*N*)	*r*	(*N*)	*r*	(*N*)
Whole State														
1952	—.08	(116)	.01	(25)	.16	(86)	—.09	(114)	.13	(109)	— .05	(93)	—.10	(31)
1957	—.36*	(94)	—	—	—.04	(78)	.02	(91)	.30*	(49)	.12	(77)	—.24	(44)
1962	—.35*	(95)	—.11	(59)	.05	(93)	.05	(93)	—.05	(73)	.11	(86)	—.14	(64)
Whole State (controlling for region)[b]														
1952	—.11	(109)	.04	(20)	.10	(79)	.09	(107)	.24*	(102)	—.17	(81)	—.26	(25)
1957	—.34*	(87)	—	—	—.00	(70)	.17	(82)	.15	(42)	—.03	(70)	—.10	(38)
1962	—.18	(87)	—.20	(53)	.05	(86)	.05	(82)	.08	(66)	—.09	(79)	.04	(57)
Plains Districts Only														
1952	—.15	(98)	.16	(20)	.28	(86)	.04	(96)	.19*	(44)	—.06	(83)	—.10	(29)
1957	—.37*	(83)	—	—	.00	(71)	.04	(82)	.29*	(47)	.12	(69)	—.24	(43)
1962	—.35*	(83)	—.11	(56)	.05	(82)	.12	(81)	—.05	(66)	.02	(74)	—.13	(56)

Rohilkhand														
	1952	—.49*	(16)	—	—	—.09	(11)	.43*	(16)	.41	(16)	.12	(11)	—	—
	1957	—.72*	(16)	—	—	—.33	(14)	.43*	(16)	—	—	—.13	(12)	—	—
	1962	—.38	(16)	—	—	—.09	(16)	.25	(16)	.38	(12)	—.15	(15)	—	—
Upper Doab															
	1952	.09	(24)	—	—	.16	(19)	—.04	(23)	.04	(22)	—.19	(20)	—	—
	1957	—.26	(18)	—	—	.05	(14)	.37	(18)	—	—	—.29	(13)	—	—
	1962	.06	(18)	—.08	(15)	.46*	(18)	—.55	(18)	.27	(13)	.10	(14)	—	—
Lower Doab															
	1952	—.77*	(12)	—	—	—	—	.62*	(12)	.49	(10)	—.25	(11)	—	—
	1957	—.77*	(13)	—	—	.18	(13)	.75*	(13)	—	—	—.28	(13)	—	—
	1962	—.71*	(13)	—	—	.13	(13)	.36	(13)	—.19	(12)	—.69*	(13)	—	—
Oudh															
	1952	.49*	(26)	.11	(14)	.03	(25)	—.36*	(25)	.14	(26)	—.17	(24)	—	—
	1957	—.14	(18)	—	—	.12	(15)	—.33	(18)	—.03	(13)	.34	(14)	.15	(10)
	1962	—.35	(18)	—	(15)	—.05	(17)	—.09	(17)	—	(13)	.07	(16)	.15	(12)
Eastern Districts															
	1952	—.24	(20)	—	—	.18	(18)	.15	(20)	.17	(20)	—.28	(17)	—	—
	1957	.05	(18)	—	—	.05	(15)	—.36	(17)	.19	(15)	—.26	(17)	—.04	(13)
	1962	—.02	(18)	—	—	.18	(18)	.11	(17)	—	(16)	.06	(16)	.30	(16)

*p=.05 or better.

[a]Correlations have not been reported in region/years when the N has been below 10.

[b]These are sixth order partial correlation ceofficients after controlling for region by treating each region as a dummy variable, with one region eliminated, and entering the six dummy variables so created into a regression equation. For a description of the procedure followed, see Nie [1975:374-375].

[c]1952 figure is for UPPP. Neither party contested in 1957. 1962 figure is for Swatantra.

[d]1952 figure is for the KMPP, those for 1957 and 1962 are for the PSP.

constituencies in Gonda district where the Congress organization was under the dominance of the Raja of Mankapur. Another group of five constituencies in the same district, in the area directly under the Raja's influence, ranked eleventh out of 26 groups in support for the Congress. Thus, in Oudh, the positive correlation between the percentage of zamindars and the Congress vote was certainly influenced by the conflict between the big talukdars and their opponents, but the relationship probably arose out of a combination of factors that included (1) some direct talukdar support for the Congress; (2) some support for the Congress in areas of strong anti-talukdar political activity; and (3) some support for the Congress among

TABLE 12

Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote Shares with Size of Holdings 1952 Elections and 1945 Land Holdings Census, Uttar Pradesh

Size Category (in acres)	*Congress*	*SP*	*Jan Sangh*	*UPPP*	*Inds.*
	(N=47)	(N=47)	(N=43)	(N=19)	(N—47)
under 0.5	—.160	.117	—.024	—.312	0.76
0.5— 0.9	—.075	.148	—.019	—.279	—.203
1.0— 1.9	—.129	.139	.219	—.260	—.223
2.0— 2.9	—.053	.053	.286*	.020	—.205
3.0— 3.9	.133	—.066	.181	.070	—.103
4.0— 4.9	.090	—.063	.123	.288	—.076
5.0— 5.9	.109	—.092	.061	.378	—.017
6.0— 6.9	.134	—.071	—.019	.306	.072
7.0— 7.9	.182	—.145	—.048	.391*	.062
8.0— 8.9	.199	—.180	—.095	.305	.108
9.0— 9.9	.207	—.187	—.147	.322	.129
10.0—11.9	.188	—.154	—.120	.280	.145
12.0—13.9	.156	—.162	—.158	.315	.162
14.0—15.9	.148	—.183	—.191	.353	.168
16.0—17.9	.163	—.184	—.221	.295	.171
18.0—19.9	.123	—.181	—.219	.268	.182
20.0—24.9	.112	—.194	—.209	.285	.182
25+	.095	—.212	—.204	.220	.182

*p=.05 or better

small zamindars who may have turned toward the Congress in the hope of acquiring political power and influence in a region whose political institutions had traditionally been dominated by the big talukdars.

Over the next two elections, in 1957 and 1962, the negative correlations between the ex-zamindari areas and the Congress vote in nearly all parts of the state persist and become statistically significant at the .05 level in the state as a whole, in the plains districts as a whole, and in Rohilkhand and the Lower Doab especially. Moreover, the correlations in Oudh also turn negative. The shift in the Oudh pattern is easier to explain than the positive correlation in 1952, for it has been well documented

TABLE 13

Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote Shares with Size of Holdings, 1952 Elections and 1945 Landholdings Census, West Plain

Size Category (in acres)	*Congress*	*SP*	*Jan Sangh*	*Inds.*
	(N=14)	(N=14)	(N=13)	(N=14)
under 0.5	—.168	—.142	.017	.345
0.5— 0.9	—.359	.188	.318	—.036
1.0— 1.9	—.408	.459*	.638*	—.378
2.0— 2.9	—.298	.562*	.496*	—.448*
3.0— 3.9	.138	.398	—.018	—.427
4.0— 4.9	.059	.347	—.148	—.232
5.0— 5.9	.272	.066	— 303	—.156
6.0— 6.9	284	.017	—.447	—.018
7.0— 7.9	.383	—.200	—.419	.023
8.0— 8.9	.454*	—.312	—.425	.044
9.0— 9.9	.467*	—.383	—.427	.079
10.0—11.9	.447*	—.346	—.370	.036
12.0—13.9	.380	—.385	—.343	.106
14.0—15.9	.428	—.449*	—.368	.128
16.0—17.9	.486*	—.484*	—.376	.104
18.0—19.9	.456*	—.471*	—.380	.115
20.0—24.9	.397	—.524*	—.342	.180
25+	.443	—.542*	—.347	.168

*p=.05 or better

that, beginning in 1957 and reaching a peak in 1962, many of the former talukdars and zamindars of Oudh mobilized support aggressively against the Congress and supported the Jan Sangh and Swatantra parties [*Brass, 1965: ch. iv and Burger, 1969: ch. v*]. Thus, with the exception of the 1952 elections in Oudh, the general pattern established for the Congress throughout Uttar Pradesh in the first three elections was one of lack of support in the areas of the state previously dominated by the bigger zamindars and ta'ukdars. This finding is consistent with anticipations in the aftermath of the passage of the Zamindari Abolition Act.

Although the Zamindari Abolition Act won for the Congress a well-defined class of enemies, it does not appear that it

TABLE 14

Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote Shares with Size of Holdings, 1952 Elections and 1945 Landholdings Census, Oudh

Size Category (in acres)	*Congress*	*SP*	*Jan Sangh*	*UPPP*	*Inds.*
	(N=12)	(N=12)	(N=12)	(N=10)	(N=12)
under 0.5	—.19	.39	—.01	—.21	.08
0.5— 0.9	.39	.40	—.63*	.08	—.01
1.0— 1.9	.37	—.18	—.59*	.29	—.06
2.0— 2.9	.39	—.23	—.19	.24	—.27
3.0— 3.9	.20	—.17	.11	.26	—.18
4.0— 4.9	.03	—.26	.30	.16	—.17
5.0— 5.9	—.10	—.32	.41	.12	—.10
6.0— 6.9	—.11	—.41	.45	.04	.09
7.0— 7.9	—.07	—.35	.43	.09	—.12
8.0— 8.9	—.15	—.39	.47	.01	—.08
9.0— 9.9	—.07	—.39	.40	.02	.00
10.0—11.9	—.27	—.40	.47	—.13	.26
12.0—13.9	—.24	—.47	.42	—.15	.27
14.0—15.9	—.34	—.46	.44	—.12	.19
16.0—17.9	—.45	—.57*	.46	—.20	.32
18.0—19.9	—.52*	—.61*	.63*	—.34	.36
20.0—24.9	—.47	—.55*	.54*	—.23	.27
25+	—.50*	—.61*	.41	—.21	.13

*p=.05 or better

worked so well to establish a rural base of friends among the general body of peasant proprietors. In the 1952 elections, there was a generally positive relationship between the Congress vote share and the per cent of middle and big cultivators in the state as a whole and particularly in the west plain, a generally negative or very weak association with dwarf landholders and agricultural labourers, and a strong negative association with the largest size categories in Oudh. The strongest positive correlations between the Congress vote shares and various size categories were with the 8 to 20 acre cultivators in the western districts of the state (see Tables 12 to 15).

Between 1957 and 1969, however, this pattern was reversed. The Congress acquired strength among agricultural labourers, as indicated by the following correlations at levels of .05 or better: .22 in the entire state in 1967; .23 and .34 in 1962 and 1967, respectively, in the plains districts only; .43 in Rohilkhand in 1969; .79 in 1957, .66 in 1962, and .55 in 1967 in the Lower Doab, and .56 in 1967 in Oudh (Table 15). During all these elections, only one strong negative association was found between the Congress vote and agricultural labourers, -.38 in 1967 in the eastern districts. Similarly, as indicated in Table 16, in both the state as a whole and in the plains districts treated separately, the predominant associations between the Congress vote and dwarf landholders with less than 2.5 acres of land are positive. However, when the plains regions are each examined separately, the pattern is one that is most pronounced in the eastern districts, among the smallest landholders only, and in the Lower Doab among the two smallest landholding size categories, except in the 1969 election. When this pattern is combined with the fairly widespread pattern of positive association with agricultural labourers, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Congress established significant, though varying, bases of support in the countryside between 1957 and 1969 in areas where the poorest and most disadvantaged rural groups were concentrated.

A second general pattern in both the state as a whole and in the plains districts is a predominantly negative association between the Congress vote and the small and middle peasantry holding between 2.5 and 12.5 acres of land. This group of landholders may be characterized as largely peasant proprietors, with holdings sufficiently large for adequate subsistence and, at

TABLE

Correlation Coefficients for Agricultural Labours, 1951, 1961 and

Region/ Election Year[b]	*Congress*		*UPPP Swatantra*[d]		*Jan Sangh*		*Independents*	
	r	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)
Whole State								
1952	.00	(116)	—.13	(25)	—.27*	(86)	.10	(114)
1957	.03	(94)	—	—	.04	(78)	—.18*	(91)
1962	—.02	(95)	—.12	(59)	.02	(93)	—.09	(93)
1967	.22*	(111)	—.18	(70)	.06	(110)	—.19*	(107)
1969	.01	(111)	—.14	(42)	—.10	(109)	—.05	(99)
1974	—.09	(101)	—.18	(74)	—.08	(99)	—.08	(101)
1977	—.00	(54)	—	—	—	—	—.14	(54)
Whole state (controlling for region)[c]								
1952	—.01	(109)	—.35	(20)	—.19	(79)	.17	(107)
1957	.15	(87)	—	—	—.04	(70)	—.20	(82)
1962	.05	(87)	—.14	(53)	—.16	(86)	.20	(82)
1967	.16	(104)	—.10	(64)	—.12	(103)	.04	(89)
1969	—.03	(104)	—.31	(36)	—.20*	(102)	.11	(89))
1974	.04	(94)	—.12	(72)	—.21*	(92)	.01	(94)
Plains Districts Only								
1952	—.01	(98)	.02	(20)	—.39*	(86)	.25*	(96)
1957	.12	(83)	—	—	.04	(71)	—.26*	(82)
1962	.23*	(83)	—.10	(56)	.02	(82)	—.06	(81)
1967	.34*	(97)	—.18	(69)	.03	(96)	—.20*	(94)
1969	.03	(97)	—.17	(41)	—.02	(95)	.02	(88)
1974	.00	(87)	—.19	(70)	—.13	(80)	—.10	(87)
1977	—.07	(43)	—	—	—	—	—.10	(43)
Rohilkhand								
1952	—.18	(16)	—	—	—.18	(11)	.41	(16)
1957	.18	(16)	—	—	.38	(14)	—.22	(16)
1962	.07	(16)	—	—	.19	(16)	.11	(16)
1967	—.11	(16)	.22	(15)	—.19	(15)	—.28	(15)
1969	.43*	(16)	—	—	—.27	(16)	.09	(15)
1974	.03	(13)	.03	(13)	—.45	(13)	.29	(13)
Upper Doab								
1952	.20	(24)	—	—	—.39*	(19)	.01	(23)
1957	—.20	(18)	—	—	.01	(14)	—.15	(18)
1962	—.35	(18)	.10	(15)	—.17	(18)	.42*	(18)

15

1971 Censuses[a], with Party Vote Shares, 1952-1977, Uttar Pradesh

BKD		*SP/SSP*		*KMPP/PSP*		*CPI*		*Janata*	
r	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)
—	—	—.03	(109)	.01	(92)	.11	(31)	—	—
—	—	—.09	(49)	—.06	(77)	.43*	(44)	—	—
—	—	.23*	(73)	.07	(86)	.32*	(64)	—	—
—	—	.20*	(91)	—.08	(68)	.19	(52)	—	—
11	(110)	.23*	(92)	—.15	(51)	.31*	(57)	—	—
.18*	(97)	—	—	.12	(78)	—.14	(25)	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	.19	(54)	—.00	(54)
—	—	.01	(102)	.03	(81)	.17	(25)	—	—
—	—	.08	(42)	.03	(70)	.34*	(38)	—	—
—	—	.13	(66)	.06	(79)	.14	(57)	—	—
—	—	.11	(84)	.08	(61)	.07	(45)	—	—
.13	(103)	.13	(85)	—.03	(44)	.21	(50)	—	—
.05	(90)	—	—	.12	(71)	—.17	(18)	—	—
—	—	—.12	(44)	.04	(83)	.10	(29)	—	—
—	—	—.12	(47)	—.02	(69)	.46*	(43)	—	—
—	—	.23*	(66)	.05	(74)	.31*	(56)	—	—
—	—	.18	(81)	—.10	(61)	.15	(46)	—	—
—.16	(97)	.23*	(80)	—.16	(47)	.21	(46)	—	—
.15	(85)	—	—	.14	(70)	—.14	(25)	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	.20	(43)	.12	(43)
—	—	.07	(16)	—.30	(11)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	.01	(12)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.13	(12)	.26	(15)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.22	(10)	—	—	—	—	—	—
—.02	(16)	—.09	(11)	—	—	—	—	—	—
.03	(13)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.19	(22)	—.16	(20)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	.44	(13)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—28	(13)	—.01	(14)	—	—	—	—

TABLE 15 (continued)

Region/ Election Year b	*Congress*		*UPPP/ Swatantra d*		*Jan Sangh*		*Independents*	
Upper Doab	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)
1967	.30	(18)	—.17	(14)	—.00	(18)	.06	(18)
1969	—.02	(18)	—.38	(14)	—.39	(16)	.01	(18)
1974	—.16	(16)	—.41	(12)	—.41	(15)	.12	(16)
Lower Doab								
1952	.08	(12)	—	—	—	—	.09	(12)
1957	.79*	(13)	—	—	—.40	(13)	—.50*	(13)
1962	.66*	(13)	—	—	—.46	(13)	.04	(13)
1967	.55*	(15)	—.43	(10)	—.12	(15)	.57*	(14)
1969	.25	(15)	—	—	—.14	(15)	.75*	(13)
1974	.13	(15)	—.01	(10)	.07	(15)	.07	(15)
Oudh								
1952	—.20	(26)	—.05	(14)	—.05	(25)	.24	(25)
1957	.01	(18)	—	—	—.34	(15)	—.01	(18)
1962	—.01	(18)	—.08	(15)	—.47	(17)	.49*	(17)
1967	.56*	(29)	—.13	(18)	—.20	(29)	—.08	(29)
1969	—.20	(29)	—	—	—.13	(29)	—.02	(24)
1974	.03	(22)	.05	(18)	—.27	(22)	—.23	(22)
Eastern Districts								
1952	—.08	(20)	—	—	—.28	(18)	.60*	(20)
1957	—.11	(18)	—	—	.44*	(15)	—.09	(17)
1962	.01	(18)	—	—	—.06	(18)	—.05	(17)
1967	—.38*	(19)	—.44	(12)	.03	(19)	—.05	(18)
1969	—.26	(19)	—	—	—.11	(19)	.22	(18)
1974	.06	(21)	—.17	(17)	—.07	(21)	—.02	(21)

KD		*SP/SSP*		*KMPP/FSP*		*CPI*		*Janata*	
r	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)	*r*	(N)
—	—	—.18	(14)	—	—	—	—	—	—
.45*	(18)	—.10	(15)	—	—	—	—	—	—
.37	(14)	—	—	—.31	(13)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.72*	(10)	.67*	(11)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	.35	(13)	—	—	—	—
—	—	.16	(12)	.54*	(13)	—	—	—	—
—	—	.17	(15)	—.02	(10)	—	—	—	—
—.24	(15)	.35	14)	—	—	—	—	—	—
—.13	(15)	—	—	.29	(12)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.04	(26)	.14	(24)	—	—	—	—
—	—	.39	(13)	—.42	(14)	.21	(10)	—	—
—	—	.25	(13)	—.35	(16)	.18	(12)	—	—
—	—	.07	(25)	—.10	(20)	.17	(13)	—	—
.18	(24	—.04	(22)	—.18	(16)	.13	(12)	—	—
	(22	—	—	.17	(19)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.17	(20)	.24	(17)	—	—	—	—
—	—	—.23	(15)	.40	(17)	.68*	(13)	—	—
—	—	.17	(16)	—.00	(16)	.05	(16)	—	—
—	—	.42*	(17)	—.09	(16)	—.09	(15)	—	—
.11	(19)	.32	(18)	—.20	(12)	.39	(13)	—	—
—.20	(21)	—	—	.21	(18)	—.41	—	—	—

*p—.05 or better

[2]The 1951 census was used for correlation with party vote shares in the 1952 elections, the 1961 census with all elections from 1957 to 1969, and the 1971 census for the 1974 and 1977 elections. The 1977 correlations shown in this table use district rather than tahsil-level census data because I have not yet been able to undertake the expensive and time-consuming task of coding and storing the data at the tahsil level to conform to the 1976 delimitation of constituencies.

[b]See footnote a to Table 1.

[c]See footnote b to Table 1.

[d]1952 figures are for the UPPP. Neither party contested in 1957 or 1977. All other figures are for Swatantra.

TABLE 16

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with Congress Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Region/Year	Election (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0—2.4	2.5—4.9	5.0—7.4	7.5—9.9	10.0—12.4	12.5—14.9	15.0—29.9	30.0—49.9	50+
Whole State											
1957	(94)	.25*	—.03	—.25*	—.23*	—.05	—.04	.07	.08	.13	.15
1962	(95)	.37*	.21*	—.23*	—.35*	—.29*	—.21*	—.16	—.10	.01	.07
1967	(111)	.35*	.19*	—.23*	—.37*	—.27*	—.14*	—.14	—.03	.02	.06
1969	(111)	.04	.04	—.13	—.09	—.13	.04	—.02	.11	.17*	.20*
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(87)	.32*	—.06	—.12	—.26*	—.11	.12	.07	.05	.19	.21*
1962	(87)	.08	—.17	—.12	.02	.02	.08	.14	.18	.30*	.30*
1967	(104)	.26*	—.04	—.23*	—.22*	—.04	—.01	.08	.13	.07	.10
1969	(104)	—.11	—.10	—.05	—.09	.04	.15	.10	16	.14	.16
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(83)	.21*	—.10	—.14	—.16	.03	—.01	.14	.11	.18*	.18*
1962	(83)	.24*	.05	—.06	—.16	—.13	—.15	—.04	—.04	.10	.18*
1967	(97)	.42*	.22*	—.17*	—.38*	—.27	—.22*	—.16	—.13	—.10	—.02
1969	(97)	.05	.13	.08	—.09	—.17	—.09	—.13	—.10	—.07	—.02
Rohilkhand											
1957	(16)	.47*	—.16	.06*	—.66*	.34	—.20	.38	.13	.24	.15
1962	(16)	.16	—.24	.04	—.04	.26	—.11	.14	.09	.13	.02
1967	(16)	—.23	—.43*	—.22	—.05	.52*	—.27	.50*	.38	.30	.08
1969	(16)	.28	.15	—.20	—.21	.25	.00	.07	.03	.08	.07

Upper Doab											
1957	(18)	.29	.05	—.10	.22	—.47*	.10	—.22	—.03	.10	.32
1962	(18)	—.15	—.19	.08	.42*	—.13	.01	.08	—.01	.16	.43*
1967	(18)	.02	.18	—.36	.06	—.21	.20	—.04	.19	.15	.45*
1969	(18)	—.34	—.15	—.28	.03	.27	.22	.38	.30	.16	—.01
Lower Doab											
1957	(13)	.65*	.26	—.12	—.70*	—.37	—.70*	—.06	.04	.25	.27
1962	(13)	.61*	.10	—.28	—.55*	—.17	—.56*	.13	.06	.16	.16
1967	(15)	.32	.05	—.25	—.30	—.14	—.25	—.03	.25	.38	.20
1969	(15)	—.28	—.16	—.15	.20	.24	.23	.25	.30	.21	.18
Oudh											
1957	(18)	.39*	—.02	—.20	—.26	—.02	—.30	.14	—.11	— 07	—.09
1962	(18)	—.14	—.25	.07	.22	.19	.25	.21	.17	.19	.25
1967	(29)	.50*	.08	—.21	—.42*	—.20	—.35*	—.06	—.17	—.26	—.20
1969	(29)	—.43*	—.17	.33*	.37*	.13	.27	—.04	.23	.27	.32*
Eastern Districts											
1957	(18)	.39	—.23	—.12	—.03	.08	—.04	.05	—.00	.05	.13
1962	(18)	.24	—.33	—.12	.07	.19	.17	.22	.20	.23	.29
1967	(19)	.43*	—.07	—.23	—.17	—.04	—.15	—.07	—.12	—.15	.02
1969	(19)	.39*	—.11	—.09	—.18	—.07	—.11	—.03	—.06	—.07	—.10

*p=.05 or better

TABLE 17

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landhoidngs in Acres, 1961 Census, with Swatantra Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/Year	*(N)*	*Less than 1.0*	*1.0— 2.4*	*2.4— 4.9*	*5.0— 7.4*	*7.5— 9.9*	*10.0— 12.4*	*12.5— 14.9*	*15.0— 29.9*	*30.0 49.9*	*50+*
Whole State											
1962	(59)	.01	.04	—.22*	—.06	.00	.05	.06	.09	.09	.07
1967	(70)	.01	—.01	.10	.05	.03	—.10	—.04	—.10	—.09	—.04
1969	(42)	—.01	.03	.35*	.01	.02	—.17	—.05	—.18	—.22	—.21
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1962	(53)	.10	.18	—.26*	—.15	—.08	—.02	.01	.02	.01	—.01
1967	(64)	.16	.16	.04	— 12	—.12	—.19	—.15	—.19	—.13	—.08
1969	(36)	.03	.08	.37*	—.04	.02	—.29	—.12	—.32*	—.33*	—.25
Plains Districts only											
1962	(56)	.05	.08	—.18	—.07	—.03	.00	.02	.01	—.01	—.06
1967	(69)	.00	—.01	.11	.06	.04	—.09	—.03	—.09	—.09	—.03
1969	(41)	.02	.05	.34*	—.02	—.01	—.19	—.08	—.20	—.25	—.23
Rohilkhand											
1967	(15)	.54*	.29	.21	—.32	—.27	—.41	—.24	—.26	—.19	—.04

Upper Doab											
1962	(15)	—.30	—.26	—.21	.03	.56*	.13	.54*	.18	.12	—.17
1967	(14)	—.35	.05	.16	.07	.35	—.14	.25	—.17	—.23	—.29
1969	(12)	—.25	.01	.50*	.02	.31	—.32	.02	—.33	—.31	—.29
Lower Doab											
1967	(10)	—.01	.38	.16	.02	—.36	.08	—.52	—.44	—.39	—.23
Oudh											
1962	(15)	.19	.46*	—.59	—.22	—.37	—.06	—.32	—.02	.28	.16
1967	(18)	.06	.34	—.61*	—.00	—.26	.37	—.21	.43*	.64*	.36
Eastern Districts											
1967	(12)	.28	—.30	.34	.01	.16	—.17	.09	—.12	—.16	—.19

*p=.05 or better

TABLE 18

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, Jan Sangh Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Eleetion Region/Year	*(N)*	*Less than 1.0*	*1.0— 2.4*	*2.5— 4.9*	*5.0— 7.4*	*7.0— 9.9*	*10.0— 12.4*	*12.5— 14.9*	*15.0— 29.9*	*30.0 — 49.9*	*50+*
Whole State											
1957	(78)	.00	.03	.12	.01	—,05	—.08	—.04	—.07	—.03	.06
1962	(93)	.07	.12	.31*	—.03	—.13	—.22*	—.20*	—.23*	—.18*	—.12
1967	(110)	—.03	—.08	—.09	.05	—.03	.05	.00	.16*	—.28*	.31*
1969	(109)	.15	.15	.03	—.06	—.23*	—.18*	—.24*	—.12	—.02	.01
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(70)	—.23*	—.26*	.07	.26*	.26*	.16	.22	.13	.13	.18
1962	(86)	—.04	—.13	.17	.10	.11	—.03	.00	—.10	—.09	—.05
1967	(103)	—.07	—.20*	.03	.20*	.17	.08	.01	.06	.08	.11
1969	(102)	.01	—.03	.07	.16	—.03	—.05	—.16	—.11	—.09	—.06
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(71)	—.05	.00	.11	.05	—.04	—·03	—.03	—.04	.07	.18
1962	(82)	.07	.12	.31*	—.03	—.13	—.22*	—.20*	—.23*	—.18*	—.12
1967	(96)	07	.12	.21*	.00	—.15	—.21*	—.25*	—.22*	—.11*	.02
1969	(95)	.09	.19*	.22*	—.01	—.25*	—.25*	—.33	—.28*	—.18*	—.04
Rohilkhand											
1957	(14)	—.12	—.25	—.20	—.10	.31	.22	.50*	.27	.37	.18
1962	(16)	.27	.09	.34	—.35	—.03	—.23	.03	—.24	—.13	—.15
1967	(15)	.38	.06	.43	—.26	—.02	—.41	—.14	—.28	—.30	—16
1969	(16)	.01	.13	.45*	.31	—.30	—.28	—.45*	—.43*	—.43*	—.14

Upper Doab											
1957	(14)	—.10	—.09	—.28	—.07	.02	.33	.06	.19	.19	—.15
1962	(18)	.08	.10	—.12	—.29	—.01	.11	—.14	.12	.15	.03
1967	(18)	.10	.17	.05	—45*	—.38	—.02	—.19	—.09	—.25	—.35
1969	(16)	.18	.24	.27	—.38	.09	—.28	—.21	—.19	—.28	—.29
Lowor Doab											
1957	(13)	.25	.50*	—.01	—.23	—.43	—.11	—.57*	—.49*	—.46	—.33
1962	(13)	.03	.28	.03	—.06	—.19	.06	—.36	—.31	—.37	—.24
1967	(15)	—.02	.12	—.18	.08	—.02	.08	—.27	—.13	—.19	—.26
1969	(15)	—.05	.15	.13	.00	—.11	—.02	—.29	—.14	—.20	—.30
Oudh											
1957	(15)	—.41	—.43*	.16	.48*	.57*	.47*	.28	.49*	.39	.19
1962	(17)	—.33	—.45*	.32	.38	.43*	.32	.44*	.36	.30	.21
1967	(29)	—.54	—.45*	.18	.64*	.42*	.55*	.23	.53*	.55*	.39
1969	(29)	—.39*	—.18	—.03	.44*	.16	.42*	.12	.47*	.58*	.37*
Eastern Districts											
1957	(15)	—.34	—.49*	.16	.61*	.48*	.26	.53*	.49*	.48*	.68*
1962	(18)	.17	—.25	—.16	.21	.19	.10	.11	.12	.13	.21
1967	(19)	.17	—.44	.17	.14	.36	—.13	.33	.24	.25	.38
1969	(19)	.33	—.30	—.09	.02	.20	—.13	.14	.13	.14	.19

*$p = .05$ or better.

the middle and upper end of the range, to produce a surplus for the market, but not large enough to have benefited much from the new agricultural inputs in the first stages of their introduction into the agricultural economy of UP. On the latter grounds, there would be reason for discontent with the Congress in areas where these segments of the peasantry are concentrated. However, the general pattern of negative association with the Congress vote varies somewhat in different regions of the state and, within some regions, across time.

A third pattern is a positive association between the Congress vote and the rich farmers, namely, those holding 30 acres of land or more. This group of landholders would have felt the most pressure because of land ceilings reductions, but also would have benefited most from the availability of agricultural inputs. The positive association with the Congress vote is most pronounced in western UP, the centre of the 'green revolution' in this state, particularly in the Upper Doab. It also appears less strongly in Rohilkhand and in the Lower Doab, but is less consistent in Oudh and in the eastern districts. In other words, the general pattern holds in the predominantly wheat-producing regions, but not in the rice-producing areas of the state. It needs to be stressed here, however, that the correlations do *not* show strong support for the Congress in wheat-growing areas generally. The correlations show only that, within these wheat-growing regions, Congress support was strongest in areas where big farmers were concentrated. Moreover, evidence to be presented below suggests that areas dominated by the bigger wheat farmers did not in fact support the Congress in the 1960s.

In general, therefore, the pattern of correlations between the Congress vote and the rural social structure variables suggests that the Congress in UP failed to establish a solid base of support in the countryside among the principal proprietory groups, the small and middle-size landholders, with holdings between 2.5 and 12.5 acres who constitute the most important cultivating peasant classes in the state. Neither did the Congress acquire consistent support among the bigger peasants holding between 12.5 and 30 acres, although it did show some strength among these groups in Rohilkhand. Rather, Congress support in the countryside was greatest in areas of the state where disadvantaged groups are concentrated and also in areas

where the largest proprietors are concentrated. Thus, neither the Zamindari Abolition Act nor Congress control over the disbursement of agricultural inputs through the 'green revolution' succeeded in gaining dominance for the Congress among the principal controllers of land, who are also the leading social and political force in U.P.

Parties of the right: Two parties in UP have been clearly identified with the interests of the former big zamindars and the large landholders. The first party to form in UP to defend landlord interests was the UP Praja Party (UPPP), which contested the 1952 elections, but polled less than two per cent of the popular vote and won only two seats. The UPPP disappeared after this poor showing and no landlord party contested in 1957. However, a state branch of the Swatantra Party was formed in UP in 1959 and polled nearly five per cent of the vote in both the 1962 and 1967 elections. The party has declined since then and polled only 1.25 per cent of the vote in 1969 and 1.13 per cent in 1974, winning only five seats in 1969 and only one seat in 1974.

These two parties succeeded only partially in winning support in areas of UP where the large landholders are concentrated. Neither the UPPP in 1952 nor Swatantra in 1962 polled well in the ex-zamindar areas (Table 11). The UPPP in 1952 clearly had its principal strength in areas where landholdings of four acres and above were concentrated (Table 12). Moreover, the UPPP showed stronger support than any party in 1952 in areas where the largest landholdings were concentrated. The pattern for the Swatantra party in relation to the landholding size groups was not uniform either throughout the state or over time. Only in the former talukdari-dominated region of Oudh in 1967 did the Swatantra vote correlate positively with the larger size landholding categories of 15 acres and above (Table 17). Clearly, the former big zamindars and talukdars did not concentrate their support in a major way in UP with the parties that set out explicitly to represent their interests. It is generally known, in fact, that many of the former big landlord-intermediaries moved from party to party to protect their individual interests rather than their class interests. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the class interest of these groups was mobilized effectively by any other opposition forces in the state.

Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh has been one of the two principal competitors with the Congress for support among the dominant peasant proprietors in UP. Over time, the party adopted positions that would appeal to proprietors of all landholding sizes including the larger ex-zamindars and talukdars, who were recruited into leadership positions in the party more extensively than by any other party in UP. It is also known that Jan Sangh support has been heavily concentrated in Oudh, the traditional talukdari area of UP. Consequently, the logical expectation is that Jan Sangh vote shares should correlate positively both with the percentage of zamindars and with the largest landholding size categories.

Correlations between the Jan Sangh vote share and the 1951 census category of non-cultivating owners did not on the whole show the expected strong support for the Jan Sangh in the ex-zamindar areas, although most correlations in the 1952 and 1957 elections were weakly positive (Table 11). Table 18 suggests a pattern of positive correlations with small landholders and negative associations with middle and large landholders in the plains districts between 1962 and 1969. However, in the Jan Sangh case, the state-wide patterns are quite misleading, since there is a striking difference in the support bases of the party in western and eastern UP.

The clearest pattern in the data for the Jan Sangh is in Oudh, the party's principal stronghold, where there has been a remarkable consistency in its support bases over time. It is here, in the former talukdari dominated region, that confirmation is found for the expectation that the Jan Sangh would show strong support among the larger categories of landholders. However, Jan Sangh support bases in Oudh were not confined only to areas where the upper landholding categories are predominant, but were spread across the entire spectrum of landholding categories of 2.5 acres and above and particularly from 5 acres and above. With the smallest landholders and with agricultural labourers, all correlations for all elections are negative. These ecological data, combined with what is known about the leadership of the Jan Sangh during this period, provide strong support for the inference that, in Oudh at least, the Jan Sangh was the party of the leading proprietary groups.

Unfortunately, we do not have any contemporary case

study evidence to assess the extent to which the Jan Sangh support base in Oudh became organizationally independent of the ex-talukdars. The only detailed case study of the Jan Sangh organization in Oudh is that done by Burger for Pratapgarh district, which does not go beyond 1962. In Pratapgarh in 1962, Burger showed that Jan Sangh strength was based on a 'Raja network', which included the dependents of the former Raja of Pratapgarh and most Thakurs in the district who allied with the Raja on the basis of caste affinities [*Burger 1969: 127*]. Such an alliance would have brought into the Jan Sangh fold many peasants with middle and large landhodings. The strength, breadth, and persistence of the Jan Sangh support in this region suggests that the Jan Sangh base was broader than the ex-Rajas only, whose support has any way been rather fickle, and that the network of relationships built up by the Jan Sangh in the manner described by Burger substituted organizational ties for the former patron-client-caste network. The fact that the Jan Sangh established its position among the leading rural social classes from the first post-Independence election and succeeded in maintaining that position not only against the dominant Congress, but against the Swatantra party, which appealed specifically to the ex-talukdars, and against the BKD, which rose up with a specific appeal to both the middle and big peasants in 1969, strongly supports such a conclusion. On balance, therefore, the evidence indicates that the Jan Sangh in Oudh became in this period the party that best reflected and articulated the common class interests of both the leading peasant proprietors and the big landlords.

Independents. Further evidence of discontent among the leading proprietary groups in UP comes from the correlations for the independent votes, which display three striking features. The first is that in 1952 all correlations with all size categories of 6 acres and above in the state as a whole, and from 1957 through 1969 all correlations with size categories of 5 acres and above in the plains districts—except for one correlation in the 50+ category in 1957—are positive, whereas nearly all correlations with small farmers and dwarf landholders are negative (Table 12 and 19). The second striking feature is that all correlations from 1957 through 1967 in the size groups between 5 and 30 acres in the plains districts are significant at the

TABLE 19

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with Independent Votes 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/Year	*(N)*	*Less than 1.0*	*1.0—2.4*	*2.5—4.9*	*5.0—7.4*	*7.5—9.9*	*10.0—12.4*	*12.5—14.9*	*15.0—29.9*	*30.0—49.9*	*50+*
Whole State											
1957	(91)	—.19*	—.15	—.08	.16	.23*	.16	.20*	.10	.02	—.07
1962	(93)	—.16	—.17*	.00	.13	.18*	.12	.15	.09	.01	.00
1967	(107)	—.28*	—.35*	—.05	.30*	.38*	.35*	.33*	.25*	.10	.01
1969	(99)	.02	—.06	—.07	—.03	.00	.02	.08	.08	.10	.09
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(82)	—.12	.13	.07	.05	—.04	—.03	—.07	—.15	—.15	—.17
1962	(82)	—.07	—.08	.00	—.01	.02	.03	.05	.06	—.02	.03
1967	(89)	—.17	—.14	—.17	.09	.12	.34*	.18	.28*	.19	.07
1969	(89)	—.03	—.09	—.02	—.06	.03	.04	.17	.16	.17	.10
Plains Districts only											
1957	(82)	—.24*	—.23*	—.10	.23*	.31*	.23*	.29*	.20*	.10	—.05
1962	(81)	—.21*	—.26*	—.04	.21*	.26*	.23*	.24*	.23*	.11	.08
1967	(94)	—.36*	—.43*	—.14	.33*	.44*	.45*	.44*	.45*	.31*	.07
1969	(88)	—.11	—.11	.13	.10	.07	.02	.11	.05	.08	.08
Rohilkhand											
1957	(16)	—.36	.08	—.05	.37	—.25	.13	—.04	.00	—.07	—.18
1962	(16)	—.35	—.30	.03	.38	.07	.07	.20	.10	.16	.23
1967	(15)	—.46*	—.26	—.09	.33	.24	.26	.15	.17	.13	.06
1969	(15)	—.22	—.32	—.26	.22	.18	.25	.29	.35	.32	.26

Upper Doab											
1957	(18)	—.01	.03	.25	—.20	.45*	—.27	.23	—.27	—.30	—.26
1962	(18)	.11	—.06	—.37	—.15	.17	.26	.02	.20	.03	.09
1967	(18)	—.14	—.44*	—.56*	.16	.11	.51	.26	.57*	.50*	.22
1969	(18)	.23	.11	.18	—.05	—.18	—.23	—.00	—.23	—.02	.24
Lower Doob											
1957	(13)	—.36	—.13	.30	.44	.17	.41	—.13	—.17	—.29	—.35
1962	(13)	—.18	.08	.58*	.04	—.16	—.02	—.15	—.12	—.11	—.06
1967	(14)	.02	—.11	.26	—.14	.06	—.13	.22	.15	.15	.14
1969	(13)	.46	.13	—.04	—.54*	—.31	—.58*	.11	.19	.44	.38
Oudh											
1957	(18)	.17	.44*	—.50*	—.20	—.34	—.09	—.30	.03	.20	.08
1962	(17)	.35	.42*	—.26	—.42*	—.38	—.37	—.31	—.37	—.47*	—.45*
1967	(29)	.04	—.10	.09	—.09	.22	—.11	.40*	.08	—.09	—.33*
1969	(24)	.12	—.10	.14	—.15	.16	—.16	.27	—.10	—.29	—.33
Eastern Districts											
1957	(17)	.10	.32	.05	—.27	—.33	—.43*	—.34	—.36	—.24	—.15
1962	(17)	.07	—.28	.00	.14	.20	.08	.21	.24	.20	.22
1967	(18)	—.14	.20	—.12	—.04	—.23	.28	—.21	—.10	—.04	.21
1969	(18)	—.52*	—.09	.05	.36	.16	.66*	.19	.33	.21	.04

*p= .05 or better.

.05 level or better, but that those with the rich farmer categories —with one exception in 1967—are much less strong. The third striking feature is the precipitous decline in the strength of the correlations with the 5- to 30-acre peasants in the 1969 election, when the BKD entered the electoral arena with a direct appeal to these groups. However, the regional correlations show some variation from the state-wide pattern. In the western plains districts of Rohilkhand and the Upper Doab, a consistent pattern did not emerge until 1962. From 1962 onward in Rohilkhand, all correlations with landholding size categories of 5 acres or more were positive. A similar pattern was evident also in the Upper Doab in the 1962 and 1967 elections. In the central and eastern plains districts (Lower Doab, Oudh, Eastern Districts), however, there is no consistent pattern of this sort.

If one views the vote for independents as at least in part a protest vote by groups discontented with all parties, then these correlations fit well with those reported above for the Congress, the parties of the right, and the Jan Sangh. Those correlations suggest general discontent with the Congress in areas where the middle proprietors are concentrated. The parties of the right succeeded only partially in mobilizing this discontent. The Jan Sangh however, succeeded in building strong and consistent support in these areas in the region of Oudh. The correlations for the independent vote shares suggest that independents mobilized much of the discontent that the parties of the right failed to pick up, particularly in western UP, but that they could not do so in Oudh where the Jan Sangh established a firm base in places dominated by the middle and upper proprietary groups.

It has been mentioned above that many ex-zamindars and former talukdars chose to protect their personal interests by contesting elections as independents or by supporting independent candidates. If this behaviour was widespread, it is reasonable to expect the correlations between the independent vote and the zamindar variable (non-cultivating owners, Table 11) to show it, although the fact that most independent candidates were certainly not ex-zamindars or even supported by ex-zamindars would be likely to distort any one-to-one relationships. In fact, the correlations shows a strong positive association

between the independent vote and the ex-zamindar areas in two regions—Rohilkhand and the Lower Doab, but not elsewhere. Once again, therefore, although the correlations do provide some evidence of political mobilization by the disgruntled ex-zamindars, they also continue to suggest that their discontent was fragmented by party and unevenly distributed by region.

The BKD. The principal party in UP in the post-Independence period to challenge the Congress with a direct and explicit appeal to the peasant proprietors as a body was the BKD, formed in 1969 as a national party, but with its principal strength in UP. In UP the BKD was practically the single-handed creation, organizationally and ideologically, of Charan Singh. Charan Singh, the chief architect of the Zamindari Abolition Act, made a strong effort to appeal to all the main beneficiaries of that Act, but with a special appeal to the backward castes. Although the BKD had a surprising electoral success in 1969, its greatest success was in western UP where the main beneficiaries of the land settlement were the backward castes. However, in 1974, the BKD did equally well in the eastern districts.

It has already been established that the BKD's dramatic success in 1969 did not come principally at the expense of the other main political parties in the state. The BKD picked up much of its strength from votes that, in previous elections, had gone to independents and smaller opposition parties. Although the Jan Sangh seat share was cut in half in 1969, it does not appear that the party's losses were caused by the BKD. The BKD drew its votes mainly from areas where minor parties and independents had been strongest [*Baxter 1975: 115, 135, 137-8*]. In fact, 24 of the 98 successful BKD candidates in 1969 'had contested the 1967 election in their same constituencies as independents' [*Kornmesser 1976: 11*]

The correlation coefficients for the BKD in 1969 with the landholding size variables support fully the above descriptions of BKD support. The party had its principal strength in the state as a whole and in the plains districts in areas where landholders in the range of 5 acres and above are concentrated (Table 20). In regional terms, the pattern holds up for the most part in the three principal regions of BKD support in the 1969 election, namely, the Upper Doab, Rohilkhand, and the Lower

TABLE 10

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with BKD Votes, 1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/Year	*(N)*	*Less than 1.0*	*1.0— 2.4*	*2.5— 4.9*	*5.0— 7.4*	*7.5— 9.9*	*10.0— 12.4*	*12.5— 14.9*	*15.0 29.9*	*30.0— 49.9*	*50+*
Whole State											
1969	(110)	—.27*	—.35*	—.09	.30*	.44*	.37*	.36*	.25*	.07	.02
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1969	(103)	—.03	—.10	—.21*	.01	.15	.24*	.15	.20*	.09	.04
Plains Districts Only											
1969	(97)	—.28*	—.42*	—.29*	.26*	.47*	.46*	.48*	.49*	.33*	.13
Rohilkhand											
1969	(16)	—.03	—.19	—.19	.33	.38	.14	.46	.32	.28	—.06
Upper Doab											
1969	(18)	—.12	—.11	—.54*	.26	—.10	.44*	—.01	.43*	.33	.25
Lower Doab											
1969	(15)	—.47*	—.49*	.05	.46*	.45*	.59*	.38	.34	.09	.10
Oudh											
1969	(24)	.19	.05	—.07	—.19	—.01	—.15	.06	—.14	—.23	—.15
Eastern Districts											
1969	(19)	.13	.13	—.05	—.16	—:08	—.21	—.14	—.19	—.15	—.00

*p=.05 or better.

Doab. Although there are some variations in positive and negative correlations in these regions, the strongest positive associations with the BKD vote fell among the size categories between 5 and 30 acres. Correlations with smallholders were uniformly negative in these regions and those with the biggest categories of 30 acres and above were either positive, but not significant at the .05 level, or were negative. In other words, BKD support was greatest in the 1969 elections in the predominantly wheat-growing regions of the state among precisely those groups of peasant proprietors and bigger farmers to which the party appealed.

This pattern of support does not hold up for eastern UP and Oudh, where the BKD vote correlated negatively with all but one of the landholding size categories of 2.5 acres and above. Consequently, it is clear from both the BKD and Jan Sangh correlations in Oudh in 1969 that the BKD did not succeed in this region in cutting into the Jan Sangh support bases. A Comparison of the BKD correlations in 1969 with those for independents in 1967 and 1969, in contrast, shows clearly that the BKD support bases in 1969 in the state as a whole and in western UP were quite similar to those of independents in 1967.[19] Clearly also, independent support went down in 1969 where BKD support was strongest.

Thus, in the 1969 election in UP, it seems evident that the BKD capitalized on the discontent that had been developing, particularly in the western part of the state, in the middle and rich peasant proprietor areas. At the end of the decade, therefore, the Congress was faced with two large parties, one based in western UP, the other, the Jan Sangh, firmly entrenched in Oudh, both with stronger support bases among the leading rural proprietary groups than the Congress itself had.

Parties of the left. The parties of the left in UP politics have been more fragmented and have done less well over time than either the Jan Sangh or the BKD. The relatively poorer performance of the left parties than either the Jan Sangh or BKD is not readily understandable in terms of the opportunities presented by rural social organization in UP. On the face of it, there would seem to be ample opportunities for the left parties to appeal to the bottom layers of the rural social structure—to the agricultural labourers, to the tenants, and to the smallest

size landholders. The proportion of agricultural labourers to the total working population was 10.5 per cent in the 1961 census and nearly 20 per cent according to the 1971 census (see Table 3). The proportion of tenants to the total number of cultivating households in 1961 was 10 per cent (see Table 4). More important numerically, however, are the smallest landholders, those holding less than 2.5 acres of land, whose holdings comprised nearly two-thirds of the total in the state, according to the 1971 census (Table 5). In eastern UP, the proportion of smallholders was much higher, with more than 75 per cent of the holdings being less than 2.5 acres.

I have argued elsewhere that a major weakness of the left parties was that their leadership and sources of support came partly from the same groups that supported the Congress [*Brass 1968:87*]. The rural MLAs of the left parties have come largely from middle peasant or petty zamindar backgrounds similar to those of Congress MLAs [*Meyer 1969:157*]. However, the parties of the left attempted to develop new bases of support. Both the PSP and the Lohia Socialists made explicit appeals to smallholders in the 1960s with the demand for exemption of landholdings of less than 6.5 acres from payment of land revenue. The Lohia Socialists also appealed more broadly to all the backward and downtrodden segments of Indian society, particularly to the backward castes, the landless, minorities, and women. Moreover, all the left parties have traditionally been strongest in the most poverty-stricken region of UP, in the eight eastern districts of Deoria, Gorakhpur, Ballia, Azamgarh, Ghazipur, Jaunpur, and Allahabad.

Of the left parties, however, only the radical Socialists succeeded in establishing fairly strong and consistent bases of support in smallholder areas (Table 21). In the state as a whole, the SP in 1962 and the SSP in 1967 and 1969 had positive correlations with smallholder categories of less than 2.5 acres. The SSP in particular had positive correlations, including several in the significance range of .05 or better, with agricultural labourers (Table 5) and with all smallholders holding 5 acres or less (Table 21). However, the PSP never established a stable support base among smallholders. In fact, from 1957 through 1969, most correlations for the PSP with smallholder

TABLE 21

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with SP/SSP Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/Year (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0—2.4	2.5—4.9	5.0—7.4	7.5—9.9	10.0—12.4	12.5—14.9	15.0—29.9	30.0—49.9	50+
Whole state										
1957 (49)	—.11	—.08	.22	.10	.10	.02	.05	—.05	—.15	—.16
1962 (73)	.10	.14	.12	—.14	—.11	—.15	—.13	—.17	—.20*	—.17
1967 (91)	.16	.14	.09	—.19*	—.16	—.19*	—.09	—.15	—.13	—.10
1969 (92)	.16	.28*	.22*	—.22*	—.27*	—.30*	—.25*	—.28*	—.23*	—.20*
Whole state (Contorlling for region)										
1957 (42)	.03	—.06	.02	.00	.09	—.04	.10	—.03	—.12	—.08
1962 (66)	.06	—.02	—.01	—.07	.02	—.03	.03	.00	—.03	.01
1967 (84)	.25*	.10	.02	—.22*	—.16	—.25*	—.01	—.16	—.11	—.04
1269 (85)	.13	.14	.07	—.18	—.15	—.20	—.06	—.13	—.09	—.05
Plains Districts Only										
1957 (47)	—.07	—.06	.19	.07	.08	.00	.04	—.07	—.20	—.19
1962 (66)	—.17	—.11	—.04	—.20	—.11	—.11	—.08	—.07	—.07	—.03
1967 (81)	.24*	.17	.00	—.26*	—.19*	—.20*	—.08	—.15	—.11	—.02
1969 (80)	.25*	.29*	.10	—.30*	—.31*	—.29*	—.24*	—.27*	—.20*	—.10
Rohilkhand										
1962 (12)	—.16	.19	.05	.28	—.36	.03	—.19	—.21	—.21	—.15
1967 (10)	—.37	.14	— 42	.34	—.34	.34	—.16	.11	.05	.00
1969 (11)	—.11	.35	—.34	.12	—.47	.24	—.35	—.07	—.02	—.00

TABLE 21 (continued)

Region/Year (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0—2.4	2.5—4.9	5.0—7.4	7.5—9.9	10.0—12.4	12.5—14.9	15.0—29.9	30.0—49.9	50+
Upper Doab										
1962 (13)	—.23	.10	—.04	.08	—.19	.15	—.13	.07	—.07	—.06
1967 (14)	—.21	—.23	.29	.16	—.00	—.12	.37	—.15	—.08	—.11
1969 (15)	—.21	—.13	.28	.04	—.00	—.13	.25	—.11	—.08	—.23
Lower Doab										
1962 (12)	—.12	—.44	—.49	.21	.51*	.31	.64*	.50*	.46	.15
1967 (15)	.46*	.32	—.22	—.36	—.38	—.43	—.13	—.18	.02	.14
1969 (14)	.47*	.44	.09	—.51*	.41	—.65*	—.24	—.35	—.11	.01
Oudh										
1957 (13)	.47*	.29	—.17	—.50*	—.40	—.43	—.39	—.47*	—.49*	—.41
1962 (13)	.43	.03	.06	—.40	—.22	—.48*	—.32	—.48*	—.50*	—.36
1967 (25)	.48*	.14	—.01	—.45*	—.21	—.45*	—.23	—.52*	—.54*	.37
1969 (22)	.40*	—.01	.02	—.37*	—.07	—.37*	—.06	.32	—.36*	—.19
Eastern Districts										
1957 (15)	.14	.01	.05	—.12	—.02	—.33	—.02	—.11	—.15	—.10
1962 (16)	—.10	.11	.21	—.13	—.09	—.34	—.00	—.09	.02	.12
1967 (17)	—.31	.07	.05	.07	.07	.01	.11	.13	.21	.24
1969 (18)	—.43*	.08	.06	.25	.05	.19	.05	.11	.14	.11

*p=.05 or better.

categories of less than 2.5 acres were negative (Table 22), whereas its correlations with the larger size categories were positive, some of them fairly strongly so. The CPI, like the PSP, also failed to establish a stable support base among small holders. In fact, in the eastern districts, all CPI correlations with smallholders of less than 2.5 acres were negative, two of them at significance levels of .05 or better, whereas most of its correlations with landholding size groups of 2.5 acres and above were positive (Table 23). In fact, the only evidence that suggests a consistent support base for the CPI among the poor is the pattern of positive correlations in every election from 1952 to 1969 with agricultural labourers (Table 5).

In general, the correlations for the left parties go far toward explaining their relative inffectiveness in UP politics. The PSP, which was for a time the leading party of the left in UP, failed to establish a support base among the poor. In fact, its areas of strength are more comparable to those of the Jan Sangh and BKD among the middle and larger landholders. The CPI also, with the exception of its positive correlations with agricultural labourers, seems to have been competing more with the Jan Sangh and the BKD for a base in areas dominated by the rich peasants than with other left parties or with the Congress for support among the poor. Only the radical Socialists, among the parties of the left, can claim to have established a support base in areas of rural poverty, a fact that may explain its ability to win a fair number of seats in the 1967 and 1969 elections despite the absence of a strong party organization.

Summary. It is desirable at this point to summarize the detailed and complex data that have so far been presented party by party. In particular, it will be useful here to show how the data provide a basis for inferring a) the extent to which areas dominated by different social categories in the countryside were persistent sources of satisfaction or of discontent with the dominant Congress party, and b) the degree to which class differences were translated into the party system. The data suggest both the persistence of rural discontent with the Congress and a considerable degree of sociopolitical differentiation within the party system, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. At the top of the rural class structure, among the former

TABLE 22

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with PSP Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/Year	(N)	Less than 1.0	1.0—2.4	2.5—4.9	5.0—7.4	7.5—9.9	10.0—12.4	12.5—14.9	15.0—29.9	30 0—49.9	50+
Whole State											
1957	(77)	—.08	—.06	—.03	.04	.01	.06	.00	.13	.19*	.26*
1962	(86)	—.04	.01	—.17	.02	—.05	.07	.01	.13	.24*	.33*
1967	(68)	—.18	—.08	.07	.19	.12	.11	.01	.04	.05	.15
1969	(51)	—.20	—.16	.01	.20	.19	.12	.13	.11	.13	.27*
Whole state (controlling for region)											
1957	(70)	—.23*	—.13	.02	.09	.12	.15	.04	.24*	.28*	.32*
1962	(79)	.03	.14	—.16	—.03	—.14	.00	—.10	.05	.20	.32*
1967	(61)	—.32*	—.05	.13	.23	.12	.18	.00	.10	.15	.24
1969	(44)	—.15	—.06	.09	.11	.05	.07	.06	.05	.21	.39*
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(69)	—.18	—.02	.24*	.12	.02	—.02	—.09	—.02	.06	.20*
1962	(74)	—.05	.18	.06	.01	—.15	—.11	—.20	—.16	—.03	.20*
1967	(61)	—.31*	—.10	.21*	.26*	.14	.12	.00	.01	.05	.18
1969	(47)	—.23	—.16	.18	.22	.19	.08	.10	.06	.13	.33*
Rohilkhand											
1957	(12)	.46	.20	.27	—.40	.11	—.38	—.32	—.29	—.25	.01
1962	(15)	.32	.39	—.17	—.10	—.27	—.05	—.57*	—.16	—.12	.28

Upper Doab											
1957	(13)	—.39	—.19	—.14	.06	.24	.18	.14	.27	.14	—.16
1962	(14)	.13	.05	.57*	—.05	—.07	—.51*	.13	—.36	—.19	—.10
Lower Doab											
1957	(13)	.16	.19	—.30	—.25	—.25	—.17	—.07	.19	.39	.40
1962	(13)	.37	.14	—.59*	—.41	—.22	—.31	.07	.32	.60*	.65*
1967	(10)	—.53	—.68*	.20	.57*	.68*	.32	.69*	.41	.26	.03
Oudh											
1957	(14)	—.58*	—.58*	.52*	.62*	.48*	.56*	.18	.38	.49*	.62*
1962	(16)	—.51*	—.20	.12	.48*	.20	.56*	—.07	.48*	.71*	.74*
1967	(20)	—.55*	—.14	.24	.44*	.11	.49*	—.09	.37	.50*	.71*
1969	(16)	—.48*	—.09	.28	.36	.03	.47*	—.07	.31	.60*	.80*
Eastern Districts											
1957	(17)	—.51*	—.11	.11	.33	.27	.34	.26	.40	.42*	.41*
1962	(16)	—.38	.49*	—.16	.07	—.28	.18	—.34	—.25	—.31	—.33
1967	(16)	.13	.45*	—.03	—.30	—.46*	—.31	—.42*	—.47*	—.48*	—.41
1969	(12)	.44	.22	—.10	—.31	—.32	—.45	—.28	—.42	—.38	—.18

*p—.05 or better

TABLE 23

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with CPI Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/ Year	*(N)*	*Less than 1.0*	*1.0— 2.4*	*2.5— 4.9*	*5.0— 7.4*	*7.5— 9.9*	*10.0— 12.4*	*12.5— 14.9*	*15.0— 29.9*	*30.0— 49.9*	*50+*
Whole State											
1957	(44)	.09	.11	—.12	—.22	—.11	—.09	.05	.07	.13	.12
1962	(64)	.08	.04	—.05	—.12	—.04	—.07	.02	.02	.04	—.03
1967	(52)	—.09	—.02	—.23*	.04	—.02	.10	.09	.18	.21	.21
1969	(57)	—.18	—.10	—.17	—.01	.03	.12	.23*	.27*	.33*	.31*
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(38)	—.35*	—.24	—.08	.11	.33*	.27	.41*	.42*	.42*	.34*
1962	(57)	—.09	—.05	.11	.08	.09	.01	.06	—.01	—.07	—.22
1967	(45)	.—20	.05	.08	.19	—.08	—.01	—.04	—.02	—.01	—.02
1969	(50)	—.25	.03	.24	.07	.04	—.15	.13	—.03	—.01	—.01
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(43)	.08	.10	—.13	—.22	—.10	—.09	.07	.11	.23	.24
1962	(56)	.13	.07	—.14	—.15	—.06	—.06	.00	.05	.09	—.06
1967	(46)	—.04	.10	—.25*	.04	—.10	.11	—.05	.09	.09	.06
1969	(46)	—.03	.23	—.03	—.11	—.20	—.07	—.13	—.05	.04	—.04

Oudh											
1957	(10)	.01	.38	.06	—.21	—.37	—.30	—.30	—.47	—.60*	—.58*
1962	(12)	.01	.15	.20	—.17	—.15	—.30	.04	—.33	—.53*	—.56*
1967	(13)	—.18	.45	—.10	.01	—.34	.06	—.31	—.10	—.12	—.20
1969	(12)	—.20	.44	—.04	—.02	—.38	.02	—.49*	—.05	—.06	—.11
Eastern Districts											
1957	(13)	—.65*	—.39	.42	.45	.52*	.45	.62*	.69*	.68*	.43
1962	(16)	—.11	—.07	.11	—.03	.12	.21	.15	.18	.02	—.28
1967	(15)	—.32	—.06	.22	.31	.09	.24	.18	.10	—.11	—.23
1969	(13)	—.77*	—.40	.58*	.74*	.60*	.51*	.73*	.73*	.69*	.45

*p—0.5 or better.

zamindars and the modern capitalist farmers, the evidence presented is that the political influence of these classes was not concentrated effectively, but was diffused and fragmented. As a consequence of the Zamindari Abolition Act and its anti-landlord bias, the Congress generally polled poorly in areas dominated by the ex-zamindars, especially in the 1957 and 1962 elections. However, the zamindars and big farmers did not succeed in organizing a coherent opposition to the Congress, even though two parties—the UPPP and Swatantra—formed largely to pursue their interests. On the contrary, most of the politically active ex-zamindars pursued individual interests rather than class interests and divided their support among several political parties, including Congress, UPPP, Swatantra, Jan Sangh, the SP, PSP, independents, and others. In Oudh, for a time, the Jan Sangh received strong support from the former landlords. However, over time, the personal economic interests of the ex-landlords and the capitalist farmers pulled many of them into the Congress orbit of influence, and into the nexus of Congress patronage, in search of the capital, the inputs, and the political influence required for them to prosper as the 'green revolution' began to spread. It is noteworthy in this regard that the *only* strong positive correlations—in the state as a whole, in the whole state controlling for region, and in the plains districts treated separately—between the Congress vote and the peasantry with more than 5 acres of land were with big farmers holding at least 30 acres of land.

2. At the bottom of the rural social structure, among the agricultural labourers, dwarf landholders, and poor peasants, there has been a similar dispersion of political support. If there has been no successful landlord-big farmer party in UP, neither has there been any successful party of agrarian protest nor, for that matter, any major radical agrarian movements. Only the SSP attempted to appeal explicitly to the interests and needs of the rural poor. Although it had some success in doing so, its poor organization and internal divisions prevented this party from consolidating its support among these rural social classes.

Although the support of the rural poor has been partly dispersed among opposition parties and groups, the Congress was persistently the strongest political force in areas where the

rural poor are concentrated. Although the class interests of the lowest rural social classes were not pursued by the Congress, many economic measures were passed during the years of Congress rule that benefited large numbers of the poor, and much patronage also was distributed to persons from these categories. The correlations have shown that the Congress in turn received support in areas where agricultural labourers and poor peasants were concentrated.

The Congress then was not, truly speaking, a party of the centre in rural UP, but a party of the extremes, one which combined both ends of the rural social structure without the middle. Class polarization and conflict, therefore, were warded off in UP partly by the dispersion and political fragmentation at opposite ends of the rural social structure, partly by the integration of the extremes into the patronage network of the dominant Congress organization.

3. The most striking finding in the data is the evidence of persistent discontent with the Congress among all classes of the peasantry holding between 2.5 and 30 acres of land, and particularly those holding between 5 and 30 acres. This discontent, which revealed itself first in the correlations for the 1957 elections, did not become translated into political support for either parties of the far left or the far right, but was dispersed among independent candidates. This pattern persisted for three elections. Among the established political parties, only the Jan Sangh received any positive support in areas where these peasant social classes were dominant, primarily in Oudh. Then, in 1967, Charan Singh, the leading spokesman of the peasant proprietors as a body and the principal supporter of the aspirations of the middle or 'backward' cultivating castes, who had left the Congress to lead the first non-Congress government in the state's history, formed the BKD. The BKD, which appealed in the 1969 elections specifically to the interests of all the peasant classes holding between 2.5 and 27.5 acres of land, and which also drew into its fold many persons who in previous elections had contested against the Congress as independents, clearly succeeded in mobilizing the discontent of the bulk of the middle and big peasantry. The success of the BKD in 1969, therefore, which appeared at the time as a flash-in-the-pan success based on the gathering together of a horde

of defectors and non-party persons, had a genuine socioeconomic basis in the support of the most important social force in the state, the peasant proprietors as a body.

B. Party Support Bases and Size of Landholdings in the 1974 Elections

Two important changes in the structure of the party system and of the contesting parties occurred before the 1974 elections. One was the split in the Congress, in which by far the largest segment of the party joined Mrs. Gandhi while a much smaller but not insignificant section joined the INC(O). In the state as a whole, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress polled 32.24 per cent of the vote while the INC(O) polled 8.36 per cent. The second change was the disintegration of the socialist parties in the state. Several

TABLE 24

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1971 Census with 1974 Party Vote Shares, Uttar Pradesh, Plains Districts (N=43)

Size Category[a]	*Congress*	*INC(O)*	*Independents*	*BKD(BLD)*	*Jan Sangh*
Less than 1	—.13	.07	—.11	—.05	.07
1—2.5	.05	.36*	.06	—.47*	.33*
2.5—5	.14	.01	.15	—.09	.04
5—7.5	.12	—.15	.12	.12	—.12
7.5—10	.11	—.20	.07	.25*	—.23
10—12.5	.10	—.24	.04	.31*	—.26*
12.5—25	.09	—.25	.01	.35*	—.26*
25—50	.07	—.22	.02	.26*	—.15
50—75	.08	—.13	.06	.01	.08
75—100	.07	—.10	.06	—.08	.17
100—125	.08	—.14	.06	—.06	.14
125+	.18	—.18	.24	—.14	.11

*$p = .05$ or better

[a]The source data were in hectares, but have been converted here to the approximate corresponding categories in acres for the sake of consistency with other data previously presented.

socialist parties contested the elections, but the largest, the Socialist Party, polled less than 3 per cent of the vote. Most important, the SSP, the major remnant of the socialist movement in UP, effectively merged with the BKD in an alliance in which SSP candidates contested on the BKD ticket. Although the BKD vote share did not increase in the state as a whole as a consequence of this alliance, it did increase markedly in the eastern districts, where the SSP had one of its major areas of strength, from 17.74 per cent in 1969 to 25.08 per cent in 1974. Aside from the two Congress parties and the BKD, the only other party that polled a substantial share of the vote in the state as a whole was the Jan Sangh, which secured 17.12 per cent of valid votes polled. The CPI polled only 1.45 per cent of the vote. Independents and a veritable host of minor parties polled approximately 20 per cent of the vote.

The shifts in the structure of the party system had some effect on the support areas of the parties that contested, but the broad patterns of differentiation in the party system in relation to agrarian social structure remained comparable to previous elections. The correlations for the two Congress parties were similar to those for 1969 in the absence of strong associations with any size category, with the sole exception of the positive correlation between the INC(O) vote share and the marginal landholding category of 1 to 2.5 acres (Table 24). The absence of strong correlations, positive or negative, suggests the persistence of some support across all size categories for the Congress without a concentration of support or opposition among any of the size groups. It also suggests, however, that tha dominant Congress was losing one of its principal support bases among the marginal landholders in both the 1969 and 1974 elections. In most other respects, the 1974 correlations are consistent with the support bases of the main parties in previous elections. There were no strong correlations between independent vote shares and any of the size categories in the plains districts as a whole, as in 1969. However, there was a strong negative correlation with marginal farmers in the rice districts and two strong positive correlations with small farmers (Table 25). The Jan Sangh pattern in 1974 also was consistent with previous results in showing strong positive correlations with marginal landholders and strong negative correlations

TABLE 25

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1971 Census with 1974 Party Vote Shares in Wheat and Rice Districts, Uttar Pradesh

Size Category	*Congress*	*INC (0)*	*Independents*	*BKD(BLD)*	*Jan Sangh*
Wheat Districts (N=22)					
Less than 1	—.16	.11	.16	—.41*	.32
1—2.5	—.23	.43*	.21	—.64*	.58*
2.5—5	.07	.07	—.07	.19	—.13
5—7.5	.15	—.14	—.17	.46*	—.38*
7.5—10	.21	—.24	—.24	.57*	—.46*
10—12.5	.25	—.32	—.26	.63*	—.51*
12.5—25	.27	—.36*	—.24	.64*	—.52*
25—50	.28	—.39*	—.13	.60*	—.56*
50—75	.29	—.30	.04	.44*	—.58*
75—100	.15	—.09	.23	.23	—.50*
100—125	.07	—.21	.14	.19	—.38*
125+	—.07	.03	.34	.15	—.30
Rice Districts (N=22)					
Less than 1	—.10	—.13	—.44*	.38*	—.18
1—2.5	.18	.19	.31	—48*	.19
2.5—4.5	.10	.12	.49*	—.44*	.22
5—7.5	.02	.10	.43*	—.32	.17
7.5—10	.01	.12	.33	—.18	.06
10—12.5	.04	.06	.31	—.12	.03
12.5—25	.08	.03	.19	—.06	.02
25—50	.08	—.07	.15	—.07	.12
50—75	.08	—.12	.09	—.10	.21
75—100	.06	—.12	.05	—.12	.26
100—125	.07	—.17	.03	—.08	.22
125+	.02	—.12	.17	—.14	.24

*p=.05 or better

[a]See footnote a to Table 14.

with middle peasant categories, particularly in the wheat districts. The sharpest pattern once again was that for the BKD, showing a very strong negative correlation with marginal landholders and strong positive correlations across the whole range of middle and rich peasant classes holding between 7.5 and 50 acres of land in the plains districts as a whole. However, the regional break-up for the BKD shows that the pattern was a phenomenon largely of the wheat districts. In the rice districts, the BKD did *not* show strength among the middle peasantry in 1974, despite the general increase in its strength in the predominantly rice-growing eastern districts. In the wheat districts, in contrast, the middle peasant areas were virtually BKD territory, with all other parties and independents except the Congress showing negative correlations in areas of middle peasant concentration. Only the Congress was in a position to compete with the BKD for support in such areas, but none of its correlations with the middle peasant categories were at significance levels of .05 or better. Finally, the strong positive correlation between the BKD vote and the smallest landholders in the rice districts suggests that the previous support of the SSP in smallholder areas in Oudh and the Lower Doab was successfully transferred to the BKD in this election.

C. Party Support Bases and Size of Landholdings in the 1977 Elections

Janata. Insofar as UP is concerned, the Janata Party represented a combination principally of the old BKD of Charan Singh, which in 1974 had merged with the SSP to form the BLD, and the Jan Sangh. It has been shown that both these major groups had developed strong support among the peasant proprietor classes in previous elections—the BKD in western UP, especially in 1969, and the Jan Sangh in Oudh. Janata support in relation to the landowning strata of UP in 1977 reflected the earlier bases of support of its principal component parties among the leading proprietary classes. In fact, its support paralleled partially the earlier support base of the first post-Independence agrarian party in the state, the UP Praja Party. The correlation between the Janata vote in 1977 and the UPPP vote in 1952 is .472(N=16, S =.03). The correlation

TABLE 26

Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1971 Census, with 1977 Party Vote Shares, Uttar Pradesh Plains Districts

	All Plains Districts (43)			*Plains Wheat Districts (22)*			*Plains Rice Districts (22)*		
Size Category[a]	*Janata*	*Congress*	*Independents*	*Janata*	*Congress*	*Independents*	*Janata*	*Congress*	*Independents*
Less than 1	—.22	—.11	.13	—.27	—.20	.30	—.04	—.11	—.05
1—2.5	—.23	—.17	.40*	—.39*	—.11	.42*	—.22	—.05	.40*
2.5—5	.14	.07	—.03	.17	.16	—.18	—.02	.08	.14
5—7.5	.25*	.15	—.20	.30	.18	—.31	.08	.13	—.02
7.5—10	.30*	.17	—.27*	.34	.20	—.38*	.13	.15	—.12
10—12.5	.32*	.18	—.31*	.38*	.23	—.42*	.16	.17	—.18
12.5—25	.34*	.18	—.33*	.39*	.24	—.45*	.25	.17	—.28
25—50	.38*	.17	—.34*	.41*	.25	—.46*	.41*	.14	—.36*
50—75	.30*	.17	—.29*	.37*	.30	—.43*	.42*	14	—.35*
75—100	.23	.15	—.23	.16	.16	—.14	.40*	.13	—.33
100—125	.21	.20	—.25	.03	.33	—.11	.40*	.18	—.37*
125+	.23	.24	—.30	.11	01	—.00	.42*	.10	—.31

*$p = .05$ or better

[a]See footnote a to Table 24.

with the UPPP in the rice-growing districts was an even stronger .746 (N=8, S=02). Janata support in 1977 also correlated positively with the BKD support in 1974 in the wheat districts at .411 (N=22, S=.03). There were no other strong positive correlations at the district level between the Janata vote in 1977 and the previous support bases of any other of the major political parties in UP, including the Jan Sangh and the SSP. In effect, therefore, the line of political continuity for the Janata Party in UP was with the previous agrarian parties only, the UPPP and the BKD.

Moreover, the support base of the Janata party among the leading proprietary groups in UP closely paralleled that of its principal predecessor, the BKD. In the state as a whole, the strongest positive correlations for Janata with the several landholding size categories were in the entire range from 5 to 75 acres. However, there is some difference in this respect between Janata support in the wheat- and in the rice-growing districts. In the wheat zone, Janata support was strongest in areas where the big peasants are concentrated, those holding from 10 to 75 acres of land. However, in the rice districts, Janata support was greatest in areas where the biggest farmers are concentrated, those with holdings above 25 acres, who are either traditional landlords or capitalist farmers. In neither the wheat nor the rice districts did Janata have support in areas of small-farmer concentration. In fact, in the plains districts taken together, the correlation coefficients with holdings of less than 2.5 acres were negative at -.22 and -.23 (Table 26).

It is clear, therefore, that although the median vote for the Janata in the wheat and rice districts was practically identical, the support bases of the party in the two zones were somewhat different. In brief, Janata support in the wheat zone was based principally on the middle and bigger peasantry. In the rice districts, Janata support was greatest in areas where the biggest farms are located.

Congress. As for the Congress, its support bases in 1977 were consistent with its support bases in previous elections. The correlations between the Congress vote and its vote in previous elections were as follows: .664 (S=.001) for 1974, .456 (S=.001) for 1969, .165 (S=.145) for 1967, .476 (S=.001) for 1962, .450(S=.001) for 1957, and .294 (S=.028) for 1952.

The strong relationship between the Congress vote in 1977 and all previous elections, except 1967, argues against attaching any special significance to the 1977 elections in terms of Congress support bases.

With respect to the landholding size groups, there were no strong correlations between the Congress vote share in 1977 and any of the individual size categories, whether in the plains districts as a whole or in the wheat or rice districts treated separately.

Independents. The independent vote once again seemed to suggest the existence of discontents not adequately reflected in support for the main contesting parties, and to reflect the mirror image of support for and opposition to the Congress and Janata. It is, for example, remarkable to note that all correlations but one for Congress and Janata in the plains districts as a whole and in the wheat and rice districts separately were in the same direction, whereas all but three of the independent correlations were in the opposite direction from both Congress and Janata. This pattern suggests, first, that Congress and Janata were competing for support among the same agrarian size groups, and that the independent candidates picked up the support that went to neither of the two main parties. The pattern of strong positive and negative correlations for independents indicates that such candidates drew mostly from the traditional Congress base of support among the marginal landholders, particularly in the wheat districts. This pattern also is consistent with the results of the two previous elections which, as already indicated, showed a loss of support for the Congress among this large group in both 1969 and 1974. The strong negative correlations between the independent vote and those categories of cultivators strongly associated with Janata are consistent with the previously identified pattern of the BKD drawing up the discontent of the middle peasantry that had previously been diffused in support for independent candidates. Clearly, Janata held that support and independents made no inroads into it in 1977. However, strong correlations between the independent vote and the marginal landholders indicate that, despite the widespread discontent with the Emergency regime of the Congress that preceded the 1977 elections, the marginal landholders were reluctant, especially

in the wheat-growing, mostly western districts of UP, to give their support to the party associated in UP with Charan Singh, the spokesman of the middle peasantry.

D. The middle peasantry and the Transformation of the Party System

The foregoing survey of the electoral history of UP in relation to rural social structure and regional imbalances suggests two broad conclusions in relation to the middle peasant sectors. One is that the small and middle peasantry, who control the bulk of the land in the countryside, have played a critical role in the transformation of the party system. The available evidence suggests that the discontent of the middle peasantry developed in the 1950s and intensified in the 1960s. That discontent arose out of frustration both with government policies on prices and procurement and with the fact that control over agricultural patronage in the districts was maintained by Congress supporters among the local landed elites, who naturally favoured themselves and their closest allies in distributing inputs and credit. During the 1950s and 1960s, the middle peasantry lacked a political spokesman with whom they could identify and whom they could trust to promote their interests. Consequently, their discontent was diffused among independent candidates. When Charan Singh broke from the Congress in 1967 and later formed the BKD, that discontent was gathered up and consolidated. It provided the principal base for BKD support in both the 1969 and 1974 elections and for the Janata party in 1977.

The second broad conclusion is that the discontent of the middle peasantry had a strong regional basis in the agriculturally more modernized western wheat-growing districts. Although it was demonstrated above that the BKD-SSP alliance in 1974 and the Janata coalition overcame the regional division between the western and eastern districts, the support bases of the BKD/BLD in 1974 and of the Janata in 1977 appeared to be different. BKD/BLD and Janata did not seem to be so firmly based on the middle peasantry in the rice-growing eastern districts. The BKD/BLD did succeed in capturing some support in 1974 in areas of concentration of marginal landholders, who are far

more important numerically in the eastern districts than in the western districts, but Janata did not retain this support in 1977. There remained, therefore, a continuing underlying regional difference in the political geography, as in the agricultural economy, of UP between the more prosperous, more market-dependent, more technologically oriented western wheat- and sugar cane-growing districts and the less prosperous, less market-dependent, less technologically oriented eastern districts, where rainfed paddy grown on small holdings is the principal crop.

V. Conclusion

Hobsbawm has argued that 'democratic electoral politics do not work for peasants as a class,' who 'tend to be election fodder, except when they demand or inhibit certain specialized political measures' [*Hobsbawm 1973: 19*]. These statements have a bold ring to them, but they are actually vague since Hobsbawm never makes clear his definition of the peasantry or what their class interests are. Linz, in contrast, after surveying patterns of voting behaviour in the rural areas of several European countries, concludes that European peasants in democratic countries were able to 'articulate and defend their divergent interests' through the party system and that, although 'democratic politics did not always serve rural interests', they 'gave the rural population a voice without forcing it to revolution or sullen apathy, as in most of the world' [*Linz 1976:424*] The evidence from the history of democratic electoral politics in UP supports Linz's point of view. In this Indian state, the system has worked for the peasantry in ways that go beyond blocking or achieving specific 'political measures'. While the system has provided little more than specific ameliorative measures for the rural poor, it has provided an effective vehicle for the articulation of both the interests and the discontent of what P. C. Joshi calls the 'intermediate classes' of former big tenants and medium landlords [*Joshi 1974*], who in UP are the 5- to 30-acre cultivators.

The post-Independence political and economic system of UP functioned for its first two decades under something of a contradiction. The Zamindari Abolition Act was designed to establish a social and economic order based on peasant pro-

prietorship, but it did not dispossess the former zamindars and talukdars. Moreover, many of the predominant leaders of the Congress in UP came not from peasant classes, but from professional classes, who accepted the Nehru ideology of planned, rapid, large-scale industrialization, with agriculture taking second place. Most also paid lip-service to the goal of establishing a system of cooperative farms in India, though it is difficult to believe that any but a few socialist diehards took this idea seriously. At any rate, the history of electoral politics in UP has been very largely influenced by this dual contradiction between the interests of the peasant proprietors and the interests of the former landlords on the one hand, and between the values associated with a political economy based on small-scale owner-cultivation and the values associated with rapid industrialization on the other. It is this dual contradiction which offers the most satisfactory explanation for the discontent of the peasantry in the 1950s and 1960s and its articulation ultimately through the BKD. The contradictions manifested themselves in political recruitment, in land reform, in economic development policies, and in the party system.

With regard to political recruitment, it is known that in the first three legislatures, MLAs whose fathers were former big and middle zamindars or peasant cultivators comprised a majority of the legislators in the UP legislative assemblies from 1952 to 1962. Many of those legislators whose fathers were cultivators did not themselves continue to practise agriculture, but in fact derived their main source of income from non-agricultural occupations, particularly the professions. Only 24 per cent of MLAs from 1952 to 1962 actually derived their principal income from cultivation.[20]

The available data on the social composition of legislators in the 1967 assembly do not differentiate MLAs with agricultural backgrounds. It is known that only 40 per cent of the Congress members and 54 per cent of the Jan Sangh members gave their occupation as agriculture [*Srivastava 1976: 354, 358*]. On the whole, therefore, the available evidence indicates that the peasantry have been underrepresented in relation especially to former landlords, big farmers, and professional persons. It was also mentioned above that the middle agricultural castes have been relatively less well represented than persons from

elite caste backgrounds. Nevertheless, it is also clear that a considerable proportion of the legislators in UP have come from peasant backgrounds. Moreover, the peasantry in UP have had an effective and articulate spokesman in Charan Singh, who himself belonged to the category of a legislator whose occupation at the time of his entry into politics was the law, but who came from a peasant background. In terms of political leadership and party cadres, therefore, one source of peasant discontent in the 1950s and 1960s may well have been the underrepresentation of peasants in politics, but it cannot be argued that the UP peasantry lacked class representation in the political system.

A second manifestation of both the dual contradiction and the influence of the peasantry in UP was the character of land reforms. The abolition of zamindari, the imposition of land ceilings, and the consolidation of landholdings all benefited principally the middle and large peasant proprietors. Proposals to introduce joint farming in UP, as elsewhere in India, were blocked. Land reform in UP clearly did not eliminate the political and economic influence of the former zamindars. Moreover, land ceilings in the state were placed at a level which permitted the biggest farmers to mechanize their operations. While in some respects, therefore, the interests of the bigger peasants and the capitalist farmers have converged, the evidence from the correlations suggested a divergence in their political identifications, with the biggest farmersr identifying with the Congress and the middle and large peasantry identifying with independents, the Jan Sangh, and the BKD.

Third, although economic development policies oriented towards large-scale industrialization and mechanized agriculture, to be financed by extraction of resources from the peasantry, were put forward in UP as elsewhere in India, they have been effectively blocked in UP. Large-scale industrial development has been very limited in UP since Independence, the state government has been unable to tax the peasantry, and economic policies have increasingly been oriented toward providing agricultural inputs to the peasantry. The 'green revolution' has been spreading during the past decade in this state, particularly in the wheat-producing regions. By all accounts, the big farmers have had greater access to and have benefited most

from the new inputs associated with the 'green revolution'. Consequently, although the interests of the 5- to 30-acre peasants again converged with those of the big farmers on economic development policies favouring agriculture, they diverged on the question of differential access to the new inputs and on differential ability to make use of them. The BKD, in its opposition to large-scale mechanized farming and its explicit support for an agricultural policy favouring the middle cultivating owners, appealed specifically and with considerable success to the class interest of the self-sufficient and the better-off peasantry.

Finally, the contradictions also found expression in the electoral system in UP. The evidence from the correlation analysis suggests that from 1957 onward the middle peasantry withdrew their support from the ruling Congress. Although the discontent of the peasantry was for a decade partly fragmented, finding expression largely through voting for independent candidates, it was more clearly channelled into support for the Jan Sangh in Oudh and ultimately was expressed in the striking success of the BKD in 1969 and in 1974. Moreover, the electoral support of the peasantry for the BKD brought the party and its leader, Charan Singh, to power. Although no government lasted for long during the turbulent period of coalition politics between 1967 and 1975, Charan Singh and his party were a leading force in the party system throughout this period. During this period, the state government passed a few acts and amendments to existing legislation to assist the peasantry, such as an amendment to the Zamindari Abolition Act that extended the right of transfer of their lands by *sirdars* to enable them to obtain bank loans for agricultural development [*Government of India 1971 : 75-6*], and an amendment to the Land Revenue A ct to provide cultivators with certified records of their land holdings [*Government of India 1975 : 76-7*]. An amendment to the Land Ceilings Act also was passed, permitting the distribution of surplus land on a permanent basis to eligible persons, rather than only to cooperative farming societies, as originally specified in the legislation [*Government of Ind'a 1973: 99*]. Parties of the left also took up the cause of the poor peasantry by securing exemption from the land revenue for cultivators holding less than 6.25 acres of land

(*Government of India 1975 : 76*). While numerous taxation measures were passed during these years, none increased the taxes or rents of the peasantry and no moves were made to reduce land ceilings. The full impact of the rise to power of the non-Congress parties cannot be seen through legislation, however, for many important decisions that affect agriculturists are taken at the local level in the cooperative credit societies and in the government agencies distributing agricultural inputs. In this respect, it is probable that the non-Congress parties wasted no time in shifting the distribution of resources and benefits to their supporters from the intermediate peasant classes.

The support of the middle peasantry also comprised a central component of the Janata victory in the 1977 state assembly elections, which brought the non-Congress groups to power again after their displacement by the Congress in the period between 1974 and the end of the Emergency in 1977. This second period of non-Congress rule in UP saw an even more vigorous attempt to promote peasant interests and agricultural development. Government policies were oriented virtually exclusively toward rural development, including agriculture, irrigation, rural small-scale cottage industries, construction of link roads, regulation of markets to prevent exploitation of the peasants by middlemen, flood protection schemes, and the like. Most important from the point of view of the peasantry was the UP Government's determination to insure a good return to the cultivators for sugar cane, the leading cash crop in the state. When production was high, the state government compelled the factories to continue crushing until all the cultivators had disposed of their cane. The state government went so far as to add its own subsidy to the cane price on top of the support prices awarded by the central government.[21]

Far from having been only 'election fodder', therefore, the middle and upper peasantry in UP have played a critical role in the electoral system, have found effective spokesmen for their class interests and have had their class interests protected. At the same time, the relatively weak representation of the middle peasantry in the Congress of Mrs. Gandhi, the break-up of the Janata coalition, and the return of Mrs. Gandhi to power at the central government in 1980 represent serious potential threats to peasant interests. The danger to the middle

peasantry lies in the possibility that Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress will move resolutely to resolve the dual contradiction between agrarian social structure and economic development strategy at their expense, by reverting to policies of rapid large-scale industrialization combined with measures to keep the poor content, such as rural works programs, cheap food, and tolerable wages for the industrial workforce. More drastic measures of agrarian reorganization such as land redistribution or the encouragement of large-scale joint or commercial farming are also possible, if less likely in the short term. Since many of these policies would involve diversion of resources from the rural to the urban sector, lower prices for farm products, and increased hostility between the middle peasantry on the one hand, and the rural poor and the biggest commercial farmers operating through bogus cooperative farms on the other hand, such policies would, without doubt, also be accompanied by widespread violence and the end of the parliamentary system in India. It is more likely, therefore, that Mrs. Gandhi's Congress will strive to divide the middle peasantry by coopting particular leaders, appealing to specific middle caste groups, and adopting economic policies that will ensure that the middle peasantry have access to inputs at reasonable cost and can sell their products at good prices. The adoption of such an accommodative policy toward the peasantry also would be more consistent with the maintenance of a competitive political regime.

NOTES & REFERENCES

*This paper was prepared during the tenure of grants from the EVIST program of the National Science Foundation and the Social Science Research Council. Neither agency is responsible for the accuracy of facts and statements presented herein or for the opinions expressed. I am grateful to Susanne Rudolph and Edwin Levy for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, to Jonathan Pool for some advice on methodology, and to Allen Kornmesser, who, as research assistant on this project, carried out much of the computer work and prepared many of the tables. Neither Jonathen Pool nor Allen Kornmesser is responsible for any methodological deficiencies or factual errors that remain.

[1]Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, cited in Singh and Misra (1964:68).

[2]For a concise summary and critique of the Zamindari Abolition Act, see Thorne [*1976:22-27*]. A more deatiled analysis may be found in Johnson (*1975: ch. iii*).

[3]Brass [*1968: 100:112*] describes these measures and the political con-

flict surrounding the land tax issue in its early phase; republished in *Caste, Faction apd Party in Indian Politics*, Volume I: *Faction and Party* (New Delhi: Chanakya, 1984), pp. 269 lf.

[4]For an analysis of the spread of the 'green revolution' technology and its political consequences, see Frankel (*1971: ch. iii*).

[5]The literature on the 'green revolution' is enormous. On these points, see, for example, Frankel [*1971: 192-196*]; Franda [*1972: 1-6*]; Byres [*1972: 102-110*], and Mellor [*1976· 48ff. and 82-89*].

[6]The average population of the district in U.P. in 1961 was over a million, that of the tahsil was approximately 275,000.

[7]This regional division differs somewhat from other efforts to define the internal boundaries of U.P. The division used here attemps to combine ecological and historical features, but sometimes choices have to be made between the two. Thus, I have chosen to retain the historical unity of Oudh because of the special features of its land tenure system rather than to divide it according to differences in terrain and agricultural economy. However, *cf.* Brass [*1965: 6-8*] and Government of India [*1966: 1-3*].

[8]They are defined in Govenrment of India [*1953: 228-248*].

[9]The figures in*ibid.* are based on total rural population, whereas those compiled for Table 1 used total population as the base.

[10]On this point, see also Johnson [*1975: ch. iii*].

[11]The difficulty arises from the fact that although the definition of an agricultural labourer remained the same in both 1961 and 1971, considerable leeway was given to the enumerators to list persons as agricultural labourers if work on land held or owned by others was their major activity even if they also owned some land. However, I have not seen any adequate discussion of the issue in the census volumes.

[12]The categories used here follow largely Mencher and the Communisty Pary of India. *Cf.* Mencher [*1974: 1495-1503*] and Ahmed [*1968: 15-16*].

[13][*Government of Uttar Pradesh, Board of Revenue, 1973: 47-48*). The corresponding figures from the 1961 census are substantially different, showing 34.7 per cent in the marginal category, 42.1 per cent small farmers, 21.2 per cent holding from 7.5 to 30 acres—roughly corresponding to the medium group in the 1971 census—and 1.3 per cent large holdings. The difference arises from the fact that the 1961 unit of enumeration was the cultivating household, which might comprise several adult males, each one operating a marginal holding, which would, therefore, reduce the proportions shown in the marginal size categories and increase the proportions in the middle and medium categories in contrast to 1971. See Table 4 for a detailed break-up of the 1961 census data on landholding size categories.

[14].Moreover, as indicated in the previous footnote, if one accepts the 1961 census categories based on cultivating households, the numbers assigned to the small and middle peasantry are even larger.

[15] For various statements of Congress policy on agrarian issues, see the publications of the Indian National Congress listed in the References

and also Nehru [*1959*].

[16]Some examples of CPI policy statements on agriculture are the following: Ahmed [*1972*]; Rajeswara Rao *et. al.* [*1970*]; Communist Party of India [*1968*]; and the AIKS journal, *Indian Peasant*.

[17]The tables are not, however, presented here because of space consideration.

[18]The ordinally-ranked data are not reported in detail here, but are contained in the data files for this project. For a description of the *kisan* movement in Pratapgarh and the role of the talukdars in district politics there, see Burger [*1969: ch. v*].

[19]This point is demonstrated very clearly also in Kornmesser (*1976:37*).

[20].The data in the previous paragraph are from Meyer (*1969: 91 and 156-60*).

[21]Interview in Lucknow, July 25, 1979.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, Z.A., 1968, 'Class Differentiations in Indian Agrarian Society', *Indian Peasant*, Vo. I, No. 1.

Ahmed, Z.A., 1972, *Ceiling on Agricultural Land*, New Delhi: Commnnist Party of India.

Bharatiya Jan Sangh, 1973, *Party Documents*, Vol. 2: *Resolutions on Economic Affairs*. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jan Sangh.

Bharatiya Kranti Dal, 1969, *Election Manifesto*, Lucknow: Bharatiya Kranti Dal.

Brass, Paul R., 1965, *Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brass Paul R., 1968, Uttar Pradesh', in Myron Weiner (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brass, Paul R., 1976, 'Leadership Conflict and the Disintegration of the Indian Socialist Movement: Personal Ambition, Power, and Policy', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XIV, No. 1.

Brass, Paul R., 1978 'Indian Election Studies', *South Asia*, Vol. I, No. 2.

Byres, T.J., 'The Dialectic of India's Green Revolution', *South Asian Review*, Vol. V.

Communist Party of India, 1968, *Nineteenth Session of the All-India Kisan Sabha, Amravati, 10-12 January, 1968: Proceedings and Resolutions*, New Delhi: All-India Kisan Sabha.

Franda, Marcus F., 1972, *Policy Responses to India's Green Revolution*, American Universities Fieldstaff Reports, South Asia Series, Vol. XVI, No. 9.

Frankel, Francine P., 1971, *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs*, Princeton: Princton University Press.

Government of India, 1952, *Census of Indiā 1951*, Vol. II: *Uttar Pradesh* Pt. II-A: *General Population Tables*, by Rajeshwari Prasad, Allaha-

bad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, Uttar Pradesh.

Government of India, 1953, *Census of India, 1951*, Vol. II: *Uttar Pradesh*, Pt. I-A *Report*, by Rajeshwari Prasad, Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationary.

Government of India, 1964, *Census of India 1961*, Vol. XV: *Uttar Pradesh*, Pt. II-A: *General Population Tables*, by P.P. Bhatnagar, Delhi: Manager of Publications.

Government of India, 1966a, *Census of India, 1961*, Vol. I, Pt. I-A, (i) *India: Levels of Regional Development in India*, by A. Mitra, Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery.

Government of India, 1966b, *Census of India, 1961*, Vol. XV: *Uttar Pradesh*, Pt. III-A: *Household Economic Tables*, by P.P. Bhatnagar, Delhi: Manager of Publications.

Government of India, 1975, *Census of India, 1971*, Series 21: *Uttar Pradesh*, Pt. II-A: *General Population Tables*, by D.M. Sinha, Delhi: Controller of Publications.

Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, 1976, *Report of the National Commission on Agrieulture*, Pt. XV: *Agrarian Reforms*, Delhi; Manager of Publications.

Government of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, 1948, *Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee*, Vols. I and II, Allahabad: Superintendent Printing and Stationary.

Government of Uttar Pradesh, Board of Revenue, 1973, *Agricultural Census in Uttar Pradesh, 1970-71*, (no publication details).

Indian National Congress, 1951, *Election Manifesto*, New Delhi: All India Congress Committee (AICC).

India National Congress, 1961a, *Election Manifesto, 1962*, New Delhi: AICC.

Indian National Congress, 1961b, *Questions and Answers*, New Delhi: AICC.

Indian National Congress, 1961c, *Agriculture in India*, New Delhi: Congress Party in Parliament.

Janata Party, 1977, *Election Manifesto, 1977*, New Delhi: Janata Party.

Johnson, Michael H., 1975, The Relation Between Land Settlement and Party Politics in Uttar Pradesh, India, 1950-69: With Special Reference to the Formation of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Sussex.

Masani, M.R. 1966, *Why Swatantra?*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Mellor John W., 1976, *The New Economics of Growth: A Strategy for India and the Developing World*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mencher, Joan, 1974, 'Problems in Analysing Rural Class Structure', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. IX, No. 35.

Meyer, Ralph C., 1969, The Political Elite in an Underdeveloped Society: The case of Uttar Pradesh, India, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.

Narendra Dev, Acharya, 1946, *Socialism and the National Revolution*, Bombay: Padma Publication.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 1959, *Co-operative Farming*, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat.

Praja Socialist Party, 1970, *Election Manifesto, 1971*, in *Handbook of Election Manifestos 1971*, Bombay: Commerce.

Rajeswara Rao, C. *et. al.*, 1970, *Problems of India's Agrarian Sector*, New Delhi: Communist Party of India.

Samyukta Socialist Party, 1970 *Election Manifesto, 1971*, New Delhi: SSP.

Singh, Baljit and Misra, Shridhar, 1964, *A Story of Land Reforms in Uttar Pradesh*, Honolulu: East-West Center Press.

Srivastava, Saraswati, 1976, 'Uttar Pradesh: Politics of Neglected Development', in Iqbal Naraln (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan.

Thorner, Daniel, 1976, *The Agrarian Prospect in India*, 2nd ed., Columbia, Missouri: South Asia Books.

Torri, Michaelguglielmo, 1976, 'Economic Policy and Political Gains: The First Phase of India's Green Revolution (1966-71)', *Asia Quarterly*, No. 1.

Weiner, Myron and Field, John O. (eds.), 1977, *Studies in Electoral Politics in the Indian States*, Vol. III: *The Impact of Modernization*, Delhi: Manohar Book Service.

4

Congress, the Lok Dal, and the Middle-Peasant Castes: An Analysis of the 1977 and 1980 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh*

The dramatic changes that have taken place in Indian politics in the past five years have their roots in the post-Independence political history of north India, particularly of the state of Uttar Pradesh, the largest state in the Indian Union and the home of four of the five prime ministers of the country. It has been widely noted that the "Emergency" imposed upon India by Mrs. Gandhi for two years between 1975 and

*Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the Special Currency Program of the Smithsonian Institution, which provided funds for me to visit India in December 1979. I am especially grateful to Francine Berkowitz of the Smithsonian Institution for her part in facilitating arrangements for this grant and the trip. I also owe thanks to Carolyn Brown for the use of her van, driver, and research assistant—Prahlad Misra—who toured with me in western U.P.; to Dr. D.P. Singh, Professor and Head, Department of Public Administration, University of Lucknow, who provided me hospitality in Lucknow; and to his children Ravi and Mahendra Singh, who toured with me in Oudh and the Eastern Districts. Finally, I want to thank John Wood, Allen Kornmesser, and an anonymous reviewer for *Pacific Affairs*, all of whom read the first draft of this article and made detailed criticisms and suggestions that substantially affected the final result. The responsibility for statements of fact, interpretation, and opinion is, of course, my own.

Reprinted with permission from *Pacific Affairs*, 1981, 54: 5-41.

1977 affected the north Indian states more than the south and that Mrs. Gandhi's overwhelming defeat in the 1977 elections and the success of Janata was principally a consequence of the nearly total sweep of the parliamentary seats in that election in every state in the north. By the same token, the ability of the Congress to recoup most of its losses in the north Indian Hindi-speaking states by winning 144 seats there in 1980, compared to only 2 in 1977, made it possible for the Congress and Mrs. Gandhi to regain power at the Center.

In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the conflicts for control of the government of India that have been going on for the past five years, during which the Emergency and the 1977 and 1980 elections have been dramatic focal points, have been almost entirely a playing-out on the national stage of social and political conflicts that have their origin in the north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which contain between them approximately 150 million people. The leading political actors and forces who have articulated those conflicts, excepting Morarji Desai, all have come from U.P. and Bihar: Mrs. Gandhi, Charan Singh, Raj Narain and H.N. Bahuguna from U.P.; Jayaprakash Narayan and Jagjivan Ram from Bihar: and the Jan Sangh, with its principal strength in U.P., Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. The issues that have overlaid the struggle for power at the Center also have derived largely, though not exclusively, from persistent political and social problems in the north: Hindu-Muslim conflict and violence, widespread student unrest, the differential impact of the Green Revolution on regions and rural social classes, the failure of industrialization to provide off-farm employment for the rural poor, and the consequent increasing discontent of the low castes and landless laborers in the countryside.

The significance of the north in the Emergency and in the 1977 and 1980 elections has been widely noted, but analysis of the sources of its importance in the social and political conflicts of the region have been neglected in the undue and misplaced attempts to read into the election results a great victory for Indian democracy or to explain them in terms of the specific issues articulated during the campaigns. The 1977 election results were hailed by most observers of Indian politics as a virtually unprecedented restoration of a democratic system by popular vote and

as a confirmation of the deep commitment of the Indian populace, rich and poor alike, to the values of democracy and parliamentarism. Specific factors associated with Mrs. Gandhi's regime also were pinpointed as particularly important in her defeat: the sterilization campaign, demolition of squatter houses, the curtailment of civil liberties in general, and the increased prominence of Mrs. Gandhi's son, Sanjay. Similar comments were made about the 1980 elections. Once again, journalists praised the Indian public for their commitment to democracy by throwing out yet another unpopular regime. Again also, specific factors were identified as especially important to the result—namely, prices and shortages of basic commodities and the discontent of the Indian public with the "politics of defection."

Yet, clearly the more sweeping interpretations of the 1977 and 1980 elections are wrong: since Mrs. Gandhi never expressed any genuine regrets for imposing the Emergency regime, it is not possible to see *both* elections as expressing deep commitment by Indian voters to democracy. As for the more specific explanations, they are not wrong, only superficial: they ignore the deeper patterns revealed in these elections that have developed during the past thirty years of north Indian political and social history and that set the stage for the Emergency and its overthrow, as well as for the return of Mrs. Gandhi to power.

The purpose of this article is to examine these underlying patterns of behavior of the leading social forces in U.P. in the elections of 1977 and 1980 and to trace the development of the social conflicts that were expressed in those two elections. Although this article focusses on the state of U P., many of the patterns described here apply also to Bihar.[1] The remainder of the article is divided into four parts. The first part summarizes the main features of the electoral history of U.P. and offers an explanation for the rise of the Janata party and its sweep of the 1977 elections. The second part examines the break-up of the Janata coalition and the setting of the stage for the 1980 elections. The third part presents a detailed analysis of the electoral history of five rural constituencies in U.P. The conclusions are presented in the fourth part.

The Electoral History of U.P. and the Rise of the Janata Party

Table 1 presents the results of the seven parliamentary elections in U.P. Three features of those results should be noted. The first concerns the overall decline of support for the Congress: having achieved its peak electoral support in 1952, when it polled 53 per cent of the vote, it began to decline thereafter to 46 per cent in 1957, 38 per cent in 1962, and to less than one-third of the popular vote in 1967. Although the Congress popular vote share increased markedly in 1971, it dropped even more severely in 1977 and then reverted to somewhat above one-third of the popular vote in 1980. It is especially important to note that the decline of the Congress was most pronounced in a tract of eight agriculturally prosperous districts near Delhi, between the Ganges and the Jumna rivers, known as the Upper Doab. This tract is also the home of Chaudhuri Charan Singh and the center of his Jat caste in U.P., the leading owner-cultivator caste not only of the Upper Doab, but of the adjoining state of Haryana as well. Finally, it is also the most politicized region of the state with the highest turnout rate in every election. In the parliamentary constituencies of these districts, the median vote share for the Congress declined from 58.2 per cent in 1952 to 30.3 per cent in 1980. In 1952, the Congress won every seat in these districts. In 1980, the Congress won only 2 out of 14, whereas the Lok Dal won 11 and Janata 1.

The leading causes of discontent in this region arose from two sources: the continued dominance of politics and patronage in most of these districts by the elite Brahman and Rajput castes in the countryside and by urban trading castes in the towns; and the failure of the government to provide desired incentives of capital inputs and prices to increase the profitability of agriculture for the main cultivating castes, especially the Jats. From 1957 until 1969, the discontent of the middle proprietary castes in this region was expressed in the form of voting for independents and other small parties,[2] but no single opposition party was able to organize this discontent until Charan Singh defected from the Congress in 1967 and founded in 1969 the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) as a party of agrarian interests, representing the peasant proprietors.

A second noteworthy feature of the electoral history of U.P.

TABLE 1

Percentage of Votes Polled by Political Parties in Uttar Pradesh Parliamentary Elections, 1952-1980

*Political Party**	*1952*	*1957*	*1962*	*1967*	*1971*	*1977*	*1980*
Congress	52.99	46.29	38.20	33.04	48.56	24.99	35.90
Congress (O)	(Founded in 1969)				8.58	—	—
Socialist Party	12.94	5.67	8.64	—	0.24	—	—
Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP)	4.90	—	—	—	—	—	—
Praja Socialist Party (PSP)		15.34	10.35	3.74	0.23	—	—
Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)	(Founded in 1964)			10.27	4.10	—	—
Jan Sangh	7.29	14.79	17.57	22.58	12.28	—	—
Hindu Mahasabha (HMS)	1.91	—	1.39	—	0.07	0.12	—
Scheduled Caste Federation/ Republican Party of India (RPI)	2.88	—	4.27	4.07	—	—	0.16
Communist Party of India (CPI)	0.35	1.67	3.63	3.75	3.70	1.10	1.63
Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM)	(Founded in 1964)			0.71	0.19	0.10	0.10

Swatantra	(Founded in 1959)		5.04	4.77	0.05	—	—
Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD)	(Founded in 1967)				12.70	—	—
Janata/Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD)	(BLD founded in 1974, Janata in 1977)					68.08	22.57
Lok Dal	(Founded in 1979)						29.02
Independents and Unsuccessful Parties	16.76	16.24	10.91	17.08	9.31	5.61	10.62
Total	100.02	100.00	100.00	100.1	100.01	100.00	100.00

Sources: Compiled from official reports of the Election Commission of India and from G.G. Mirchandani, *The People's Verdict* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980).

*All parties that won at least one seat in one election are included. The KMPP also is included in 1952, though it did not win a seat, to facilitate comparison of the 1957 PSP vote with the vote of its two pre-merger progenitors, the SP and the KMPP. The figure for the Socialist Party in 1957 is for the Lohia Socialists, who broke away from the PSP and fought the 1957 elections as Independents.

has been the relative weekness of the radical leftist opposition. However, the Socialists, particularly the radical wing, did establish a consistent base of support that stabilized around the 10 per cent level in the central and eastern districts of the state which in contrast to west U.P. and the Upper Doab, have been agriculturally less advanced and have a very large population of marginal landholders and landless laborers. In these districts, as elsewhere in the state, the Congress organization in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by the elite proprietary castes of Brahmans and Rajputs. The radical wing of the Socialists here appealed, with considerable success, to those who were either excluded from or were junior partners in the Congress coalition—namely, the middle cultivating castes of Ahirs (Yadavs)[3] and Kurmis; a higher status proprietary caste, the Bhumihars; and the landless laborers.

The third important feature of the electoral history of U.P. has been the rise of the Jan Sangh as the leading and best-organized non-Congress party in the state, with a popular support base above 22 per cent in the 1967 elections. The Jan Sangh was a party of militant Indian nationalism, which drew its symbols from the Hindu religion and the Sanskrit and Hindi languages, and whose strength was confined to north India, including Punjab, Haryana, U.P., Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. It, and especially its principal organizational prop, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), were widely considered to be anti-Muslim, as they were usually opposed to educational and linguistic concessions demanded by the Muslim minority. In U.P., the Jan Sangh—like the Congress—drew its main support from the elite castes of Brahmans, Rajputs and Kayasthas, and from the Vaishya castes in the towns. Moreover, like other non-Congress parties in U.P., it developed a strong regional support base—in this case, the central plains districts of Oudh, once the homeland of the great landlords of U.P., known as the *talukdars*. For some time the party drew heavily upon the support and resources of several of the *talukdari* families, but eventually it succeeded in establishing itself more broadly in this region as the principal voice for the leading proprietary communities, including many from among the backward cultivating castes of Ahirs (Yadavs) and Kurmis. In Oudh as well as other regions, then, the Congress support base among the important land-con-

trolling communities had been eroded as early as the 1960s.

Before we can comprehend the social significance of the rise of the BKD and the Janata party, we need to examine the consequences for the Congress support-base of the party splits that occurred between 1967 and 1969. In 1967 Charan Singh left the Congress. For many years he had been the principal spokesman in the U.P. government on behalf of rural, peasant interests and values and had developed a network of relationships in the U.P. districts among the middle-caste groups in the state, particularly Jats and Yadavs. Following his defection from the Congress in the U.P. legislature, he joined forces with the opposition to form and lead the first non-Congress government in the history of the province. Although only seventeen persons left the Congress with him in April 1967, Charan Singh had the broader support of the middle proprietary communities, particularly in western U.P. This fact was demonstrated by the dramatic rise of his party, the BKD, to second position behind the Congress in the 1969 legislative assembly elections and again in the 1971 parliamentary elections, by its emergence as the leading party in the Upper Doab in the 1969 legislative assembly elections (with 31 per cent of the vote), and by the strong positive correlations between its vote share and the percentage of landholdings above five acres in the plains districts of the state as a whole.[4]

The defection of Charan Singh in 1967 was far more significant for the future of the Congress in U.P. than was the major split which occurred in the Congress in 1969. Also, because of the critical importance of U.P. nationally, it was to be very significant for political developments in the central government in the 1970s. Insofar as U.P. is concerned, the Congress split of 1969 involved the departure of the Gupta faction, a largely urban-based political machine, but one with connections also to important landed groups—particularly Rajputs—in the countryside. After the split, Mrs. Gandhi attempted to reabsorb the Charan Singh forces into the Congress (I) and even supported a minority BKD government led by him in 1970. However, when Charan Singh refused—or proved unable to deliver the parliamentary BKD delegation—to support the Congress government at the Center, Mrs. Gandhi withdrew the support of the Congress in U.P. from Charan Singh's government. Gandhi's landslide victory in the 1971 parliamentary elections made it

unnecessary for her to seek an alliance with Charan Singh thereafter. From 1971 onwards, therefore, she sought to maintain control of U.P. through the remnant of the Congress organization in the state, which was left in the hands primarily of Brahman politicians and their allies.

However, it deserves to be noted that, despite the defection of the Charan Singh forces before the 1969 election in U.P. and the loss of the Gupta faction thereafter, the total support for Mrs. Gandhi's Congress was consistent at one-third of the popular vote in both the 1969 and 1974 state assembly elections and, after the dramatic fluctuations of the 1971 and 1977 parliamentary elections, remained at about that same level in the parliamentary elections of 1980. How can this stability of the Congress vote—albeit at a low level—be explained in the face of the erosion of its base among the middle proprietary castes ? The Congress was able to hold onto its one-third share of the total vote partly by retaining its support among the influential rural Brahman and some Rajput castes, and partly by drawing upon varied and heterogeneous groups of supporters that any large political party is bound to collect because of its superior organization and, in the case of the Congress, its control of government patronage. At the same time, the party managed to increase its support among the rural poor, the landless and the Scheduled Castes, by such measures as allotting land to Scheduled Castes for cultivation and house sites, establishing the Small Farmers' Development Agency and the Marginal Farmer and Agricultural Labour Agency, and abolishing forced labor. Thus, under Mrs. Gandhi's domination, the Congress in U.P., which had been always conceived by both scholars and journalists as a great, broad-based party of the Center, became a party of extremes—but of opposite extremes—comprising within its fold the old dominant landlord and leading proprietary communities of Brahmans and Rajputs and the rural poor and landless. Largely disaffiected from the Congress was the band of middle cultivating groups, generally less influential and less widespread than the Brahman and Rajput groups, but forming a broad and diverse alliance of varying local importance.

Needless to say, the above description understates the complexity of the support bases of the various political parties in

U P., which have often varied from constituency to constituency and election to election, depending upon the state of local rivalries, the castes of local candidates, and the interrelationships among local, provincial, and national leaders. Nevertheless, I believe it to be valid as an account of the core regional and caste support bases of the U.P. parties through the 1969 elections. Between 1969 and 1977, two steps were taken which built upon the shifts in party support bases noted above and ultimately led to the great Janata sweep in the 1977 elections. The first was the dismantling of the Socialist movement in U.P. principally by Raj Narain'[5] and the decision to merge its most vital segment, the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), with Charan Singh's BKD in 1974. This merger had the effect of giving the BKD more balanced support between western and eastern U.P. In the process, though not entirely because of the alliance with the SSP, the BKD—by now renamed the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD)—extended its support base among the middle cultivating castes, particularly among the Ahirs (Yadavs), who are the largest cultivating caste in the central and eastern districts of the state. The BLD also succeeded in winning some support in areas where low-caste groups are concentrated.

The second step toward the grand electoral sweep of 1977 was the formation of the Janata party itself which, insofar as U.P. was concerned, meant the addition to the BLD of the Jan Sangh strength. Since the Jan Sangh support base was strongest in the central districts of the state and among the middle and rich peasantry, the Janata was now in a position that only the Congress had occupied before. It had become a coalition with strong and relatively even support across the length and breadth of this vast and populous state. Not only had it gained a solid base of support among particular castes, particularly Jats and Ahirs (Yadavs), but it also had gathered into its fold large segments from the middle and rich peasantry of other communities. Moreover, it received some support from Scheduled Castes and Muslims because of developments during the Emergency that turned many from these groups away from the Congress and towards Janata—particularly, the demolition of squatter houses, the rumors about forced sterilizations, the killing of Muslims in Muzaffarnagar, and the call by the Shahi Imam of the Jama Masjid in Delhi to support the Janata party. However, the

principal social significance of the Janata party in U.P. was the successful formation of a broad-based party of the Center with the middle and rich peasantry at its core.

The Break-up of the Janata Coalition and the Prelude to the 1980 Elections

The Janata victory in the 1977 elections was built principally upon a coalition of three major social forces—the middle and rich peasantry, the Muslims, and the Scheduled Castes who had become disaffected from the Congress during the Emergency. That coalition broke apart because of both external pressures and internal contradictions that have their sources in the social fabric of north India and the multiple cleavages of that society with which coalition leaders must cope in order to succeed. The Janata retained its central core of support among the peasantry throughout its two-year rule, but such support depended largely on the identification of the peasantry with Charan Singh, the leading advocate of and most articulate sopkesman for this much-maligned social category. The depth of that support was clearly demonstrated during the period that Charan Singh withdrew from the Janata government, between June 1978 and January 1979. In December 1978, in the largest and most impressive demonstration ever carried out in Delhi for a political cause, five million *kisans* (peasants) expressed their firm commitment to Charan Singh and his pro-peasant policies.

As Home Minister before his exit from the Cabinet, Charan Singh was not able to accomplish much of significance for the peasantry directly, even though his ideas provided much of the guiding force behind the Janata government's policies in favor of agriculture and rural industries. Throughout his tenure he remained dissatisfied with the overall budget allocation for agricultural research and production-related measures, which he thought should be doubled. He also failed to persuade the government to support a higher price for sugar cane. His advocacy of such measures, however, was well known to his supporters and made his withdrawal from the government appear to be a consequence of its failure to do enough for the peasantry.

After his reinduction into the Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Charan Singh was able to

implement two measures of direct benefit to the peasantry. One was a reduction, by 50 per cent, of the excise duty on artificial fertilizer. The other was the transfer of the excise duty on tobacco from the grower to the manufacturer, a move which benefited mainly the *kisans* in south India. Both these measures occurred in a budget that otherwise bore down heavily—particularly on the urban sectors—with excise duties and other taxes on consumer goods. In these and other ways, Charan Singh and his followers made clear their conviction that cities tended to get better breaks in such matters as taxation, resource allocation, price policies and availability of credit—and showed their determination to do something about it.

Charan Singh's base among the middle peasantry of north India was also reinforced by the selection of people from middle and "backward" castes[6] as chief ministers of three north Indian states—Chaudhuri Devi Lal, a Jat, in Haryana; Ram Naresh Yadav, an Ahir, in U.P.; and Karpuri Thakur, from a caste of barbers (Hajjam), in Bihar. These state governments in turn took measures on behalf of agricultural development, and in support of the backward castes in particular, that ensured continued support for Charan Singh and his allies in the north. Some of those measures—such as the Bihar policy of reserving a percentage of places in government service and in schools and colleges for the backward castes—were also quite controversial and drove the wedge more deeply between the upper-caste groups and the middle cultivating and artisan castes.

During his brief tenure as Prime Minister of India, Charan Singh was not able to do much more for the peasantry. However, he supported the establishment of a very high cane-price in north India that partially offset the considerable losses because of the poor monsoon rains in the summer before the 1980 elections. This measure could not have been more timely: the elections of January 1980 were held precisely during the period that cane is harvested in north India.

Though the Janata—or rather Charan Singh—was able to retain the support of the middle peasantry, it had already lost its hold over the other two elements of its 1977 coalition even before the disintegration of the coalition at the leadership level in July 1979. Muslim support was weakened by the failure of the central government and the governments in U.P. and Bihar

to make any significant concessions concerning the use of the Urdu language, by the slowness of the central government in framing a new Aligarh Muslim University Act that would guaranteee the future Muslim character of the University, by the appointment of a non-Muslim, Minoo Masani, to head the new Minorities Commission established by the Janata government, and by an increased incidence of Hindu-Muslim communal riots. The support of the Scheduled Castes was weakened by the failure of the Janata leadership to name Jagjivan Ram as Prime Minister and, more importantly, by the growing attenion given to the tension between Scheduled Castes and middle proprietary castes in the countryside, especially in north and central India. The press and Mrs. Gandhi were giving wide publicity to several particularly violent incidents in which Scheduled Castes were killed at Belchi in Bihar, at Pantnagar and in Agra in U.P., and at other places.[7]

Although the collapse of the Janata coalition was due primarily to competition among the top leaders for preeminence and the Prime Ministership and struggles for power among the original party constituents, social contradictions in the coalition also were important during the several crises that occurred during its two years in power. Of particular importance in this regard was the conflict for control over the chief ministerships of the north Indian states, in which the chief protagonists were the former BLD group of Charan Singh and the former Jan Sangh. As already noted, Charan Singh and the BLD were able to place in power as chief ministers in Haryana, U.P., and Bihar persons from backward castes. Eventually, however, all three were displaced in a continuing struggle for power.

Throughout these struggles for control over the north Indian states and over the Janata party organization, issues concerning the relative political and economic status of elite, backward, and Scheduled Castes and concerning Hindu-Muslim relations were ever-present. Eventually, the followers of Jagjivan Ram tended to ally with the Jan Sangh in conflicts with Charan Singh's BLD group. Members of the Scheduled Castes, who often suffered at the hands of dominant peasant-proprietor groups from the backward castes, were clearly opposed to any measures enhancing the influence of those whom they already saw as locally powerful and whose political spokesmen were their rivals

for power in state politics. Consequently, they sought an alignment with the Jan Sangh, both because they hoped that Jagjivan Ram would become Prime Minister with Jan Sangh support and because they opposed concessions to the backward castes. For their own part, elite-caste followers of the former Jan Sangh objected to the BLD group's policies favoring reservation of jobs in services and colleges for backward castes, as decreasing their own opportunities for advancement. The BLD leaders, caught in a crossfire between both ends of the caste order, attempted to divert attention from the backward caste issue to the Hindu-Muslim issue, by describing the conflict as an attempt by the RSS elements in the Janata to gain control of the party and destroy its secular character.

It is a measure of the significance of these two contradictions in north Indian society—in the caste order and in Hindu-Muslim relations—that as the Janata coalition fell apart socially as well as politically, the Congress of Mrs. Gandhi rebuilt its old coalition of the late 1960s by capitalizing on the discontent of the elite castes, the Scheduled Castes, and the Muslims. It is movement back and forth from within these three broad groupings that largely explains the dramatic shifts in voting from 1971 to 1977 and from 1977 to 1980.

Five Constituencies in Uttar Pradesh

The development of the social contradicitions discussed above, the ways in which the political parties have been affected by these contradictions and have tried to control them to their own advantage, and the ways in which such phenomena have been perceived by voters can best be brought out by a detailed examination of several rural constituencies in U.P. Five constituencies have been selected, drawn from four regions of the state.[7] (The detailed election results for each of the constituencies for 1977 and 1980 are given in Table 2.) Each constituency chosen illustrates a different aspect of the main social conflicts that have been prominent in U.P. politics, but there are also certain patterns common to all. The history of each constituency will be discussed and then followed by an analysis of the strategies of the parties in the 1980 elections and of the likely voting behavior of particular categories of voters based on

TABLE 2

Election Results for Five Parliamentary Constituencies in Uttar Pradesh, 1977 and 1980

Constituency/Year/(Turnout percentage)	*Candidate*	*Caste*	*Party*	*Votes Polled*	*Percentage of Total Valid Votes*
Naini Tal 1980 (51.68)	N.D. Tewari	Brahman	Cong. (I)	163, 117	50.58
	Bharat Bhushan	Agarwal	Janata	58, 695	18.20
	Pratap Singh	Rajput	Lok Dal	49, 506	15.35
	8 Other Candidates			54, 069	15.86
	Total Valid Votes			322, 387	99.99
Naini Tal 1977 (60.45)	Bharat Bhushan	Agarwal	BLD[a]	196, 304	61.70
	K.C. Pant	Brahman	Cong. (I)	111, 658	35.09
	2 Other Candidates			10, 208	3.21
	Total Valid Votes			318, 170	100.00
Aligarh 1980 (50.22)	Indra Kumari	Rajput	Lok Dal	128, 353	38.49
	Ghanshyam Singh	Rajput	Cong. (I)	110, 375	33.10
	Sangram Singh	Rajput	Janata	61, 158	18.34
	23 Other Candidates			33, 613	10.08
	Total Valid Votes			333, 499	100.01
Aligarh 1977 (64.79)	Nawab Singh Chauhan	Rajput	BLD	280, 811	70.85
	Ghanshyam Singh	Rajput	Cong. (I)	90, 053	22.72
	4 Other Candidates			25, 492	6.43
	Total Valid Votes			396, 356	100.00
Baghpat 1980 (70.34)	Charan Singh	Jat	Lok Dal	323, 077	65.21
	R.C. Vikal	Gujar	Cong. (I)	157, 956	31.88
	Dhara Singh[b]	Gujar	Janata	3, 843	0.78

			8 Other Candidates			10, 591	2.14
			Total Valid Votes			495, 467	100.01
Baghpat	1977	(74.83)	Charan Singh	Jat	BLD	286, 301	63.47
			R.C. Vikal	Gujar	Cong. (I)	164, 763	36.53
			Total Vaild Votes			451, 064	100 00
Gonda	1980	(35.18)	Anand Singh	Rajput	Cong. (I)	125, 196	52.29
			Kaushalendra Datt	Brahman	Lok Dal	52, 270	21.83
			Satya Deo Singh	Rajput	Janata	38, 849	16.23
			7 Other Candidates			23, 106	9.65
			Total Valid Votes			239, 421	100.00
Gonda	1977	(45.25)	Satya Deo Singh	Rajput	BLD	157, 963	59.76
			Anand Singh	Rajput	Cong. (I)	86, 690	32.80
			Gopal Chand	Not Known	Ind.	19, 656	7.44
			Total Valid Votes			264, 309	100.00
Deoria	1980	(46.68)	Ramayan Rai	Bhumihar	Cong. (I)	110, 014	32.83
			Ram Dhari Shastri	Sainthwar	Lok Dal	109, 937	32.81
			Ugra Sen	Rajput	Janata	81, 337	24.27
			5 Other Candidates			33, 823	10.09
			Total Valid Votes			335, 111	100.00
Deoria	1977	(55.12)	Ugra Sen	Rajput	BLD	258, 864	77.15
			Vishwa Nath	Brahman	Cong. (I)	76, 691	22.85
			Total Valid Votes			335, 555	100.00

Sources: 1980 election returns are provisional and were provided through the courtesy of the Election Commission of India; 1977 returns are from Government of India, Election Commission, ***Report on the Sixth General Election to the House of the People in India***, 1977, vol. II (Statistical) (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1978).

[a]BLD=Bharatiya Lok Dal, which was the Janata Party in U.P. in 1977.

[b]Dhara Singh withdrew towards the end of the campaign in favor of the Congress (I) candidate.

interviews with voters, non-voters, and knowledgeable observers carried out in December 1979 before the elections. The interviews were not random in the scientific sense and do not provide a basis for an accurate account of the detailed voting results in each constituency. They have been used to provide some insight into the ways in which persons from different castes, communities, and economic levels perceive the parties and the social conflicts in U.P. The interpretations of events in each constituency, therefore, which are closer to guesses than to scientific judgments, are less important than the broader historical patterns and the similarities in the statements of categories of voters across the several constituencies.

Naini Tal Constituency

Naini Tal constituency comprised in 1980 all of Naini Tal district, including both plains and hills regions, and a small part of Bareilly district. The district had a population of 790,080 in 1971.[9] The constituency had an electorate of 645,203 in 1980. There is only one town in the district with a population above 50,000—Haldwani. Nearly 18 per cent of the population of the district in 1971 was from Scheduled Castes, and another 6.65 per cent was from Scheduled Tribes. There are several unusual social and demographic features of the district that are relevant to its electoral behavior. One is the very high proportion of elite castes to the total Hindu population: according to the last caste census in U.P. in 1931, the Brahman castes comprised 19 per cent of the population, the Rajputs 26 per cent.[10] A second demographic feature is the very high proportion of migrants of the total population, composed of refugees from the Pakistan Punjab, veterans, "political sufferers"[11] who have settled on *tarai* land reclaimed from jungle since Independence, and tens of thousands of agricultural laborers from eastern U.P. and Bihar. A third important feature of the district is the presence of the Govind Ballabh Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, which has been a leading force in spreading the Green Revolution in north India. It is also the largest landholder in the region, having 16,000 acres of its own, including a highly mechanized seed farm employing some two to four thousand mostly migrant laborers. In April 1978, a labor dispute on the

university farm led to an incident in which at least fifteen laborers were killed by police gunfire.[12] The killings were politically very significant at the time, since the Vice-Chancellor was a Jat and was considered to be close to Charan Singh (also a Jat) who was then Home Minister in the government of India. The laborers killed were presumed to be mostly low- and lower-middle caste persons, and Mrs. Gandhi lost no time rushing to the scene to identify with them. At the same time, the incident was widely reported to have been precipitated by Jat policemen antagonistic to the lower caste laborers from eastern U.P. and Bihar. On the other side of the issue, the bigger *tarai* farmers in the surrounding region, especially those who themselves employed large numbers of laborers, were said to be sympathetic to the university authorities in the labor dispute, which centered on a wage issue. Although many of these *tarai* farmers received their lands from previous Congress governments, they now often identify with different splinters of the old Congress or with parties other than Congress.

Politically, Naini Tal constituency has been consistently a Congress and a Brahman stronghold, the only exception being the 1977 elections. A Brahman Congressman, C.D. Pande, won both the 1952 and 1957 elections. In the next three elections—1962, 1967, and 1971—the successful candidate was K.C. Pant (also a Brahman), the son of Govind Ballabh Pant, and a minister in Mrs. Gandhi's government for some time. In 1977, Bharat Bhushan, from a business caste and formerly a member of the Congress (O), won the seat on the BLD ticket with 61.7 per cent of the vote. In 1980, the seat reverted again to a Brahman Congressman, Narain Dutt Tiwari, a former Chief Minister of U.P. during the Emergency.

Interviews in this constituency in December 1979 suggest that the Congress base of support was principally among Brahmans and low-and middle-caste laborers, whereas the Lok Dal, which came in third with a Thakur candidate from the hills, was strong among Thakurs and *kisans* in general. The Janata candidate, Bharat Bhushan (who ultimately came in second) was being supported by the former Jan Sangh cadres, had some support from persons of elite-caste status in the plains, and was thought to have some support from Scheduled Castes because o Jagjivan Ram's leadership of Janata.

The two most impressive factors that emerged from these interviews were *kisan* support for the Lok Dal and open statements from Brahman and laborer voters that they wanted the Emergency back or that things were better during the Emergency. It was also reported that the big farmers in the area, many of whom were members of a local *kisan* association, would support the Lok Dal. Reasons given for supporting the Lok Dal included specific approval for the economic policies of Charan Singh and disapproval of Indira Gandhi's policy of favoring enforcement of land-ceilings legislation.

Sentiment in favor of the Emergency was expressed, for example, by a Brahman *kisan*, who claimed that the government did more for poor people during the Emergency and that police did a better job of catching *dacoits* (armed robbers). In a similar vein, laborers in a labor colony beside the Agricultural University farm claimed that the farm laborers had received wage increases during the Emergency that were not implemented under Janata, and that prices were lower then. They also complained about the shortage of kerosene. Moreover, they were reportedly against the Janta candidate because of the police firing that occurred on the Pantnagar farm and because they felt that the Janata leaders had not come to see what had happened after the killings.

Although Naini Tal constituency is rather atypical both demographically and geographically, several of the patterns revealed in this constituency are characteristic of broader trends in the state as a whole. They include the historical association between Brahmans and the Congress organization, broad *kisan* support for the Lok Dal among non-Brahman castes, and the ability of Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress to win support from Scheduled Castes and the poor.

Aligarh Constituency

Aligarh constituency comprises about half of Aligarh district. Although the town of Aligarh is within its boundaries, it is predominantly rural. It is one of the most interesting constituencies in north India for several reasons. First, in the town of Aligarh is the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), whose founders, students and graduates played a critical role in the devel-

opment of a modern Muslim political identity in India during the nationalist period. The AMU continues to be one of the leading symbols of contemporary Muslim political identity in India. The demand for a new Aligarh Muslim University Act, which would ensure the preservation of the predominantly Muslim composition and Islamic character of the university, has been a salient political issue for many years. Just before the 1980 elections, the government of Charan Singh and Mrs. Gandhi both promised to meet this Muslim demand. Second, partly because of the presence of the AMU, the town has frequently been the scene of Hindu-Muslim conflict and riots, which were recurrent during the two years of Janata rule. Third, the town and the surrounding countryside contain a large population of low-caste Chamars. Moreover, the region has been a leading center of political mobilization of the Chamar caste category—particularly of the Jatavs, an upwardly mobile segment of this large caste. Fourth, Aligarh district was selected in the early 1960s by the government of India and the Ford Foundation for intensive agricultural development. Along with other districts in the Upper Doab, it has been in the forefront of the Green Revolution in western U.P. Fifth, two of the *tahsils* whose boundaries lie within the constituency—Khair and Iglas—contain very large populations of Jats, the leading cultivating caste of western U.P. and the caste to which Charan Singh belongs. There are also large populations of Brahmans and Rajputs, as well as a broad array of other castes and communities. Finally, the constituency has been an important center of the Arya Samaj, a Hindu religious reform movement that has often allied with the Jan Sangh in support of Hindu causes—such as cow protection—and that draws most of its members and supporters from the elite castes of Brahmans and Rajputs and from Jats.

The diversity of this constituency has been reflected in its political history. In contrast to Naini Tal, it has not been either a Congress or a Brahman stronghold. In fact, the Congress has not won the seat since 1957; and no Brahman has ever won on any party ticket. In the 1962 elections, B. P. Maurya, a Jatav, combining the support of Muslims and Scheduled Castes, won the seat for the Republican Party. In 1967, the seat was won by Shiv Kumar Shastri, who was an Independent candidate, a

Rajput, and a member of the Arya Samaj. In the 1971 elections, running counter to the "Indira wave" of that year, Shiv Kumar Shasri was again victorious, this time on the BKD ticket. In 1977, another Rajput and a former Congress leader in the district, Nawab Singh Chauhan, was swept into office by the "Janata wave" with a massive 70.85 per cent of the popular vote. In 1980, the seat was won by another Rajput—Indra Kumari, the wife of a big ex-zamindar of the Jadon clan—on the Lok Dal ticket. Thus, during the last three elections the constituency has been a stronghold of Charan Singh's forces in one form or another—first the BKD, then the BLD, then the Lok Dal.

The strategy of the Charan Singh forces in the last three elections has been to combine the support of Jats and Thakurs (Rajputs)[13] in the countryside to form the core of their support base. They have done so by presuming the support of the Jats for any candidate of Charan Singh and by running a Thakur on the ballot. On the other side, the Congress strategy has been to rely on Brahman support for Mrs. Gandhi, to regain the support of Muslims and Scheduled Castes, and to attempt to split the Thakurs, who are divided into numerous distinct clans in this area, by also running Thakur candidates. With the exception of the 1977 "Janata wave" elections, when the Congress lost its support base among Muslims and Scheduled Castes, the strategies of both sides have largely worked. The outcome has depended upon the strength of the respective coalitions, the degree to which a candidate of either side can muster additional support, and the extent to which the electorate is divided by the appeals of strong third-party or independent candidates.

Looking first at the Congress strategy in the 1980 elections in Aligarh, the Congress candidate, Ghanshyam Singh, was a Thakur of the Chauhan clan, who had run for the Congress in 1977 but had polled only 22.72 per cent of the vote. In 1980, his vote share increased by 10 per cent to 32.51. His major support in both elections presumably came from some Thakurs and most of the Brahmans. It is notable that in neither election was there an independent Brahman candidate who drew a large share of the vote. The additional 10 per cent vote share in 1980 probably came principally from Muslims and Scheduled Castes.

The Muslims were reportedly somewhat divided in 1980.

They were overwhelmingly opposed to Janata because of the of recurrent Hindu-Muslim riots in Aligarh during the two years Janata rule and because of the identification of the Janata party with the former Jan Sangh in the minds of many Muslims. Some Muslims turned to the Lok Dal because of the support given the latter by the two communist parties—the CPI and CPM—which have some Muslim followers in this area. Others preferred the Lok Dal to the Congress because they continued to resent the police attacks on Muslims which had occurred during the Emergency in the neighboring districts of Meerut and Muzaffarnagar. The Lok Dal opposition to the Jan Sangh and the attempt by Charan Singh to promulgate an ordinance establishing a new Aligarh Muslim University Act on the eve of the election[14] also may have inclined some anti-Congress Muslims to support the Lok Dal. At the same time, many Muslims in Aligarh town supported the Congress in this election because of the backing given to Mrs. Gandhi's Congress by the Shahi Imam of Delhi's Jama Masjid, because of the return to the Congress of H.N. Bahuguna (who is considered to be an outspoken defender of the Muslim community), and because the Congress manifesto clearly promised the maintenance of the minority status of AMU. As for the Scheduled Castes, it was expected that most would is mply return to the Congress fold.

The presumption before the election among academic observers in Aligarh was that the Congress would have support from most Muslims, most Scheduled Castes, nearly all Brahmans, and many Thakurs—altogether a stronger coalition than that of the Lok Dal. The fact that the coalition ultimately did not produce sufficient votes for a Congress victory was largely because the Thakur, Jat, Ahir, and other backward class votes in the countryside went predominantly to the Lok Dal, Many Muslims also voted for the Lok Dal, and many Scheduled Caste people voted for Janata.

The Lok Dal strategy was simpler than that of the Congress. It was decided, for two strategically sound reasons, not to place a Jat candidate on the party ticket. On the one hand, few people other than Jats would vote for such a candidate; on the other, virtually all Jats would vote for *any* candidate of Charan Singh. The strategy, therefore, was to put forward a Thakur of a clan different from that of the Congress candidate,

with the hope of winning broad support in the countryside among the two leading proprietary castes of Thakurs and Jats and from their allies and clients. The Lok Dal strategy proved the more successful : its candidate won the seat with 37.81 per cent of the vote, 5 percentage points ahead of the Congress candidate.

Baghpat Constituency

Baghpat constituency in Meerut district lies in the heart of the Jat country of western U.P. and in the forefront of the Green Revolution in this part of the state. It is also the home ground of Chaudhuri Charan Singh. Jats are the leading proprietary caste here comprising between 15 and 19 per cent of the population, according to the old gazetteer of the district. Other important proprietary castes are Brahmans, Rajputs, Tyagis, and Gujars. Chamars comprise approximately 12 per cent and Muslims between 15 to 23 per cent of the population in different parts of the constituency.[15]

In district Congress politics, and often in elections in this district, Jats and Tyagis have been allied with each other in competition with Brahmans and the mostly urban trading castes of Banias. In the countryside, there are also traditional rivalries between Jats and Rajputs and between Jats and Gujars. The electoral history of the constituency has partly reflected these alliance patterns and rivalries.

Congress won the first three elections in the progenitors of this constituency—Meerut South in 1952 and Sardhana in 1957 and 1962—with urban Brahman and Bania candidates. However, by 1962 Chaudhuri Charan Singh had become disaffected from the dominant group in Congress state politics, and his own dominance in the district also was being challenged. Moreover, discontent was growing in the countryside among the *kisans* over the failure of the state government to provide adequate support for agricultural development and for food-grain and sugar-cane prices. Consequently, the Congress candidate's vote share in 1962 dropped to 32.86 per cent, and a rural Jat candidate running as an independent—allegedly with the surreptitious backing of Charan Singh—polled 27.22 per cent of the vote. In 1967, in a replay of the contest between the Congress urban

Brahman candidate and the Jat independent, the latter won the seat with an absolute majority of 50.15 per cent. In the next three elections, the pattern of rivalry changed completely to an entirely rural competition between Ram Chandra Vikal, a man from the middle proprietary caste of Gujars, who ran on the Congress ticket in all three elections, and Jat candidates running on the BKD/BLD/Lok Dal tickets, respectively. In 1971, Ram Chandra Vikal defeated the BKD Jat candidate who had won the seat in 1967. Then in 1977 and 1980, Charan Singh himself contested and defeated Vikal with the largest majorities ever achieved in the constituency—63.47 per cent in 1977 and 64.45 per cent in 1980. In a sense, therefore, the electoral history of this constituency capsulizes several important aspects of the broader post-independence history of state politics, namely, the transition from urban to rural leadership, the rise in importance of the middle agricultural castes, and the competition between parties for support among these middle castes.

Interviews and newspaper reports from Baghpat constituency forecast the following trends during the 1980 election.[16] Most Brahmans had voted for Ram Chandra Vikal in 1977 and would do so again in 1980. Brahman respondents expressed a favorable view of the Emergency and their faith in Mrs. Gandhi. It was expected that the middle landed castes, such as Ahirs (Yadavs) and, of course, Jats—but not Gujars—would vote for Charan Singh. Some Scheduled Castes who were interviewed—Julahas and Chamars—expressed a preference for Mrs. Gandhi and hostility towards Charan Singh. It was assumed, once the Janata candidate had withdrawn, that nearly all the Scheduled Caste votes, except those controlled by Jats, would be cast for the Congress. Muslim votes were expected to be divided, with most going to the Congress candidate.

In general, the electoral contest in Baghpat seemed to turn primarily around three factors: divisions among the leading proprietary castes; conflict between the Scheduled Castes and the leading proprietary castes, especially the Jats; and the issues of the cane-price and the availability of needed inputs such as diesel, electricity, and water, which were of concern mainly to the landed castes in the constituency. These three factors are representative of broader trends in electoral and political conflict in the north Indian countryside in recent years. It should

also be noted that these issues and conflicts intersect with each other in such a way as to prevent a polarization of class conflict in the countryside, to perpetuate the complex intercaste alliance patterns that have always characterized north Indian political behavior, and to maintain the economic and political dominance of the landed castes, which is not affected by electoral divisions among them even though the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims may hold the balance of popular votes needed for victory in an electoral contest.

Conflict among the leading proprietary castes was evident in Baghpat particularly in the underlying opposition between Jats and Brahmans. Sure of the Brahman vote, however, the Congress did not feel it necessary to run a Brahman candidate in this constituency. In any event, such a decision would have been counterproductive for the Congress in Baghpat, where the Brahmans are a less powerful rural social class than they are in some other districts of U.P. and where the support of some elements from the middle proprietary castes is essential for victory. Consequently, the Congress ran Ram Chandra Vikal again in the hope of dividing the middle castes. The Janata party pursued a similar strategy at first in also putting forth a Gujar candidate. The withdrawal of the Janata candidate during the election campaign seemed to add considerable strength to the Congress (I) candidate by preventing the division of Gujar votes and also of Scheduled Caste votes, some of which might have gone to Janata because of the identification of that party with the name of Jagjivan Ram. The Congress candidate, therefore, seemed to have a strong base with the solid support of Brahmans, Gujars, Scheduled Castes, and Muslims.

Against this formidable coalition, the Lok Dal relied principally upon the support of the Jats and the middle proprietary castes allied with them, especially the Ahirs (Yadavs) and also, according to one newspaper report, the Thakurs (Rajputs) and other landed communities.[17] The practical issues used to unite these castes were the sugar-cane price and the availability of agricultural inputs and other scarce commodities. The high cane-price benefited Brahmans and the Gujars as much as other landed castes in Baghpat, but these two communities were dissuaded from allying with other proprietary groups on econo-

mic grounds by the appeal to caste loyalty, which inclined them towards the Congress.

The Scheduled Castes should be regarded more as pawns than as a powerful force in their own right. All the landed castes share an interest in thwarting the economic and political demands of the low castes, but the votes of the latter are numerous and can be decisive in many constituencies in U.P. In Baghpat, it has been reported often that the landed castes—especially Jats and Gujars—do not permit the low castes to vote as they wish, but caste their votes for them. Although both Jats and Gujars have been accused of this kind of intimidation, the Congress has had considerable success in identifying the Jats and Charan Singh as the leading exploiters of the Scheduled Castes. Given a free choice, therefore, it is likely that most Scheduled Castes in Baghpat would have cast their votes for the Congress (I) candidate. In Jat-dominated areas, however, many Scheduled Castes may have voted for Charan Singh or had their votes cast for them. Regardless of how Scheduled Castes voted, economic and political power in Baghpat, as elsewhere in the north Indian countryside, remains in the hands of the dominant landed castes, who may contest against each other in the political arena, but who nevertheless share common economic interests.

Gonda Constituency

Gonda constituency in Gonda district lies in the former province of Oudh, in a region where politics and rural economy have traditionally been dominated by great landlords—known here as *talukdars*—and their descendants. In the area of Gonda constituency in particular, the most powerful *talukdari* family has been that of Mankapur, a Rajput estate which once collected the revenue from 149 villages. Although the heir to the Mankapur estate, Anand Singh, no longer is entitled to collect the land revenues, his father's and his own good management and political skills have made it possible for him to maintain a very strong economic position and to extend his political influence beyond the area that was formerly controlled directly by the estate. The passage of land-ceilings legislation and numerous attempts by the government to confiscate the lands

under the direct control of the Mankapur estate have resulted in much of the land formerly held by Anand and his father being lost. However, Anand Singh still controls some land[18] and also owns several agro-business enterprises. Moreover, the palace of the Mankapur estate has been maintained—as well as a flock of managers and personal retainers, who become campaign managers for Anand Singh or the candidate of his choice at election time. Most important for the political success of Mankapur has been the perpetuation and extension of its influence in the countryside by continuing the princely traditions of dispute settlement, relief of the just grievances of the people who seek help in dealing with the local administration, and distribution of patronage, especially in hard times.

Mankapur is not the only politically active estate in Gonda district or in the constituency. The heirs to the Gonda estate—the second largest former *talukdari* estate in Gonda district—also have been politically active in this constituency, formerly in alliance with Mankapur but lately in opposition. Morever, Anand Singh's uncle has controlled extensive landholdings and has participated in district politics, sometimes in opposition to Anand and his father.

The constituency is virtually 100 per cent rural, containing only a few small towns within its boundaries. Its largest castes and communities, in rank order, are Brahmans, Muslims, Koiris, Kurmis, Ahirs, Kahars, Chamars, and Rajputs, of whom the most influential are the Brahmans and Rajputs followed by the middle-peasant castes of Ahirs, Kurmis, and Koiris. However, in all elections caste has been a less important factor in this constituency than the resources brought to bear by the heirs to the great estates and their political rivals.

Most of the electoral history of the Gonda constituency has centered around the efforts of the Mankapur scions to demonstrate their political power in order to retain their economic resources. In fact, in all elections except that of 1952, whether or not Anand Singh himself has contested the parliamentary seat and irrespective of the political parties whose candidates have been put forth in the constituency, the contest has been between the Mankapur forces and their rivals. Several of those elections also have been "prestige" contests, bitterly contested,

and involving candidates of considerable importance in state or national politics.

Anand Singh himself has contested the election three times: successfully in 1971 on the Congress (O) ticket against his uncle on the Congress (I) ticket; unsuccessfully in 1977 on the Congress (I) ticket; and successfully in 1980, again on the Congress (I) ticket. Running against the Raja of Gonda on the Lok Dal ticket, Satya Deo Singh on the Janata ticket, and seven other minor candidates, Anand won the last election with a huge margin and an absolute majority (50.95 per cent) of the votes. The result hinged partly on the relative resources and popularity of the contending scions of the two competing houses of Mankapur and Gonda, and partly on caste coalitions similar to those in other constituencies in the state. In both respects, Anand Singh had the advantage.

Despite the fact that Gonda constituency had been gerrymandered in such a way as to divide the central core of Anand Singh's influence, the Mankapur forces had built a broader base of support in the area over the past elections. Moreover, the caste combinations also favored Mankapur in this election. The Lok Dal strategy in Gonda constituency was to win the support of Brahmans, the largest caste in the constituency, on the strength of the fact that their candidate, the Raja of Gonda, was a Brahman; and to combine Brahman support with that of backward castes, particularly Ahirs, who are also numerous in the area. In fact, however, interviews and personal observations in the constituency suggest that the Mankapur forces had broader influence than the forces of the Raja of Gonda and that the Lok Dal's strategy of combining Brahman and backward-caste votes did not work effectively. Insofar as the backward castes are concerned, it was generally conceded that the Ahirs would vote for the Lok Dal candidate. However, the other great middle cultivating caste of Kurmis, who are also numerous in Gonda constituency, were reportedly divided, because their most prominent leader, Jai Ram Verma from the adjacent district of Faizabad and previously a supporter of Charan Singh, had joined the Congress (I). Brahmans, too, were divided; but it is probable that Anand Singh received most of his support from Brahmans and that he secured more Brahman support than the Raja of Gonda. It was also reported that there were

some divisions among Muslims and that the trading community and some other urban groups would vote for the Janata candidate, who was a member of the RSS. It was expected that the majority of the Thakurs, the Scheduled Castes, the middle and backward castes other than the Ahirs and Kurmis, and the Muslims would vote for the Congress.

The following impressions emerge most strongly from interviews and observations in Gonda constituency. The first is that the election contest in 1980, as in most previous elections, centered around the conflicts between the descendants of the great landed estates in the district. Second, in this contest not only the lower-caste groups, but also the middle castes, were essentially pawns in an arena dominated by men with great resources. Third, the Congress in this constituency, despite its desire to project an image as the party for the poor and the landless, was dependent upon the Mankapur forces for its victory. Finally, the coalition put together by the Congress strikingly illustrates a general aspect of Congress support in U.P.—namely, that it is a party of extremes, combining the upper and lower levels of the social and economic order in its coalition, but lacking much support among the middle proprietary castes.

Deoria Constituency

Deoria constituency is one of three parliamentary constituencies in the very densely populated district of Deoria, which has always been—and remains today—virtually entirely rural. The leading proprietary castes in Deoria traditionally have been the Brahmans, Rajputs and Bhumihars, but the most numerous castes in the district are the middle cultivating castes of Ahirs (Yadavs), followed by the low-caste Chamars and Brahmans. The density of population and the absence of other work opportunities except through emigration have led to great pressure on the available land. The ratio of agricultural laborers to the total working population in the district has increased during recent decades. According to the 1972 census, nearly one-third (32 per cent) of the working population were agricultural laborers.[19]

Along with most of the other Eastern Districts of U.P., Deoria has been a leading center of Socialist politics. Here as

elsewhere, the Socialist movement was set back and ultimately eliminated as a serious political force by persistent factionalism and defections to the Congress. Nevertheless, the politics of the district and of Deoria constituency have come to be dominated by persons who were once prominent Socialist leaders, though they are now members of the Congress, Lok Dal, or Janata. Because of its Socialist political history and because of the large concentration of the middle cultivating castes of Ahirs, Deoria constituency is an ideal site to consider the electoral significance of the alliance forged in 1974 between Charan Singh and the BKD, on the one hand, and Raj Narain and the SSP, on the other hand—and the impact of that alliance on the 1977 and 1980 elections.

In the pre-Independence years, the Congress Socialist Party was a major force in the Congress organization in Deoria district. In 1952, the Socialist party won four of the fifteen Legislative Assembly seats in the district and of the three parliamentary seats. Ramji Verma won the Deoria District (East) parliamentary constituency in the 1952 elections on the Socialist ticket; in 1957, as a member of the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), he won the Deoria seat with 52 per cent of the votes.

In 1962, Deoria constituency was considered "safe" enough to give to Ashok Mehta, the most prominent national leader of the PSP in the country. This time, however, Bishwanath Roy won the seat for the Congress in a four-way contest with a plurality of 40 per cent of the votes. The seat remained in the hands of the Congress during the next two elections. The Socialist parties, which were previously major forces in the constituency, were severely weakened by the defection of the followers of Ashok Mehta to the Congress in 1964 and by a succession of splits and mergers in the remnants of the Socialist parties thereafter. In the election of 1967, the candidate of the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) polled only 27 per cent of the vote in Deoria constituency, and in 1971 another SSP candidate polled only 13 per cent of the vote

Between 1952 and 1971, the character of the electoral contest changed in two important respects. The first change, already noted, was the decline in the strength of the opposition to the Congress—particularly the Socialist opposition. Another more dramatic change was taking place in successive elections, how-

ever, that was more threatening to the Congress: the entry of backward-class candidates into this constituency and the adjacent constituency of Salempur, and the attempts by SSP candidates in particular to mobilize support from the backward castes.

In Deoria constituency, the successful PSP candidate in 1957 was a Kayastha, while the second-place candidate was a Brahman. In 1962, 1967 and 1971, the successful Congress candidate was a Bhumihar. The second-place candidate in 1971 was a Yadav, who polled only 13 per cent of the vote on the SSP ticket. However, in 1977 and 1980 the backward castes made their influence felt in a very dramatic way. In the 1977 election, the BLD—formed from the merger of the BKD and the SSP—put forward Ugra Sen, a long-time radical Socialist leader of the district. Though himself a Thakur, he had built up strong support among the backward castes, especially the Ahirs. In that "Janata-wave" election, he defeated Vishwanath Pande by a massive majority, with 77 per cent of the vote. In 1980, after the split in the Janata, Ugra Sen ran again on the rump Janata party ticket. However, the main contest was between the Congress (I) candidate, Ramayan Rai, a former PSP leader of the district and a Bhumihar, and the Lok Dal candidate, Ram Dhari Shastri, a member of the Sainthwar caste.[20] In a very close contest, the Congress (I) candidate won with a bare plurality of 77 votes.

Among knowledgeable observers, party election agents, and voters interviewed in this constituency in December 1979, there was a high degree of consensus that most of the backward-caste votes would go to the Lok Dal candidate. Even the Janata party workers, though hoping to get some votes from the backward castes, completely wrote off the votes of the Yadavs and the Sainthwars, "all" of whom, they said, would vote for Ram Dhari Shastri. Interviews with Yadav *kisans* in the constituency yielded the same impression and also made it clear that, by voting for the Lok Dal candidate, they were voting for Charan Singh. It is important to note, however, that this kind of middle-caste pro-Lok Dal sentiment became attenuated or non-existent in this constituency—as elsewhere—among non-Yadav middle castes and the poorer middle castes.

Insofar as the upper-caste votes were concerned, there was

a fair degree of consensus among those persons interviewed about the likely voting behavior of these groups. It was presumed that most Brahmans would vote for the Congress (I). There was agreement between the election agents of both the Janata party and the Lok Dal that most Thakurs would vote for the Janata candidate, Ugra Sen, himself a Thakur. It was also generally assumed that the Bhumihars would vote for the Bhumihar Congress (I) candidate.

As for the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes, Janata and the Lok Dal hoped to draw votes from these traditional Congress (I) support groups, but their hopes seemed exaggerated. The aggregate election returns suggest that the Scheduled Caste votes were split between Congress and Janata, with Congress receiving the larger share. It is not clear to what extent or how the Muslim votes were divided.

What does emerge most clearly from the interviews in this constituency and from the election returns is that, even though the Lok Dal candidate lost, the middle castes, especially the Yadavs, made their influence felt very decisively. There was simply no doubt in the minds of any of the persons interviewed, including the opponents of the Lok Dal, that the Yadavs would vote solidly for Ram Dhari Shastri. A second prominent feature of the electoral contest in Deoria constituency was that the Congress here, as elsewhere in U.P., won the seat by combining opposite ends of the social order—Brahmans and Bhumihars, on the one hand, and Scheduled Castes and the Muslim minority, on the other. Finally, this was one constituency where the Lok Dal nearly won because the middle castes, primarily the Yadavs, were united while the upper castes, the Scheduled Castes, and the Muslims were, in varying degrees, divided between Congress (I) and Janata.

Conclusions

The following conclusions emerge from this survey of five constituencies in U.P.[21] First, to the extent that these constituencies are representative of the state as a whole, the landed castes continue to be politically dominant in the U.P. countryside and constitute the central core of support for all leading political parties. The predominant landed castes in U.P. include

the elite proprietary castes of Brahmans, Rajputs and Bhumihars, and the middle castes of Jats, Ahirs, Gujars, Kurmis and other small groups of local importance. The elite castes, especially, have retained their traditional importance as candidates and sources of support in these constituencies. Ten of the fifteen candidates of the three leading parties in these five constituencies in 1980 were Brahmans, Rajputs or Bhumihars; one was an Agarwal; and four were middle castes. Four of the five successful candidates were of Brahman, Rajput or Bhumihar caste and the fifth—Charan Singh—was a Jat. It also should be noted that in three of the five constituencies the main contests were among persons of elite-caste status—a Brahman, a Rajput and an Agarwal in Naini Tal; a Rajput against a Rajput in Aligarh; and two Rajputs and a Brahman in Gonda. In only one constituency—Baghpat—was the main contest between two persons of middle-caste status. Here, however, the Jats have for long been the dominant caste both in numbers and in control over the land; they traditionally occupied the economic position—if not the status—that Brahmans and Rajputs have held elsewhere in U.P. Only in Deoria, in other words, was there a direct contest between a representative of an elite caste (Bhumihars) and a backward caste (Sainthwars). Even here it is somewhat misleading to describe the contest in this way, since the Bhumihars have traditionally occupied an ambiguous position in the Hindu hierarchy, and the Sainthwars, though of Kurmi origin, claim Rajput status. All in all, therefore, what is most striking about the leading candidates is that they came overwhelmingly from the chief landowning castes in each constituency, whether of high- or middle-status ranking.

Especially worthy of notice is the prominence of persons of Rajput caste in these electoral contests. The Rajput and Thakur castes have traditionally been the leading proprietary castes in U.P. Before zamindari abolition, they were the principal landowners in most districts in the province—particularly in Oudh, where they usually held more than half of the land. In the five constituencies discussed in this article, Rajputs contributed the largest number of leading candidates—seven out of fifteen—and won two of the five seats. They were leading contestants in all constituencies except Baghpat, and they ran as nominees of one or more of the three major parties in these constituencies—on

the Lok Dal ticket in Naini Tal; on the Lok Dal, Congress, and Janata tickets in Aligarh; on both the Congress and Janata tickets in Gonda; and on the Janata ticket in Deoria. In the aggregate in these five constituencies, Rajput candidates received 51.32 per cent of the votes polled by the leading candidates.

The second important conclusion from this survey of five constituencies is a corollary of the first, namely, that despite the electoral significance of the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims as swing forces, particularly for the Congress, they are really pawns in electoral contests in which the resources and the predominant local support bases are controlled by the landed castes, whose economic interests are similar whatever the status differences among them. Two other features of the political position and behavior of the Scheduled Castes and Muslims should be noted here. One is that their support for the Congress, which has been the preferred party for both of these categories of voters, has fluctuated across time and space. In Aligarh, for example, the Congress lost the support of both groups in the 1962, 1967, and 1977 elections. More generally, the success of the Congress in particular constituencies and in the state as a whole has depended upon its ability to retain the support of most voters from among these two categories. The Congress cannot afford to base its appeal exclusively on the support of these two categories, however, for power in the countryside remains with the landed castes.

The last point to be noted about the low-caste voters and the poorer voters of middle-caste status is that, in many cases, their votes can be purchased. The impression is unavoidable that many, if not most, poor persons of low-caste status are looking for protection and patronage from anybody who comes by. Most low-caste persons see the Congress as their protector and vote accordingly, unless they are frightened by such issues as sterilization or are intimidated by the landed castes. They are not, however (as they are in Kerala), an independent political force and do not show signs of becoming one.

A third set of conclusions concerns the support structure and resource base of the Congress. The central core of support for the Congress in U.P. comes from the Brahman proprietary castes and, although there are some exceptions, the Brahmans

have tended not to divide their votes. Save for unusual circumstances, Brahman votes will go to the candidate of the Congress, whatever his caste, and will not be diverted to non-Congress candidates of Brahman caste. It is my impression from these constituencies and from interviews in many other constituencies throughout north India that the generalization applies to small Brahman *kisans* as well as to the more prosperous ones.

There is a broader generalization to be made concerning the Congress support base, however, which is that the Congress depends upon elite castes and the wealthy for victory in its election contests while projecting an image of itself as the party of the poor and landless. It is also true that the Congress in 1980 and at other times has won broad support from among the low-land middle-caste laborers and poor *kisans*. The Congress, because of the many ameliorative measures it has taken on behalf of these groups when in power and because of its carefully cultivated image as the protector of the poor and the landless, has become the preferred party for most of these people in U.P. It is because of its mutual dependence on elements from both upper and lower levels of the economic and status hierarchies in U.P. that I have described the Congress as a "coalition of extremes." Moreover, it should be obvious that, whatever its rhetoric, a party so constructed cannot be an instrument for revolutionary change in the north Indian countryside—or probably at all in India.

The Lok Dal emerged from the 1980 parliamentary elections as the second largest party in U.P., less than seven percentage points behind the Congress in the state's total vote share. It was also the principal opposition to the Congress in most constituencies in the state—as it was in four of the five constituencies analyzed in this article. Interviews in all five constituencies left little doubt that there was a solid core of *kisan* support for the Lok Dal throughout the state. The solidarity of the Yadav *kisans* was especially evident, particularly in Gonda and Deoria constituencies. The support of the Jats in western U.P. was, of course, taken for granted; but that of the Yadavs was more important, for the latter caste is much larger and more widespread in U.P. Thus, in the 1980 elections, the Lok Dal with its core of support among the Jat and Yadav castes was pitted against the Congress with its core of support among

the Brahmans. The support of all other elite and middle-caste groups was divided among the three leading parties in different constituencies, and sometimes in the same constituency.

The rise of the Lok Dal and its predecessors—the Janata and the BKD—has been associated with the increasing prominence of middle castes both as voters and as candidates. The latter phenomenon was especially evident in Baghpat, where, although they were divided, the leading candidates were all of intermediate-caste status, and in Deoria, where the middle castes were united behind the Lok Dal candidate. The growing political importance of the middle castes in these two constituencies over the last seven elections has involved a movement away from both urban candidates—as in Baghpat—and candidates of elite-caste status. However, the significance of these trends should not be exaggerated, for as has been noted above, the elite castes remain politically more important than the backward castes in the north Indian countryside. Economically, the most important fact is the universal dominance of the landed castes in the U.P. countryside. The political divisions among these castes reflect not only the persisting importance of status differences among them; they also reflect a feeling among the leaders of the middle castes that the elite castes, who have dominated most local institutions, are barring their advancement, which in effect means barring their access to control over these institutions—the banks, the cooperative societies, and the schools—and the resources channelled through them.

If these interpretations of the political divisions among the landed castes are correct, then the political process of the north Indian countryside is likely to be characterized more by tactics of coalition, division, and cooption of particular caste groups and their leaders than by class-caste polarization, for it is primarily a conflict over political control of economic resources that is occurring, and not so much a conflict based on different economic interests. The future political strategy of the Congress, therefore, will probably be to divide the middle castes. As long as political power in the provincial and national capitals is dependent upon adult suffrage elections, the leading contenders for power are likely to continue to attempt to build inter-caste coalitions that cut across either status or economic differences—or both. Class polarization, therefore is unlikely to occur as long

as the Indian regime is based upon open, competitive elections.

This concluding analysis has focussed so far on questions of caste and class. It remains to consider both the importance of the issues in the campaign and the significance of the 1980 election for the future of Indian democracy. On the face of it, the election seemed to turn overwhelmingly on the issues of high prices, scarcity of essential commodities, the sugar-cane price, and the availability of agricultural inputs (particularly diesel) needed by the *kisans* in the previous growing season. Several of these issues cut evenly across lines of caste and class. Only the biggest farmers, with ample financial resources and good political connections, were able to obtain sufficient supplies of diesel. Yet, the voters clearly did not respond evenly to the issues. Whether or not a voter blamed government for the economic difficulties and scarcities—and, if so, *which* government—depended more on the caste status of the respondents than on their economic position. The break-up of the Janata coalition also made it convenient for different categories of voters to be selective in allocating blame. Brahman voters favorably disposed to the Congress naturally blamed the Janata government in general, including both the rump Janata party and the Lok Dal. Yadav *kisans*, who were inclined toward the Lok Dal, however, blamed only the Janata government and excused Charan Singh, who had been in office only a short time. Brahman and Yadav *kisans* who harvested cane in November-December had equally good reason to thank Charan Singh for the high price of cane, but only the Yadavs articulated such feelings. In other words, the issues in the campaign were as much excuses for voting behavior as reasons for it. The really central issue in the campaign—in U.P. at least—was whether the voters identified with the middle cultivating castes or with the Congress coalition. The strong undercurrent in this campaign, therefore, was the question of the political and economic advancement of the middle castes.

To give precedence in this way to caste over economic issues is not to deny the importance of the latter. People who supported Charan Singh and the Lok Dal—particularly those from the middle castes—did so for a combination of caste and economic reasons. The cultivating *kisans* of intermediate-caste status with economically viable holdings believed that Charan

Singh and the Lok Dal would promote their economic interests. Moreover, his hold on these castes was solidified by the belief among the middle castes that he was one of them and that he favored their social advancement as well. A Brahman or Thakur with the same program as Charan Singh would not have had the same appeal to these groups.

Another feature of the election and voter reaction to it in U.P., which was most apparent in interviews across the state, was that more voters were oriented to the national leaders and to the party labels than to the local candidates. It would not, however, be correct to infer from this fact that the traditional parochial attitudes of the north Indian electorate had been overcome and replaced by national perspectives. Rather, it was more a case of the voters "parochializing" the national candidates and issues. Often, in fact, the voters did not know the names and castes of the parliamentary candidates, because the parliamentary constituencies are very large and diverse. They did know—or thought they knew—the castes of the national candidates from U.P. and Bihar, with Charan Singh being somewhat of an exception in that he was seen as simply a member of a backward caste. Thus, in a sense, the national leaders have become symbols of the local identifications and aspirations of the north Indian voters. Consequently, Mrs. Gandhi's manoeuver in 1971 of separating the parliamentary from the legislative assembly elections has had the effect of focussing voter attention on national leaders and parties, but it has not freed the parliamentray elections form local, parochial issues and concerns. In some respects, in fact, it has promoted the spread of such issues.[22]

A final observation concerns the optimistic conclusions that have been drawn from the results of the 1977 and 1980 elections about the commitment of the Indian public to democracy and competitive elections. Such conclusions do not seem warranted. In fact, voter comments about the Emergency in the interviews conducted in December 1979 suggest that this issue, even more than the issues of scarcities and high prices, was used to rationalize voting behavior that had other motivations. Voters who identified with the Congress either were prepared to excuse Mrs. Gandhi for her past errors and accept her statements that she would not impose an Emergency again, or

welcomed the prospect of reimposition of an Emergency. Brahmans in particular, some Rajputs, and some low-caste persons openly declared that they would like to see the Emergency back or, at least, that things were better during the Emergency—which, for these persons, primarily meant law and order and stable prices. Opponents of the Congress (I) were naturally also vociferous in their attacks on Mrs. Gandhi and the Emergency regime—which for them meant forced sterilization, detention, and other forms of harassment. It did not, however, appear to this writer in December 1979 that attitudes for or against the Emergency were a primary motivating factor in the voting decisions of most voters.

The significance of the 1977 and 1980 elections in U.P. must be sought elsewhere—in the persistent underlying trends and tendencies that are masked if undue attention is paid to the "issues" articulated by candidates and voters. Two such trends are particularly important. The first is the attempt by the political parties to turn some caste and communal categories into voting blocs, providing a stable basis of support across time and space. Insofar as the attempt is successful, it involves for Hindus the elevation of the caste category to greater importance than local *jati* as a political factor. In the 1980 elections, three caste categories in particular seem to have voted as blocs—Brahmans, Jats, and Yadavs. Brahmans voted overwhelmingly for Congress (I), and Jats and Yadavs for the Lok Dal, often even when presented with reasonably good candidates of their own caste in opposition to a candidate of their preferred party but not of their own caste. Muslims and Scheduled Castes, too, have often voted as blocs—usually for the Congress. Congress probably won most of the votes of these two groupings, but there was some loss of Muslim votes to the Lok Dal and of Scheduled Caste votes to Janata and the Lok Dal. All other castes were more divided both across and within particular constituencies.

The tendency towards bloc voting is partly reinforced and partly counteracted by the dual appeal of the Congress to rich and poor. Its practice of distributing patronage and protection to secure the support of the rich draws into its fold persons and groups from the upper layers of all castes. Its adoption of programs and policies for the poor has the effect of

consolidating the support of some Scheduled Caste groups and of drawing away from the Lok Dal segments of *jatis* and caste categories of intermediate status.

The second major underlying pattern in these past two elections is really an aspect of the first—namely the politicization and increased cohesion of the middle castes of peasants, who formed the bulk of the support for Janata in 1977 and for the Lok Dal of Charan Singh in 1980. Some of them supported Congress (I) also, but most did not and were in conflict with both ends of the spectrom of support that formed the basic Congress coalition. This has been the principal underlying conflict in north India—between the middle peasantry and all other social forces. It was not changed by the 1980 elections. In fact, it was sharpened. The major political issue in north Indian politics in the immediate future is whether that conflict will intensify or will be deflected by political tactics that divide middle-caste leaders and groups. The future of the Indian parliamentary system depends more on the outcome of that struggle than on either the presumed commitment of the Indian public to democratic values or on transient issues such as sterilization, high prices, and shortage of basic commodities.

NOTES & REFERENCES

[1]See Harry W. Blair, "Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social Change in the Late 1970s," *Economic and Political Weekly*, XV, no. 2 (January 12, 1980), pp. 64-74, and Pradhan H. Prasad, "Rising Middle Peasantry in North India," *Economic and Political Weekly*, XV, nos. 5,6, and 7, Annual Number (February 1980), pp. 215-19.

[2]Space considerations preclude the presentation of the regional data on which this and other statements about regional voting behavior are based. However, for regional voting patterns for the U.P. Legislative Assembly elections from 1952 to 1977, which are similar in important respects to the parliamentary results, see Paul R. Brass, "The Politicization of the Peasantry in a North Indian State: Part I," *Journal of Peasant Studies*, VII, no. (July 1980), pp. 395-426 and "Part II," in *ibid*, VIII, no. 1 (September 1980), pp. 3-36 [republished as ch: iii in this volume].

[3]Ahirs and Yadavs are interchangeable terms for the same caste category in U.P. The term "Yadav" is used virtually exclusively in Bihar, more often than not in eastern U.P. and less often in Oudh and western U.P. where the term "Ahir" is still common. Ahir is the traditional census name for this caste, and Yadav the preferred name used by politicized

and socially mobile segments of the caste.

[4]Brass, "Politicization of the Peasantry," this volume, pp. 99 and 132-134.

[5]See Paul R. Brass, "Leadership Conflict and the Disintegration of the Indian Socialist Movement : Personal Ambition, Power and Policy," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, XIV, no. 1 (March 1976), pp. 19-41 [republished as ch. v in vol. I of these essays].

[6]The term "backward" castes is commonly used in political language in India to refer to the middle castes, whether or not they are landed, landless, or come from artisan and service castes. In general, I prefer the more neutral term "middle castes" for these groups, and "middle proprietary castes" for the landed groups among them; but sometimes it seems appropriate to use the term "backward" castes also, as here where the referents are to both the middle, typically landed castes of Jats and Yadavs, and the lower middle artisan caste of barbers.

[7]For descriptions of these and other incidents, see Udayan Sharma, ed., *Violence Erupts* (New Delhi: Radha Krishna Prakashan, 1978).

[8]Four of the five constituencies are in districts in which the field research was done in 1961-62 that led to my *Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). I have also done previous work in Naini Tal on another project. Consequently, the analysis and judgments made about the influences of various social forces in the 1980 elections are based upon information collected in interviews in both 1961-62 and 1979 and also in occasional interviews and meetings with politicians from these districts in the intervening years.

[9]Contemporary demographic data for this section were derived from Government of Uttar Pradesh, Election Directorate, *Population of Uttar Pradesh* (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1973).

[10]*Census of India*, 1931, vol. XVIII: *United Provinces of Agra and Oudh*, Part II, by A.C. Turner (Allahabad: Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1933), table XVII.

[11]The term "political sufferers" refers to persons who reportedly suffered some personal hardship during the Independence movement and were, therefore, rewarded by the Congress government after Independence.

[12]On this incident and its broader significance, see Sharma, *Violence Erupts*, pp. 107-118, and Paul R. Brass, "Institutional Transfer of Technology The Land Grant Model and the Agricultural University at Pantnagar," in Robert S. Anderson, et al., eds., *Science, Politics and the Agricultural Revolution in Asia* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

[13]The terms Rajput and Thakur are interchangeable in U.P., Thakur being the title used for persons of Rajput caste, but also a substitute generic term for the caste category.

[14]The ordinance did not, however, receive Presidential assent.

[15]H.R. Nevill, ed., *Meerut: A Gazeteer, Being Volume IV of the District Gazetteers of the United Provinees of Agra and Oudh* (Allahabad:

Superintendent, Government Press, United Provinces, 1904), pp. 187-316.

[16]See especially, *Statesman* (New Delhi), December 28, 1979; *Northern India Patrika*, December 28, 1979; and *Overseas Hindustan Times*, January 17, 1980.

[17]*Northern India Patrika*, December 28, 1979.

[18]Some years ago, Anand Singh transferred 500 acres of land to a educational trust. The state government challenged the transfer in th courts on the grounds that it was a bogus transaction, alleging tha Anand still controls the land indirectly. Anand is fighting the case in court, insisting that the transfer was a genuine one.

[19]*Census of India, 1971*, Series 21, *Uttar Pradesh*, Pt. II-A: *General Population Tables*, by D.M. Sinha (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1975), pp. 318-19.

[20]The Sainthwars are mostly cultivators who, though they claim Thakur status, are generally classified as a backward caste.

[21]Although the constituencies are not representative in a demographic sense, I believe that, taken together, they illustrate the major trends and tendencies in contemporary U.P. electoral politics. Also, my interviews in 1979 were not confined to the five constituencies discussed above. The conclusions, therefore, are based also on my broader impressions derived from interviews in several other constituencies.

[22]It would be interesting to know to what extent the legislative assembly elections have been influenced by similar tendencies, that is, whether in these much smaller constituencies—where the names, castes and personalities of the local candidates are more intimately known to the voters —voting continues to be influenced more by local coalitions and combinations than by the broader identifications that are now prominent in the parliamentary elections.