



The Journal of Peasant Studies

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Published online: 05 Feb 2008.

To cite this article: Paul R. Brass (1980) The politicization of the peasantry in a North Indian state: II, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 8:1, 3-36

The Politicization of the Peasantry in a North Indian State: II

Paul R. Brass*

During the past three decades, the dominant party in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP), the Indian National Congress, has undergone a secular decline in its support in state legislative assembly elections. The principal factor in its decline has been its inability to establish a stable basis of support among the middle peasantry, particularly among the so-called 'backward castes', with landholdings ranging from 2.5 to 30 acres. Disaffected from the Congress since the 1950s, these middle proprietary castes, who together form the leading social force in the state, turned in large numbers to the BKD, the agrarian party of Chaudhuri Charan Singh, in its first appearance in UP elections in 1969. They also provided the central core of support for the Janata party in its landslide victory in the 1977 state assembly elections. The politicization of the middle peasantry in this vast north Indian province is no transient phenomenon, but rather constitutes a persistent factor with which all political parties and all governments in UP must contend.

Rural social structure and party support in Uttar Pradesh: the critical role of the middle peasantry

A. PARTY SUPPORT BASES, 1952-69

In this section, the data from the *Zamindari Abolition Committee Report* and from the censuses of Uttar Pradesh at the tahsil level will be correlated with party support data in order to explore the relationships between political party support and rural social structure. Intercorrelation matrixes were prepared for the census variables.¹ Adjacent landholding size categories tend to be highly intercorrelated, which means that it will not be possible to separate with precision the effects on the dependent variables of each landholding size category. Rather, the data will be examined for general patterns. The temptation to overinterpret isolated, individual correlations, however high, will be avoided.

There are, of course, some critical data missing that are relevant to an analysis of rural social structure and party support. It would be useful, for

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example, to know the distribution of the leading castes in UP by landholding size. Nevertheless, the UP data on landholding groups and agricultural labourers are rich enough to make analysis of them worthwhile. In the following pages, these data will be used to pursue three broad questions. First, an attempt will be made to determine whether or not and to what extent the leading political parties in UP established stable bases of electoral support in areas where particular rural social groups and classes are concentrated. Second, the data will be analysed to determine to what extent shifts over time in the support for political parties can be related to shifts in support in areas where different rural groups and classes are concentrated. Third, and more broadly, an attempt will be made to ascertain to what extent there is evidence for a general pattern of rural social class differentiation that is reflected in distinct bases of support for UP political parties.

Congress. In the nearly twenty-five years in which the Congress exercised power in UP after Independence, it established both a record of legislation and administration of land reforms and other rural programs and built an effective political organization that drew its leadership from particular social groups in the rural districts of the state. It is to be expected, therefore, that its support bases in the countryside would have been influenced by both these factors. Actually, the two factors are interrelated. The leadership groups in control of the Congress organization after Independence influenced the development of rural programs that either benefited directly or at least did not harm castes and classes from which they came and through which they continued to derive political support in the countryside. On balance, the system of land settlement and political control in post-Independence UP was one that should have established for the Congress relatively stable bases of support in areas where the middle and rich peasantry of elite caste status are concentrated. The largest landholders, however, and the middle and smaller sections of the peasantry should have been less content overall. Consequently, the Congress should have done less well in areas where these two groups are concentrated. Moreover, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as pressure for introducing cooperative farming and land ceilings measures increased within the Congress, it should be expected that there would have been some nervousness and loss of support for the Congress among the richer sections of the rural proprietors, even though cooperative farming has not been introduced in fact and the land ceilings law is quite generous and full of loopholes. The discontent of the richer peasantry, however, would have been countered in the middle and later 1960s by the impact of the 'green revolution' and the increased availability of agricultural inputs under the Congress regime, which benefited principally the farmers with a minimum of 10 or 15 acres of land. Finally, the defection from the Congress in 1967 of Charan Singh – the principal architect of the Zamindari Abolition Act, the leading spokesman for the interests of the middle-level and rich peasant proprietors, and a man considered sympathetic also to the welfare of the backward castes – and the formation of the BKD in 1969, should have led to

further loss of support for the Congress in areas where the middle proprietors and backward castes are concentrated.

Unfortunately, as already indicated, caste data are not available from the 1961 census. Even though it is a safe assumption that the proportion of elite castes, particularly Brahmans and Rajputs, to the total population increases with landholding size, there simply are no available figures on landholding size by caste. Consequently, the analysis of the tahsil-level data must be confined to rural economic categories only. Tables 1 through 6 show the correlations between Congress vote shares and selected rural social structure and landholding size variables for elections between 1952 and 1977 for the state as a whole; for the whole state with the effect of the regional distribution of votes controlled; for the plains districts only, excluding Kumaon and Bundelkhand; and for each of the five plains regions.

The correlations show several patterns, some of which conform to expectations and others that do not. Looking first at the relationship between the Congress vote in 1952 and the expropriated class of zamindars (Table 1), all the correlations for the state as a whole and within all the regions of the state except Oudh and the Upper Doab are, as expected, negative. The positive correlation in the Upper Doab is too small to represent evidence of a significant deviation from the pattern here. However, the strong positive correlation in Oudh, the land of the semi-princely class of talukdars, requires some comment. The evidence available from election returns and from case studies in this region does *not* suggest that the zamindars and talukdars in Oudh generally supported the Congress in 1952. Although there were some cases where they did so and one well-documented case where a talukdar dominated a district Congress organization in Oudh [*Brass 1965: ch. iv*], the general pattern in 1952 was for the talukdars either to support opposition parties or to remain aloof from the elections. Moreover, the census category of non-cultivating owners of land, although it included the big talukdars, was comprised mostly of thousands of considerably smaller zamindars, whose political behaviour may well have differed from that of the talukdars. There is also some evidence to suggest that the positive correlation here is a classic example of the potential dangers of inferring individual behaviour from aggregate data. An examination of the ordinal ranking of the grouped constituencies in Oudh by their degree of support for the Congress revealed that the highest vote for the Congress occurred in a group of six constituencies in Pratapgarh district completely dominated by Brahman leaders who rose to power in the district in an anti-talukdar, *kisan* movement.² In contrast, the weakest support for the Congress occurred in a group of constituencies in Gonda district where the Congress organization was under the dominance of the Raja of Mankapur. Another group of five constituencies in the same district, in the area directly under the Raja's influence, ranked eleventh out of 26 groups in support for the Congress. Thus, in Oudh, the positive correlation between the percentage of zamindars and the Congress vote was certainly influenced by the conflict between the big talukdars and their opponents, but the relationship probably arose out of a combination of

TABLE 1: Correlation Coefficients for per cent Non-cultivating Owners (Zamindars)
1951 Census, with Party Vote Shares, 1952-1962, Uttar Pradesh

Region/Election Year ^a	Congress		UPPP/ Swatantra ^c		Jan Sangh		Independents		SY		KMPP/PSP ^d		CPI	
	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)
Whole State														
1952	-.08	(116)	.01	(25)	.16	(86)	-.09	(114)	.13	(109)	-.05	(92)	-.10	(31)
1957	-.36*	(94)	--	--	-.04	(78)	.02	(91)	.30*	(49)	.12	(77)	-.24	(44)
1962	-.35*	(95)	-.11	(59)	.05	(93)	.05	(93)	-.05	(73)	.11	(86)	-.14	(64)
Whole State (controlling for region) ^b														
1952	-.11	(109)	.04	(20)	.10	(79)	.09	(107)	.24*	(102)	-.17	(81)	-.26	(25)
1957	-.34*	(87)	--	--	-.00	(70)	.17	(82)	.15	(42)	-.03	(70)	-.10	(38)
1962	-.18	(87)	-.20	(53)	.05	(86)	.05	(82)	.08	(66)	-.09	(79)	.04	(57)
Plains Districts Only														
1952	-.15	(98)	.16	(20)	.28	(86)	.04	(96)	.19*	(44)	-.06	(83)	-.10	(29)
1957	-.37*	(83)	--	--	.00	(71)	.04	(82)	.29*	(47)	.12	(69)	-.24	(43)
1962	-.35*	(83)	-.11	(56)	.05	(82)	.12	(81)	-.05	(66)	.02	(74)	-.13	(56)
Rohilkhand														
1952	-.49*	(16)	--	--	-.09	(11)	.43*	(16)	.41	(16)	.12	(11)	--	--
1957	-.72*	(16)	--	--	-.33	(14)	.43*	(16)	--	--	-.13	(12)	--	--
1962	-.38	(16)	--	--	-.09	(16)	.25	(16)	.38	(12)	-.15	(15)	--	--
Upper Doab														
1952	.09	(24)	--	--	.16	(19)	-.04	(23)	.04	(22)	-.19	(20)	--	--
1957	-.26	(18)	--	--	.05	(14)	.37	(18)	--	--	-.29	(13)	--	--
1962	.06	(18)	-.08	(15)	.46*	(18)	-.55	(18)	.27	(13)	.10	(14)	--	--
Lower Doab														
1952	-.77*	(12)	--	--	--	--	.62*	(12)	.49	(10)	-.25	(11)	--	--
1957	-.77*	(13)	--	--	.18	(13)	.75*	(13)	--	--	-.28	(13)	--	--
1962	-.71*	(13)	--	--	.13	(13)	.36	(13)	-.19	(12)	-.69*	(13)	--	--
Oudh														
1952	.49*	(26)	.11	(14)	.03	(25)	-.36*	(25)	.14	(26)	-.17	(24)	--	--
1957	-.14	(18)	--	--	.12	(15)	-.33	(18)	-.03	(13)	.34	(14)	.15	(16)
1962	-.35	(18)	--	(15)	-.05	(17)	.09	(17)	--	(13)	.07	(16)	.15	(12)
Eastern Districts														
1952	-.24	(20)	--	--	.18	(18)	.15	(20)	.17	(20)	-.28	(17)	--	--
1957	.05	(18)	--	--	.05	(15)	-.36	(17)	.19	(15)	-.26	(17)	-.04	(13)
1962	-.02	(18)	--	--	.18	(18)	.11	(17)	--	(16)	.06	(16)	.30	(16)

Notes for Table 1 overleaf.

Notes for Table 1:

* $p = .05$ or better.

^aCorrelations have not been reported in region/years when the N has been below 10.

^bThese are sixth order partial correlation coefficients after controlling for region by treating each region as a dummy variable, with one region eliminated, and entering the six dummy variable so created into a regression equation. For a description of the procedure followed, see Nie [1975: 374-375].

^c1952 figure is for UPPP. Neither party contested in 1957. 1962 figure is for Swatantra.

^d1952 figure is for the KMPP, those for 1957 and 1962 are for the PSP.

factors that included 1) some direct talukdar support for the Congress; 2) some support for the Congress in areas of strong anti-talukdar political activity; and 3) some support for the Congress among small zamindars who may have turned toward the Congress in the hope of acquiring political power and influence in a region whose political institutions had traditionally been dominated by the big talukdars.

Over the next two elections, in 1957 and 1962, the negative correlations between the ex-zamindari areas and the Congress vote in nearly all parts of the state persist and become statistically significant at the .05 level in the state as a whole, in the plains districts as a whole, and in Rohilkhand and the

Table 2: Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote Shares with Size of Holdings 1952 Elections and 1945 Land Holdings Census, Uttar Pradesh

Size Category (in acres)	Congress (N = 47)	SP (N = 47)	Jan Sangh (N = 43)	UPPP (N = 19)	Inds. (N = 47)
under 0.5	-.160	.117	-.024	-.312	.076
0.5 - 0.9	-.075	.148	-.019	-.279	-.203
1.0 - 1.9	-.129	.139	.219	-.260	-.223
2.0 - 2.9	-.053	.053	.286*	.020	-.205
3.0 - 3.9	.133	-.066	.181	.070	-.103
4.0 - 4.9	.090	-.063	.123	.288	-.076
5.0 - 5.9	.109	-.092	.061	.378	-.017
6.0 - 6.9	.134	-.071	-.019	.306	.072
7.0 - 7.9	.182	-.145	-.048	.391*	.062
8.0 - 8.9	.199	-.180	-.095	.305	.108
9.0 - 9.9	.207	-.187	-.147	.322	.129
10.0 - 11.9	.188	-.154	-.120	.280	.145
12.0 - 13.9	.156	-.162	-.158	.315	.162
14.0 - 15.9	.148	-.183	-.191	.353	.168
16.0 - 17.9	.163	-.184	-.221	.295	.171
18.0 - 19.9	.123	-.181	-.219	.268	.182
20.0 - 24.9	.112	-.194	-.209	.285	.182
25+	.095	-.212	-.204	.220	.182

* $p = .05$ or better

Table 3: Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote Shares with Size of Holdings, 1952 Elections and 1945 Landholdings Census, West Plain

Size Category (in acres)	Congress (N = 14)	SP (N = 14)	Jan Sangh (N = 13)	Inds. (N = 14)
under 0.5	-.168	-.142	.017	.345
0.5 - 0.9	-.359	.188	.318	-.036
1.0 - 1.9	-.408	.459*	.638*	-.378
2.0 - 2.9	-.298	.562*	.496*	-.448*
3.0 - 3.9	.138	.398	-.018	-.427
4.0 - 4.9	.059	.347	-.148	-.232
5.0 - 5.9	.272	.066	-.303	-.156
6.0 - 6.9	.284	.017	-.447	-.018
7.0 - 7.9	.383	-.200	-.419	.023
8.0 - 8.9	.454*	-.312	-.425	.044
9.0 - 9.9	.467*	-.383	-.427	.079
10.0 - 11.9	.447*	-.346	-.370	.036
12.0 - 13.9	.380	-.385	-.343	.106
14.0 - 15.9	.428	-.449*	-.368	.128
16.0 - 17.9	.486*	-.484*	-.376	.104
18.0 - 19.9	.456*	-.471*	-.380	.115
20.0 - 24.9	.397	-.524*	-.342	.180
25+	.443	-.542*	-.347	.168

*p = .05 or better

Lower Doab especially. Moreover, the correlations in Oudh also turn negative. The shift in the Oudh pattern is easier to explain than the positive correlation in 1952, for it has been well documented that, beginning in 1957 and reaching a peak in 1962, many of the former talukdars and zamindars of Oudh mobilized support aggressively against the Congress and supported the Jan Sangh and Swatantra parties [Brass 1965: ch. iv and Burger 1969: ch. v]. Thus, with the exception of the 1952 elections in Oudh, the general pattern established for the Congress throughout Uttar Pradesh in the first three elections was one of lack of support in the areas of the state previously dominated by the bigger zamindars and talukdars. This finding is consistent with anticipations in the aftermath of the passage of the Zamindar Abolition Act.

Although the Zamindari Abolition Act won for the Congress a well-defined class of enemies, it does not appear that it worked so well to establish a rural base of friends among the general body of peasant proprietors. In the 1952 elections, there was a generally positive relationship between the Congress vote share and the per cent of middle and big cultivators in the state as a whole and particularly in the west plain, a generally negative or very weak

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients for Party Vote Shares with Size of Holdings, 1952 Elections and 1945 Landholdings Census, Oudh

Size Category (in acres)	Congress (N = 12)	SP (N = 12)	Jan Sangh (N = 12)	UPPP (N = 10)	Inds. (N = 12)
under 0.5	-.19	.39	-.01	-.21	.08
0.5 - 0.9	.39	.40	-.63*	.08	-.01
1.0 - 1.9	.37	-.18	-.59*	.29	-.06
2.0 - 2.9	.39	-.23	-.19	.24	-.27
3.0 - 3.9	.20	-.17	.11	.26	-.18
4.0 - 4.9	.03	-.26	.30	.16	-.17
5.0 - 5.9	-.10	-.32	.41	.12	-.10
6.0 - 6.9	-.11	-.41	.45	.04	.09
7.0 - 7.9	-.07	-.35	.43	.09	-.12
8.0 - 8.9	-.15	-.39	.47	.01	-.08
9.0 - 9.9	-.07	-.39	.40	.02	.00
10.0 - 11.9	-.27	-.40	.47	-.13	.26
12.0 - 13.9	-.24	-.47	.42	-.15	.27
14.0 - 15.9	-.34	-.46	.44	-.12	.19
16.0 - 17.9	-.45	-.57*	.46	-.20	.32
18.0 - 19.9	-.52*	-.61*	.63*	-.34	.36
20.0 - 24.9	-.47	-.55*	.54*	-.23	.27
25+	-.50*	-.61*	.41	-.21	.13

*p = .05 or better

association with dwarf landholders and agricultural labourers, and a strong negative association with the largest size categories in Oudh. The strongest positive correlations between the Congress vote shares and various size categories were with the 8- to 20-acre cultivators in the western districts of the state (see Tables 2 to 5).

Between 1957 and 1969, however, this pattern was reversed. The Congress acquired strength among agricultural labourers, as indicated by the following correlations at levels of .05 or better: .22 in the entire state in 1967; .23 and .34 in 1962 and 1967, respectively, in the plains districts only; .43 in Rohilkhand in 1969; .79 in 1957, .66 in 1962, and .55 in 1967 in the Lower Doab; and .56 in 1967 in Oudh (Table 5). During all these elections, only one strong negative association was found between the Congress vote and agricultural labourers, -.38 in 1967 in the eastern districts. Similarly, as indicated in Table 6, in both the state as a whole and in the plains districts treated separately, the predominant associations between the Congress vote and dwarf landholders with less than 2.5 acres of land are positive. However, when the plains regions are each examined separately, the pattern is one that

Table 5: Correlation Coefficients for Agricultural Laborers, 1951, 1961, and 1971 Censuses,^a with Party Vote Shares, 1952–1977, Uttar Pradesh

Region/Election Year ^b	Congress		UPPP/ Swatantra ^d		Jan Sangh		Independents		BKD		SP/SSP		KMPP/PSP		CPI		Janata	
	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)
Whole State																		
1952	.00	(116)	-.13	(25)	-.27*	(86)	.10	(114)	—	—	-.03	(109)	.01	(92)	.11	(31)	—	—
1957	.03	(94)	—	—	.04	(78)	-.28*	(91)	—	—	-.09	(49)	-.06	(77)	.43*	(44)	—	—
1962	-.02	(95)	-.12	(59)	.02	(93)	-.09	(93)	—	—	.23*	(73)	.07	(86)	.32*	(64)	—	—
1967	.22*	(111)	-.18	(70)	.06	(110)	-.19*	(107)	—	—	.20*	(91)	-.08	(68)	.19	(52)	—	—
1969	.01	(111)	-.14	(42)	-.10	(109)	-.05	(99)	.11	(110)	.23*	(92)	-.15	(51)	.31*	(57)	—	—
1974	-.09	(101)	-.18	(74)	-.08	(99)	-.08	(101)	.18*	(97)	—	—	.12	(78)	-.14	(25)	—	—
1977	-.00	(54)	—	—	—	—	-.14	(54)	—	—	—	—	—	—	.19	(54)	-.00	(54)
Whole state (Controlling for region) ^c																		
1952	-.01	(109)	-.35	(20)	-.19	(79)	.17	(107)	—	—	.01	(102)	.03	(81)	.17	(25)	—	—
1957	.15	(87)	—	—	-.04	(70)	-.20	(82)	—	—	.08	(42)	.03	(70)	.34*	(38)	—	—
1962	.05	(87)	-.14	(53)	-.16	(86)	.20	(82)	—	—	.13	(66)	.06	(79)	.14	(57)	—	—
1967	.16	(104)	-.10	(64)	-.12	(103)	.04	(89)	—	—	.11	(84)	.08	(61)	.07	(45)	—	—
1969	-.03	(104)	-.31	(36)	-.20*	(102)	.11	(89)	.03	(103)	.13	(85)	-.03	(44)	.21	(50)	—	—
1974	.04	(94)	-.12	(72)	-.21*	(92)	.01	(94)	.15	(90)	—	—	.12	(71)	-.17	(18)	—	—
Plains Districts Only																		
1952	-.01	(98)	.02	(20)	-.39*	(86)	.25*	(96)	—	—	-.12	(44)	.04	(83)	.10	(29)	—	—
1957	.12	(83)	—	—	.04	(71)	-.26*	(82)	—	—	-.12	(47)	-.02	(69)	.46*	(43)	—	—
1962	.23*	(83)	-.10	(56)	.02	(82)	-.06	(81)	—	—	.23*	(66)	.05	(74)	.31*	(56)	—	—
1967	.34*	(97)	-.18	(69)	.03	(96)	-.20*	(94)	—	—	.18*	(81)	-.10	(61)	.15	(46)	—	—
1969	.03	(97)	-.17	(41)	-.02	(95)	.02	(88)	-.16	(97)	.23*	(80)	-.16	(47)	.21	(46)	—	—
1974	.00	(87)	-.19	(70)	-.13	(80)	-.10	(87)	.15	(85)	—	—	.14	(70)	-.14	(25)	—	—
1977	-.07	(43)	—	—	—	—	-.10	(43)	—	—	—	—	—	—	.20	(43)	.12	(43)
Rohilkhand																		
1952	-.18	(16)	—	—	-.18	(11)	.41	(16)	—	—	.07	(16)	-.30	(11)	—	—	—	—
1957	.18	(16)	—	—	.38	(14)	-.22	(16)	—	—	—	—	.01	(12)	—	—	—	—
1962	.07	(16)	—	—	.19	(16)	.11	(16)	—	—	-.13	(12)	.26	(15)	—	—	—	—
1967	-.11	(16)	.22	(15)	-.19	(15)	-.28	(15)	—	—	-.22	(10)	—	—	—	—	—	—
1969	.43*	(16)	—	—	-.27	(16)	.09	(15)	-.02	(16)	-.09	(11)	—	—	—	—	—	—
1974	.03	(13)	.03	(13)	-.45	(13)	.29	(13)	.03	(13)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Upper Doab																		
1952	.20	(24)	—	—	-.39*	(19)	.01	(23)	—	—	-.19	(22)	-.16	(20)	—	—	—	—
1957	-.20	(18)	—	—	.01	(14)	-.15	(18)	—	—	—	—	.44	(13)	—	—	—	—
1962	-.35	(18)	.10	(15)	-.17	(18)	.42*	(18)	—	—	-.28	(13)	-.01	(14)	—	—	—	—

Table 5: Correlation Coefficients for Agricultural Laborers, 1951, 1961, and 1971 Censuses,^a with Party Vote Shares, 1952–1977, Uttar Pradesh (*cont*)

Region/Election Year ^b	Congress		UPPP/ Swatantra ^d		Jan Sangh		Independents		BKD		SP/SSP		KMPP/PSP		CPI		Janata	
	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)	r	(N)
Upper Doab																		
1967	.30	(18)	-.17	(14)	-.00	(18)	.06	(18)	—	—	-.18	(14)	—	—	—	—	—	—
1969	-.02	(18)	-.38	(14)	-.39	(16)	.01	(18)	.45*	(18)	-.10	(15)	—	—	—	—	—	—
1974	-.16	(16)	-.41	(12)	-.41	(15)	.12	(16)	.37	(14)	—	—	-.31	(13)	—	—	—	—
Lower Doab																		
1952	.08	(12)	—	—	—	—	-.09	(12)	—	—	-.72*	(10)	.67*	(11)	—	—	—	—
1957	.79*	(13)	—	—	-.40	(13)	-.50*	(13)	—	—	—	—	.35	(13)	—	—	—	—
1962	.66*	(13)	—	—	-.46	(13)	.04	(13)	—	—	.16	(12)	.54*	(13)	—	—	—	—
1967	.55*	(15)	-.43	(10)	-.12	(15)	.57*	(14)	—	—	.17	(15)	-.02	(10)	—	—	—	—
1969	.25	(15)	—	—	-.14	(15)	.75*	(13)	-.24	(15)	.35	(14)	—	—	—	—	—	—
1974	.13	(15)	-.01	(10)	.07	(15)	.07	(15)	-.13	(15)	—	—	.29	(12)	—	—	—	—
Oudh																		
1952	-.20	(26)	-.05	(14)	-.05	(25)	.24	(25)	—	—	-.04	(26)	.14	(24)	—	—	—	—
1957	.01	(18)	—	—	-.34	(15)	-.01	(18)	—	—	.39	(13)	-.42	(14)	.21	(10)	—	—
1962	-.01	(18)	-.08	(15)	-.47	(17)	.49*	(17)	—	—	.25	(13)	-.35	(16)	.18	(12)	—	—
1967	.56*	(29)	-.13	(18)	-.20	(29)	-.08	(29)	—	—	.07	(25)	-.10	(20)	.17	(13)	—	—
1969	-.20	(29)	—	—	-.13	(29)	-.02	(24)	.18	(24)	-.04	(22)	-.18	(16)	.13	(12)	—	—
1974	.03	(22)	.05	(18)	-.27	(22)	-.23	(22)	.32	(22)	—	—	.17	(19)	—	—	—	—
Eastern Districts																		
1952	-.08	(20)	—	—	-.28	(18)	.60*	(20)	—	—	-.17	(20)	.24	(17)	—	—	—	—
1957	-.11	(18)	—	—	.44*	(15)	-.09	(17)	—	—	-.23	(15)	.40	(17)	.68*	(13)	—	—
1962	.01	(18)	—	—	-.06	(18)	-.05	(17)	—	—	.17	(16)	-.00	(16)	.05	(16)	—	—
1967	-.38*	(19)	-.44	(12)	.03	(19)	-.05	(18)	—	—	.42*	(17)	-.09	(16)	-.09	(15)	—	—
1969	-.26	(19)	—	—	-.11	(19)	.22	(18)	-.11	(19)	.32*	(18)	-.20	(12)	.39	(13)	—	—
1974	.06	(21)	-.17	(17)	-.07	(21)	-.02	(21)	-.20	(21)	—	—	.21	(18)	-.41	—	—	—

* $p = .05$ or better

^aThe 1951 census was used for correlation with party vote shares in the 1952 elections, the 1961 census with all elections from 1957 to 1969, and the 1971 census for the 1974 and 1977 elections. The 1977 correlations shown in this table use district rather than tahsil-level census data because I have not yet been able to undertake the expensive and time-consuming task of coding and storing the data at the tahsil level to conform to the 1976 delimitation of constituencies.

^bSee footnote a to Table 1.

^cSee footnote b to Table 1.

^d1952 figures are for the UPPP. Neither party contested in 1957 or 1977. All other figures are for Swatantra.

Table 6: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with Congress Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/ Year	(N)	Less than 1.0	1.0- 2.4	2.5- 4.9	5.0- 7.4	7.5- 9.9	10.0- 12.4	12.5- 14.9	15.0- 29.9	30.0- 49.9	50+
Whole State											
1957	(94)	.25*	-.03	-.25*	-.23*	-.05	-.04	.07	.08	.13	.15
1962	(95)	.37*	.21*	-.23*	-.35*	-.29*	-.21*	-.16	-.10	.01	.07
1967	(111)	.35*	.19*	-.23*	-.37*	-.27*	-.14	-.14	-.03	.02	.06
1969	(111)	.04	.04	-.13	-.09	-.13	.04	-.02	.11	.17*	.20*
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(87)	.32*	-.06	-.12	-.26*	-.11	-.12	.07	.05	.19	.21*
1962	(87)	.08	-.17	-.12	.02	.02	.08	.14	.18	.30*	.30*
1967	(104)	.26*	-.04	-.23*	-.22*	-.04	-.01	.08	.13	.07	.10
1969	(104)	-.11	-.10	-.05	.09	.04	.15	.10	.16	.14	.16
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(83)	.21*	-.10	-.14	-.16	.03	-.01	.14	.11	.18*	.18*
1962	(83)	.24*	.05	-.06	-.16	-.13	-.15	-.04	-.04	.10	.18*
1967	(97)	.42*	.22*	-.17*	-.38*	-.27	-.22*	-.16	-.13	-.10	-.02
1969	(97)	.05	.13	.08	-.09	-.17	-.09	-.13	-.10	-.07	-.02
Rohilkhand											
1957	(16)	.47*	-.16	.06	-.66*	.34	-.20	.38	.13	.24	.15
1962	(16)	.16	-.24	.04	-.04	.26	-.11	.14	.09	.13	.02
1967	(16)	-.23	-.43*	-.22	-.05	.52*	.27	.50*	.38	.30	.08
1969	(16)	.28	.15	-.20	-.21	-.25	.00	.07	.03	.08	.07
Upper Doab											
1957	(18)	.29	.05	-.10	.22	-.47*	.10	-.22	-.03	.10	.32
1962	(18)	-.15	-.19	.08	.42*	-.13	.01	.08	-.01	.16	.43*
1967	(18)	.02	.18	-.36	.06	-.21	.20	-.04	.19	.15	.45*
1969	(18)	-.34	-.15	-.28	.03	.27	.22	.38	.30	.16	-.01
Lower Doab											
1957	(13)	.65*	.26	-.12	-.70*	-.37	-.70*	-.06	.04	.25	.27
1962	(13)	.61*	.10	-.28	-.55*	-.17	-.56*	.13	.06	.16	.16
1967	(15)	.32	.05	-.25	-.30	-.14	-.25	-.03	.25	.38	.20
1969	(15)	-.28	-.16	-.15	.20	.24	.23	.25	.30	.21	.18
Oudh											
1957	(18)	.39*	-.02	-.20	-.26	-.02	-.30	.14	-.11	-.07	-.09
1962	(18)	-.14	-.25	.07	.22	.19	.25	.21	.17	.19	.25
1967	(29)	.50*	.08	-.21	-.42*	-.20	-.35*	-.06	-.17	-.26	-.20
1969	(29)	-.43*	-.17	.33*	.37*	.13	.27	-.04	.23	.27	.32*
Eastern Districts											
1957	(18)	.39	-.23	-.12	-.03	.08	-.04	.05	-.00	.05	.13
1962	(18)	.24	-.33	-.12	.07	.19	.17	.22	.20	.23	.29
1967	(19)	.43*	-.07	-.23	-.17	-.04	-.15	-.07	-.12	-.15	.02
1969	(19)	.39*	-.11	-.09	-.18	-.07	-.11	-.03	-.06	-.07	-.10

*p = .05 or better

is most pronounced in the eastern districts, among the smallest landholders only, and in the Lower Doab among the two smallest landholding size categories, except in the 1969 election. When this pattern is combined with the fairly widespread pattern of positive association with agricultural labourers, the evidence supports the conclusion that the Congress established significant, though varying, bases of support in the countryside between 1957 and 1969 in areas where the poorest and most disadvantaged rural groups were concentrated.

A second general pattern in both the state as a whole and in the plains districts is a predominantly negative association between the Congress vote and the small and middle peasantry holding between 2.5 and 12.5 acres of land. This group of landholders may be characterized as largely peasant

proprietors, with holdings sufficiently large for adequate subsistence and, at the middle and upper end of the range, to produce a surplus for the market, but not large enough to have benefited much from the new agricultural inputs in the first stages of their introduction into the agricultural economy of UP. On the latter grounds, there would be reason for discontent with the Congress in areas where these segments of the peasantry are concentrated. However, the general pattern of negative association with the Congress vote varies somewhat in different regions of the state and, within some regions, across time.

A third pattern is a positive association between the Congress vote and the rich farmers, namely, those holding 30 acres of land or more. This group of landholders would have felt the most pressure because of land ceilings reductions, but also would have benefited most from the availability of agricultural inputs. The positive association with the Congress vote is most pronounced in western UP, the centre of the 'green revolution' in this state, particularly in the Upper Doab. It also appears less strongly in Rohilkhand and in the Lower Doab, but is less consistent in Oudh and in the eastern districts. In other words, the general pattern holds in the predominantly wheat-producing regions, but not in the rice-producing areas of the state. It needs to be stressed here, however, that the correlations do *not* show strong support for the Congress in wheat-growing areas generally. The correlations show only that, within these wheat-growing regions, Congress support was strongest in areas where big farmers were concentrated. Moreover, evidence to be presented below suggests that areas dominated by the bigger wheat farmers did not in fact support the Congress in the 1960s.

In general, therefore, the pattern of correlations between the Congress vote and the rural social structure variables suggests that the Congress in UP failed to establish a solid base of support in the countryside among the principal proprietary groups, the small and middle-size landholders, with holdings between 2.5 and 12.5 acres (who constitute the most important cultivating peasant classes in the state). Neither did the Congress acquire consistent support among the bigger peasants holding between 12.5 and 30 acres, although it did show some strength among these groups in Rohilkhand. Rather, Congress support in the countryside was greatest in areas of the state where disadvantaged groups are concentrated and also in areas where the largest proprietors are concentrated. Thus, neither the Zamindari Abolition Act nor Congress control over the disbursement of agricultural inputs through the 'green revolution' succeeded in gaining dominance for the Congress among the principal controllers of land, who are also the leading social and political force in UP.

Parties of the right. Two parties in UP have been clearly identified with the interests of the former big zamindars and the large landholders. The first party to form in UP to defend landlord interests was the UP Praja Party (UPPP), which contested the 1952 elections, but polled less than two per cent of the popular vote and won only two seats. The UPPP disappeared after this

poor showing and no landlord party contested in 1957. However, a state branch of the Swatantra Party was formed in UP in 1959 and polled nearly five per cent of the vote in both the 1962 and 1967 elections. The party has declined since then and polled only 1.25 per cent of the vote in 1969 and 1.13 per cent in 1974, winning only five seats in 1969 and only one seat in 1974.

These two parties succeeded only partially in winning support in areas of UP where the large landholders are concentrated. Neither the UPPP in 1952 nor Swatantra in 1962 polled well in the ex-zamindar areas (Table 1). The UPPP in 1952 clearly had its principal strength in areas where landholdings of four acres and above were concentrated (Table 2). Moreover, the UPPP showed stronger support than any other party in 1952 in areas where the largest landholdings were concentrated. The pattern for the Swatantra party in relation to the landholding size groups was not uniform either throughout the state or over time. Only in the former talukdari-dominated region of Oudh in 1967 did the Swatantra vote correlate positively with the larger size landholding categories of 15 acres and above (Table 7). Clearly, the former big zamindars and talukdars did not concentrate their support in a major way in UP with the parties that set out explicitly to represent their interests. It is generally known, in fact, that many of the former big landlord-intermediaries moved from party to party to protect their individual interests rather than their class interests. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the class

Table 7: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with Swatantra Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Region/	Election	Less	1.0-	2.5-	5.0-	7.5-	10.0-	12.5-	15.0-	30.0-	
Year	/(N)	than 1.0	2.4	4.9	7.4	9.9	12.4	14.9	29.9	49.9	50+
Whole State											
1962	(59)	.01	.04	-.22*	-.06	.00	.05	.06	.09	.09	.07
1967	(70)	.01	-.01	.10	.05	.03	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.09	-.04
1969	(42)	-.01	.03	.35*	.01	.02	-.17	-.05	-.18	-.22	-.21
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1962	(53)	.10	.18	-.26*	-.15	-.08	-.02	.01	.02	.01	-.01
1967	(64)	.16	.16	.04	-.12	-.12	-.19	-.15	-.19	-.13	-.08
1969	(36)	.03	.08	.37*	-.04	.02	-.29	-.12	-.32*	-.33*	-.25
Plains Districts Only											
1962	(56)	.05	.08	-.18	-.07	-.03	.00	.02	.01	-.01	-.06
1967	(69)	.00	-.01	.11	.06	.04	-.09	-.03	-.09	-.09	-.03
1969	(41)	.02	.05	.34*	-.02	-.01	-.19	-.08	-.20	-.25	-.23
Rohilkhand											
1967	(15)	.54*	.29	.21	-.32	-.27	-.41	-.24	-.26	-.19	-.04
Upper Doab											
1962	(15)	-.30	-.26	-.21	.03	.56*	.13	.54*	.18	.12	-.17
1967	(14)	-.35	.05	.16	.07	.35	-.14	.25	-.17	-.23	-.29
1969	(12)	-.25	.01	.50*	.02	.31	-.32	.02	-.33	-.31	-.29
Lower Doab											
1967	(10)	-.01	.38	.16	.02	-.36	.08	-.52	-.44	-.39	-.23
Oudh											
1962	(15)	.19	.46*	-.59	-.22	-.37	-.06	-.32	.02	.28	.16
1967	(18)	.06	.34	-.61*	-.00	-.26	.37	-.21	.43*	.64*	.36
Eastern Districts											
1967	(12)	.28	-.30	.34	.01	.16	-.17	.09	-.12	-.16	-.19

*p = .05 or better

interest of these groups was mobilized effectively by any other opposition forces in the state.

Jan Sangh. The Jan Sangh has been one of the two principal competitors with the Congress for support among the dominant peasant proprietors in UP. Over time, the party adopted positions that would appeal to proprietors of all landholding sizes including the larger ex-zamindars and talukdars, who were recruited into leadership positions in the party more extensively than by any other party in UP. It is also known that Jan Sangh support has been heavily concentrated in Oudh, the traditional talukdari area of UP. Consequently, the logical expectation is that Jan Sangh vote shares should correlate posi-

Table 8: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with Jan Sangh Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/ Year / (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0-2.4	2.5-4.9	5.0-7.4	7.5-9.9	10.0-12.4	12.5-14.9	15.0-29.9	30.0-49.9	50+
Whole State										
1957 (78)	.00	.03	.12	.01	-.05	-.08	-.04	-.07	-.03	.06
1962 (93)	.07	.12	.31*	-.03	-.13	-.22*	-.20*	-.23*	-.18*	-.12
1967 (110)	-.03	-.08	-.09	.05	-.03	.05	.00	.16*	.28*	.31*
1969 (109)	.15	.15	.03	-.06	-.23*	-.18*	-.24*	-.12	-.02	.01
Whole State (controlling for region)										
1957 (70)	-.23*	-.26*	.07	.26*	.26*	.16	.22	.13	.13	.18
1962 (86)	-.04	-.13	.17	.10	.11	-.03	.00	-.10	-.09	-.05
1967 (103)	-.07	-.20*	.03	.20*	.17	.08	.01	.06	.08	.11
1969 (102)	.01	-.03	.07	.16	-.03	-.05	-.16	-.11	-.09	-.06
Plains Districts Only										
1957 (71)	-.05	.00	.11	.05	-.04	-.03	-.03	-.04	.07	.18
1962 (82)	.07	.12	.31*	-.03	-.13	-.22*	-.20*	-.23*	-.18*	-.12
1967 (96)	.07	.12	.21*	.00	-.15	-.21*	-.25*	-.22*	-.11	.02
1969 (95)	.09	.19*	.22*	-.01	-.25*	-.25*	-.33	-.28*	-.18*	-.04
Rohilkhand										
1957 (14)	-.12	-.25	-.20	-.10	.31	.22	.50*	.27	.37	.18
1962 (16)	.27	.09	.34	-.35	-.03	-.23	.03	-.24	-.13	-.15
1967 (15)	.38	.06	.43	-.26	-.02	-.41	-.14	-.28	-.30	-.16
1969 (16)	.01	.13	.45*	.31	-.30	-.28	-.45*	-.43*	-.43*	-.14
Upper Doab										
1957 (14)	-.10	-.09	-.28	-.07	.02	.33	.06	.19	.19	-.15
1962 (18)	.08	.10	-.12	-.29	-.01	.11	-.14	.12	.15	.03
1967 (18)	.10	.17	.05	-.45*	.38	-.02	-.19	-.09	-.25	-.35
1969 (16)	.18	.24	.27	-.38	.09	-.28	-.21	-.19	-.28	-.29
Lower Doab										
1957 (13)	.25	.50*	-.01	-.23	-.43	-.11	-.57*	-.49*	-.46	-.33
1962 (13)	.03	.28	.03	-.06	-.19	.06	-.36	-.31	-.37	-.24
1967 (15)	-.02	.12	-.18	.08	-.02	.08	-.27	-.13	-.19	-.26
1969 (15)	-.05	.15	.13	.00	-.11	-.02	-.29	-.14	-.20	-.30
Oudh										
1957 (15)	-.41	-.43*	.16	.48*	.57*	.47*	.26	.49*	.39	.19
1962 (17)	-.33	-.45*	.32	.38	.43*	.32	.44*	.36	.30	.21
1967 (29)	-.54	-.45*	.18	.64*	.42*	.55*	.23	.53*	.55*	.39*
1969 (29)	-.39*	-.18	-.03	.44*	.16	.42*	.12	.47*	.58*	.37*
Eastern Districts										
1957 (15)	-.34	-.49*	.16	.61*	.48*	.26	.53*	.49*	.48*	.68*
1962 (18)	.17	-.25	-.16	.21	.19	.10	.11	.12	.13	.21
1967 (19)	.17	-.44	.17	.14	.36	-.13	.33	.24	.25	.38
1969 (19)	.33	-.30	-.09	.02	.20	-.13	.14	.13	.14	.19

*p = .05 or better.

tively both with the percentage of zamindars and with the largest landholding size categories.

Correlations between the Jan Sangh vote share and the 1951 census category of non-cultivating owners did not on the whole show the expected strong support for the Jan Sangh in the ex-zamindar areas, although most correlations in the 1952 and 1957 elections were weakly positive (Table 1). Table 8 suggests a pattern of positive correlations with small landholders and negative associations with middle and large landholders in the plains districts between 1962 and 1969. However, in the Jan Sangh case, the state-wide patterns are quite misleading, since there is a striking difference in the support bases of the party in western and eastern UP.

The clearest pattern in the data for the Jan Sangh is in Oudh, the party's principal stronghold, where there has been a remarkable consistency in its support bases over time. It is here, in the former talukdari dominated region, that confirmation is found for the expectation that the Jan Sangh would show strong support among the larger categories of landholders. However, Jan Sangh support bases in Oudh were not confined only to areas where the upper landholding categories are predominant but were spread across the entire spectrum of landholding categories of 2.5 acres and above and particularly from 5 acres and above. With the smallest landholders and with agricultural labourers, all correlations for all elections are negative. These ecological data, combined with what is known about the leadership of the Jan Sangh during this period, provide strong support for the inference that, in Oudh at least, the Jan Sangh was the party of the leading proprietary groups.

Unfortunately, we do not have any contemporary case study evidence to assess the extent to which the Jan Sangh support base in Oudh became organizationally independent of the ex-talukdars. The only detailed case study of the Jan Sangh organization in Oudh is that done by Burger for Pratapgarh district, which does not go beyond 1962. In Pratapgarh in 1962, Burger showed that Jan Sangh strength was based on a 'Raja network', which included the dependents of the former Raja of Pratapgarh and most Thakurs in the district who allied with the Raja on the basis of caste affinities [Burger 1969: 127]. Such an alliance would have brought into the Jan Sangh fold many peasants with middle and large landholdings. The strength, breadth, and persistence of the Jan Sangh support in this region suggests that the Jan Sangh base was broader than the ex-Rajas only, whose support has anyway been rather fickle, and that the network of relationships built up by the Jan Sangh in the manner described by Burger substituted organizational ties for the former patron-client-caste network. The fact that the Jan Sangh established its position among the leading rural social classes from the first post-Independence election and succeeded in maintaining that position not only against the dominant Congress, but against the Swatantra party, which appealed specifically to the ex-talukdars, and against the BKD, which rose up with a specific appeal to both the middle and big peasants in 1969, strongly supports such a conclusion. On balance, therefore, the evidence indicates that the Jan Sangh in Oudh became in this period the party that best reflected

Table 9: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with Independent Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Region/	Election Year / (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0-2.4	2.5-4.9	5.0-7.4	7.5-9.9	10.0-12.4	12.5-14.9	15.0-29.9	30.0-49.9	50+
Whole State											
	1957 (91)	-.19*	-.15	-.08	.16	.23*	.16	.20*	.10	.02	-.07
	1962 (93)	-.16	-.17*	.00	.13	.18*	.12	.15	.09	.01	.00
	1967 (107)	-.28*	-.35*	-.05	.30*	.38*	.35*	.33*	.25*	.10	.01
	1969 (99)	.02	-.06	-.07	-.03	.00	.02	.08	.08	.10	.09
Whole State (controlling for region)											
	1957 (82)	-.12	.13	.07	.05	-.04	-.03	-.07	-.15	-.15	-.17
	1962 (82)	-.07	-.08	.00	-.01	.02	.03	.05	.06	-.02	.03
	1967 (89)	-.17	-.14	-.17	.09	.12	.34*	.18	.28*	.19	.07
	1969 (89)	-.03	-.09	-.02	-.06	.03	.04	.17	.16	.17	.10
Plains Districts Only											
	1957 (82)	-.24*	-.23*	-.10	.23*	.31*	.23*	.29*	.20*	.10	-.05
	1962 (81)	-.21*	-.26*	-.04	.21*	.26*	.23*	.24*	.23*	.11	.08
	1967 (94)	-.36*	-.43*	-.14	.33*	.44*	.45*	.44*	.45*	.31*	.07
	1969 (88)	-.11	-.11	.13	.10	.07	.02	.11	.05	.08	.08
Rohilkhand											
	1957 (16)	-.36	.08	-.05	.37	-.25	.13	-.04	.00	-.07	-.18
	1962 (16)	-.35	-.30	.03	.38	.07	.07	.20	.10	.16	.23
	1967 (15)	-.46*	-.26	-.09	.33	.24	.26	.15	.17	.13	.06
	1969 (15)	-.22	-.32	-.26	.22	.18	.25	.29	.35	.32	.26
Upper Doab											
	1957 (18)	-.01	.03	.25	-.20	.45*	-.27	.23	-.27	-.30	-.26
	1962 (18)	.11	-.06	-.37	-.15	.17	.26	.02	.20	.03	.09
	1967 (18)	-.14	-.44*	-.56*	.16	.11	.51*	.26	.57*	.50*	.22
	1969 (18)	.23	.11	.18	-.05	-.18	-.23	-.00	-.23	-.02	.24
Lower Doab											
	1957 (13)	-.36	-.13	.30	.44	.17	.41	-.13	-.17	-.29	-.35
	1962 (13)	-.18	.08	.58*	.04	-.16	-.02	-.15	-.12	-.11	-.06
	1967 (14)	.02	-.11	.26	-.14	.06	-.13	.22	.15	.15	.14
	1969 (13)	.46	.13	-.04	-.54*	-.31	-.58*	.11	.19	.44	.38
Oudh											
	1957 (18)	.17	.44*	-.50*	-.20	-.34	-.09	-.30	.03	.20	.08
	1962 (17)	.35	.42*	-.26	-.42*	-.38	-.37	-.31	-.37	-.47*	-.45*
	1967 (29)	.04	-.10	.09	-.09	.22	-.11	.40*	.08	-.09	-.33*
	1969 (24)	.12	-.10	.14	-.15	.16	-.16	.27	-.10	-.29	-.33
Eastern Districts											
	1957 (17)	.10	.32	.05	-.27	-.33	-.43*	-.34	-.36	-.24	-.15
	1962 (17)	.07	-.28	.00	.14	.20	.08	.21	.24	.20	.22
	1967 (18)	-.14	.20	-.12	-.04	-.23	.28	-.21	-.10	-.04	.21
	1969 (18)	-.52*	-.09	.05	.36	.16	.66*	.19	.33	.21	.04

*p = .05 or better.

and articulated the common class interests of both the leading peasant proprietors and the big landlords.

Independents. Further evidence of discontent among the leading proprietary groups in UP comes from the correlations for the independent votes, which display three striking features. The first is that in 1952 all correlations with all size categories of 6 acres and above in the state as a whole, and from 1957 through 1969 all correlations with size categories of 5 acres and above in the plains districts – except for one correlation in the 50+ category in 1957 – are positive, whereas nearly all correlations with small farmers and dwarf landholders are negative (Tables 2 and 9). The second striking feature is that all correlations from 1957 through 1967 in the size groups between 5 and 30

acres in the plains districts are significant at the .05 level or better, but that those with the rich farmer categories – with one exception in 1967 – are much less strong. The third striking feature is the precipitous decline in the strength of the correlations with the 5- to 30-acre peasants in the 1969 election, when the BKD entered the electoral arena with a direct appeal to these groups. However, the regional correlations show some variation from the state-wide pattern. In the western plains districts of Rohilkhand and the Upper Doab, a consistent pattern did not emerge until 1962. From 1962 onward in Rohilkhand, all correlations with landholding size categories of 5 acres or more were positive. A similar pattern was evident also in the Upper Doab in the 1962 and 1967 elections. In the central and eastern plains districts (Lower Doab, Oudh, Eastern Districts), however, there is no consistent pattern of this sort.

If one views the vote for independents as at least in part a protest vote by groups discontented with all parties, then these correlations fit well with those reported above for the Congress, the parties of the right, and the Jan Sangh. Those correlations suggest general discontent with the Congress in areas where the middle proprietors are concentrated. The parties of the right succeeded only partially in mobilizing this discontent. The Jan Sangh, however, succeeded in building strong and consistent support in these areas in the region of Oudh. The correlations for the independent vote shares suggest that independents mobilized much of the discontent that the parties of the right failed to pick up, particularly in western UP, but that they could not do so in Oudh, where the Jan Sangh established a firm base in places dominated by the middle and upper proprietary groups.

It has been mentioned above that many ex-zamindars and former talukdars chose to protect their personal interests by contesting elections as independents or by supporting independent candidates. If this behaviour was widespread, it is reasonable to expect the correlations between the independent vote and the zamindar variable (non-cultivating owners, Table 1) to show it, although the fact that most independent candidates were certainly not ex-zamindars or even supported by ex-zamindars would be likely to distort any one-to-one relationships. In fact, the correlations show a strong positive association between the independent vote and the ex-zamindar areas in two regions – Rohilkhand and the Lower Doab, but not elsewhere. Once again, therefore, although the correlations do provide some evidence of political mobilization by the disgruntled ex-zamindars, they also continue to suggest that their discontent was fragmented by party and unevenly distributed by region.

The BKD. The principal party in UP in the post-Independence period to challenge the Congress with a direct and explicit appeal to the peasant proprietors as a body was the BKD, formed in 1969 as a national party, but with its principal strength in UP. In UP the BKD was practically the single-handed creation, organizationally and ideologically, of Charan Singh. Charan Singh, the chief architect of the Zamindari Abolition Act, made a

Table 10: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with BKD Votes, 1969, Uttar Pradesh

Region/ Election Year / (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0- 2.4	2.5- 4.9	5.0- 7.4	7.5- 9.9	10.0- 12.4	12.5- 14.9	15.0- 29.9	30.0- 49.9	50+
Whole State 1969 (110)	-.27*	-.35*	-.09	.30*	.44*	.37*	.36*	.25*	.07	.02
Whole State (controlling for region) 1969 (103)	-.03	-.10	-.21*	.01	.15	.24*	.15	.20*	.09	.04
Plains Districts Only 1969 (97)	-.28*	-.42*	-.29*	.26*	.47*	.46*	.48*	.49*	.33*	.13
Rohilkhand 1969 (16)	-.03	-.19	-.19	-.33	.38	.14	.46*	.32	.28	-.06
Upper Doab 1969 (18)	-.12	-.11	-.54*	.26	-.10	.44*	-.01	.43*	.33	.25
Lower Doab 1969 (15)	-.47*	-.49*	.05	.46*	.45*	.59*	.38	.34	.09	.10
Oudh 1969 (24)	.19	.05	-.07	-.19	-.01	-.15	.06	-.14	-.23	-.15
Eastern Districts 1969 (19)	.13	.13	-.05	-.16	-.08	-.21	-.14	-.19	-.15	-.00

*p = .05 or better.

strong effort to appeal to all the main beneficiaries of that Act, but with a special appeal to the backward castes. Although the BKD had a surprising electoral success in 1969, its greatest success was in western UP where the main beneficiaries of the land settlement were the backward castes. However, in 1974, the BKD did equally well in the eastern districts.

It has already been established that the BKD's dramatic success in 1969 did not come principally at the expense of the other main political parties in the state. The BKD picked up much of its strength from votes that, in previous elections, had gone to independents and smaller opposition parties. Although the Jan Sangh seat share was cut in half in 1969, it does not appear that the party's losses were caused by the BKD. The BKD drew its votes mainly from areas where minor parties and independents had been strongest [Baxter 1975: 115, 135, 137-8]. In fact, 24 of the 98 successful BKD candidates in 1969 'had contested the 1967 election in their same constituencies as independents' [Kornmesser 1976: 11].

The correlation coefficients for the BKD in 1969 with the landholding size variables support fully the above descriptions of BKD support. The party had its principal strength in the state as a whole and in the plains districts in areas where landholders in the range of 5 acres and above are concentrated (Table 10). In regional terms, the pattern holds up for the most part in the three principal regions of BKD support in the 1969 election, namely, the Upper Doab, Rohilkhand, and the Lower Doab. Although there are some variations in positive and negative correlations in these regions, the strongest positive associations with the BKD vote fell among the size categories between 5 and 30 acres. Correlations with smallholders were uniformly negative in these regions and those with the biggest categories of 30 acres and above were either positive, but not significant at the .05 level, or were

negative. In other words, BKD support was greatest in the 1969 elections in the predominantly wheat-growing regions of the state among precisely those groups of peasant proprietors and bigger farmers to which the party appealed.

This pattern of support does not hold up for eastern UP and Oudh, where the BKD vote correlated negatively with all but one of the landholding size categories of 2.5 acres and above. Consequently, it is clear from both the BKD and Jan Sangh correlations in Oudh in 1969 that the BKD did not succeed in this region in cutting into the Jan Sangh support bases. A comparison of the BKD correlations in 1969 with those for independents in 1967 and 1969, in contrast, shows clearly that the BKD support bases in 1969 in the state as a whole and in western UP were quite similar to those of independents in 1967.³ Clearly also, independent support went down in 1969 where BKD support was strongest.

Thus, in the 1969 election in UP, it seems evident that the BKD capitalized on the discontent that had been developing, particularly in the western part of the state, in the middle and rich peasant proprietor areas. At the end of the decade, therefore, the Congress was faced with two large parties, one based in western UP, the other, the Jan Sangh, firmly entrenched in Oudh, both with stronger support bases among the leading rural proprietary groups than the Congress itself had.

Parties of the left. The parties of the left in UP politics have been more fragmented and have done less well over time than either the Jan Sangh or the BKD. The relatively poorer performance of the left parties than either the Jan Sangh or the BKD is not readily understandable in terms of the opportunities presented by rural social organization in UP. On the face of it, there would seem to be ample opportunities for the left parties to appeal to the bottom layers of the rural social structure – to the agricultural labourers, to the tenants, and to the smallest size landholders. The proportion of agricultural labourers to the total working population was 10.5 per cent in the 1961 census and nearly 20 per cent according to the 1971 census (see Table 3 to Part I of this article). The proportion of tenants to the total number of cultivating households in 1961 was 10 per cent (see Table 4 to Part I). More important numerically, however, are the smallest landholders, those holding less than 2.5 acres of land, whose holdings comprised nearly two-thirds of the total in the state, according to the 1971 census (Table 5 to Part I). In eastern UP, the proportion of smallholders was much higher, with more than 75 per cent of the holdings being less than 2.5 acres.

I have argued elsewhere that a major weakness of the left parties was that their leadership and sources of support came partly from the same groups that supported the Congress [*Brass 1968: 87*]. The rural MLAs of the left parties have come largely from middle peasant or petty zamindar backgrounds similar to those of Congress MLAs [*Meyer 1969: 157*]. However, the parties of the left attempted to develop new bases of support. Both the PSP and the Lohia Socialists made explicit appeals to smallholders in the 1960s

Table 11: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with SP/SSP Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/ Year	(N)	Less than 1.0	1.0-2.4	2.5-4.9	5.0-7.4	7.5-9.9	10.0-12.4	12.5-14.9	15.0-29.9	30.0-49.9	50+
Whole State											
1957	(49)	-.11	-.08	.22	.10	.10	.02	.05	-.05	-.15	-.16
1962	(73)	.10	.14	.12	-.14	-.11	-.15	-.13	-.17	-.20*	-.17
1967	(91)	.16	.14	.09	-.19*	-.16	-.19*	-.09	-.15	-.13	-.10
1969	(92)	.16	.28*	.22*	-.22*	-.27*	-.30*	-.25*	-.28*	-.23*	-.20*
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(42)	.03	-.06	.02	.00	.09	-.04	.10	-.03	-.12	-.08
1962	(66)	.06	-.02	-.01	-.07	.02	-.03	.03	.00	-.03	.01
1967	(84)	.25*	.10	.02	-.22*	-.16	-.25*	-.01	-.16	-.11	-.04
1969	(85)	.13	.14	.07	-.18	-.15	-.20	-.06	-.13	-.09	-.05
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(47)	-.07	-.06	.19	.07	.08	.00	.04	-.07	-.20	-.19
1962	(66)	.17	-.11	-.04	-.20	-.11	-.11	-.08	-.07	-.07	-.03
1967	(81)	.24*	.17	.00	-.26*	-.19*	-.20*	-.08	-.15	-.11	-.02
1969	(80)	.25*	.29*	.10	-.30*	-.31*	-.29*	-.24*	-.27*	-.20*	-.10
Rohilkhand											
1962	(12)	-.16	.19	.05	.28	-.36	.03	-.19	-.21	-.21	-.15
1967	(10)	-.37	.14	-.42	.34	-.34	.34	-.16	.11	.05	.00
1969	(11)	-.11	.35	-.34	.12	-.47	.24	-.35	-.07	-.02	-.00
Upper Doab											
1962	(13)	-.23	.10	-.04	.08	-.19	.15	-.13	.07	-.07	-.06
1967	(14)	-.21	-.23	.29	.16	-.00	-.12	.37	-.15	-.08	-.11
1969	(15)	-.21	-.13	.28	.04	-.00	-.13	.25	-.11	-.08	-.23
Lower Doab											
1962	(12)	-.12	-.44	-.49	.21	.51*	.31	.64*	.50*	.46	.15
1967	(15)	.46*	.32	-.22	-.36	-.38	-.43	-.13	-.18	.02	.14
1969	(14)	.47*	.44	.09	-.51*	-.41	-.65*	-.24	-.35	-.11	.01
Oudh											
1957	(13)	.47*	.29	-.17	-.50*	-.40	-.43	-.39	-.47*	-.49*	-.41
1962	(13)	.43	.03	.06	-.40	-.22	-.48*	-.32	-.48*	-.50*	-.36
1967	(25)	.48*	.14	-.01	-.45*	-.21	-.45*	-.23	-.52*	-.54*	.37
1969	(22)	.40*	-.01	.02	-.37*	-.07	-.37*	-.06	.32	-.36*	-.19
Eastern Districts											
1957	(15)	.14	.01	.05	-.12	-.02	-.33	-.02	-.11	-.15	-.10
1962	(16)	-.10	.11	.21	-.13	-.09	-.34	-.00	-.09	.02	.12
1967	(17)	-.31	.07	.05	.07	.07	.01	.11	.13	.21	.24
1969	(18)	-.43*	.08	.06	.25	.05	.19	.05	.11	.14	.11

*p = .05 or better.

with the demand for exemption of landholdings of less than 6.5 acres from payment of land revenue. The Lohia Socialists also appealed more broadly to all the backward and downtrodden segments of Indian society, particularly to the backward castes, the landless, minorities, and women. Moreover, all the left parties have traditionally been strongest in the most poverty-stricken region of UP, in the eight eastern districts of Deoria, Gorakhpur, Ballia, Azamgarh, Ghazipur, Jaunpur, and Allahabad.

Of the left parties, however, only the radical Socialists succeeded in establishing fairly strong and consistent bases of support in smallholder areas (Table 11). In the state as a whole, the SP in 1962 and the SSP in 1967 and 1969 had positive correlations with smallholder categories of less than 2.5 acres. The SSP in particular had positive correlations, including several in the significance range of .05 or better, with agricultural labourers (Table 5)

Table 12: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with PSP Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/ Year / (N)	Less than 1.0	1.0- 2.4	2.5- 4.9	5.0- 7.4	7.5- 9.9	10.0- 12.4	12.5- 14.9	15.0- 29.9	30.0- 49.9	50+
Whole State										
1957 (77)	-.08	-.06	-.03	.04	.01	.06	.00	.13	.19*	.26*
1962 (86)	-.04	.01	-.17	.02	-.05	.07	.01	.13	.24*	.33*
1967 (68)	-.18	-.08	.07	.19	.12	.11	.01	.04	.05	.15
1969 (51)	-.20	-.16	.01	.20	.19	.12	.13	.11	.13	.27*
Whole State (controlling for region)										
1957 (70)	-.23*	-.13	.02	.09	.12	.15	.04	.24*	.28*	.32*
1962 (79)	.03	.14	-.16	-.03	-.14	.00	-.10	.05	.20	.32*
1967 (61)	-.32*	-.05	.13	.23	.12	.18	.00	.10	.15	.24
1969 (44)	-.15	-.06	.09	.11	.05	.07	.06	.05	.21	.39*
Plains Districts Only										
1957 (69)	-.18	-.02	.24*	.12	.02	-.02	-.09	-.02	.06	.20*
1962 (74)	-.05	.18	.06	.01	-.15	-.11	-.20	-.16	-.03	.20*
1967 (61)	-.31*	-.10	.21*	.26*	.14	.12	.00	.01	.05	.18
1969 (47)	-.23	-.16	.18	.22	.19	.08	.10	.06	.13	.33*
Rohilkhand										
1957 (12)	.46	.20	.27	-.40	.11	-.38	-.32	-.29	-.25	.01
1962 (15)	.32	.39	-.17	-.10	-.27	-.05	-.57*	-.16	-.12	.28
Upper Doab										
1957 (13)	-.39	-.19	-.14	.06	.24	.18	.14	.27	.14	-.16
1962 (14)	.13	.05	.57*	-.05	-.07	-.51*	.13	-.36	-.19	-.10
Lower Doab										
1957 (13)	.16	.19	-.30	-.25	-.25	-.17	-.07	.19	.39	.40
1962 (13)	.37	.14	-.59*	-.41	-.22	-.31	.07	.32	.60*	.65*
1967 (10)	-.53	-.68*	.20	.57*	.68*	.32	.69*	.41	.26	.03
Oudh										
1957 (14)	-.58*	-.58*	.52*	.62*	.48*	.56*	.18	.38	.49*	.62*
1962 (16)	-.51*	-.20	.12	.48*	.20	.56*	-.07	.48*	.71*	.74*
1967 (20)	-.55*	-.14	.24	.44*	.11	.49*	-.09	.37	.50*	.71*
1969 (16)	-.48*	-.09	.28	.36	.03	.47*	-.07	.31	.60*	.80*
Eastern Districts										
1957 (17)	-.51*	-.11	.11	.33	.27	.34	.26	.40	.42*	.41*
1962 (16)	-.38	.49*	-.16	.07	-.28	.18	-.34	-.25	-.31	-.33
1967 (16)	.13	.45*	-.03	-.30	-.46*	-.31	-.42*	-.47*	-.48*	-.41
1969 (12)	.44	.22	-.10	-.31	-.32	-.45	-.28	-.42	-.38	-.18

*p = .05 or better.

and with all smallholders holding 5 acres or less (Table 11). However, the PSP never established a stable support base among smallholders. In fact, from 1957 through 1969, most correlations for the PSP with smallholder categories of less than 2.5 acres were negative (Table 12), whereas its correlations with the larger size categories were positive, some of them fairly strongly so. The CPI, like the PSP, also failed to establish a stable support base among smallholders. In fact, in the eastern districts, all CPI correlations with smallholders of less than 2.5 acres were negative, two of them at significance levels of .05 or better, whereas most of its correlations with landholding size groups of 2.5 acres and above were positive. In fact, the only evidence that suggests a consistent support base for the CPI among the poor is the pattern of positive correlations in every election from 1952 to 1969 with agricultural labourers (Table 5).

In general, the correlations for the left parties go far toward explaining their relative ineffectiveness in UP politics. The PSP, which was for a time

Table 13: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1961 Census, with CPI Votes, 1957-1969, Uttar Pradesh

Election Region/ Year	(N)	Less than 1.0	1.0- 2.4	2.5- 4.9	5.0- 7.4	7.5- 9.9	10.0- 12.4	12.5- 14.9	15.0- 29.9	30.0- 49.9	50+
Whole State											
1957	(44)	.09	.11	-.12	-.22	-.11	-.09	.05	.07	.13	.12
1962	(64)	.08	.04	-.05	-.12	-.04	-.07	.02	.02	.04	-.03
1967	(52)	-.09	-.02	-.23*	.04	-.02	.10	.09	.18	.21	.21
1969	(57)	-.18	-.10	-.17	-.01	.03	.12	.23*	.27*	.33*	.31*
Whole State (controlling for region)											
1957	(38)	-.35*	-.24	-.08	.11	.33*	.27	.41*	.42*	.42*	.34*
1962	(57)	-.09	-.05	.11	.08	.09	.01	.06	-.01	-.07	-.22
1967	(45)	-.20	.05	.08	.19	-.08	-.01	-.04	-.02	-.01	-.02
1969	(50)	-.25	.03	.24	.07	.04	-.15	.13	-.03	-.01	-.01
Plains Districts Only											
1957	(43)	.08	.10	-.13	-.22	-.10	-.09	.07	.11	.23	.24
1962	(56)	.13	.07	-.14	-.15	-.06	-.06	.00	.05	.09	-.06
1967	(46)	-.04	.10	-.25*	.04	-.10	.11	-.05	.09	.09	-.06
1969	(46)	-.03	.23	-.03	-.11	-.20	-.07	-.13	-.05	.04	-.04
Oudh											
1957	(10)	.01	.38	.06	-.21	-.37	-.30	-.30	-.47	-.60*	-.58*
1962	(12)	.01	.15	.20	-.17	-.15	-.30	.04	-.33	-.53*	-.56*
1967	(13)	-.18	.45	-.10	.01	-.34	.06	-.31	-.10	-.12	-.20
1969	(12)	-.20	.44	-.04	-.02	-.38	.02	-.49*	-.05	-.06	-.11
Eastern Districts											
1957	(13)	-.65*	-.39	.42	.45	.52*	.45	.62*	.69*	.68*	.43
1962	(16)	-.11	-.07	.11	-.03	.12	.21	.15	.18	.02	-.28
1967	(15)	-.32	-.06	.22	.31	.09	.24	.18	.10	-.11	-.23
1969	(13)	-.77*	-.40	.58*	.74*	.60*	.51*	.73*	.73*	.69*	.45

*p = .05 or better.

the leading party of the left in UP, failed to establish a support base among the poor. In fact, its areas of strength are more comparable to those of the Jan Sangh and BKD among the middle and large landholders. The CPI also, with the exception of its positive correlations with agricultural labourers, seems to have been competing more with the Jan Sangh and the BKD for a base in areas dominated by the rich peasants than with other left parties or with the Congress for support among the poor. Only the radical Socialists, among the parties of the left, can claim to have established a support base in areas of rural poverty, a fact that may explain its ability to win a fair number of seats in the 1967 and 1969 elections despite the absence of a strong party organization.

Summary. It is desirable at this point to summarize the detailed and complex data that have so far been presented party by party. In particular, it will be useful here to show how the data provide a basis for inferring a) the extent to which areas dominated by different social categories in the countryside were persistent sources of satisfaction or of discontent with the dominant Congress party, and b) the degree to which class differences were translated into the party system. The data suggest both the persistence of rural discontent with the Congress and a considerable degree of sociopolitical differentiation within the party system, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. At the top of the rural class structure, among the former zamindars and

the modern capitalist farmers, the evidence presented is that the political influence of these classes was not concentrated effectively, but was diffused and fragmented. As a consequence of the Zamindari Abolition Act and its anti-landlord bias, the Congress generally polled poorly in areas dominated by the ex-zamindars, especially in the 1957 and 1962 elections. However, the zamindars and big farmers did not succeed in organizing a coherent opposition to the Congress, even though two parties – the UPPP and Swatantra – formed largely to pursue their interests. On the contrary, most of the politically active ex-zamindars pursued individual interests rather than class interests and divided their support among several political parties, including Congress, UPPP, Swatantra, Jan Sangh, the SP, PSP, independents, and others. In Oudh, for a time, the Jan Sangh received strong support from the former landlords. However, over time, the personal economic interests of the ex-landlords and the capitalist farmers pulled many of them into the Congress orbit of influence, and into the nexus of Congress patronage, in search of the capital, the inputs, and the political influence required for them to prosper as the 'green revolution' began to spread. It is noteworthy in this regard that the *only* strong positive correlations – in the state as a whole, in the whole state controlling for region, and in the plains districts treated separately – between the Congress vote and the peasantry with more than 5 acres of land were with big farmers holding at least 30 acres of land.

2. At the bottom of the rural social structure, among the agricultural labourers, dwarf landholders, and poor peasants, there has been a similar dispersion of political support. If there has been no successful landlord – big farmer party in UP, neither has there been any successful party of agrarian protest nor, for that matter, any major radical agrarian movements. Only the SSP attempted to appeal explicitly to the interests and needs of the rural poor. Although it had some success in doing so, its poor organization and internal divisions prevented this party from consolidating its support among these rural social classes.

Although the support of the rural poor has been partly dispersed among opposition parties and groups, the Congress was persistently the strongest political force in areas where the rural poor are concentrated. Although the class interests of the lowest rural social classes were not pursued by the Congress, many economic measures were passed during the years of Congress rule that benefited large numbers of the poor, and much patronage also was distributed to persons from these categories. The correlations have shown that the Congress in turn received support in areas where agricultural labourers and poor peasants were concentrated.

The Congress then was not, truly speaking, a party of the centre in rural UP, but a party of the extremes, one which combined both ends of the rural social structure without the middle. Class polarization and conflict, therefore, were warded off in UP partly by the dispersion and political fragmentation at opposite ends of the rural social structure, partly by the integration of the extremes into the patronage network of the dominant Congress organization.

3. The most striking finding in the data is the evidence of persistent discontent with the Congress among all classes of the peasantry holding between 2.5 and 30 acres of land, and particularly those holding between 5 and 30 acres. This discontent, which revealed itself first in the correlations for the 1957 elections, did not become translated into political support for either parties of the far left or the far right, but was dispersed among independent candidates. This pattern persisted for three elections. Among the established political parties, only the Jan Sangh received any positive support in areas where these peasant social classes were dominant, primarily in Oudh. Then, in 1967, Charan Singh, the leading spokesman of the peasant proprietors as a body and the principal supporter of the aspirations of the middle or 'backward' cultivating castes, who had left the Congress to lead the first non-Congress government in the state's history, formed the BKD. The BKD, which appealed in the 1969 elections specifically to the interests of all the peasant classes holding between 2.5 and 27.5 acres of land, and which also drew into its fold many persons who in previous elections had contested against the Congress as independents, clearly succeeded in mobilizing the discontent of the bulk of the middle and big peasantry. The success of the BKD in 1969, therefore, which appeared at the time as a flash-in-the-pan success based on the gathering together of a horde of defectors and non-party persons, had a genuine socioeconomic basis in the support of the most important social force in the state, the peasant proprietors as a body.

B. PARTY SUPPORT BASES AND SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS IN THE 1974 ELECTIONS.

Two important changes in the structure of the party system and of the contesting parties occurred before the 1974 elections. One was the split in the Congress, in which by far the largest segment of the party joined Mrs. Gandhi while a much smaller but not insignificant section joined the INC(O). In the state as a whole, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress polled 32.24 per cent of the vote while the INC(O) polled 8.36 per cent. The second change was the disintegration of the socialist parties in the state. Several socialist parties contested the elections, but the largest, the Socialist Party, polled less than 3 per cent of the vote. Most important, the SSP, the major remnant of the socialist movement in UP, effectively merged with the BKD in an alliance in which SSP candidates contested on the BKD ticket. Although the BKD vote share did not increase in the state as a whole as a consequence of this alliance, it did increase markedly in the eastern districts, where the SSP had had one of its major areas of strength, from 17.74 per cent in 1969 to 25.08 per cent in 1974. Aside from the two Congress parties and the BKD, the only other party that polled a substantial share of the vote in the state as a whole was the Jan Sangh, which secured 17.12 per cent of the valid votes polled. The CPI polled only 1.45 per cent of the vote. Independents and a veritable host of minor parties polled approximately 20 per cent of the vote.

The shifts in the structure of the party system had some effect on the support areas of the parties that contested, but the broad patterns of

Table 14: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1971 Census with 1974 Party Vote Shares, Uttar Pradesh, Plains Districts (N = 43)

Size Category ^a	Congress	INC (O)	Independents	BKD(BLD)	Jan Sangh
Less than 1	-.13	.07	-.11	-.05	.07
1 - 2.5	.05	.36*	.06	-.47*	.33*
2.5 - 5	.14	.01	.15	-.09	.04
5 - 7.5	.12	-.15	.12	.12	-.12
7.5 - 10	.11	-.20	.07	.25*	-.23
10 - 12.5	.10	-.24	.04	.31*	-.26*
12.5 - 25	.09	-.25	.01	.35*	-.26*
25 - 50	.07	-.22	.02	.26*	-.15
50 - 75	.08	-.13	.06	.01	.08
75 - 100	.07	-.10	.06	-.08	.17
100 - 125	.08	-.14	.06	-.06	.14
125+	.18	-.18	.24	-.14	.11

* p = .05 or better

^aThe source data were in hectares, but have been converted here to the approximate corresponding categories in acres for the sake of consistency with other data previously presented.

differentiation in the party system in relation to agrarian social structure remained comparable to previous elections. The correlations for the two Congress parties were similar to those for 1969 in the absence of strong associations with any size category, with the sole exception of the positive correlation between the INC(O) vote share and the marginal landholding category of 1 to 2.4 acres (Table 14). The absence of strong correlations, positive or negative, suggests the persistence of some support across all size categories for the Congress without a concentration of support or opposition among any of the size groups. It also suggests, however, that the dominant Congress was losing one of its principal support bases among the marginal landholders in both the 1969 and 1974 elections. In most other respects, the 1974 correlations are consistent with the support bases of the main parties in previous elections. There were no strong correlations between independent vote shares and any of the size categories in the plains districts as a whole, as in 1969. However, there was a strong negative correlation with marginal farmers in the rice districts and with small farmers (Table 15). The Jan Sangh pattern in 1974 also was consistent with previous results in showing strong positive correlations with marginal landholders and strong negative correlations with middle peasant categories, particularly in the wheat districts. The

Table 15: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1971 Census with 1974 Party Vote Shares in Wheat and Rice Districts, Uttar Pradesh

Wheat Districts (N = 22)					
Size Category ^a	Congress	INC (0)	Independents	BKD(BLD)	Jan Sangh
Less than 1	-.16	.11	.16	-.41*	.32
1 - 2.5	-.23	.43*	.21	-.64*	.58*
2.5 - 5	.07	.07	-.07	.19	-.13
5 - 7.5	.15	-.14	-.17	.46*	-.38*
7.5 - 10	.21	-.24	-.24	.57*	-.46*
10 - 12.5	.25	-.32	-.26	.63*	-.51*
12.5 - 25	.27	-.36*	-.24	.64*	-.52*
25 - 50	.28	-.39*	-.13	.60*	-.56*
50 - 75	.29	-.30	.04	.44*	-.58*
75 - 100	.15	-.09	.23	.23	-.50*
100 - 125	.07	-.21	.14	.19	-.38*
125+	-.07	.03	.34	.15	-.30
Rice Districts (N = 22)					
Less than 1	-.10	-.13	-.44*	.38*	-.18
1 - 2.5	.18	.19	.31	-.48*	.19
2.5 - 4.5	.10	.12	.49*	-.44*	.22
5 - 7.5	.02	.10	.43*	-.32	.17
7.5 - 10	.01	.12	.33	-.18	.06
10 - 12.5	.04	.06	.31	-.12	.03
12.5 - 25	.08	.03	.19	-.06	.02
25 - 50	.08	-.07	.15	-.07	.12
50 - 75	.08	-.12	.09	-.10	.21
75 - 100	.06	-.12	.05	-.12	.26
100 - 125	.07	-.17	.03	-.08	.22
125+	.02	-.12	.17	-.14	.24

*p = .05 or better

^aSee footnote a to Table 14.

sharpest pattern once again was that for the BKD, showing a very strong negative correlation with marginal landholders and strong positive correlations across the whole range of middle and rich peasant classes holding between 7.5 and 50 acres of land in the plains districts as a whole. However, the regional break-up for the BKD shows that the pattern was a phenomenon largely of the wheat districts. In the rice districts, the BKD did *not* show strength among the middle peasantry in 1974, despite the general increase in its strength in the predominantly rice-growing eastern districts. In the wheat districts, in contrast, the middle peasant areas were virtually BKD territory,

Table 16: Correlation Coefficients for Size of Landholdings in Acres, 1971 Census, with 1977 Party Vote Shares, Uttar Pradesh Plains Districts

Size Category ^a	All Plains Districts (43)			Plains Wheat Districts (22)			Plains Rice Districts (22)		
	Janata	Congress	Independents	Janata	Congress	Independents	Janata	Congress	Independents
Less than 1	-.22	-.11	.13	-.27	-.20	.30	-.04	-.11	-.05
1 - 2.5	-.23	-.17	.40*	-.39*	-.11	.42*	-.22	-.05	.40*
2.5 - 5	.14	.07	-.03	.17	.16	-.18	-.02	.08	.14
5 - 7.5	.25*	.15	-.20	.30	.18	-.31	.08	.13	-.02
7.5 - 10	.30*	.17	-.27*	.34	.20	-.38*	.13	.15	-.12
10 - 12.5	.32*	.18	-.31*	.38*	.23	-.42*	.16	.17	-.18
12.5 - 25	.34*	.18	-.33*	.39*	.24	-.45*	.25	.17	-.28
25 - 50	.38*	.17	-.34*	.41*	.25	-.46*	.41*	.14	-.36*
50 - 75	.30*	.17	-.29*	.37*	.30	-.43*	.42*	.14	-.35*
75 - 100	.23	.15	-.23	.16	.16	-.14	.40*	.13	-.33
100 - 125	.21	.20	-.25	.03	.33	-.11	.40*	.18	-.37*
125+	.23	.24	-.30	.11	.01	.00	.42*	.10	-.31

*p = .05 or better

^aSee footnote a to Table 14.

with all other parties and independents except the Congress showing negative correlations in areas of middle peasant concentration. Only the Congress was in a position to compete with the BKD for support in such areas, but none of its correlations with the middle peasant categories were at significance levels of .05 or better. Finally, the strong positive correlation between the BKD vote and the smallest landholdings in the rice districts suggests that the previous support of the SSP in smallholder areas in Oudh and the Lower Doab was successfully transferred to the BKD in this election.

C. PARTY SUPPORT BASES AND SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS IN THE 1977 ELECTIONS

Janata. Insofar as UP is concerned, the Janata Party represented a combination principally of the old BKD of Charan Singh, which in 1974 had merged with the SSP to form the BLD, and the Jan Sangh. It has been shown that both these major groups had developed strong support among the peasant proprietor classes in previous elections – the BKD in western UP, especially in 1969, and the Jan Sangh in Oudh. Janata support in relation to the landowning strata of UP in 1977 reflected the earlier bases of support of its principal component parties among the leading proprietary classes. In fact, its support paralleled partially the earlier support base of the first post-Independence agrarian party in the state, the UP Praja Party. The correlation between the Janata vote in 1977 and the UPPP vote in 1952 is .472 ($N = 16, S = .03$). The correlation with the UPPP in the rice-growing districts was an even stronger .746 ($N = 8, S = .02$). Janata support in 1977 also correlated positively with the BKD support in 1974 in the wheat districts at .411 ($N = 22, S = .03$). There were no other strong positive correlations at the district level between the Janata vote in 1977 and the previous support bases of any other of the major political parties in UP, including the Jan Sangh and the SSP. In effect, therefore, the line of political continuity for the Janata Party in UP was with the previous agrarian parties only, the UPPP and the BKD.

Moreover, the support base of the Janata party among the leading proprietary groups in UP closely paralleled that of its principal predecessor, the BKD. In the state as a whole, the strongest positive correlations for Janata with the several landholding size categories were in the entire range from 5 to 75 acres. However, there is some difference in this respect between Janata support in the wheat- and in the rice-growing districts. In the wheat zone, Janata support was strongest in areas where the big peasants are concentrated, those holding from 10 to 75 acres of land. However, in the rice districts, Janata support was greatest in areas where the biggest farmers are concentrated, those with holdings above 25 acres, who are either traditional landlords or capitalist farmers. In neither the wheat nor the rice districts did Janata have support in areas of small-farmer concentration. In fact, in the plains districts taken together, the correlation coefficients with holdings of less than 2.5 acres were negative at $-.22$ and $-.23$ (Table 16).

It is clear, therefore, that although the median vote for the Janata in the wheat and rice districts was practically identical, the support bases of the

party in the two zones were somewhat different. In brief, Janata support in the wheat zone was based principally on the middle and bigger peasantry. In the rice districts, Janata support was greatest in areas where the biggest farms are located.

Congress. As for the Congress, its support bases in 1977 were consistent with its support bases in previous elections. The correlations between the Congress vote and its vote in previous elections were as follows: .664 ($S = .001$) for 1974, .456 ($S = .001$) for 1969, .165 ($S = .145$) for 1967, .476 ($S = .001$) for 1962, .450 ($S = .001$) for 1957, and .294 ($S = .028$) for 1952. The strong relationship between the Congress vote in 1977 and all previous elections, except 1967, argues against attaching any special significance to the 1977 elections in terms of Congress support bases.

With respect to the landholding size groups, there were no strong correlations between the Congress vote share in 1977 and any of the individual size categories, whether in the plains districts as a whole or in the wheat or rice districts treated separately.

Independents. The independent vote once again seemed to suggest the existence of discontents not adequately reflected in support for the main contesting parties, and to reflect the mirror image of support for and opposition to the Congress and Janata. It is, for example, remarkable to note that all correlations but one for Congress and Janata in the plains districts as a whole and in the wheat and rice districts separately were in the same direction, whereas all but three of the independent correlations were in the opposite direction from both Congress and Janata. This pattern suggests, first, that Congress and Janata were competing for support among the same agrarian size groups, and that the independent candidates picked up the support that went to neither of the two main parties. The pattern of strong positive and negative correlations for independents indicates that such candidates drew mostly from the traditional Congress base of support among the marginal landholders, particularly in the wheat districts. This pattern also is consistent with the results of the two previous elections which, as already indicated, showed a loss of support for the Congress among this large group in both 1969 and 1974. The strong negative correlations between the independent vote and those categories of cultivators strongly associated with Janata are consistent with the previously identified pattern of the BKD drawing up the discontent of the middle peasantry that had previously been diffused in support for independent candidates. Clearly, Janata held that support and independents made no inroads into it in 1977. However, strong correlations between the independent vote and the marginal landholders indicate that, despite the widespread discontent with the Emergency regime of the Congress that preceded the 1977 elections, the marginal landholders were reluctant, especially in the wheat-growing, mostly western districts of UP, to give their support to the party associated in UP with Charan Singh, the spokesman of the middle peasantry.

D. THE MIDDLE PEASANTRY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

The foregoing survey of the electoral history of UP in relation to rural social structure and regional imbalances suggests two broad conclusions in relation to the middle peasant sectors. One is that the small and middle peasantry, who control the bulk of the land in the countryside, have played a critical role in the transformation of the party system. The available evidence suggests that the discontent of the middle peasantry developed in the 1950s and intensified in the 1960s. That discontent arose out of frustration both with government policies on prices and procurement and with the fact that control over agricultural patronage in the districts was maintained by Congress supporters among the local landed elites, who naturally favoured themselves and their closest allies in distributing inputs and credit. During the 1950s and 1960s, the middle peasantry lacked a political spokesman with whom they could identify and whom they could trust to promote their interests. Consequently, their discontent was diffused among independent candidates. When Charan Singh broke from the Congress in 1967 and later formed the BKD, that discontent was gathered up and consolidated. It provided the principal base for BKD support in both the 1969 and 1974 elections and for the Janata party in 1977.

The second broad conclusion is that the discontent of the middle peasantry had a strong regional basis in the agriculturally more modernized western wheat-growing districts. Although it was demonstrated above that the BKD-SSP alliance in 1974 and the Janata coalition overcame the regional division between the western and eastern districts, the support bases of the BKD/BLD in 1974 and of the Janata in 1977 appeared to be different. BKD/BLD and Janata did not seem to be so firmly based on the middle peasantry in the rice-growing eastern districts. The BKD/BLD did succeed in capturing some support in 1974 in areas of concentration of marginal landholders, who are far more important numerically in the eastern districts than in the western districts, but Janata did not retain this support in 1977. There remained, therefore, a continuing underlying regional difference in the political geography, as in the agricultural economy, of UP between the more prosperous, more market-dependent, more technologically oriented western wheat- and sugar cane-growing districts and the less prosperous, less market-dependent, less technologically oriented eastern districts, where rainfed paddy grown on smallholdings is the principal crop.

Conclusion

Hobsbawm has argued that 'democratic electoral politics do not work for peasants as a class', who 'tend to be election fodder, except when they demand or inhibit certain specialized political measures' [*Hobsbawm 1973: 19*]. These statements have a bold ring to them, but they are actually vague since Hobsbawm never makes clear his definition of the peasantry or what their class interests are. Linz, in contrast, after surveying patterns of voting

behaviour in the rural areas of several European countries, concludes that European peasants in democratic countries were able to 'articulate and defend their divergent interests' through the party system and that, although 'democratic politics did not always serve rural interests', they 'gave the rural population a voice without forcing it to revolution or sullen apathy, as in most of the world' [Linz 1976: 424]. The evidence from the history of democratic electoral politics in UP supports Linz's point of view. In this Indian state, the system has worked for the peasantry in ways that go beyond blocking or achieving specific 'political measures'. While the system has provided little more than specific ameliorative measures for the rural poor, it has provided an effective vehicle for the articulation of both the interests and the discontent of what P. C. Joshi calls the 'intermediate classes' of former big tenants and medium landlords [Joshi 1974], who in UP are the 5- to 30-acre cultivators.

The post-Independence political and economic system of UP functioned for its first two decades under something of a contradiction. The Zamindari Abolition Act was designed to establish a social and economic order based on peasant proprietorship, but it did not dispossess the former zamindars and talukdars. Moreover, many of the predominant leaders of the Congress in UP came not from peasant classes, but from professional classes, who accepted the Nehru ideology of planned, rapid, large-scale industrialization, with agriculture taking second place. Most also paid lip-service to the goal of establishing a system of cooperative farms in India, though it is difficult to believe that any but a few socialist diehards took this idea seriously. At any rate, the history of electoral politics in UP has been very largely influenced by this dual contradiction between the interests of the peasant proprietors and the interests of the former landlords on the one hand, and between the values associated with a political economy based on small-scale owner-cultivation and the values associated with rapid industrialization on the other. It is this dual contradiction which offers the most satisfactory explanation for the discontent of the peasantry in the 1950s and 1960s and its articulation ultimately through the BKD. The contradictions manifested themselves in political recruitment, in land reform, in economic development policies, and in the party system.

With regard to political recruitment, it is known that in the first three legislatures, MLAs whose fathers were former big and middle zamindars or peasant cultivators comprised a majority of the legislators in the UP legislative assemblies from 1952 to 1962. Many of those legislators whose fathers were cultivators did not themselves continue to practise agriculture, but in fact derived their main source of income from non-agricultural occupations, particularly the professions. Only 24 per cent of MLAs from 1952 to 1962 actually derived their principal income from cultivation.⁴

The available data on the social composition of legislators in the 1967 assembly do not differentiate MLAs with agricultural backgrounds. It is known that only 40 per cent of the Congress members and 54 per cent of the Jan Sangh members gave their occupation as agriculture [Srivastara 1976:

354, 358]. On the whole, therefore, the available evidence indicates that the peasantry have been underrepresented in relation especially to former landlords, big farmers, and professional persons. It was also mentioned above that the middle agricultural castes have been relatively less well represented than persons from elite caste backgrounds. Nevertheless, it is also clear that a considerable proportion of the legislators in UP have come from peasant backgrounds. Moreover, the peasantry in UP have had an effective and articulate spokesman in Charan Singh, who himself belonged to the category of a legislator whose occupation at the time of his entry into politics was the law, but who came from a peasant background. In terms of political leadership and party cadres, therefore, one source of peasant discontent in the 1950s and 1960s may well have been the underrepresentation of peasants in politics, but it cannot be argued that the UP peasantry lacked class representation in the political system.

A second manifestation of both the dual contradiction and the influence of the peasantry in UP was the character of land reforms. The abolition of zamindari, the imposition of land ceilings, and the consolidation of landholdings all benefited principally the middle and large peasant proprietors. Proposals to introduce joint farming in UP, as elsewhere in India, were blocked. Land reform in UP clearly did not eliminate the political and economic influence of the former zamindars. Moreover, land ceilings in the state were placed at a level which permitted the biggest farmers to mechanize their operations. While in some respects, therefore, the interests of the bigger peasants and the capitalist farmers have converged, the evidence from the correlations suggested a divergence in their political identifications, with the biggest farmers identifying with the Congress and the middle and large peasantry identifying with independents, the Jan Sangh, and the BKD.

Third, although economic development policies oriented towards large-scale industrialization and mechanized agriculture, to be financed by extraction of resources from the peasantry, were put forward in UP as elsewhere in India, they have been effectively blocked in UP. Large-scale industrial development has been very limited in UP since Independence, the state government has been unable to tax the peasantry, and economic policies have increasingly been oriented toward providing agricultural inputs to the peasantry. The 'green revolution' has been spreading during the past decade in this state, particularly in the wheat-producing regions. By all accounts, the big farmers have had greater access to and have benefited most from the new inputs associated with the 'green revolution'. Consequently, although the interests of the 5- to 30-acre peasants again converged with those of the big farmers on economic development policies favouring agriculture, they diverged on the question of differential access to the new inputs and on differential ability to make use of them. The BKD, in its opposition to large-scale mechanized farming and its explicit support for an agricultural policy favouring the middle cultivating owners, appealed specifically and with considerable success to the class interest of the self-sufficient and the better-off peasantry.

Finally, the contradictions also found expression in the electoral system in UP. The evidence from the correlation analysis suggests that from 1957 onward the middle peasantry withdrew their support from the ruling Congress. Although the discontent of the peasantry was for a decade partly fragmented, finding expression largely through voting for independent candidates, it was more clearly channelled into support for the Jan Sangh in Oudh and ultimately was expressed in the striking success of the BKD in 1969 and in 1974. Moreover, the electoral support of the peasantry for the BKD brought the party and its leader, Charan Singh, to power. Although no government lasted for long during the turbulent period of coalition politics between 1967 and 1974, Charan Singh and his party were a leading force in the party system throughout this period. During this period, the state government passed a few acts and amendments to existing legislation to assist the peasantry, such as an amendment to the Zamindari Abolition Act that extended the right of transfer of their lands by *sirdars* to enable them to obtain bank loans for agricultural development [*Government of India 1971: 75-6*], and an amendment to the Land Revenue Act to provide cultivators with certified records of their land holdings [*Government of India 1975: 76-7*]. An amendment to the Land Ceilings Act also was passed, permitting the distribution of surplus land on a permanent basis to eligible persons, rather than only to cooperative farming societies, as originally specified in the legislation [*Government of India 1973: 99*]. Parties of the left also took up the cause of the poor peasantry by securing exemption from the land revenue for cultivators holding less than 6.25 acres of land [*Government of India 1975: 76*]. While numerous taxation measures were passed during these years, none increased the taxes or rents of the peasantry and no moves were made to reduce land ceilings. The full impact of the rise to power of the non-Congress parties cannot be seen through legislation, however, for many important decisions that affect agriculturists are taken at the local level in the cooperative credit societies and in the government agencies distributing agricultural inputs. In this respect, it is probable that the non-Congress parties wasted no time in shifting the distribution of resources and benefits to their supporters from the intermediate peasant classes.

The support of the middle peasantry also comprised a central component of the Janata victory in the 1977 state assembly elections, which brought the non-Congress groups to power again after their displacement by the Congress in the period between 1974 and the end of the Emergency in 1977. This second period of non-Congress rule in UP saw an even more vigorous attempt to promote peasant interests and agricultural development. Government policies were oriented virtually exclusively toward rural development, including agriculture, irrigation, rural small-scale cottage industries, construction of link roads, regulation of markets to prevent exploitation of the peasants by middlemen, flood protection schemes, and the like. Most important from the point of view of the peasantry was the UP Government's determination to insure a good return to the cultivators for sugar cane, the leading cash crop in the state. When production was high, the state government compelled the

factories to continue crushing until all the cultivators had disposed of their cane. The state government went so far as to add its own subsidy to the cane price on top of the support prices awarded by the central government.⁵

Far from having been only 'election fodder', therefore, the middle and upper peasantry in UP have played a critical role in the electoral system, have found effective spokesmen for their class interests, and have had their class interests protected. At the same time, the relatively weak representation of the middle peasantry in the Congress of Mrs. Gandhi, the break-up of the Janata coalition, and the return of Mrs. Gandhi to power at the central government in 1980 represent serious potential threats to peasant interests. The danger to the middle peasantry lies in the possibility that Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress will move resolutely to resolve the dual contradiction between agrarian social structure and economic development strategy at their expense, by reverting to policies of rapid large-scale industrialization combined with measures to keep the poor content, such as rural works programs, cheap food, and tolerable wages for the industrial workforce. More drastic measures of agrarian reorganization such as land redistribution or the encouragement of large-scale joint or commercial farming are also possible, if less likely in the short term. Since many of these policies would involve diversion of resources from the rural to the urban sector, lower prices for farm products, and increased hostility between the middle peasantry on the one hand, and the rural poor and the biggest commercial farmers operating through bogus cooperative farms on the other hand, such policies would, without doubt, also be accompanied by widespread violence and the end of the parliamentary system in India. It is more likely, therefore, that Mrs. Gandhi's Congress will strive to divide the middle peasantry by coopting particular leaders, appealing to specific middle caste groups, and adopting economic policies that will ensure that the middle peasantry have access to inputs at reasonable cost and can sell their products at good prices. The adoption of such an accommodative policy toward the peasantry also would be more consistent with the maintenance of a competitive political regime.

NOTES

1. The tables are not, however, presented here because of space considerations.
2. The ordinaly-ranked data are not reported in detail here, but are contained in the data files for this project. For a description of the *kisan* movement in Pratapgarh and the role of the talukdars in district politics there, see Burger [1969: ch. v].
3. This point is demonstrated very clearly also in Kornmesser [1976: 37].
4. The data in the previous paragraph are from Meyer [1969: 91 and 156-60].
5. Interview in Lucknow, July 25, 1979.

N.B. *Erratum*. Page 26, line 16, should read, 'farmers in the rice districts and with two strong positive correlations with small farmers (Table 15). . . .'

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